Per what you're saying above, I can't subjectively compare "not okay to rape others" and "okay to rape others," But I don't know why. It seems like it would be easy to compare them, especially since I already have a view about it, that view being "It's not okay to rape others." When I consider "It's okay to rape others" I reject that, because I don't agree with it. — Terrapin Station

go ahead and make the argument please - tell me why my subjective judgment that rape is not immoral.

What you're saying is illogical. I don't need to go outside of myself for any reason, and I cannot do so anyway. My own judgement is all I have, and all I need. He is wrong in this way - the only way that matters as far as I'm concerned. He should change his judgement. — S

What is your argument than to person b who has a different subjective judgement that he is incorrect, other than - "in my opinion" any other argument you chose must be adding a degree of objectivity.

and as an aside - i am not championing any morality over another on this point -
my argument is just pointing to what i think is a logic flaw.

If all judgments are subjective - than all judgments are subjectively correct - I see no way around this

The part in bold is the problem. Who has committed to an absolute sense of correctness? Is the relativist a relativist, or an absolutist?

If the relativist is a relativist, which he obviously is, then there is no internal contradiction, and your criticism is therefore ineffective. Both are correct in way which does not violate the law of noncontradiction. — S

subjectively you are both right, if you do not allow some level of objectivity into the judgment you can not compare them, other than saying they are different

Right. Its a form of question begging, I think. The hidden premise is {we must defer to what is objective when we make demands on the actions of others}. So then the argument goes "objectively there are no rules, therefore you cannotaask anyone to abide by a rule. But take away the hidden premise and the argument fails. — Isaac

that is exactly what I am saying - don't see how that begs the question

If I may. They only must admit that the other's subjective judgement is correct for them (the other person — Isaac

agree

it is still incorrect for the person thinking about it and so still requires action to remediate (or not, depending on the degree). — Isaac

fine - but must now give up the the believe that all moral judgments are subjective. Because now you are comparing subjective judgement - how can it be possible to compare them subjectively - that is impossible - they must be compared in measure of objectivity.

The realisation that one cannot make objective ones preferences, does not prevent one from acting to further them — Isaac

no issue - but all such arguments must be prefaced with " from my perspective" any other argument is some measure of objectivity

I thought that pointing out the logical error seemed appropriate. Must I construct a logical argument for you as well? What would I need you for in that case? The way I see it, it's on you to put forward an argument for whatever it is that you're claiming, and I will then analyse it and inform you of any problems I detect, and then we can either work on them or you can just close it down as you sometimes do when it gets a bit too much for you. — S

this is the issue i am struggling with - happy to be schooled on my errors -

If morality is completely subjective to the individual, than it is equally subjective for all other individuals as well.

for any action - X

person A - makes a subjective moral judgement that X is moral
person B - makes a subjective moral judgement that X is immoral

They are both subjectively right in their individual judgments.
So both must admit the others subjective judgement is correct or

give up the position that all moral judgments are subjective.

Indeed, it is not hard to grasp. Anyone familiar enough with common objections to moral relativism will recognise this. And it is easily refuted. You're making the illogical argument that if you're a moral relativist, then you must be an amoralist. I pointed that out ages out. Sorry, but you're not doing fine. You're still not getting it. — S

Thanks, I’ll do a few hours of research today. It would have been easier if you just directly pointed to the lack of logic. Understand how demeaning it might make you feel to engage the point directly to such an ignorant person as myself. I will crawl back down the mountain master S.

whether it is my inability to state it clearly or your lack of understanding it correctly- but that reply has nothing at all to do with the point I was trying to make.

agree

Let's look at this part first.

So, first off, "I prefer pizza to horseradish" is a value judgment. Comparing and preferring one thing to another is making a judgment about them, and it has a valuation included--"I like A more than B" is valuing A more than B. — Terrapin Station

Which both bob and joe can make individually relative to how they individually feel. They just can't make any value judgments on what anyone else values and still believe in relative food judgments

This point I am trying to communicate is not that hard to grasp. lf you want to have relative morality for yourself, you have to allow relative morality for others.

I can't see how such a thing as that is possible.

Look at it this way, with something that's less controversially a matter of preferences:

Say that Joe prefers the taste of pizza to the taste of horseradish.

Bob, though, prefers horseradish to pizza.

Is Joe going to say, "From my perspective, Bob's preference is just as good as mine"?

Wouldn't that imply that Joe doesn't actually have a preference between pizza and horseradish? If one preference is just as good to Joe as another from his perspective, then he shouldn't have a preference in the first place. This is pretty wrapped up in how preferences work/what they are. — Terrapin Station

Sorry the delay - real life got in the way

What I would say is joe has no right to make any kind of value judgment about bob preference at all and still hold that he believes in relative food judgements. The minute joe utters any qualitative word at all about joe's relative preference- it is no longer relative. Because all value judgments imply against some standard, and if you are applying them against a standard they are now objective.

Joe can say nothing at all to bob about his presence other than OK.

ok - can you try it one more time in a complete though ?

how can one relative judgement be better than another relative judgment - by definition they are equal - they can only be unequal if there is some objective criteria they can be evaluated against - and then they are not relative anymore.

we are talking past each other - i don't feel you understand the point I am making - I am very sure that is my fault - but I am out of ways to explain it

can't play these word games with you. I have restated the concept like 4 times to you - i can't do it any better sorry - I am out of other ways to say it

Okay, subjectively two competing stances aren't on equal ground, are they? — Terrapin Station

I think competing stances between moral relativists are on completely equal ground - by definition

i have no issue with that at all - but the relative art critic must accept relative judgment of other relative art critics

Indeed you're not understanding me. Your framework here is that we have to defer to what's objectively the case. Objectively, the stances are on equal ground. You see that as being a trump card of sorts — Terrapin Station

no i am only dealing with relative morality - the whole point is how a moral relativist interacts with a moral view different than his own. Nothing in this case is objective - objective reality in this example does not exist.

no issue with that - if as equal moral relativists we accept each others relative moral judgments. If that is what you are saying.

Why not? Again, the idea of that only makes sense if you think we must defer to objectivity. You're focusing on the fact that objectively, both stances are on equal ground.

But subjectivists aren't advocating a deferral to objectivity. Objectivity with respect to morality is irrelevant. It's a category error.

Subjectively, both stances aren't on equal ground, are they? — Terrapin Station

no - we are not understanding each other - my point has nothing at all with objective morality at all - you are assuming something I am not saying.

I want to quote a passage from one of the most notorious radical relativist philosophers, Jacques Derrida. Here he is defending deconstruction against charges that it denies the possibility of determining truth in any sense. What he is trying to say here is that while any ultimate, universal, god-given grounding of truth, moral or otherwise, is not possible, within specific contexts, one must be able to make such moral determinations. That is , ,one must be able to choose from among "all the possible relative moral views of others" those which are on the 'right tack' and those that arent. — Joshs

So where is the line between "any ultimate, universal, god-given grounding of truth, moral or otherwise, is not possible," and "within specific contexts, one must be able to make such moral determinations. That is , ,one must be able to choose from among "all the possible relative moral views of others" those which are on the 'right tack' and those that are not." and who is to judge?

you can't have your cake and eat it too. to me there is some continuum between relative and objective morality - and we all place ourselves somewhere on that continuum. Even Mr Derrida is hedging in his quote - seems to him morality is relative unless it is not - and he knows when that is.

running out of language here

To Moral relativist A - action X is immoral
To Moral relativist B - action X is moral

If morality is relative to the individual they should ( pick a word you like accept, respect, not judge, fill in your own word) the relative moral judgement of each other. If they do not, than their adherence to moral relativity ( as poorly as I seem to understand it) seems questionable.

In my mind, i am not arguing about the merits of one moral philosophy over another - which is what I think you are doing above. No issue with that at all. I am arguing about particular judgement made inside a philosophy of some type of moral relativism.

My point continues to be you cant have your relative moral view, without allowing all the possible relative moral views of others and still be a moral relativist.

I understand i am way out on my element on this topic - so I am learning here more than arguing, and trying to explain this logic log jam i have in my head on this point.

I am not sure it is even consistent for a moral relativist to have any view on the moral view of others, other than " I am not them -how can i judge their view" any view other than that seems to me to be an argument for some level of objective morality from a professed moral relativist.

Have no difficulty with a view of moral relativity where each person feels the stance is morally right and the other stance is not. My point is i don't think you can be a moral relativist and tell me my stance is incorrect nor should you have any desire to have me see it your way. If one is a moral relativist it seems to me that entails an inherent acceptance of the moral views of others. @s seems to disagree.

I hold no believe I have any expertise on this and could be all wet - but i can't see how you can be a moral relativist without an acceptance of the relative morality of others.

Ok - and I then can have the same view back at you. That you are then equally wrong and different, and I am of course right about that relative to me.

So than do you tell me - that my moral judgement is wrong? Or different ?

so if you are a moral relativist, and I am a moral relativist, can we both have different moral judgments on some action, and agree the other judgement is correct for the other person ? Or do believe your relative morality is right, and my relative morality is wrong ?

You thought wrong. — S

certainly not the last time that will happen -

Why shouldn't we care? That's how morality is, and yet we do care. We care because we live as part of a society, and our respective moral views matter socially — S

The issue I was pointing to is not that the moral relativist shouldn't care, but why would he comment. My understanding of moral relativism would be something like this " that action is different than my moral belief, oh well, guess his is different ". I thought moral relativity encompasses an acceptance of the moral positions of others. So what would be the moral relativists standing - in passing a moral judgement on others be ? In that case he is no longer a moral relativist, he just thinks his moral view is right. That is not my understanding of moral relativism -

Aside - that is the most times I have ever used "moral relativist" in one paragraph in my whole life.

I think i see your point - What i was asking was - If Tim Wood's point was IF you are a moral relativist ( either a meta or normative one), then how can you have any basis to question the moral judgments of others. If that was the claim - i see the conclusion as following - and not a non sequitur.

That's a non sequitur. — S

If point was, why should we care about the opinion about morality - from a moral relativist, if he him/herself's core belief is the position only applies to them - than I don't see it as a non sequitur.

Thanks enjoyed the review, and will look into the book. Agree of course.

I think the popular atheism in the article is a somewhat real product of a more thoughtful atheism of the 1930 - 1950's. Which I think has its roots in the horrors of mechanized, chemical, and nuclear war of the same period - not to mention an attempted elimination of an entire race. In the face of such horror - a questioning of God seems quite appropriate. What I find interesting though, was this horror was the application of science by man - technology. Yet there seemed little discussion in this time frame for a more responsible use of science. But what these thinkers did try to address is, if not God, than why do we exist, what is our purpose.

The more "commercial atheists" Dawkins et al - who to me seemed more intent on selling atheism in their books and commercial appearances than any significant in depth philosophy of the subject. And it need to be said there sale was much easier with the rise of an equally un-thoughtful evangelical fundamental Christianity, used by some for their own power and money. These atheists has an easy fight - and a winning strategy - you use a poor definition of God ( IMO they all are by the way), that is completely based on faith - and show it does not pass a test of reason. Basically showing that faith and reason are different. duh. They all but ignore the question of if not God - what, generally falling into some form of hedonism - also great timing in the mid 60's for that.

Now what they did do well was establish a narrative, by comparing their erudite sophisticated selves to the crude fundamental Christians that smart people were atheists and dumb people were not. I think this narrative has had more to do with a rise in popular atheism than anything else.

IMO there is a large gap between popular atheism and popular theism, the gap is much smaller between thoughtful atheism and theism.

NOW GET OFF OF MY LAWN !!!!

not sure it was you point, but people believe things all the time without empirical proof - sometimes despite empirical proof

We believe the guy driving the other car will stop at the light
We believe our spouse will love us forever
We believe the airplane is well made and well maintained
and on and on

and while we may have good reason to believe such things, there is also some pretty good empirical evidence that they are not always true. Yet we believe them anyway.

The base debate at the creation of the US was the role/power of the the Central government in relation to the power of the individual states. The creation of the electoral college was in relation to this. The less populated states feared that the heavily populated states could dominate a popular election and thereby impose undo power on the less populated states. The electoral college was a way to mitigate that imbalance.

A post from yesterday on a different thread.

IMO the application of science - Technology - is driven by inherently human drives - mostly power and money - but occasionally and to a lesser degree - altruism. Technology, as the application of science, can not escape the human condition with all the good and bad that that entails.

no worries -

agree - but can you reconcile your answer above, with the point you made to ?

By saying this:

Your mistake is confusing physical scale for our position on a scale of knowledge

It seems you have made some assumption of where we are on such a scale. Your posts 2 posts appear in opposition to me.

Your mistake is confusing physical scale for our position on a scale of knowledge. — TogetherTurtle

What is your reasonable argument that you can have any idea at all where we as human beings stand on such a thing as a scale of knowledge - with zero knowledge on one end - and all the possible knowledge on the other ? Seems an unsupportable statement to me.