"What does Heidegger mean when he says, as quoted above: "Discourse is the articulation of intelligibility."?"


Why are you asking me? :smile:

My interpretation of Heidegger suggests:
Discourse is the process of expressing (articulating?) an interpretation of an understanding rooted in the intelligibility of being-in-the-world.

So yes, discourse is ultimately rooted in the intelligibility of being-in-the-world.

"Whether it's historically/etymologically rooted in that or not doesn't matter. The distinction can (and typically does) simply refer to mental versus nonmental phenomena, which is a distincrion between a subset of brain function and things that aren't a subset of that particular brain function."


It matters not how you frame the distinction (mental/non-mental or external/internal or subject/object). Instead, the deeper issue is the relationship between the entities you are trying to distinguish. And you have already rejected the notion of the relationship as being between two self-sufficient substances.

Unless I am missing something, you avoid the Cartesian nightmare by being a non-Cartesian, i.e., you are a materialist.

"There's no "transcendence.""

I disagree.

Though I do reject the notion that transcendence is from "subject" to "object."

Instead, transcendence is from "self" to "world."

you are missing my point and the point of the original post.

1. The very notion of "objective" is rooted in substance ontology, i.e., the subject/object distinction.

2. The subject/object distinction is the Cartesian distinction between two self-sufficient substances, i.e., thinking substances (having non physical attributes) and extended substances (having physical attributes).

3. Being self-sufficient, thinking substances (minds) are completely independent of extended substances (physical things). Similarly and being self-sufficient, extended substances (physical things) are completely independent of thinking substances (minds). After all, self-sufficient does mean self-sufficient.

Therefore, when you claim that there are only physical things, you are rejecting substance ontology.

And that is okay. But you need to recognize that you are doing that.

Otherwise, you end up trying to resolve a problem from within a paradigm you have rejected.

Welcome to contemporary man's Cartesian nightmare.

If you live your life as if you have no free will and it turns out you did, that is tragic. If you live your life as if you had free will and it turns out you did not, then you had no other choice. So you might as well live as if you have free will, if you can.

you seem to be suggesting a necessary connection between the number of choices presented and the degree of free will that someone has. I think some would suggest that if you are inevitably going to choose A, then it matters not whether the apparent choices are A or B as opposed to A or B or C or D. For a determinist, all choices are an illusion no matter their apparent number.

either C and B are coextensive or they are not. If they are co-extensive, then being allowed to talk about one while not being allowed to talk about other violates the rule of non-contradiction and your issue is not a matter of a fallacy. If C and B overlap, nowhere did you say that you can discuss anything and everything in C. Instead, you said you can discuss C. So your formulation reasonably implies that you can discuss those portions of C that do not overlap with B, which still means you can discuss C. If you say can discuss all of C and none of B, then you are back to the rule of non-contradictions and once again the issue is not a matter of a fallacy.

then what is the point of discussion? If your response is going to be that you are "certain", then I suppose the rest of us might just as well say thank you for enlightening us and move on to other discussions.

Thank you for enlightening me.

I am going to move on to other discussions.

:smile:

"I don't believe there's anything difficult to it. As I explained earlier, you have a thought that amounts to wanting to type the word "word," and so your brain, via the rest of your nervous system, sends a signal that activates tendons/muscles that enable you to move your arm to the keyboard and move your finger to push the "w" key."

All that does is beg the question as to where the "magic" occurs. Rather than describing the "transcendence" as between yourself and the physical world external to you, you have chosen to describe the "transcendence" as between your thought and the physical world.

None of what you say comes even close to explaining how a non-physical thought somehow creates physical activity in the brain. Unless you are suggesting that your thoughts are physical, in which case you are rejecting the notion of an external reality and are now outside of the original post.

Simply put, the point at which the supposed magic of "transcendence" occurs is not an explanation of how the transcendence occurs. How does that "thought" (of a thinking substance) cause a physical (extended substance) "signal".

And please keep in mind that for the Cartesians, a substance is self-sufficient.

Only for those who thought epistemology was easy.

got it.

but it does mean that the arguments we give and the things we believe are determined.

Finally, after 2000 years of Western Philosophy, we now have a definition. :smile:

For me, philosophy is an ongoing discussion over the nature of being. But that is just me.

If you seem to missing a lot of "ifs". And "if" you were to put them in, then you would have created a great "straw man" argument.

Good luck with that.

:smile:

again, you are in the same circle. I consistently used the word "ALL" each and every time I used the word object.

So again:

1. if existence is a predicate of ALL objects; and
2. if existence is the only predicate that is a predicate of ALL objects;

THEN we are necessarily "justified" in calling existence a special predicate. (it is the only predicate that is a predicate of ALL objects).

The argument is not that complicated.

Your resistance is futile.

There is nothing more I can do.

This is the Cartesian issue that never does and never will go away. It is in and of itself the primary argument for rejecting Cartesian dualism.

Even if people can make the conundrum seem a little less absurd by claiming you can interact with a mind independent world, they will nonetheless end up being unable to explain adequately the process by which such interaction is even possible. (they have been trying for 400 years and yet here we are.).

In the end, they will give the process some sort of label such as "transcendence" and then proceed as if the label explains all when of course it explains nothing. And when push comes to shove, they will do the Husserlian thing and point out how truly wonderful is the "magic" of transcendence.

The only reason you can interact with other entities is because they are within the world that you are in.

I do not believe in drugs for non-recreational purposes. :smile:

You seem to be going in the same circle. If existence is a real predicate that applies to all actual objects, then it is by definition a universal predicate of all actual objects. And if there are no other predicates universal to all actual objects, then we are "justified" [your word] in calling existence a "special case".

And I am not even saying I agree with the proposition, I am simply saying "existence" as a special case is inherently justified within the proposition.

For the most part, I tend to agree with Kant in that "existence" [at least in the way it is generally used] is not a real predicate.

Excellent. Heidegger is definitely a bit murky on the issue. And limiting oneself to just Being and Time is no help. But his failure to be more precise in Being and Time does not affect the overall ontological thrust of his work.

In that context, I say:
"Discourse" is the process whereby one expresses an interpretation of an understanding rooted in the intelligibility of being-in-the-world.

And language is just one of the many ways for engaging in that process.

For those who are unable to conceive of "Discourse" in non-verbal/non-linguistic terms, then I simply say:
"X" is the process whereby one expresses an interpretation of an understanding rooted in the intelligibility of being-in-the-world.

And language is just on of the many ways for engaging in that process.

Had you actually replied directly to me, I would have responded days ago.

Oh well.

he is obviously talking about existence as a universal property of all objects. Because one property may have to be a property of all objects does not necessitate that all properties be a properties of all objects. and you already know that.

are you sure you are talking to me? I made no request for "plain language." As for Heidegger and neologisms, are you really going to claim that words do not accrue baggage? Is there a single one of us for whom the word "reality" is not pregnant with a particular ontological disposition? Does the realist mean the same by "reality" as the idealist? Neologisms are essential to breaking new ground. Does Being and Time often lack clarity? Of course it does, But it was put together on time constraints and the body of Heidegger's work (both before and after) is well suited to providing clarification.

When I turn the oven to 425 degrees in order to bake a potato, I have just expressed my understanding of the appropriate temperature at which to bake a potato. Every act is an expression of an understanding and every such expression is discourse.

I disagree. And I am particularly puzzled about Wittgenstein's and your notion of futility regarding "some" or "many" "so called" discussions. Doesn't that merely beg the question? Certainly Wittgenstein would deem worthy the discussions he joined or started and I suspect you would do the same. Or do the both of you engage in "futile" discussions? Or is that an adjective reserved for discussions that you do not find "worthwhile?" Just asking.

1. There is being-in-the-world.
2. There is the intelligibility of being-in-the-world.
3. There is an understanding rooted in the intelligibility of being-in-the-world.
4. There is an interpretation of an understanding rooted in the intelligibility of being-in-the-world.
5. There is a rendering explicit of an interpretation of an understanding rooted in the intelligibility of being-in-the-world.
6. There is language as a method (one of several) for rendering explicit an interpretation of an understanding rooted in the intelligibility of being-in-the-world.

Language does not make an appearance in the primordial order of being-in-the-world until level six and even then it is just one of several methods for doing what it does.

I agree that language plays a pivotal role in reflection and I suspect Heidegger would also agree. However, he would maintain that the role of reflection is quite minimal in our average everydayness. Only for the novice does reflection play a role in most of the routine things we do each and every day. That in fact the better we get at doing things (rendering explicit our understanding of what we are doing) the less thought we give them and the less thought we need to give them.

!! I do not disagree with that. Partly because I have not read enough of Nietzsche or those who have. But again, my primary appreciation of Kaufmann is the historical context he provides, particularly regarding what Nietzsche's sister did with his unpublished works following his descent to madness. He would never have condoned the interpretation she gladly pushed upon the Nazis. As for the continental philosophers in general, you may be correct regarding the general public. As for myself and even though other interpretations are useful, I prefer my Heidegger main line. (though sadly, I do not read in German). Give it to me straight doctor, I can take it!!! :smile:

I agree. and the notion that Shakespeare's plays are "contrived" (I believe that was the word) is in and of itself relative. They may well be contrived by today's standards, but can the same be said regarding the standards of his day, whatever they may have been? So again, are people upset because the standards seem to be based upon opinions or are they upset because the opinions upon which they are based do not include theirs? and that is a fair question.

oh well

as true as the starting point may be, many seem to argue that there is nothing wrong with opinion being the basis of what constitutes art, but only object to whose opinion ought to matter. the deeper issue is what is art aside from the various constituencies who feel entitled to have their opinion determine the issue.

that toward which we are drawn. thoughts are useful to rendering explicit that to which we are drawn. they are not the cause.

existence is not a real predicate (Kant)

interesting. I agree.

high school science should be sufficient. I majored in philosophy and geology was the only college level science course I had. You will be fine.

then it would not be rule by the people, it would be rule by some of the people. which pretty much describes every form of government other than democracy. words have meaning.

which only reinforces my primary message. it is difficult to understand Nietzsche directly.

except Kaufmann does far more than translate. He provides historical perspective.

the argument over free will is nothing more than philosophy as industry. if there is free will and you live as if there is not, that is tragic. If there is no free will and you live as if there is, you could not have chosen to do otherwise.

Nietzsche will always be difficult to understand first hand. I found it extremely useful to read Walter Kaufman's seminal assessment of Nietzsche.

only a being in a world could question whether there was world.

Objectivity is an adopted disposition useful for purposes of assessment. It is not our natural state of being. You cannot be more on the inside than we are. And when we mistakenly think objectivity can be a constant state of being, we mistakenly think we are on the outside looking in. As a result, we are on the inside mistakenly believing we are on the outside looking in and that is a formula for maximum cognitive dissonance.