There is no point to laying out the process of interpretation without accounting for the primary results and aim of interpretation (facilitating the transformation from understanding to purposeful involvement in the world). And it is absurd to suggest that Heidegger would lay bare an “existential whole of Dasein” wherein the collective primordials account only for the least significant form of interpretive results.

If the relations among the primordials 1) State-of-Mind, 2) Understanding, and 3) Discourse (which together constitute the existential whole of Dasien) do not account for the non-verbal expressions of interpretation, then they cannot account for either our involvement in the equipmental whole (such involvements generally being non-verbal expressions of interpretations) or the ultimate for the sake of which (from which involvements draw their purpose).

There is our State-of Mind, there is our Understanding, and there is what we do.

Discourse is what we do!

The primary purpose is to once again ask the question of the meaning of being. The everyday mode of existence is the starting point for his explication of Dasein. The everyday is not Dasein's mode of being for in everyday existence our concern is not the question of the meaning of being, that is, what it is for us to be. Dasein is: — Fooloso4

It matters not whether your purpose is 1) to tell us the meaning of A by fully explicating B or 2) to fully explicate B in order to tell us the meaning of A. Heidegger has tied a full explication of Dasein to explaining the meaning of being in such a way that the two are inseparable to his purpose. And you already know this. If all he wanted to do was tell us the meaning of being, he could have stopped after page 26 of the M&R translation of B&T.

This is what Heidegger calls involvement with equipment, the 'ready to hand'. We can talk about ovens and baking potatoes, but that does not mean that talking about ovens and baking potatoes and lawn mowers and mowing the lawn are a priori conditions for using ovens and lawn mowers or that the activities are discursive. — Fooloso4

Seriously? I know what Heidegger calls involvement with equipment and at no point did I suggest that talking about anything is an a prior condition for using anything. (and by the way, the ready to hand and equipment are not synonymous). I did suggest that one cannot possibly render explicit their understanding of how to mow a lawn if they did not already have a general understanding of how to mow a lawn. The point being is that interpretations (the rendering explicit of understanding) are done for the purpose of acting upon the interpretation. And rendering explicit (interpreting) my understanding of the proper heat at which to bake a potato is done for the purpose of setting the oven to the appropriate temperature. And the act of setting the oven to the appropriate temperature is a non-verbal expression of my interpretation (explicit understanding) of how to bake a potato.

It does not follow from the equiprimordiality of state-of-mind, understanding, and discourse that discourse must include such things as mowing the lawn and baking potatoes. Their equiprimordiality means that none of them is primary, that they do not derive one from another. Our active involvement in the world is not reducible to discourse. — Fooloso4

Seriously again? The primary issue is not the definition of equiprimordial. You may rest assured I know what it means. Instead, the issue is whether when taken together these primoridials constitute the existential whole of Dasein. And they do. Please see B&T (M&R) at page 224 (German at 180).

It would be strange indeed if Heidegger laid out the “existential whole of Dasein” and it accounted for the expressions of interpretations made by Dasein except for the expressions of interpretations at the very heart of Heidegger’s originality, i.e., non-verbal acts expressing our interpretations (explicit understandings) of how to use (not talk about) equipment (such as ovens and lawn mowers). And if you think that is what Heidegger has done, then you are wrong. And I can live with that.

IF a primary purpose (perhaps the primary purpose) of Being and Time is to capture the average everyday involvement of being-in-the-world;

AND

IF much (perhaps most) of the average everyday involvement of being-in-the-world is comprised of what would be typically described as non-verbal acts (mowing the lawn, driving to the store, baking a potato);

AND

IF State-of-Mind, Understanding, and Discourse are equiprimordial and comprehensively constitutive of being-in-the-world;

THEN: Discourse must include those acts typically described as non-verbal OR Heidegger fails (MISERABLY) at capturing the average everyday involvement of being-in-the-world.

Or put another way, you cannot capture the average everyday involvement of being-in-the-world without accounting for those acts typically described as non-verbal.

exactly!

whether language is inherent in all actions does not determine whether an action is verbal/non-verbal.

If we account for those actions (in which language is inherent) that are verbal and call them Discourse, then we still must account for those actions (in which language is inherent) that are non-verbal (which for Heidegger will constitute most of our average everyday involvement in the world).

And if we call the latter something other than Discourse, then Disposition, Understanding and Discourse as comprehensively constitutive of being-in-the-world will not capture the non-verbal acts that make up the greater portion of our average everyday involvement in the world. And that would be a strange interpretation of Heidegger indeed.

So even conceding that language is inherent in everything we do changes nothing so long as we cling to the notion that Discourse includes only verbal acts.

Simply put, whatever term one uses for that which is equiprimordial with disposition and understanding, it must capture all expressions of interpretations or it will not capture our average every day involvement in the world. And if you are a Bavarian peasant, it will not even come close.

The degree to which one insists upon language as somehow running through and through our average everyday involvement in the world is the degree to which one's comportment toward being-with-others has become an emotional need for others.

As I understand Heidegger, Dasein is always a doing, but doing for Heidegger means a meaningful involvement with others in the world.which is at the same time a praxis, an understanding, an attunement and a discoursing. Discourse serves the same purpose for Heidegger that language does for Derrida and other post-structuralists. Rather than being a secondary phenomenon in relation to perception, it is intrinsic to all forms of experiencing. — Joshs

You will never be able to capture the average everydayness of our involvement in the world without accounting for all expressed interpretations. Either Discourse will include non-verbal expressions of interpretations or it will be defined in such a way as to claim that it does not include non-verbal expressions of interpretations but will capture them nonetheless. Philosophers are good at that. And the post-structuralists are especially good at that.

[X] is the expressing of interpretations. If your term for X does not capture all expressions of interpretations, then it is useless.

It is not a question of limiting the discussion but of identifying whether you are interpreting BT, introducing other works by H., or addressing something that is not in the text. — Fooloso4

I am addressing Heidegger and Language. Confusion also results when people presume their projects are the same as the projects of other people. My primary project is to raise interest in Heidegger. You seem to suggest that my project has something to do with judging whether Heidegger lacks clarity regarding language. I have already made that judgment and it is clearly stated in the first sentence of the original post.

It is clear that Heidegger says all sorts of things about discourse, language and silence. It strikes me as a fool's errand to reduce what Heidegger has to say about each to a single statement he may have said about each.

As for my father's tendency to silence, I was merely commenting upon its effect in regard to those occasions when he chose not to be silent. And in that sense, I was using the example of his silence to highlight Heidegger's distinction between those who are silent because they have nothing to say and those for whom silence is what they have to say.

As for "genuine" silence being about the disclosure of Dasein, that is true of all forms of disclosure. There is nothing else for Dasein to disclose but Dasein. Dasein is the disclosure of Dasein.

Carry on.

though most of us are quick to agree that morality and law are not the same thing, most of us are also quick to forget it.

got it. :smile:

"Discourse" - as opposed to language (assuming I understand what you wrote) - can express, but there is no appreciation of expression except in language via memory. That is, language is exactly front, center, and all around. — tim wood

Though Heidegger did indeed consider language to be the house of being, it is important to keep in mind that in Being and Time he is attempting to describe being-in-the-world in terms of the average everydayness of our involvement in the world. And most of the average everydayness of our involvement has little to do with expressions intended for the appreciation of others.

Most of our day is spent expressing our interpretation of our understanding of the world by taking the dogs for a walk, mowing the lawn, baking a potato, doing the dishes and so on. And such mundane involvements in the world take up far more time than the amount of time the average person spends upon expressions intended for consumption by others.

Though language might well be "front, center, and all around" when dealing with expressions intended for public consumption and evaluation, such expressions account for an extremely small amount of the daily involvement in the world of the average person.

And again and in Being and Time, Heidegger is in pursuit of the nature of being in our average everydayness.

Woke up
Fell out of bed
Dragged a comb across my head
Went downstairs and drank a cup. . .

A Day in Life is not a day in which "language is exactly front, center, and all around." In fact, it is quite the opposite.

Your opening post was about how Being and Time is misunderstood. If the text is to be understood we must attend to it. That is what I have been doing. It is what I thought you were doing. — Fooloso4

The thread is entitled Heidegger and Language and though I refer specifically toBeing and Time in the original post, there is nothing in the original post to suggest that I or anyone else must limit our discussion of Heidegger and Language to only Being and Time. If you would like to do that, I am fine limiting my discussions with you to only Being and Time.

And I see no inconsistencies between my comments and examples regarding silence and your subsequent comments. Returning to the example of my father, his own tendencies to silence had the effect of amplifying his words on the occasions when he did choose to speak.

Discourse is tied to being-with: — Possibility

Discourse is not exclusively tied to being-with.

Discourse is equiprimordial with both disposition (mood, state-of-mind) and understanding.

As such and by definition Discourse is tied to being-in-the-world in general and that would not change even if you were the only remaining Dasein.

Every being-in-the-world has 1) a disposition toward the world, 2) an understanding of the world, and 3) is in Discourse with the world.

And when it comes to our average everydayness, most of our Discourse with the world is neither verbal/linguistic nor intended to be publicly communicative.

Simply put and to put it another way, Discourse is the process whereby we render our disposition and our understanding in to active involvement in the world.

If you are unable to think of Discourse in non-verbal/non-linguistic terms, then [X] is the process whereby we render our disposition and our understanding in to active involvement in the world.

However and whatever term you find helpful, please keep in mind that it must also carry the burden of being equiprimordial with disposition and understanding. And that is no small task for any word.

To clarify, I interpret discourse as the process of expressing an interpretation of an understanding rooted in the intelligibility of being-in-the-world. As you can see, the definition does not require that an expression be either public or communicative in any form, including verbal/linguistic forms (though it can be.).

And for those who are uncomfortable with the notion of a private discourse divorced from the verbal and/or linguistic, I am happy to interpret "[X} as the process of expressing an interpretation of an understanding rooted in the intelligibility of being-in-the-world".

If we had no understanding of the world, we would have no basis upon with to choose one act over another or several others. But we do have an understanding of the world and in order to act with purpose there are times we must render "explicit" our understanding. For example and if one wants a good potato, it is not enough to understand that heat is useful for baking potatoes. One must understand how much heat and for how long, i.e., one's understanding must be more explicit than heat is useful.

And the process of rendering explicit our understanding is what Heidegger calls interpretation. In turn, discourse is an expression of our interpretation. And I express my interpretation of my understanding of what is necessary to bake a good potato by turning the oven to 425 degrees and setting the timer to 30 minutes at which point I would turn the potato and reset the timer for another 30 minutes.

And none of that would be possible absent a general understanding of cooking and a more explicit understanding of cooking a potato and the ability to put that understanding in to actions both verbal and non-verbal and both private and public.

Keep in mind, Heidegger is attempting to describe our regular and ongoing involvement in the world in our average every dayness, i.e,, walking the dogs, mowing the lawn, taking out the trash, baking potatoes. And very little of our average everyday involvement in the world is intended to be publicly communicative.

First, I do believe my opening remark for the thread was to the effect that Heidegger’s position on language is a bit confusing and that one of the ways to untangle it is to accept that he does not consider “discourse” and “language” to be synonymous.

Second, I too write for the “ear” of all those who may choose to read (and perhaps engage in) the ongoing discussion. And to be above board in that regard, my understanding and interpretation of being is obviously Heideggerian. But Heidegger is difficult to understand, leaves much room for interpretation, and leaves significant gaps in his overall ontological thrust. As a result, much of what I say includes my own interpretations of being and I do not in any form or fashion claim that Heidegger or anyone else for that matter would necessarily agree with them.

But this forum is not formal to the degree that I am going to write footnotes or necessarily delineate clearly between my interpretations of Heidegger per se and my own interpretations of being in light of the deficiencies in Heidegger’s work.

All of that having been said, I am not so certain that “silence” as a form of discourse is as complex as your questions suggest. When my wife and I had disagreements (I am a widower) and she went silent, it spoke volumes. Similarly and while I was growing up, my father spoke very little. But many is the person who would say to the effect, "your father does not speak much; but when he does, you are well advised to listen." And I do think those are the type of situations to which Heidegger refers.

And in that regard, one of the things I see in Heidegger is a continual refusal to frame issues in terms of opposites. Intentional silence is not the opposite of discourse (it is a comportment toward discourse), intentional solitude is not the opposite of daseining-with (it is a comportment toward daseining-with), and a lack of solicitude is not the opposite of care (it is a comportment toward care).

And finally, I recently read Heidegger's Analytic by Taylor Carmen. Chapter 5 is an excellent take on discourse and does push the envelope, though perhaps not as far as I. For those serious about Heidegger, the entire book is a must read. I suspect I will read it many times.

I can neither reasonably agree nor disagree with your premise since your only response to enquiries regarding your feebly supported sub-premises was to assure us of your certainty.

Under such circumstances, I thought it best to move along to discussions rooted in reason rather than proclamations of self-certainty.

So once again, thank you for your enlightening me.

some of us have a sense of humor and some do not.

carry on.

Correct. I'm a materialist/physicalist. — Terrapin Station

But you are still alive, so there is still hope for you.

:razz:

He says:

Discourse [Rede] is existentially equiprimordial with state-of-mind and understanding — Fooloso4

And therefore? Are you asking me whether I agree or what I think that means?

I suspect any understanding of discourse as equiprimordial with state-of-mind and understanding is rooted in thrownness and falling. And thrownness and falling together are such that we have to keep moving forward in the world and we do so by our actions. And discourse is the process whereby our state-of-mind and our understanding are transformed into actions.

"What does Heidegger mean when he says, as quoted above: "Discourse is the articulation of intelligibility."?"


Why are you asking me? :smile:

My interpretation of Heidegger suggests:
Discourse is the process of expressing (articulating?) an interpretation of an understanding rooted in the intelligibility of being-in-the-world.

So yes, discourse is ultimately rooted in the intelligibility of being-in-the-world.

"Whether it's historically/etymologically rooted in that or not doesn't matter. The distinction can (and typically does) simply refer to mental versus nonmental phenomena, which is a distincrion between a subset of brain function and things that aren't a subset of that particular brain function."


It matters not how you frame the distinction (mental/non-mental or external/internal or subject/object). Instead, the deeper issue is the relationship between the entities you are trying to distinguish. And you have already rejected the notion of the relationship as being between two self-sufficient substances.

Unless I am missing something, you avoid the Cartesian nightmare by being a non-Cartesian, i.e., you are a materialist.

"There's no "transcendence.""

I disagree.

Though I do reject the notion that transcendence is from "subject" to "object."

Instead, transcendence is from "self" to "world."

you are missing my point and the point of the original post.

1. The very notion of "objective" is rooted in substance ontology, i.e., the subject/object distinction.

2. The subject/object distinction is the Cartesian distinction between two self-sufficient substances, i.e., thinking substances (having non physical attributes) and extended substances (having physical attributes).

3. Being self-sufficient, thinking substances (minds) are completely independent of extended substances (physical things). Similarly and being self-sufficient, extended substances (physical things) are completely independent of thinking substances (minds). After all, self-sufficient does mean self-sufficient.

Therefore, when you claim that there are only physical things, you are rejecting substance ontology.

And that is okay. But you need to recognize that you are doing that.

Otherwise, you end up trying to resolve a problem from within a paradigm you have rejected.

Welcome to contemporary man's Cartesian nightmare.

If you live your life as if you have no free will and it turns out you did, that is tragic. If you live your life as if you had free will and it turns out you did not, then you had no other choice. So you might as well live as if you have free will, if you can.

you seem to be suggesting a necessary connection between the number of choices presented and the degree of free will that someone has. I think some would suggest that if you are inevitably going to choose A, then it matters not whether the apparent choices are A or B as opposed to A or B or C or D. For a determinist, all choices are an illusion no matter their apparent number.

either C and B are coextensive or they are not. If they are co-extensive, then being allowed to talk about one while not being allowed to talk about other violates the rule of non-contradiction and your issue is not a matter of a fallacy. If C and B overlap, nowhere did you say that you can discuss anything and everything in C. Instead, you said you can discuss C. So your formulation reasonably implies that you can discuss those portions of C that do not overlap with B, which still means you can discuss C. If you say can discuss all of C and none of B, then you are back to the rule of non-contradictions and once again the issue is not a matter of a fallacy.

then what is the point of discussion? If your response is going to be that you are "certain", then I suppose the rest of us might just as well say thank you for enlightening us and move on to other discussions.

Thank you for enlightening me.

I am going to move on to other discussions.

:smile:

"I don't believe there's anything difficult to it. As I explained earlier, you have a thought that amounts to wanting to type the word "word," and so your brain, via the rest of your nervous system, sends a signal that activates tendons/muscles that enable you to move your arm to the keyboard and move your finger to push the "w" key."

All that does is beg the question as to where the "magic" occurs. Rather than describing the "transcendence" as between yourself and the physical world external to you, you have chosen to describe the "transcendence" as between your thought and the physical world.

None of what you say comes even close to explaining how a non-physical thought somehow creates physical activity in the brain. Unless you are suggesting that your thoughts are physical, in which case you are rejecting the notion of an external reality and are now outside of the original post.

Simply put, the point at which the supposed magic of "transcendence" occurs is not an explanation of how the transcendence occurs. How does that "thought" (of a thinking substance) cause a physical (extended substance) "signal".

And please keep in mind that for the Cartesians, a substance is self-sufficient.

Only for those who thought epistemology was easy.

got it.

but it does mean that the arguments we give and the things we believe are determined.

Finally, after 2000 years of Western Philosophy, we now have a definition. :smile:

For me, philosophy is an ongoing discussion over the nature of being. But that is just me.

If you seem to missing a lot of "ifs". And "if" you were to put them in, then you would have created a great "straw man" argument.

Good luck with that.

:smile:

again, you are in the same circle. I consistently used the word "ALL" each and every time I used the word object.

So again:

1. if existence is a predicate of ALL objects; and
2. if existence is the only predicate that is a predicate of ALL objects;

THEN we are necessarily "justified" in calling existence a special predicate. (it is the only predicate that is a predicate of ALL objects).

The argument is not that complicated.

Your resistance is futile.

There is nothing more I can do.

This is the Cartesian issue that never does and never will go away. It is in and of itself the primary argument for rejecting Cartesian dualism.

Even if people can make the conundrum seem a little less absurd by claiming you can interact with a mind independent world, they will nonetheless end up being unable to explain adequately the process by which such interaction is even possible. (they have been trying for 400 years and yet here we are.).

In the end, they will give the process some sort of label such as "transcendence" and then proceed as if the label explains all when of course it explains nothing. And when push comes to shove, they will do the Husserlian thing and point out how truly wonderful is the "magic" of transcendence.

The only reason you can interact with other entities is because they are within the world that you are in.

I do not believe in drugs for non-recreational purposes. :smile:

You seem to be going in the same circle. If existence is a real predicate that applies to all actual objects, then it is by definition a universal predicate of all actual objects. And if there are no other predicates universal to all actual objects, then we are "justified" [your word] in calling existence a "special case".

And I am not even saying I agree with the proposition, I am simply saying "existence" as a special case is inherently justified within the proposition.

For the most part, I tend to agree with Kant in that "existence" [at least in the way it is generally used] is not a real predicate.

Excellent. Heidegger is definitely a bit murky on the issue. And limiting oneself to just Being and Time is no help. But his failure to be more precise in Being and Time does not affect the overall ontological thrust of his work.

In that context, I say:
"Discourse" is the process whereby one expresses an interpretation of an understanding rooted in the intelligibility of being-in-the-world.

And language is just one of the many ways for engaging in that process.

For those who are unable to conceive of "Discourse" in non-verbal/non-linguistic terms, then I simply say:
"X" is the process whereby one expresses an interpretation of an understanding rooted in the intelligibility of being-in-the-world.

And language is just on of the many ways for engaging in that process.

Had you actually replied directly to me, I would have responded days ago.

Oh well.

he is obviously talking about existence as a universal property of all objects. Because one property may have to be a property of all objects does not necessitate that all properties be a properties of all objects. and you already know that.

are you sure you are talking to me? I made no request for "plain language." As for Heidegger and neologisms, are you really going to claim that words do not accrue baggage? Is there a single one of us for whom the word "reality" is not pregnant with a particular ontological disposition? Does the realist mean the same by "reality" as the idealist? Neologisms are essential to breaking new ground. Does Being and Time often lack clarity? Of course it does, But it was put together on time constraints and the body of Heidegger's work (both before and after) is well suited to providing clarification.