I think the reason S said it was a non sequitur was the conflation of normative with meta ethics. The opinion of a subjective relativist about what is' right' in some moral question may be of no consequence, but that doesn't mean their opinion with regards to meta-ethics is. Meta-ethical positions are argued by reference to shared standards like logic and reason. Normative ethical positions are argued from a position of shared values (although all too often, not even that, making such discussions hopelessly pointless).

To say that a relativist speaking of a variety of value positions must therefore also speak from an equally heterogeneous position with regards to logic and reason is the non sequitur. — Isaac

Bingo.

You thought wrong. — S

certainly not the last time that will happen -

You thought wrong.
— S

certainly not the last time that will happen - — Rank Amateur

What you were describing is amoralism. Moral relativism is not amoralism. Tim wood was making the same mistake. Like I said, these are common misunderstandings.

I don't really understand S's position. He says he's a moral relativist. The trouble with relativism is that it ultimately destroys its own ground. But S doesn't like "destruction" or the like, as loaded language. — tim wood

No, that's the trouble with a poor way of thinking about moral relativism.

And he seems unaware that Kant answered moral relativism for all time with his categorical imperative. — tim wood

:rofl:

Kant's categorical imperative is a joke.

Apparently some things are and some things are not relative. I begin to wonder if S even knows what "relative" means. What, S, is an example of something that is not relative - I assume that for you all moral judgments are relative.

Or perhaps by "relative" you mean only that everything is referenced (I..e., "relative") - indexed to - to something else. If that is all you mean, then agreed; but then everything is relative, not just some things. — tim wood

What I think about everything else is entirely irrelevant in the context of this discussion. This discussion is about morality, and regarding that, I am a moral relativist. Relativism, more broadly, is a red herring.

so if you are a moral relativist, and I am a moral relativist, can we both have different moral judgments on some action, and agree the other judgement is correct for the other person ? Or do believe your relative morality is right, and my relative morality is wrong ?

So if you are a moral relativist, and I am a moral relativist, can we both have different moral judgements on some action, and agree the other judgement is correct for the other person? Or do you believe that your relative morality is right, and my relative morality is wrong? — Rank Amateur

Both. Just don't misinterpret the latter. Think about it how I would think about it, as a moral relativist would think about it, that is. I can help you out if need be, but I'm interested in what you can come up with on your own.

So than do you tell me - that my moral judgement is wrong? Or different ?

So then do you tell me that my moral judgement is wrong? Or different? — Rank Amateur

It's both.

Ok - and I then can have the same view back at you. That you are then equally wrong and different, and I am of course right about that relative to me.

"What I think about everything else is entirely irrelevant in the context of this discussion. This discussion is about morality, and regarding that, I am a moral relativist. Relativism, more broadly, is a red herring."
If you were to say that you believe the history of scientific or technological understanding is a linear progression it would be difficult to deny that such a view would color what moral relativism means to you. It would certain distinguish your notion of moral relativism from that of someone who thought that scientific history is a relativistic genealogy rather than a progressive teleology.

so if you are a moral relativist, and I am a moral relativist, can we both have different moral judgments on some action, and agree the other judgement is correct for the other person ? — Rank Amateur

On my view, by the way, "correct" is a category error there. We can say that each person feels their stance is morally right.

You're going to feel that a contradictory stance is morally wrong, of course.

This is just another way to say that each person has the preferences re interpersonal behavior that they do, and they don't prefer other preferences regarding interpersonal behavior than their own.

I thought moral relativity encompasses an acceptance of the moral positions of others. — Rank Amateur

The subjectivist brand of relativism doesn't imply this, at least.

The problem understanding this usually stems from difficulties parsing the issue so that we do not defer to objectivity.

When you frame things so that we have to, or so that we should defer to objectivity, then either (a) there's an objective fact that people can get correct or incorrect, or (b) there is no objective fact, and since we have to defer to objectivity, we thus simply can't pass any sort of judgment at all.

But that's not how subjectivists look at it. We can and do pass judgments--we're just passing subjective judgments. At the same time we're not saying that others' moral stances are incorrect--because as I noted that's a category error.

Subjectively, we're going to have likes/dislike, preferences, etc., and that in no way implies that we're going to be okay with others likes/dislikes or preferences, especially when we're talking about preferences of interpersonal behavior, which is what morality is. When we're talking about preferences of interpersonal behavior, those preferences don't just effect the bearer--they're about what someone wants to allow other people to do, too.

Have no difficulty with a view of moral relativity where each person feels the stance is morally right and the other stance is not. My point is i don't think you can be a moral relativist and tell me my stance is incorrect nor should you have any desire to have me see it your way. If one is a moral relativist it seems to me that entails an inherent acceptance of the moral views of others. @s seems to disagree.

I hold no believe I have any expertise on this and could be all wet - but i can't see how you can be a moral relativist without an acceptance of the relative morality of others.

I am not sure it is even consistent for a moral relativist to have any view on the moral view of others, other than " I am not them -how can i judge their view" any view other than that seems to me to be an argument for some level of objective morality from a professed moral relativist.

My point is i don't think you can be a moral relativist and tell me my stance is incorrect nor should you have any desire to have me see it your way. — Rank Amateur

I just added some stuff to my post that's pertinent to this.

Again, since morality is preferences of interpersonal behavior, our preferences do not wind up only being our own business and that's it. By their very nature, moral stances are about what we are okay or not okay with other people doing. Obviously people are going to try to have an influence on that, especially since these preferences wind up codified into laws, they impact persons' abilities to do various social things, etc.

We're not deferring to what's objectively the case (where everyone's stance is on equal footing), beacuse that's irrelevant for morality. The arbiter is our own preferences.

In a discussion with a moral or subjective relativist, always first determine what exactly is relative to what.

I mean...the keyword here is, after all....relative.

Every notable philosopher, whether relatlvist , realist or platonist, has a position that they believe is original in some way, and in some sense superioir or preferable to competing positions (more clarifying, truer, more primordial, more comprehensive). If that philosopjher begins from a thinking of radical relativism (Nietzsche, Derrida, Fouccault, Heidegger) they would not want to justify distinguishing ways of thinking in terms of 'correctness', but they would be able to distinguish them on the basis of constricted vs expanded awareness, or lesser vs greater potentiality of transformation of meaning. So a morality applies to relativistic philosophy, but a different sort than that of traditional judgements of correctness, truth or falsity.

In my mind, i am not arguing about the merits of one moral philosophy over another - which is what I think you are doing above. No issue with that at all. I am arguing about particular judgement made inside a philosophy of some type of moral relativism.

My point continues to be you cant have your relative moral view, without allowing all the possible relative moral views of others and still be a moral relativist.

I understand i am way out on my element on this topic - so I am learning here more than arguing, and trying to explain this logic log jam i have in my head on this point.

"You cant have your relative moral view, without allowing all the possible relative moral views of others and still be a moral relativist."

I want to quote a passage from one of the most notorious radical relativist philosophers, Jacques Derrida. Here he is defending deconstruction against charges that it denies the possibility of determining truth in any sense. What he is trying to say here is that while any ultimate, universal, god-given grounding of truth, moral or otherwise, is not possible, within specific contexts, one must be able to make such moral determinations. That is , ,one must be able to choose from among "all the possible relative moral views of others" those which are on the 'right tack' and those that arent.

I see his view here as consonant with other moral relativistic philosophers that i have read.
.
"For of course there is a "right track" [une 'bonne voie "] ,
a better way, and let it be said in passing how surprised I have often been, how
amused or discouraged, depending on my humor, by the use or abuse of the
following argument: Since the deconstructionist (which is to say, isn't it, the skeptic-
relativist-nihilist!) is supposed not to believe in truth, stability, or the unity of
meaning, in intention or "meaning-to-say, " how can he demand of us that we
read him with pertinence, precision, rigor? How can he demand that his own text
be interpreted correctly? How can he accuse anyone else of having misunderstood,
simplified, deformed it, etc.? In other words, how can he discuss, and
discuss the reading of what he writes? The answer is simple enough: this definition
of the deconstructionist is false (that's right: false, not true) and feeble; it
supposes a bad (that's right: bad, not good) and feeble reading of numerous
texts, first of all mine, which therefore must finally be read or reread. Then perhaps
it will be understood that the value of truth (and all those values associated
with it) is never contested or destroyed in my writings, but only reinscribed in
more powerful, larger, more stratified contexts. And that within interpretive contexts
(that is, within relations of force that are always differential-for example,
socio-political-institutional-but even beyond these determinations) that are relatively
stable, sometimes apparently almost unshakeable, it should be possible to
invoke rules of competence, criteria of discussion and of consensus, good faith,
lucidity, rigor, criticism, and pedagogy." Derrida, Limited, Inc.

My point continues to be you cant have your relative moral view, without allowing all the possible relative moral views of others and still be a moral relativist. — Rank Amateur

Relativism or not, in what sense does anyone not "allow" others to have whatever moral views they have?

I'm not sure I know what sort of thing you're referring to there.

running out of language here

To Moral relativist A - action X is immoral
To Moral relativist B - action X is moral

If morality is relative to the individual they should ( pick a word you like accept, respect, not judge, fill in your own word) the relative moral judgement of each other. If they do not, than their adherence to moral relativity ( as poorly as I seem to understand it) seems questionable.

:cool:

I want to quote a passage from one of the most notorious radical relativist philosophers, Jacques Derrida. Here he is defending deconstruction against charges that it denies the possibility of determining truth in any sense. What he is trying to say here is that while any ultimate, universal, god-given grounding of truth, moral or otherwise, is not possible, within specific contexts, one must be able to make such moral determinations. That is , ,one must be able to choose from among "all the possible relative moral views of others" those which are on the 'right tack' and those that arent. — Joshs

So where is the line between "any ultimate, universal, god-given grounding of truth, moral or otherwise, is not possible," and "within specific contexts, one must be able to make such moral determinations. That is , ,one must be able to choose from among "all the possible relative moral views of others" those which are on the 'right tack' and those that are not." and who is to judge?

you can't have your cake and eat it too. to me there is some continuum between relative and objective morality - and we all place ourselves somewhere on that continuum. Even Mr Derrida is hedging in his quote - seems to him morality is relative unless it is not - and he knows when that is.

If morality is relative to the individual they should ( pick a word you like accept, respect, not judge, fill in your own word) the relative moral judgement of each other. — Rank Amateur

Why not? Again, the idea of that only makes sense if you think we must defer to objectivity. You're focusing on the fact that objectively, both stances are on equal ground.

But subjectivists aren't advocating deference to objectivity. Objectivity with respect to morality is irrelevant. It's a category error.

Subjectively, both stances aren't on equal ground, are they?

Ok - and I then can have the same view back at you. That you are then equally wrong and different, and I am of course right about that relative to me. — Rank Amateur

What's your point? That is indeed how it works and how we think. You think you're right and I'm wrong, I think I'm right and you're wrong. To you, you're right and I'm wrong, and I accept that to you, you're right and I'm wrong. To me, it is otherwise.

As soon as you demonstrate that morality is anything other than subjective and relative, I will concede. Good luck with that.

Why not? Again, the idea of that only makes sense if you think we must defer to objectivity. You're focusing on the fact that objectively, both stances are on equal ground.

But subjectivists aren't advocating a deferral to objectivity. Objectivity with respect to morality is irrelevant. It's a category error.

Subjectively, both stances aren't on equal ground, are they? — Terrapin Station

no - we are not understanding each other - my point has nothing at all with objective morality at all - you are assuming something I am not saying.

no issue with that - if as equal moral relativists we accept each others relative moral judgments. If that is what you are saying.

no - we are not understanding each other - my point has nothing at all with objective morality at all - — Rank Amateur

Indeed you're not understanding me. Your framework here is that we have to defer to what's objectively the case. Objectively, the stances are on equal ground. You see that as being a trump card of sorts.

But subjectively, the stances aren't on equal ground, are they? (That's not a rhetorical question. I'm hoping you'll answer it.)

I think the point is that morality is more of an art than a science. Think about the arts; there are real differences in quality between different works, some really are better than others, and yet everyone has their own tastes, and no universal agreement about the relative quality of works is possible to any high degree of precision.

The other thing is that people are more or less deficient in moral feeling; and it really is feeling, not rules, that is key when it comes to morals, just as it is with the arts.

Indeed you're not understanding me. Your framework here is that we have to defer to what's objectively the case. Objectively, the stances are on equal ground. You see that as being a trump card of sorts — Terrapin Station

no i am only dealing with relative morality - the whole point is how a moral relativist interacts with a moral view different than his own. Nothing in this case is objective - objective reality in this example does not exist.

no i am only dealing with relative morality - the whole point is how a moral relativist interacts with a moral view different than his own. Nothing in this case is objective - objective reality in this example does not exist. — Rank Amateur

Okay, subjectively two competing stances aren't on equal ground, are they?