Read your citation more closely
we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause ... We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other.
— Hume — tim wood

I understand what Hume is saying. I'm simply pointing out that he's wrong. We have discovered the power behind the transfer of kinetic energy, we do know the connection between decapitation and death. Let's see you take one of my examples and argue that we are not observing cause and effect. Are you telling me that when people watch an execution by decapitation that they are NOT seeing cause and effect? Are you saying that removing the head from the body doesn't cause death?

Also modern physics actually agree with Hume that causes and effects or Causality don't really exist at a fundamental level, things move according to a pattern, no causes and effects are necessary. Here's a vid where this is explained clearly and briefly: — ChatteringMonkey

The words "fundamental level" refer to quantum scales. Hume was not aware of quantum mechanics so don't try to force him to take a position he never took. In the video you linked, Sean Carroll admits that causes and effects are known on the classical scale.

And a final point, on could argue that even though on an everyday basis Newton's law of gravity holds as an accurate mathematical description, his picture of gravity is fundamentally wrong. There's no 'force of gravity' or "masses attracting eachother"... gravity is the curvature of space. — ChatteringMonkey

You are correct to a point. Newton did discover the law of gravity and he described it using an inverse square law and assigned the symbol g for his equations. Newton did not assign a cause for gravity, he simply described it as a centripetal force without being able to assign a cause for the attraction. Einstein came with a deeper and more precise theory which explained the cause of the attraction as the warping of the spacetime continuum. But Einstein still retained Newton's g in his equations and g retained the same value that Newton gave it. Someday we may have a deeper theory still which will explain why massive objects warp the fabric of spacetime. When we discover it, we will not make fun of Einstein because he didn't know the cause. And we don't mock Newton because he didn't know spacetime was warped. Einstein stood on the shoulders of Newton. The point of this thread is that Hume is attacking Newton's law of cause and effect. This is not something Einstein did or would have done.

Can anyone prove that after if 20 people die from a poison, everyone after that will? — Gregory

It is not the poison that is toxic, but the quantity. Yes, it is possible to know that everyone who takes a certain quantity of a given poison will die. The way we know this is due to physical necessity.

Yet it would be very weird to claim that a flame is caused by fuel, a window is caused by there not being a brick in the same space, and a person being alive because their head is attached to their body. — Echarmion

Yes, that would be weird and not what I'm doing at all. It is a logical fallacy to think that because separating a head from a living body would cause it to die that sewing the head back on would cause the body to come back to life. The weirdness of the idea isn't really relevant to the fact that physical necessity is present in these cases of cause and effect that I mention.

The crucial thing you seem to be missing is that the only justification we have for claiming that one state causes the other is that, to us, the states appear to follow each other in time. What you call physical necessity - the laws of physics, all depend on causation as an axiom. Therefore, they cannot prove causation. — Echarmion

False. Cause and effect are directly observable. I've given a number of examples. You have not attempted to refute the examples and so I am under the impression that you agree that cause and effect are directly observable in these cases. From the fact that we can observe cause and effect, we then inquire into the physical necessity that produces the effect. I've already named the physical necessities at work in my examples. Again, you have not attempted to refute these examples of physical necessity and so I am under the impression you agree that a physical necessity exists in each example. From the existence of physical necessity, we can then posit the existence of physical laws. The physical laws then allow us to make inductive inferences regarding future natural events. This allows us to plan for and control our environments, engineering bridges and skyscrapers and build smart phones. If Hume was right and cause and effect was only mental, then we would not be living in a technologically advanced society and we would be communicating using quill pens.

Causation and necessity are metaphysical concepts, and that is all they are. — tim wood

I can agree that you can think of causation and necessity as metaphysical concepts, but they have value because they accurately describe the real world that is external to our minds. I have given several examples of causation being observed: a flame consumes the match, a brick shatters a window, a decapitation causes death. I've explained that causation exists and is observable in these situations because of the physical necessity. A flame must have fuel to burn, two solid objects cannot pass through each other, to be alive a person must have their head attached to their body. These examples are simple, observable and undeniable.

Causation can become more difficult in complex or chaotic system. For example, in medicine it is often difficult to know what caused a particular disease state. While we know that correlation is not causation, doctors will often treat patients as if it is because it provides the best possible guess.

I'm not really arguing these complex situations. Rather, I'm refuting Hume who tried to say that we could not see simple cause and effect such as one billiard ball causing another to move. Hume's claim is ridiculous on its face. It is an embarrassment to philosophy that Hume is considered a great philosopher.

To account for the movement of two billiard balls - as his representing example - he could detect no third thing or quality to explain or mediate their movement. And I'm thinking that his observation holds today. That is, no third thing or quality. — tim wood

Hume says it is just our habit of seeing these two events happen close to each other that we begin to think that one causes the other. Hume thinks this connection arises in our minds due to our imagination. It is not our imagination. There is a third thing or quality which explains how one ball causes the other to move. It is the transfer of kinetic energy. Whenever you see an object in motion, you are looking at kinetic energy. When you see one ball strike another and the second ball begins to move, there is at least a partial transfer of kinetic energy. Cause and effect is easily observable.

By the way, I'm not the first person to point this out. Ducasse wrote a paper on it in 1930. See Ducasse, C. J. "Of the spurious mystery in causal connections." The Philosophical Review 39.4 (1930): 398-403.

Sir Isaac Newton published his work about the laws of motion in 1687. The concept of Law of Cause and Effect was introduced in the 19th century with the advent of Spiritism. — http://sirwilliam.org/en/the-law-cause-effect-reaction/

It sounds like the Spiritism movement is trying to re-define Newton's Law of Cause and Effect. Newton's third law of motion was given that name long before the arrival of the spiritists. The reason is clear. Let me give you a quote from Newton that introduces his laws of motion. Newton writes:

The causes by which true and relative motions are distinguished, one from the other, are the forces impressed upon bodies to generate motion. True motion is neither generated nor altered, but by some force impressed upon the body moved; but relative motion may be generated or altered without any force impressed on the body. For it is sufficient only to impress some force on other bodies with which the former is compared, that by their giving way, the relation may be changed, in which the relative rest or motion of this other body did consist. P16

...how from the motions, either true or apparent, we may come to the knowledge of their causes and effects, shall be explained more at large in the following tract. For to this end it was that I composed it. P18

End Quote

I love when authors tell us why they wrote a particular piece. Here Newton tells us that he wrote the next portion of Book I to explain how we can learn causes and effects by studying the motions of bodies. This is the reason philosophers began to call the third law Newton's Law of Cause and Effect in the late 17th and early 18th centuries.

To me this was one theory early on in learning philosophy as a dilettante, validated me for myself as a real philosopher. — god must be atheist

Don't take this wrong, but you are a very odd person.

What's that, then? — Banno

In the Principia, Newton tells us how we can learn causes and effects by studying the motions of
bodies. After discussing motions, he then demonstrates the existence of several laws. The Third Law of Motion is also known as Newton's Law of Cause and Effect. It discusses the transfer of kinetic energy such as when one billiard ball strikes another and causes it to move. Newton's doesn't use the term "transfer of kinetic energy" because that term began to be used only in the mid-1800s. But the concept was known and understood since Newton. I will give you a few notes from the Principia.

Begin quotes
Axioms, or Laws of Motion
Law I
Every body perseveres in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed thereon. P19

Projectiles persevere in their motions, so far as they are not retarded by the resistance of the air, or impelled downward by the force of gravity… The greater bodies of the planets and comets, meeting with less resistance in more free spaces, preserve their motions both progressive and circular for a much longer time. P19

Law II
The alteration of motion is ever proportional to the motive force impressed; and is made in the direction of the right line in which that force is impressed.

If any force generates a motion, a double force will generate double the motion, a triple force triple the motion, whether that force be impressed altogether and at once, or gradually and successively. P19

Law III
To every action there is always opposed an equal action: or the mutual actions of two bodies upon each other are always equal, and directed to contrary parts. P19

Whatever draws or presses another is as much drawn or pressed by that other. If you press a stone with your finger, the finger is also pressed by the stone.

If a body impinge upon another, and by its force change the motion of the other, that body also (because of the equality of the mutual pressure) will undergo an equal change, in its own motion, towards the contrary part. The changes in these actions are equal, not in the velocities but in the motion of bodies; that is to say, if the bodies are not hindered by any other impediments. P20

End Quote

Note: Here Newton is discussing the transfer of kinetic energy, although he does not refer to it by that name. Specifically, Newton is saying when a transfer of kinetic energy happens, the motion of both bodies are changed by that impact. The impact itself (the impinging) is the cause of the observed effect.

Remember that Hume never completed his coursework on natural philosophy. He never read Galileo, Kepler, Huygens, etc. and so he did not have a good foundation to understand Newton when he read the Principia. Hume did not understand why natural philosophers consider the quantity of matter and the quantity of motion to be primary qualities of objects and the color and smell to be secondary qualities. I will point out the color and smell become important in chemistry, but they are not important in physics.

Hume also wrote: "The instance of motion, which is commonly made use of to show after what manner perception depends, as an action, upon its substance, rather confounds than instructs us. Motion to all appearance induces no real or essential change on the body, but only varies its relation to other objects." T.1.4.5. Location 3592 in Kindle

Hume admits that he is confounded by motion. He read Newton but did not understand him. Hume disagreed with Newton, but he did so out of ignorance.

To say we observe cause and effect is false. — Gregory

No, Hume is wrong. When we watch a match burn, we are seeing cause and effect. The flame is the cause of the match being consumed. We understand the physical necessity of a flame needing fuel for the fire. When we watch a brick shatter a window, we are seeing cause and effect. No solid objects cannot pass through each other. We understand the physical necessity of the glass breaking so the brick can pass through. There are thousands of everyday examples like these. In Hume's day, he could have watched an executioner chop off a prisoner head. The blade separated the head from the body and the person died. This is cause and effect. We know a body cannot live when the head is separated. We understand the physical necessity.

So are you developing your paper in a philosophy department? — Wayfarer

No, usually at home or a Starbucks. I'm not an academic.

So why do you think David Hume rates as a philosopher? Why do you think Emmanuel Kant regarded it as such a serious challenge? — Wayfarer

Interesting question. Kant's biggest mistake as a philosopher was taking Hume seriously. By attempting to refute Hume and doing a poor job of it, Kant really did a disservice to philosophy. But then the earlier refutations by Reid, Beattie and Priestley were not great either.

A thorough refutation could have been given by some of the really good Newtonian natural philosophers. For example, Willem s'Gravesande could have done one before he passed in 1742 but Newtonians simply didn't care to waste time refuting skeptics. They would rather be about the work.

No. simple causation is directly observed. In the case of simple causes, they exist in the form of physical necessity which we can understand, predict and control. The laws exist because of this physical necessity. Hume never graduated from university and never completed a course in natural philosophy. If he had, he would not have made these simple mistakes.

Still, his theory is disturbing because whatever he says, of course we all believe in gravity and we really think one ball causes the other to roll even though that is not strictly observable. Luckily, Kant saves our obvious belief with a nice twist. He agrees with Hume that causation is not observable, but he places it in us as a pre-existing, pre-programmed category and thereby secures its reality. Causation really exists, not in itself, but as a necessity in us. — Congau

You understand Hume and Kant correctly. Of course, they are both spouting nonsense. Causation is clearly observable. Physical necessity exists.

Hume has something stronger in mind. It isn't just that laws of cause and effect aren't observable, but rather that there are no laws of cause and effect. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Your description of Hume's view is correct. This is a frontal attack on Newton and his Law of Cause and Effect. And, of course, Newton is right and Hume is wrong.

For exmaple, if there occurs a state of a ball which floats up when released, our insistence the ball must fall down by a law of gravity has no power at all. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I wish you could hear yourself.

Interesting topic as it specifically relates to Hume. A quick question arises, though, are you suggesting that on principle, Newtonian physics is acceptable in this day & age (independently of whether Hume’s causal objection impugned it or not)? — aRealidealist

No. I'm not saying anything close to that. I would be willing to say that Newtonian physics are a huge improvement over Cartesian physics and cosmology. Newtonian physics have been made more precise by Einstein's theory, but Einstein's equations still require Newton's g for gravitational constant and the value remains the same.

Regardless, I agree that Hume’s causal objection is objectionable (even if, not for the same reason or reasons), although only to an extent; so, nonetheless, I personally still accept Hume’s argument in regards to the relation between sensible things or objects of experience, but, I don’t accept it when comes to the relation between sensible & sentient things (& as all sensible things or objects of experience cannot be, in truth, taken as sentient, the reality of the distinction between sensible & sentient things is admitted [which leads me to my partial rejection of Hume’s objection]). — aRealidealist

And why would you accept it between objects?

I don’t quite remember, but didn’t physicists have to change or at least clarify a part Newton’s theory to refute Hume’s argument? — NOS4A2

I don't know what you are referring to here.

Can you give a reference for this? Three points: 1) I doubt he argued precisely in these terms, 2) if you're saying he said, then probably you should be able to provide references, 3) in general, references to underpin discussion are good — tim wood

You asked for some references. I will give you a few quotes. The billiard ball illustration was actually one he returned to several times.

In the Treatise Hume writes:
Having thus discovered or supposed the two relations of contiguity and succession to be essential to causes and effects, I find I am stopped short, and can proceed no further in considering any single instance of cause and effect. Motion in one body is regarded upon impulse as the cause of motion in another. When we consider these objects with utmost attention, we find only that the one body approaches the other; and that the motion of it precedes that of the other, but without any, sensible interval. It is in vain to rack ourselves with farther thought and reflection upon this subject. We can go no farther in considering this particular instance. T.1.3.2

Should any one leave this instance, and pretend to define a cause, by saying it is something productive of another, it is evident he would say nothing. For what does he mean by production? Can he give any definition of it, that will not be the same with that of causation? If he can; I desire it may be produced. If he cannot; he here runs in a circle, and gives a synonymous term instead of a definition. T.1.3.2

In the first Enquiry, Hume writes:
The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the accurate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it. Motion in the second Billiard-ball is a quite distinct event from the motion in the first; nor is there anything in the one to suggest the smallest hint of the other. Section 25

When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects: Consequently, there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, any thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion. Section 50

The first time a man saw the communication of motion by impulse, as by the shock of two billiard balls, he could not pronounce that the one event was connected: but only that it was conjoined with the other. After he has observed several instances of this nature, he pronounces them to be connected. What alteration has happened to give rise to this new idea of connexion? Nothing but that he now feels these events to be connected in his imagination, and can readily foretell the existence of one from the appearance of the other. Section 59

Cause and effect itself is observable all day every day. — tim wood

I'm glad you agree with me.

OK. So he is difficult to categorize. Yet this directly contradicts your stance throughout this thread that the proper way to categorize Hume is obvious. I get the sense that this too will be ignored by you. But I find it very significant. — javra

I say he is difficult to categorize, not in the sense that it is difficult for me, but in the sense that different philosophers put him in different categories. There is no agreement about the right category. Kant sees him as a skeptical idealist. Buckle sees him as a skeptical materialist. I see him as both even though most philosophers think the two categories are mutually exclusive. Many other people put him in entirely different categories. The most errant category of them all is British Empiricist. The great British Empiricists are Bacon, Boyle, Locke and Newton. Hume is nothing like them.

Antinomies are not logical contradictions; they're two or more conclusions that are each equally well justified yet appear to contradict each other. To me, Hume's greatest antimony, so to speak, is his justification that free will and determinism not only coexist but require each other. But this doesn't make him contradictory to himself, i.e. self-contradictory, this makes him a compatibilist. — javra

Hume certainly is a compatibilist. But he is so about things when they truly are mutually exclusive.

Likewise, he was neither an obvious idealist nor an obvious materialist. With both SEP and Wikipedia as references, Hume is commonly considered a neutral monist. This conclusion is not devoid of criticism, but it is what most subscribe to. In this light there are no contradictions in his philosophical works as regards idealism and materialism. — javra

Neutral monism is not a view that Hume ever used for himself as the term was coined only after he died. Hume certainly did embrace skepticism.

I can't grasp why it is that you're so certain of what was going on in Hume's head. Especially when you characterize him as someone who is difficult to categorize. — javra

Hume says that his philosophy in the Treatise and in his first Enquiry are the same, that the manner is different but not the matter. Some people read the Treatise and try to interpret the Enquiry to fit the Treatise. Others read the Enquiry and try to interpret the Treatise fit the Enquiry. For me, the key is found in the Treatise 1.4.7. This is the passage in which Hume talks about his doubts about his own philosophy and then claims the answer is to "doubt your doubts" and "not think" about the contradictions and difficulties. That is the approach Hume takes in the Enquiry. He is following his own advice. He never discusses his doubts or how his philosophy is unlivable. As a result, the Enquiry appears to be less skeptical than the Treatise. And then Hume throws his "tincture of Pyrrhonism" in Section 119. It all fits. Now the Treatise and Enquiry can be said to have the same philosophy even though EHU reads like it is much less skeptical than THM. That's why I'm certain of how to interpret Hume. My interpretation fits both his words and what he wrote about his philosophy.

If you haven't read the Treatise Book 1, you will never understand Hume. You must pay special attention to 1.1.1., 1.1.2, 1.4.2 and 1.4.7.

Hume is actively taking a metaphysical position that physical necessity is impossible on the grounds the world is distinct from our concepts. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Can you provide a quote where Hume says that?

Since Hume was a skeptical materialist (when he wasn't being a skeptical idealist) I very much doubt that Hume would be so dogmatic as to say either that physical necessity is impossible or that the world is distinct from our concepts.

Hume is rejecting these natural philosophers because they put our ideas above how the world behaves. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Hume is not rejecting the natural philosophers, he is ignorant of them. He only read Newton and he doesn't understand him.

But that's the assumption: that all battleships will work like this, such that any which don't float have some kind of problem explicable in these rules. Hume's point is we might encounter a battleship which fails to behave as stated in our laws. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I know that is what Hume thinks. That's why he is a bad philosopher. It is impossible for a battleship to behave contrary to the law of floatation. How do I know this? Because we understand the concept of physical necessity. Hume did not understand this because he did not read the natural philosophers.

Rather, it is our concept of necessary behaviour is being stated in the wrong terms. We can know, with certainty, but only when we grasp how a given individual state behaviour. We cannot substitute out the existence of a state with our concepts and laws. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I don't understand what you are trying to say here. It is the last sentence that baffles me. What do you mean exactly? Why would you think that?

The assumption is unscientific. If we apply the stipulation battleship will necessarily float, we place our own concepts about the battleship over how any given battleship behaves. — TheWillowOfDarkness

The issue here isn't that I'm claiming that every battleship will always float, but that we know how to make battleships float. Unerringly. We know. If a particular battleship doesn't float, we can investigate what went wrong and then we will know that too. There is no guesswork here. This is engineering based on science, not science fiction or imagination. Why pretend we don't know things with certainty when we obviously do?

But the problem is this move from 'battleships have floated' to 'battleships will float.' — joshua

No. It isn't that "battleships will float" as if battleships suddenly appear out of the blue, but we know how to make battleships float because we discovered the law of floatation. Why pretend that we don't know the things we know with certainty? What makes you think there is any value to humanity in that?

In particular, the uniformities observed in the past will hold for the present and future as well. Hume’s query in Inquiry IV/ii is whether our belief in this principle is founded on reason or not. — paper

The paper you quoted is describing Hume's thought, but it isn't defending Hume's thought. At least the portion quoted is not defending Hume. Hume thinks it is not possible to demonstrate the uniformity of nature "because there is no contradiction in the thought that nature does not continue uniformly the same." But just because there is no contradiction doesn't mean that it cannot be demonstrated in another way. I'm explaining to you how the uniformity of nature can be demonstrated and it relates to what we call "the laws of nature." We understand the physical necessity of these laws, such as the law of floatation. Once you understand the physical necessity behind the laws, then you understand why it is necessary and why it can be called a law of nature and why it isn't one way one time and a different way the next. Hume never understood the physical necessity because he never studied the natural philosophers like Galileo, Kepler, Boyle and Huygens. If he had, and if he wasn't committed to his skeptical idealism, then he might have understood Newton.

The problem as I see it is that Hume is a bad philosopher. None of his original thoughts are true or beneficial. The problem is that philosophy has followed Hume into this dark place where it is at odds with science. I believe in the unity of reality. That is, science and philosophy are both inquiring into the nature of reality, the same reality. Philosophy has a role to play just as science has a role to play. But philosophy has badly misplayed its role. Now there is tension between science and philosophy. This is the fault of philosophy, not science. Philosophy should be helping science think clearly about the standards of science, about the meaning of scientific discoveries, about new things science can investigate, about how to make life better for the greatest number of people. Philosophy has a very important role but it has become more of a hindrance to science than a help right now. Philosophy will not progress out of its current state of darkness until Hume is seen as entirely refuted.

That we all 'project' necessary connection or physical necessity is not in dispute. Our minds seem built to do just that. The point is that this is so automatic that even understanding the problem of induction is difficult. It's not only conceptually difficult (but it's too 'close' to us), but it's also difficult in terms of motivation. — joshua

I'm not missing the point at all. My second paper contra Hume will discuss in detail the fact we can observe cause and effect and that we can know causation is from physical necessity. But I will not be the first person to write such a paper. See
Ducasse, Curt J. "On the nature and the observability of the causal relation." The Journal of Philosophy 23.3 (1926): 57-68.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2014377.pdf?casa_token=ggnTBa3vcIIAAAAA:_IfujdK5d1dYpLjVfdeywH3iR_YU1zbOojcAT1JfUhOHiW_wG4MT2A1RUGGrWBVL03l28UlejQOVPjSEmfXNBkmWlcS3LM3ph4LbVbpq71j1teiXlw

In my guts I believe in the 'laws' of nature, even though I can see that such 'laws' are merely 'irrational' expectations. — joshua

No, they are not irrational. Not believing in the laws of nature is irrational. Consider for example the law of floatation. The law of floatation explains why a big metal battleship floats and a needle sinks. Because we understand the law, we can engineer battleships. If the law was not real, and was only a matter of our imagination as Hume says, then we could not reliably engineer battleships to float.
See https://www.reference.com/science/law-flotation-863f4c00172608f

Can you provide any reference to Hume being a "skeptical idealist"? Or else one that critiques Hume as "doubting the existence of an external world"? Fallible though I am, these complaints seem idiosyncratic. — javra

I will be happy to give you some things to read. First, Hume is difficult to interpret which makes him difficult to categorize. This is due in part to Hume's self-contradictory statements, called antinomies, in the philosophy literature.

Hume's Antinomies by Manfred Kuehn
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/389183/pdf

In an Introduction to Hume's writings, Selby-Bigge writes:

“Hume’s philosophic writings are to be read with great caution. His pages, especially those in the Treatise, are so full of matter, he says so many different things in so many different ways and different connexions, and with so much indifference to what he said before, that it is very hard to say positively that he taught, or did not teach, this or that particular doctrine…. This makes it easy to find all philosophies in Hume, or, by setting up one statement against another, none at all.” - L. A. Selby-Bigge, Introduction to the Enquiries, p. viii. (2nd ed., 1902).

So Hume is harder to categorize than most philosophers. What I have said in this thread is that Hume is primarily a skeptical idealist in the Treatise, although he also wrote some comments that qualify as skeptical materialist in the same book. I have characterized Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding as primarily skeptical materialist although Section 119 is clearly skeptical idealism.

I use the term "skeptical idealism" because I think it fits. The link below is by G.J. Mattey, a philosopher from UC Davis. He clearly views to Hume as skeptical idealist. He writes:

The various forms of idealism and realism are based on two other sets of opposing high-level concepts:
* dogmatic/skeptical/critical
* transcendental/empirical
Kant thought that all earlier varieties of idealism were either dogmatic or skeptical. This distinction is one of philosophical methodology. The dogmatic procedure attempts to establish the truth of principles a priori, based on the analysis of philosophical concepts. Dogmatism itself is the attempt to do so without a previous critique of the powers of human reason. Criticism, then, is the "necessary preparation for a thoroughly grounded metaphysics" which itself is subject to the dogmatic procedure (Bxxxv). Skepticism, on the other hand, is a response to the failure of dogmatism, and it denies the possibility of a priori metaphysical principles. Wolff is held up as a paradigmatic practitioner of dogmatism, Hume of skepticism, and Kant himself of criticism.

Kant sought to refute Hume. Although he did a poor job, he certainly viewed Hume as a skeptical idealist.
See http://hume.ucdavis.edu/mattey/kant/IDEALISM.HTM

The term skeptical idealism also has a certain symmetry with Hume's later predominant position of skeptical materialism. Stephen Buckle has written of Hume's skeptical materialism.

Hume's Sceptical Materialism by Stephen Buckle
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20185271.pdf?casa_token=cbmMsRzTA5sAAAAA:UbkipmAgRxfwVyFkHUYzY9VZc77g8Kubv4BaGR0SqVJ6Ou81naiR2jwZKSH4M71n8tRg8Dx5chEVoEzxHkXPmYHeUzNH3_sTSz8IgdrksUQ0Sawl_8c

Greatly appreciative of that. I'm now content — javra

Your welcome.

I am not a Hume expert, i'm just a googler. But doesn't this defence of Hume miss the point, or at least fail to stress the epistemological target of Hume's argument? — sime

The defense of Hume in IEP is accurate to a point. However, it fails to consider the fact of physical necessity shown by natural philosophers Galileo, Kepler and others that Hume never read. If Hume had read them, then he would have had the foundation to understand Newton's law of cause and effect. Hume's doubt of an external world is his stumbling block. If the doubt is removed, then Hume would be free to investigate physical necessity.

So assuming Hume was a good philosopher, his concepts of resemblance and constant-conjunction must have been mental concepts referring to the mentalistic interpretation of knowledge, where they make sense. For instance, in our modern world of virtual reality it might be the case that we instinctively avoid virtual fire as we might also instinctively avoid virtual spiders and virtual snakes, even though we consciously appreciate, via resemblence and constant-conjunction, that these virtual entities are likely to be harmless. — sime

Hume was not a good philosopher. He was writing as a skeptical idealist and so you are correct that Hume's concepts are mental concepts. Hume could not consider physical necessity as long as he doubted the existence of the external world.

Why not? Because it's not the sort of thing that has happened so far? — joshua

Because of physical necessity. We understand the temperature characteristics of snow and of snowballs. We understand that the temperature at the equator is above 32 degrees. We understand snow begins to melt above 32 degrees. We understand why snow melts above 32 degrees because we understand the physical necessity of it.

And what do we know about H2OH2O that isn't based on our past experience? Our entire theory of molecules, atoms, and sub-atomic particles is a codification of the patterns we have found to hold so far (or since we've been checking.) [If someone did observe a violation, we probably wouldn't believe, them, though.] So saying that the snowball must melt because the electron must do X etc. only shifts the issue to electrons. Why should electrons continue to behave as they have? — joshua

Because of cause and effect due to physical necessity. Each step in the process is well understood. It is like the physical necessity of one billiard ball forcing another billiard ball to move. It can be clearly observed.

No, Hume's bundle theory of the self claims that there is no immutable self - which is what I've previously stated. — javra

I don't think Hume said anything about immutability in his theory of self.

"The bundle theory of substance explains compresence. Specifically, it maintains that properties' compresence itself engenders a substance. Thus, it determines substancehood empirically by the togetherness of properties rather than by a bare particular or by any other non-empirical underlying strata. The bundle theory of substance thus rejects the substance theories of Aristotle, Descartes, and more recently, J. P. Moreland, Jia Hou, Joseph Bridgman, Quentin Smith, and others." — javra

This is not Hume's theory of substance. Notice that Hume's name does NOT appear in that list. Here's the quote I provided in context. It occurs right at the beginning of the article. You will see that Hume is named.

"Bundle theory, originated by the 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume, is the ontological theory about objecthood in which an object consists only of a collection (bundle) of properties, relations or tropes.

"According to bundle theory, an object consists of its properties and nothing more: thus neither can there be an object without properties nor can one even conceive of such an object; for example, bundle theory claims that thinking of an apple compels one also to think of its color, its shape, the fact that it is a kind of fruit, its cells, its taste, or at least one other of its properties. Thus, the theory asserts that the apple is no more than the collection of its properties. In particular, there is no substance in which the properties are inherent."

Again, notice the words "consists only" in the first paragraph. Notice the second paragraph says "an object consists of its properties and nothing more." This is Hume's Bundle Theory.

You asked for a quote directly from the Treatise. Here's a quote from 1.1.6:
"I would fain ask those philosophers, who found so much of their reasonings on the distinction of substance and accident, and imagine we have clear ideas of each, whether the idea of substance be derived from the impressions of sensations or of reflection? If it be conveyed to us by our senses, I ask, which of them; and after what manner? If it be perceived by the eyes, it must be a colour; if by the ears, a sound; if by the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses. But I perceive none will assert, that substance is a colour, or sound, or a taste. The idea, of substance must therefore be derived from an impression of reflection, if it really exist. But the impressions of reflection resolve themselves into our passions and emotions: none of which can possibly represent a substance. We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it."

If Hume was a student of the natural philosophers, he would have learned that natural philosophers had a very good conception of substance and very clear reasons why color and taste are secondary qualities. It is obvious that Hume is trying to preserve his Pyrrhonism and trying to continue his doubt about the existence of an external world. Remember that Hume teaches that sensations of color, taste, etc arise in the mind "from unknown causes."

Yes, I recall that statement. What makes his bundle theory of the self imperfect is the presence of what some might term a unified first person point of view. Still, I can well argue that this imperfection does not in any way invalidate the claim that there is no permanent, immutable, aspect of the self. — javra

Yes, the unified first person is inescapably contradictory to the bundle theory. Hume saw the contradiction. I'm wondering why you don't? I don't think Hume ever claimed that individuals were immutable. I'm not sure where that is coming from.

OK, I haven't read him in a very long time. Still, I don't recall him saying that "objects consist of its properties and nothing more". All I recall is his argument for the bundle theory of the self, in which he states that the self is a commonwealth of elements that constantly change. — javra

I don't have a quote at my fingertips but the Wikipedia article on Bundle Theory, the one you linked above, has this quote:
"Thus, the theory asserts that the apple is no more than the collection of its properties. In particular, there is no substance in which the properties are inherent."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bundle_theory

Wikipedia has it correctly.

As to modern bundle theory, it does not deny substance, but presents the view, roughly speaking, that substance is composed of an aggregate of properties (such that properties can includes relations, which include causal relations.) The link I previously gave can serve as reference to this. — javra

No, the link you provided supports my claim.

Also, we are addressing substance within contexts of philosophy, not those of science. It makes for a world of difference. — javra

I reject the idea that science and philosophy are investigating different subjects when investigating the substance of material objects.

The idea that a thought experiment or actual experiment can disprove subjective idealism, is therefore an oxymoron as far as the subjective idealist is concerned. — sime

This is the argument Hume makes, but he's wrong. Stay tuned.

Where else would our perceptions reside? — Echarmion

Perhaps I used the wrong phrase here. I should have said that "if perceptions arise in our minds from unknown causes."

The problem is that unless and until there is at least an outline of this proof, your criticism of Hume sounds rather hollow. — Echarmion

Yes, I understand there are people such as yourself who want to see this proof. I've given some hints and I will be publishing it next year. In the meantime, you can consider if what I say makes sense of the external world can be proven.

Hey, my bad. I guess I should slow down a bit. You do understand that Hume's bundle theory of the self basically states that there is no such thing as a permanent, or immutable, self? I presumed you do on account that you've read Book 1 of the Treatise. — javra

Yes. When I first read the question my eye skipped over the words "of the self" and so I answered based purely on Hume's bundle theory of objects. When I realized my mistake, I provided Hume's quote saying that he understands that his theory of personal identity is not correct and that he cannot find a way to rescue it. Anything that leads to absurdities and contradictions is considered demonstrably false. Hume was optimistic that someone would be able to find a minor adjustment to his theory that would avoid these contradictions and absurdities, but I am not optimistic. It has been 250 years and it hasn't happened yet.

But again, going at a slower pace, do you then presume that the something which objects are made of have a permanent, or immutable, core? — javra

No, all material objects are mutable. The substance objects are made of are well characterized. Take any object to a condensed matter physicist and they can tell you all about the substance and its properties.

I'm simply curious to find out how you think that Hume's bundle theory fails. — javra

I thought I explained it clearly enough. I must have assumed you had some background information that I shouldn't have assumed. Let me back up and take another run at it.

Hume's bundle theory states that an objects consists of its properties and nothing more. That view would make sense if it were rational to doubt the existence of an external world. Once the external world is proven, then the bundle theory falls apart because the objects exist and have an actual substance. The properties of the object arise from the substance. Physicists and chemists are able to describe the material substance very precisely. We know matter is made up of molecules, atoms of different sizes and that the atoms themselves are made up of quanta (quarks, electrons and photons). We have a chart of elements that tell us about the different types of atoms. Materials made from these elements can be tested to measure their density, tensile strength, temperature characteristics, etc. Knowing the properties of the different materials allows us to engineer vast bridges and amazing skyscrapers. Without this knowledge, engineering like this would not be possible.

In the Treatise, Hume is predominantly a skeptical idealist. From the very beginning, Hume talks about how sensations "arise from unknown causes," exist only in our minds, and cannot be used to prove the existence of an external world. Hume also throws in a few comments that indicate he is a skeptical materialist, that is, that even if we could prove an external world - then we still could not know much of anything about the nature of these objects. The problem is that Hume's irrational skepticism in the Treatise leads him into doubt and despair in 1.4.2 and 1.4.7. There he decides it is better to take on a mitigated skepticism, a kind of on-again, off-again skepticism. This means he will talk more about his skeptical materialism and less about his skeptical idealism. This is the position he takes in his first Enquiry.

In the first Enquiry, Hume begins the book as a skeptical materialist. He lists out a number of things that he believes we cannot possibly know (even though knowledge of many of these had already been demonstrated by natural philosophers before he wrote). Then in Section 119, Hume throws in his "tincture of scepticism" and says that we cannot even know that an external world exists. Most philosophers believe that skeptical idealism and skeptical materialism are mutually exclusive. Hume doesn't take that view.

The fact Hume thinks that it is possible to maintain his bundle theory while being a skeptical materialist just shows how ignorant Hume is regarding natural philosophy. As I've mentioned before, motion, force, energy, etc are all concepts that are very well defined in Galileo, Kepler, Newton and others. Hume never studied natural philosophy. He read Newton but didn't understand him because he never read Galileo or Kepler or Huygens which would have given him the background to understand Newton.

Regarding Hume's bundle theory on personal identity, Hume himself admits that the theory leads to absurdities and contradictions. And he goes on to say that he has no idea how to mend this theory to avoid these contradictions. Anytime a theory leads to absurdities and contradictions, it is recognized as demonstrably false. Hume thinks his theory may be rescued by some minor adjustment. He has no reason to think so.

If I still have not answered your question adequately, please try to ask a specific question based on what I've said here.

At the risk of being redundant, and assuming in good faith that this is to be interpreted as written, into which of these categories would put Hume's bundle theory of the self from Book 1 of the Treatise? — javra

I have already claimed here the ability to prove the existence of an external world. If true, then Hume's bundle theory is demonstrably false. It is demonstrably false because objects actually exist and are "made of" something. The properties inhere due to the objects composition. Said another way, the properties the objects display are a result of the matter the object is made of. In the terms of a physicist, matter is made of molecules consisting in atoms which are composed of quanta. Depending on the composition of the matter, objects will display different density or heaviness, different tensile strength, different temperature characteristics and different rates of decay. All of this has been known for a long time. If we didn't know it, we wouldn't be able to engineer bridges and skyscrapers and jet planes. It is a bit of scandal that Hume is still being read in universities. He isn't right about anything.

Oops. I'm sorry. I read your question incorrectly. I missed the words "of the self."

To answer the question specifically regarding "of the self," I think it would be important to quote Hume himself:

I had entertained some hopes, that however deficient our theory of the intellectual world might be, it would be free from those contradictions, and absurdities, which seem to attend every explication, that human reason can give of the material world. But upon a more strict review of the section concerning personal identity, I find myself involved in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent. If this be not a good general reason for skepticism, it is at least a sufficient one (if I were not already abundantly supplied) for me to entertain a diffidence and modesty in all my decisions. --Hume

That quote appears in Hume's Appendix to the Treatise. Hume himself recognized that his view on personal identity led to contradictions and absurdities.

But in general I'm personally less interested in a philosopher's failures than in his or her successes. — joshua

Normally, I am as well. I've been struck by the complete failure of the Treatise Book 1 to add anything to our store of philosophical knowledge. Hume's epistemology and metaphysics are wrong at every point. I once told a friend that I could go through Book 1 and put each of Hume's propositional statements in one or more of five categories:
1. Patently absurd
2. Demonstrably false
3. Self-contradictory
4. Intentionally obscure
5. Trivially true

I don't blame Hume for some of his passages that are intentionally obscure. He held views that would not be welcomed in an age when excommunication was a thing to be feared.

I might be wrong, but I have the sense that you aren't grasping the problem of induction, which means you are missing out on a real mindbender. — joshua

The mindbender only exists if one doubts the existence of an external world. If our perceptions arise in our minds from unknown causes, as Hume argues, then a snowball that never melts on the equator would be possible. But if an external world actually exists, then it cannot. Because an external world exists, we actually know what happens to H2O when it is frozen or heated. We know how temperature changes impact the chemical bonds and how molecules change shape at different temperatures. And we understand the second law of thermodynamics. It is a real natural law and it is never violated on cosmic scales and rarely on much smaller scales.

I very much relate and agree.

For better or worse, though, I do think that existence as a whole is absurd. I think the times we live in are part of that. I imagine the philosophers from centuries who expected technology and the ideology of freedom to transform the world into a paradise. — joshua

I cannot agree that existence is absurd. I believe the empirical evidence clearly shows that life has purpose and meaning. I can't go into the reasons for this yet. I must finish my contra Hume papers first.

Anyway, that leaves me with some blend of stoicism, epicureanism, cynicism, existenialism, humanism, etc., etc. Eat well, exercise, maybe buy some land and build a tiny house, work at something I believe in. Die well at a good moment if possible. Tho more likely by being run over by an Amazon Prime truck. — joshua

You are an amusing conversationalist. I certainly hope the Amazon truck that runs you over is not delivering another load of books to my house.

It is however conceivable that a normal brick would just pass through a normal window without damaging it. — joshua

No, that isn't conceivable. We know that solid objects cannot pass through solid objects without breaking them. In the old days, people looked to philosophy to discover the nature of material things. The speculations of philosophers, included Hume, have been disproven. Now we look to condensed matter physics. Our advances in knowledge in this area and others have led to our technologically advanced society. There is no way society is going to accept a retreat from the knowledge gained since Hume. Instead, we have to bring philosophy into the modern age. The only way to do that is to accept that everything Hume said about material objects, epistemology and metaphysics was wrong.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condensed_matter_physics

From what you've written so far, I have the sense that you aren't seeing the strange problem of induction as I do. Yet this is one of the reasons Hume is great. — joshua

Many philosophers had written about the problem of induction prior to Hume, but none of these had doubted the existence of an external world. Hume was the first to attack induction from the viewpoint that we cannot prove the existence of external objects. Once my paper is published and the external world is proven, the problem of induction will remain but it will be the original problem of induction as before Hume. I have two more papers in development contra Hume. One of these deals with Hume's failed attack on Isaac Newton and his law of cause and effect and the other deals with the problem of induction after Hume is refuted. The second paper will, of course, deal with laws of nature.

Thanks for the links, but I'd prefer to hear your thoughts on topic, or paraphrases from those sources. After all, I think Hume destroyed the metaphysical foundations of science. Or showed that science never had one. Which revealed that science never needed one, though it's natural for philosophers to step in and try to invent one. — joshua

No, science did have metaphysical foundations prior to Hume. Or, at least Burtt would claim so. His book is fascinating from a history of philosophy of science perspective. He explained the difference between primary and secondary qualities (in the writings of Galileo, Kepler and Newton) in a way that was clear and concise. Then when I read Hume, it was clear that Hume had never read Galileo and Kepler and so Hume was ill-prepared to understand Newton. Hume never grasped this important distinction and Hume admitted that he never understood motion, force, power and energy. Indeed, these things cannot be understood until you understand the difference between primary and secondary qualities. The problem persists among the followers of Hume. None of them seem the slightest bit interested in understanding Hume's failures.

Do we need to subdivide, so that neuroscience somehow gets its own dedicated branch of philosophy? — Pattern-chaser

This is already done. Within philosophy of science we have philosophy of physics, philosophy of biology, etc. So you could call it neurophilosophy or you could call it philosophy of neuroscience. I would leave it up to the practitioners to name it. But I don't see it taking over all of philosophy in any case.