The essay seems to have weight even beyond this seeming fatal flaw - that's why I'll read it. But if this is Don Marquis, then what was the other article? — tim wood

Ah yes, I remember how it is. You want me to do all the work. I've already provided the criticism.[/

Ok I will do some work, let's do this one at a time. Please answer directly, do you agree or not, and if not why.
— S

P1. There exist such things as Theists – defined as human beings who believe in some form of supernatural being or entity - for this argument we will label as “God” — Rank Amateur

I don't accept it as true, no. Why wouldn't whether or not some form of supernatural being or entity be a factual matter whereby the scientific method is relevant and applicable? — S

I don't need a method to know I have a headache. — Banno

And I stand by my criticism as a whole. That was just a part. Resolving one part doesn't get you out of the water. — S

So in other words, the idea is that given that you're okay saying it's a fact that there's no x on an absence of evidence of it even when the idea of an x is coherent (for example, the Easter bunny), it's even stronger to say that there's no x on an absence of evidence when the idea of the x isn't coherent (as with gods). — Terrapin Station

.and theism isn’t so defined anywhere in the list of premises — Mww

I’m a serious reductionist. For me, defining what a “fact” is, even to qualify its limits, doesn’t say anything about the altogether tentative nature of human knowledge which are also generally the same limits placed on the “facts”. Something is needed to prevent falsification of the premise because it lacks the conditions of time. — Mww

But with the Easter bunny notion, that's not even incoherent. There's just no evidence for it. So it doesn't seem consistent for you to not say that it's not a fact, there's just no empirical evidence for it--until there is. — Terrapin Station

Sure. So you wouldn't say that it's a fact that there's no easter bunny, for example? — Terrapin Station

I already responded to this. Do you withhold judgment on everything conceivable that there's no empirical evidence for, no matter how crazy the idea is? — Terrapin Station

I’m suggesting it cannot be expected that one formal instance of understanding transfers unequivocably to separated propositions. In this case, the proposition constructed with a compounded subject and its predicate is an analytic true statement, whereas the separated propositions both require a formal synthesis in order to even be possibly true. Thus, the same understanding cannot justify all three at the same time. — Mww

I’m saying you threw a metaphysical monkey wrench into an otherwise respectable dialectic by forcing a co-conversant to argue from an irrational position. — Mww

Right. So one reason that we know that it's a fact that there is no god is that there's no empirical evidence at all that there is a god. Now, you'd say that's not a reason, it's simply a "declarative statement without support."

So that means it doesn't meet some criterion you have for a sentence, Q, to count as a reason for or to count as support of another sentence, P. We need to figure out what your criteria are. — Terrapin Station

That would imply that you have criteria for what counts as reasons. — Terrapin Station

Right--I can't imagine why you'd not say that in response to anything I'd say, because I have no idea what your criteria are to count as support rather than counting as a declarative statement without support. — Terrapin Station

But then I explained that facts are not something "elevated." Facts are states of affairs, and the state of affairs that's apparent in the world is that there is no God. — Terrapin Station

What would be the requirements for me supporting a declarative statement I'm making? — Terrapin Station

What are the criteria for support in your view? — Terrapin Station