If he has a body, he experiences time through the changes in his body. Most urgently, increasing thirst, and by the end of five or six days, dying. If he were fed and watered at intervals, he could experience less significant changes: sleep and waking, boredom and terror, beard and fingernails growing, the arrival of food and need to eliminate. That's how you generally mark the passage of time in solitary confinement, hospital or long train rides: mealtimes.
But then walls and a body are something. Even a disembodied consciousness is something. The problem here is not with time - which you're absolutely right has no autonomous existence - but the concept of "nothing". — Vera Mont
But wouldn't he still feel as if time passed? He would be able to estimate how much time passed based on his awareness of his own thoughts, creating an internal clock. His sucessive sequence of thoughts also creates the perception of time. — finarfin
To me, the world created by the mind, and the world created by sense perception are one and the same world. — Metaphysician Undercover
I was not the one proposing the separation between mind produced world and sense produced world. To me, the world created by the mind, and the world created by sense perception are one and the same world. But we need to be aware of the cases where the senses mislead us. And I think your proposal to separate these two is not warranted. So the problem you present here with your question, is just an indication that your proposal is unacceptable. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think that there are regularities to the way things occur in the universe, due to the universe having such regularities biological evolution could and did occur. — wonderer1
None of them provide any content. — Janus
t is a characterization of Kant's philosophy that applies to synthetic philosophies in general. Wherever there is creativity, it is a product of the imagination. — Janus
I have no problem with the imagination being used to try to sort of something empirical—it is when we going beyond the empirical that gets sketchy to me. — Bob Ross
Every valid aspect of science is a prediction about something which could be possibly experienced. Metaphysics is about that which, in principle, can never be. — Bob Ross
Viewing it from a telescope is a form of experiencing it. How do you ‘view’ whether the world is actually made of a physical or mental substance? Or that there actually are Universals, or just particulars? — Bob Ross
Positing hypotheses to try to predict objects within possible experience is not metaphysics. — Bob Ross
All of these (except maybe ‘dialectic logic’, depending on what you mean there) share that pertain to the form of argumentation and not the content. — Bob Ross
Of course! Metaphysics, in the sense that I defined it in the OP, is about ontological things; that is, about that which is beyond the possibility of experience (e.g., Universals vs. particulars, nature of time, nature of space, substances, etc.). Now, all we can ever know empirically is from our experience, so the best we can ever do in terms of explaining the ‘nature’ of things is what is conditioned, right off the bat, by our possible forms of experience (and, not to mention, our means of cognizing the world) (namely space and time) and thusly are only valid constrained to them. Take away your forms of experience, and everyone else’s, and what is intelligible left (with any metaphysical claim you can think of)? Absolutely nothing. — Bob Ross
So if you propose a separation between the perceived world (world created by sensation), and a mind created world, the perceived world is demonstrably less accurate. — Metaphysician Undercover
Agree, the implications of the term 'create' are especially significant in this context. I could have equally called the essay 'the mind-made world', I guess. — Wayfarer
A world. There's a difference. — Wayfarer
A world. There's a difference. — Wayfarer
I'm not sure what you mean by 'extreme idealism', but give these modern editions of Berkeley a squiz. He's surprisingly persuasive. — Wayfarer
Logic supplies no content; it consists in procedural rules. — Janus
Kant's philosophy is the product of logically constrained imagination; that is it consists in imagining the entailments of some basic premises in a logically rigorous, i.e. coherent and consistent, way. — Janus
I say prelinguistic because apparently some animals can do simple counting. — Janus
My definition of metaphysics is that is the study of that which is beyond the possibility of experience, and not that it is a process of using the imagination. For most metaphysicians, they use principles like parsimony, explanatory power, internal/external coherence, (logical) consistency, intuitions, etc. to determine metaphysical theories. — Bob Ross
Logic devoid of empirically verified content is indistinguishable from the imagination. I can make a logically consistent argument for the world being comprised of one giant cookie monster. — Bob Ross
Of course, it attempts to answer questions we humans want to answer, but there is a reason we can’t legitimately: there is no way to ground it in reality, since all we have of reality is our experience of it and the questions metaphysics tries to answer (as a matter of ontology) is beyond that experience. — Bob Ross
But mathematicians are very imaginative people. What they have done goes far beyond what you describe. — jgill
I can't speak for Wayfarer, but as an idealist, my own thoughts on that are idealism inevitably leads to god for just that sort of reason. — RogueAI
That seems to me to prefigure the answer from Austin. — Banno
What is real? And how can you know that for real? — A Realist
Depending on how you define it, yes. In the sense I defined it in the OP, no. — Bob Ross
What say you? — Bob Ross