• Atheism is untenable in the 21st Century
    Does the word "God" - as you are using it in this discussion - represent any physical being or object in the universe?
    ↪EricH     — 3017amen

    ↪EricH
    To answer your question, [several paragraphs of discussion]     — 3017amen

    I read through your response several times just to make sure I wasn't overlooking something, but I am still not seeing a definitive answer to the question. I believe you are answering "No", but I could be mis-understanding you. So please:

    Does the word "God" - as you are using it in this discussion - represent any physical being or object in the universe? Please choose one of the following answers:

    1. Yes
    2. No
  • Atheism is untenable in the 21st Century
    Does the word "God" - as you are using it in this discussion - represent any physical being or object in the universe?
    ↪EricH     — 3017amen

    In a Kierkegaardian sense I conceive God as an ineffable experience. Though if I were to put it into words I would say the Christian God is spirit. And for what it's worth there is some scripture that supports that. And of course the Book of Thomas that was left out of the Bible includes Gnosticism... — 3017amen

    So just to be 100% clear, your answer to my question is "No"?
  • Atheism is untenable in the 21st Century
    ↪3017amen

    A good question. I will re-phrase:

    Does the word "God" - as you are using it in this discussion - represent any physical being or object in the universe?
  • Atheism is untenable in the 21st Century
    Okay good for you. Just don't say: God does not exist. — 3017amen

    I don't say that. I say something along these lines:

    The word "God" does not represent any physical being or object in the universe.

    There are many variations of that sentence which express the same thought.
  • Godel's Incompleteness Theorems vs Justified True Belief
    Strictly a meta-comment here: this discussion is a good example or why I come out to this forum. A great exchange of ideas which leaves me more informed than before. And on top of that, no insults! :smile:
  • Should hate speech be allowed ?
    ↪L Michaud


    Ah - that's better. Also I mis-read the second half of the quote. Thanks for clearing that up for me.
  • Should hate speech be allowed ?
    Noam Chomsky said, saying "I don't mind if the government spy on me cause I have nothing to hide — L Michaud

    I could be wrong but this does not sound like something Chomsky would say. Would you please point me to the source of this quote? Thanks!
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    Now, in plain English, once more, is the argument I made valid? You have said that it is. — Bartricks
    Sigh. I never once said that your argument was valid. But you're engaging in many cross discussions, so perhaps you mixed me up with someone else.

    Here is what I said:
    You appear to be making some basic errors in logic, What you are calling P & Q contain hidden variables and operators. BUT I keep an open mind - it is possible that I am mistaken. However, if you want to convince me that your logic is sound, we will need to unpack your logic — EricH

    Anyway . . . besides myself, multiple people have demonstrated to you from different angles that - while your formula may have the superficial appearance of being correct - when you get into the details it falls apart. It is neither logical nor valid. You can shout it from the rooftops, you can buy a billboard and plaster it across Times Square or Piccadilly Circus (which ever is closer to you), you can repeat the same thing over and over again and insult everyone who disagrees with you, but that is not going to change anything.

    - - - - - - - - - - -

    Now please take what I am about to say as constructive criticism. It is clear from your writing that you're reasonably intelligent and articulate. However, by your own admission:
    I don't know about all this DeMorgan stuff. — Bartricks
    I don't know what a truth table is — Bartricks
    you have made it clear that not only are deeply ignorant of basic Predicate and First Order Logic but that you have no desire to educate yourself. That's a shame.

    This is a highly technical philosophy forum, and the ability to understand Predicate & First Order Logic along with rudimentary set theory are basic skills needed to engage in any philosophical discussion. These are things that a philosophy major would take in their first year of study. If you don't understand these basic building blocks of modern philosophy, then no one here is going to take anything you say seriously.

    If you want to engage with other people on this forum, I recommend that you take some time and learn these skills - there are numerous online resources. If you get that far, you can stop at Modal Logic - that stuff is really hairy. :razz: If you are having trouble understanding some particular concept (e.g. negating an inference), then this forum is an excellent resource; there are many folks out here who will be glad to help.

    And now I give you the last reply (or insult) in this conversation . . .
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    ↪Happenstance
    I don't know about all this DeMorgan stuff. But what you've said seems plainly false.

    Q says "if I value something, [then] necessarily it is morally valuable"

    The negation of Q is not "if I don't value something, necessarily it is not morally valuable". That's not the opposite of Q at all, but Q again.

    The negation of Q is "If I value something, it is not necessarily morally valuable"     — Bartricks

    Your last statement is incorrect. That is not the negation of Q. Statement Q is an inference - it is in the form
    IF C THEN NECESSARILY D
    Notice that I am keeping the word necessarily in here, per your insistance,

    In order to negate an inference (your Q) you need to negate the full inference, not just part of it. This means that
    ~Q = ~(IF C THEN NECESSARILY D)
    In plain language that translates to "It is not the case that if I value something, [then] necessarily it is morally valuable"

    This is very different than "If I value something, it is not necessarily morally valuable". If you set up the truth tables you can verify this for yourself.

    If you do not believe me or otherwise think I'm wrong, please google negating an inference and show me a logical framework that says otherwise.
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    ↪Happenstance

    Thank you for taking this on, you're doing a far better job than I could. I hope this is not too much of a burden on your time.
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    ↪Bartricks

    Let’s take a step back here and review the big picture
    1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable
    2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable
    3. Therefore moral values are not my values.     — Bartricks
    You have been stating that this is logically sound because the sentences map to this logic:
    1. if P then Q
    2. Not Q
    3. Therefore not P     — Bartricks
    However, as many people have demonstrated, this mapping is clearly incomplete since both P & Q have embedded logic. E.g., at an absolute bare minimum we need to start by splitting out P into A = B. In fact it’s a lot more complicated than that.

    On top of that, you are using the word necessarily. Now 6 or 7 days ago,@Happenstance explained that if you are using the word necessarily then you need to use modal logic to represent your sentences in some proper logical form. Here is how @Happenstance converted your sentences into modal logic:

    ∀ = for all, ∃ = there exists a least one.
    Predicate V = value, M = moral.
    Variables x = not y nor z, y = person(implied by I or my), z = something,
    Necessarily = ∆.

    ∀x∃y∃z[
    1. (Vx&Mx→Vy)→ ( ∆(Vyz)→Vx&Mx)
    2. Vyz→¬∆(Vx&Mx)
    3. Vx&Mx→¬Vy
    ]     — Happenstance
    I did a quick run through of this, and while I am far from an expert in these things, it looks sound to me. @Happenstance then demonstrated that this is invalid for various reasons. He then asked you to map your sentences into first order predicate logic.

    Your response was that you were
    not sophisticated enough to do that — Bartricks

    What I am attempting to do here is to do what @Happenstance asked you to do, the only difference is that I am trying to use second order logic. The reason I am using second order logic is because it makes more sense to me to represent your term Moral Values as a set of individual moral values.

    But this still means that we must eliminate the word necessarily - and now we are back to this point. Here is your #1, along with some alternatives:

    A. If I am superman, then if superman goes to the grocery necessarily I go, because I am he.
    B. If I am superman, then if superman goes to the grocery obviously I go, because I am he.
    C. If I am superman, then if superman goes to the grocery then of course I go, because I am he.
    D. If I am superman, then there are no occurrences of superman to go to the grocery but not me, because I am he.
    E. If I am superman, then if superman goes to the grocery I go

    As far as I can tell, these sentences all have the exact same semantics and the same truth value - the word necessarily serves no purpose except to add additional emphasis.

    However, you seem be saying is that you need necessarily, otherwise your #2 is false. I have not even gotten to formulating #2; removing the necessarily from that is a separate task. But there’s no point in doing that if we cannot convert #1 into some formal representation.

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    SO - all that said, you now have a decision to make. Do you want to convince me (and many others) that your logic is valid & sound? If yes, then you need to demonstrate that your sentences can be converted/mapped into some recognized system of formal logic.

    1. You can continue to work with me and see if we can convert your sentences into second order propositional logic. I cannot do this on my own, since some of your terms are not well defined and I need to figure out exactly what you mean.
    2. If you insist that the word necessarily is necessary, then you need to demonstrate that @Happenstance’s reasoning is flawed - of course you would also have to demonstrate a logically sound representation in modal logic.
    3. You can use some other generally recognized system of formal logic.
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    1. If Bartricks Potter is Superman, then if Superman went to the grocery, necessarily Bartricks Potter went to the grocery — Bartricks

    This may seem like a minor point, but I'd like to clear it up before moving on. Why do we need the word necessarily in here? To me, the implication is that if we were to take out the word "necessarily", then there could be some hypothetical situation in which Barticks Potter did not go to the grocery. Clearly that is not the case. If A = B, then A & B identify the same entity/object, and by the basic rules of logic they must have the same properties.

    I.e, removing the word necessarily does not alter the meaning of the proposition, the word is redundant and unnecessary.

    1. If Bartricks Potter is Superman, then if Superman went to the grocery, Bartricks Potter went to the grocery

    Are you OK with removing necessarily? If not, would you please explain.
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    ↪Bartricks

    Those were some clever insults there - nicely done.

    But seriously, I’m a kumbaya kind of person. When I see a someone assert something that looks obviously wrong, my first impulse is to find common ground and/or to try to re-phrase what that person is trying to say in my own words so as to better explain to that person how they are mistaken. I prefer not to start out by being critical, since that puts the other person into a defensive position and it makes it harder to communicate.

    That said, I can see where my approach could be perceived as being disingenuous. So let me start from the beginning.

    You appear to be making some basic errors in logic, What you are calling P & Q contain hidden variables and operators. BUT I keep an open mind - it is possible that I am mistaken.

    However, if you want to convince me that your logic is sound, we will need to unpack your logic. In order to do this I will be asking you a series of questions - some of which may seem really stupid - but I have to ask them in order to make sure that there is no mis-understanding.

    In asking these questions I will be dealing strictly with the underlying logic. Many other folks out here have pointed out that there are some serious semantic issues with your terms, but I will not deal with those. I will be treating your terms as abstract logical variables - so there should be no need to give any real life examples.

    If you are willing to do this, then my first question is this:

    Going back to your #s 1->3:

    1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable (if P, then Q)
    2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable (not Q)
    3. Therefore moral values are not my values (therefore not P)

    We need to start off with the term “moral values”. For purposes of analyzing your logic, this must be defined as a set of individual moral values; let’s call this set Moral_Values.

    Moral_Values = {mv1, mv2, . . .}

    This implies that there is at least one additional set of values that are not moral; let’s call this Not_Moral_Values (for want of a better term). There is then a third set called Values which is the union of Moral_Values and Not_Moral_Values. If, for your purposes, you need to further sub-divide Not_Moral_Values into, say, Un_Values & Miscellaneous_Values, that’s OK, as long as we agree that every moral value is a member of at least one sub-set and that the set Values is the union of the subsets.

    I’m using italics here so the variables stand out, but if you prefer to use a different nomenclature and/or different names for these sets and variables that’s fine.

    Are we in agreement so far? If not, please clarify. BTW - if you want to continue insulting me? That’s fine too.
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    ↪Bartricks

    I come to this forum to learn new things and to understand how I can integrate philosophical thinking into my life. Most of the people on this forum are far more knowledgeable about philosophy than I - and I have benefited from following and occasionally interacting with them.

    When I first read your OP it seemed incoherent to me, but it looked like there were some interesting ideas in there. I said to myself that maybe I was simply not understanding what you were saying - or perhaps you were not expressing yourself clearly.

    So I have been making a good faith effort to understand what you are saying - in particular I have been trying to get some clarity re how you are defining your terms.

    I have not been trolling you.

    I respectfully suggest that if you cannot communicate your ideas to a reasonably smart person who is making a good faith effort to understand you, then you should re-consider your situation.
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    ↪Bartricks


    There are things that I value. That is a set of things.. Call that set my_Values. I asked you for some examples of things that are in this set. I'm still not clear on exactly what you mean by this, but I believe you gave me one example: "The person I love."

    Next there are things that are morally valuable. That is a set of things. Call that set moral_Values. I asked you for some examples of things that are in this set. I believe you gave me a longer list here:

    you are morally valuable, I am morally valuable, character traits, such as kindness, generosity, honesty- these are morally valuable (usually). Happiness is often morally valuable — Bartricks

    What I am asking you is very simple. If you were to draw a Venn Diagram of these two sets of things, would they be disjoint, would they overlap somewhat (some items are in both sets, some are only in one or the other), or would they be identical?

    Just do be clear, we are only talking about your P from #1.
    1. If moral values are my values, then Q — Bartricks
    We are not talking about Q or #2 or #3.
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    ↪Bartricks


    So if I'm following you, then the way you are defining these, the intersection between the set of things that I value and the set of things that are morally valuable is the null set. Am I getting this correctly?
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    ↪Bartricks


    I'm sorry but I'm still not following this. Right now I'm still stuck on your P from #1

    1. If my values are moral values, then . . . . — Bartricks

    I still don't know what this means. If you could give me some specific examples of things that you would consider to be "my values" and things that you would consider "moral values" that would be a big help to my understanding you - it would help me to get a handle on what you're saying.
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    I am not sure I understand your question. None of our values - that is no valuing of ours, no valuing activity that we may be engaged in - are moral values. That's what the argument established. What we sometimes call 'a person's moral values' are just what we think that person takes to be morally valuable. — Bartricks

    So I don't understand you and you don't understand my question. Seems like we are having some trouble communicating :smile:

    Let me try another approach - let's go back to your statement #1, and take just the first part (what you are calling P):

    1. If my values are moral values, then . . . . — Bartricks

    What do you mean when you use the terms my values vs the term moral values? My assumption (which could be wrong) is that both of these terms identify sets of statements / assertions / propositions (which ever term best works for you).

    So - just for example - I could loosely define the set my_Values like this:

    my_Values = {"Ice cream is good", "Murder is wrong", "Chairs without cushions are better than chairs with cushions", etc etc etc}

    Now you just said that none of my values are moral values. So how do we define the set moral_Values?
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    1. If my values are moral values, then if I value eating ice cream then necessarily it is morally valuable for me to eat ice cream. — Bartricks

    Is it possible for me to have some values that are not moral values? I.e., are there different types or categories of values?
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    I'm still not getting this. Let's just stick to #1.

    #1. If I value eating ice cream, then necessarily eating ice cream is morally valuable — Bartricks

    As far as I can tell, this statement ( assertion / proposition / whatever-you-want-to-call-it) is clearly false.

    1. if P then Q
    2. Not Q
    3. Therefore not P     — Bartricks

    #3 is only true iff both #1 & #2 are true. Since #1 is clearly false, we cannot determine the truth value of #3.

    But maybe I'm still missing something. Can you please clarify?
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    ↪Isaac

    That's what I was thinking, but I'd like to hear what @Bartricks has to say. I will keep an open mind on this.
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    I'm coming rather late into this conversation, but please help this bear of little brain. I'm trying to follow this and I can't make sense of it.
    1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable (if P, then Q)
    2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable (not Q)
    3. Therefore moral values are not my values (therefore not P)

    That argument is valid and sound. You can run it again with yourself mentioned in premise 1 and 2 rather than me and it will remain valid and sound.     — Bartricks

    Staring with #1, I value eating ice cream (in moderation) - but I think we would all agree that eating ice cream is not morally valuable. What am I missing here?
  • Would only an evil god blame his own creations for the taint therein -- of his poor craftsmanship?
    Whether or not God is good has no impact on whether or not he exists. — T Clark

    inconsistencies in different parts of the bible — T Clark

    You are correct that whether or not God is good has no impact on whether or not he exists.

    However, as far as I know, God's goodness is a core tenet of most versions of Christianity,

    By pointing out that the God depicted in the Old & new Testaments commits horribly cruel acts, Hitchens was simply highlighting one of the most glaring inconsistencies in standard Christian version of God.
  • Should hate speech be allowed ?
    "The world we need is one in where people don't believe anything just because someone said it, don't automatically follow anyone's orders just because someone gave them, etc. " — Terrapin Station

    I could be wrong (a regular occurrence) but I think most of us here would agree that such a world would be preferable to the world we currently live in - a world in which most people do believe things just because someone said it and in which most people will automatically follow orders when given by a person or persons in authority.

    Is this world even possible given human nature and the history of mankind? I'm highly doubtful, but let's assume that it's possible. Now it becomes a question of methods - how do we achieve this lofty goal that we all agree on?

    What I think Echamion and others are saying is that - again given human nature and the history of mankind - allowing all hate speech will increase the odds that that authoritarian regimes will arise - exactly the opposite result that we all desire.
  • Objective Morality vs Subjective Morality
    ↪Janus

    I believe that Terrapin & I are using the word "fact" as it functions in the context of the Correspondence theory of truth. I do not pretend to be an expert in these matters, but as I understand it, in Correspondence Theory the word "fact" is synonymous with "state of affairs", "existence", "reality", etc. Statements/propositions are true or false in so far as they accurately describe facts.

    So definition #5
    Philosophy) philosophy a proposition that may be either true or false, as contrasted with an evaluative statement — Janus
    is wrong - at least in this context. True propositions describe facts ((wikipedia uses the term structural isomorphism), but the word "fact" and the word "proposition" have very different definitions.

    ↪Terrapin Station
    Terrapin, please correct me if I have misrepresented your position.
  • Objective Morality vs Subjective Morality
    ↪Terrapin Station


    OK. I understand what you're saying - we're on the same page there. I just find the wording a bit confusing. Maybe it's just me, but I find this a bit clearer - if a bit more wordy

    Factual claim = a claim about a possible fact.
  • Objective Morality vs Subjective Morality
    "Eels don't reproduce. They spontaneously generate from the mud." That's a claim about a fact. It's asserting something about what the world is like, how the world works. It's wrong, of course, but that's irrelevant. It's a claim about facts. — Terrapin Station

    I'm not following you on this one. Are you saying that facts can be false?
  • How Do You Do Science Without Free Will?
    How Do You Do Knitting Without Free Will?

    1. The ability to make choices is a necessary condition for choosing what garment to knit.
    2. Choosing which garment to knit next is a necessary condition for knitting.
    3. Without free will there is no ability to make choices.
    4. Without the ability to make choices, choosing which garment to knit next is impossible.
    5. If choosing which garment to knit next is impossible, knitting is impossible.
    6. There is no free will.
    7. Therefore, knitting is impossible.
  • Objective Morality vs Subjective Morality
    The Needs of the Many Outweigh the Needs of the One

    The Needs of the One Outweigh the Needs of the Many

    Even the writers of Star Trek can't make up their minds :smile:
  • Is Cooperation the Best Strategy for Alien Civs?
    ↪RogueAI

    I don't have any opinion one way or the other, but you might want to check this alternative approach: Dark Forest Theory
  • Can we assign truth values to statements in ethics.
    Please no replies; I've nothing more to add — tim wood

    If you feel you have nothing more to say, that's OK. But to request that no one replies? I don't think that is in the spirit of this forum. Just say "I give you the last word". I have done this.

    Unless they're on a jury - or in almost any other position in which the quality of their moral compass and moral thinking matters. — tim wood

    I would not serve on a jury if there was any chance that the death penalty could be applied.
  • Can we assign truth values to statements in ethics.
    That murder is wrong is trivially assumed by everyone, I think - almost everyone. At issue here is whether the non-cognitivist view is nonsense. I think it is. — tim wood

    Given that "murder is wrong is trivially assumed by everyone", does it make any practical difference in the real world if the reasons for a person thinking that murder is wrong are based in a strong sense of personal morality - i.e. if they are non-cognitivists? I think not.
  • Can we assign truth values to statements in ethics.
    ↪Wittgenstein


    Since non-cognitivism is a species of irrealism about ethics, it should be unsurprising that many of its main motivations overlap with those for other versions of ethical irrealism

    So non-cognitivism is a variation on a yet more generic framework? Dang, I missed that one - and that was the first sentence! :smile:

    I did a quick search and ran into a different article in the same online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entitled "Moral Anti-Realism". I tried plowing through this, but got bogged down in a ticket of jargon and terminologies. In fact, even the author (or authors) of this article humorously acknowledge the difficulty in defining/characterizing the different philosophical positions.

    Anyway - I appreciate your efforts to explain the various beasts in this menagerie of philosophical positions. I will try to absorb some of this, but it will be very slow going.
  • Can we assign truth values to statements in ethics.
    I have a question for you. Is murder wrong? — tim wood

    Long post coming up, bear with me . . .

    This discussion began with a reference to an entry in the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entitled "Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism". The OP asked for opinions on this article.

    I tried reading this and have to confess that I could not get through it - it was too dense and jargon laden for me. However, the summary at the top of the article is reasonably clear and I believe I get the gist of things.

    Basically the article is a survey of contemporary philosophical schools of thought regarding statements about morality. The author groups these schools of thought into two large categories - Moral Cognitivism vs. Moral Non-Cognitivism. There are also many sub-categories.

    Based on the opening summary, you seem to be on the side of Moral Cognitivism and in particular you seem to be a moral realist. Per the article, "... moral realists are cognitivists insofar as they think moral statements are apt for robust truth and falsity and that many of them are in fact true."
    I.e., I believe you would assert that the statement "Murder is wrong" is a true statement. Please correct me if I am mis-representing you.

    Terrapin, on the other hand, falls into the Non-cognitivist camp. Again, per the article, "non-cognitivists think that moral statements have no substantial truth conditions".

    So asking the question "Is murder wrong, yes or no?" cannot possibly be a starting point for discussion since this statement assumes that Moral Cognitivism is correct. To continue this thought, even if a person were to answer this "No" - that too is a statement that only a Moral Cognitivist would make - albeit one that you would disagree with. I.e., by asserting that "Murder is OK" a person is asserting a truth value about a moral statement and (at the risk of repeating myself) non-cognitivists think that moral statements have no substantial truth conditions.

    Putting it another way, the question "Is murder wrong, yes or no?" is *not* a simple question since there is a hidden assumption behind the question - namely that the question must be answered within the context of Moral Cognitivism.

    So it is pointless to continue asking Terrapin the same question over and over since Terrapin is of the opinion that the question itself is wrong. Now could Terrapin find a way to answer you more clearly and respectfully? Perhaps - I wish both of you would be more respectful to each other; the name calling is distracting and does not contribute to the discussion. I do disagree with you that Terrapin is a troll, he may be arrogant, he may be totally wrong, but I am not seeing any trolling.

    Oh - and I also disagree with Terrapin that you are a troll. :wink:

    Perhaps you have already done so - in which case I apologize for the implication - but I respectfully suggest that you read the full article from the OP. I do not follow all the discussions, but there seem to be some interesting objections to Non-Cognitivism in sections 4 & 5. I could be wrong (it happens on a regular basis) but if you want to poke holes in Terrapin's Non-cognitivist position? That seems like a more fruitful approach.
  • Bias against philosophy in scientific circles/forums
    ↪T Clark
    Thanks for the compliment - I do have a scientific background. I mostly just lurk - it's fun reading some of these discussions, but it takes a lot of my very limited time to write a post that gets the point across with as few words as possible.
  • Bias against philosophy in scientific circles/forums
    The dark matter hypothesis doesn't successfully match all the data, there are plenty of problems with it, — leo

    Agree - as would every scientist who is working in this area.

    How much work has been done on a model, and how easy it is to with the model with observations through fine-tuning, are two variables that have to be taken into account when we compare different models. — leo

    How much work has been done on a model is irrelevant. If person A spends 10 years working on a hypothesis and person B spends 10 minutes, the only thing that matters is which hypothesis better fits the data.

    For instance it's easy to come up with a model that successfully matches all the data while having a bunch of degrees of freedom. — leo

    Well dang it man! If it's easy, then why are you posting here? Go come up with that better model. Fame & fortune will be your reward! :smile:

    But kidding aside, it sounds to me that your gripe is that the dark matter hypothesis has been over-hyped, and that more work/attention should be paid to the alternative models. That may be the case. It may be that dark matter will turn out to be analogous to the Copernican model - and that some brilliant person (or persons) will come up with a new model that neatly explains all the data. That would be very cool indeed!

    OR - it may be the case that dark matter is the correct explanation and we just didn't fully understand it.
  • Bias against philosophy in scientific circles/forums
    Galactic rotation curves that are observed do not match the ones predicted by theory. Either it's because there is invisible matter, or because the theory is flawed. The discrepancy between observation and theory is not a detection of invisible matter, because we don't know that the theory is not flawed. I can't make it simpler than that. — leo

    I have studied the subject for years, — leo

    Given that you have studied the subject for years, you are certainly aware that numerous hypotheses have been proposed to explain the discrepancy, and that most of these involve changes/enhancements to the existing theories of gravitation. However, every alternative hypothesis - at least up to now - has made predictions which are not matched by the data.

    Currently, dark matter is the hypothesis which best matches the data, but it is still only a hypothesis - it is not established theory. If you could present an alternative explanation that successfully matches all the data and does not involve hypothetical invisible particles, you would go down in history along with Einstein.

    You have my blessings to go for it!
  • Are science and religion compatible?
    In the case of the creation account in Genesis, about the only people who believe it is literally true are called young-earth creationists. They believe that the earth was miraculously created a few thousand years ago and that the science of radio-carbon dating and everything of the kind is wrong.

    Very few people believe that,     — Wayfarer

    While the number of people who believe in biblical inerrancy is slowly diminishing, that number is still quite large - and these people have significant influence on American (and global) politics.
    https://news.gallup.com/poll/210704/record-few-americans-believe-bible-literal-word-god.aspx
  • Are you a genius? Try solving this difficult Logic / Critical Reasoning problem
    ↪Alexis Schaffer

    You might want to work on your punctuation. I glanced at this sentence and it read like this:

    "No! People are not dinosaurs."

    :smile: :grin: :razz: :razz:
  • Atheism versus Agnostism
    These may have some relevance to the conversation:

    Ignosticism
    Theological Noncognitivism
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