1.13
The facts in logical space are the world.

What is logical space?

and if the facts in logical are the world, then there can be no other space within the world that is not subsumed by logical space?

and states of affairs. — Posty McPostface

is the difference between "states of affairs" and "atomic facts" reconcilable?

It is my understanding that they are not synonymous?

It is also my understanding we are using the Ogden translation?

ok

It's a matter outside of the applicability of logic, proof and words. — Michael Ossipoff

I like that.

And I agree.

I'm not posing an objection as much as a skeptical worry that you're a flesh and blood animal employing concepts which you acquired in the course of participating in an earth-bound human form of life and it seems bad philosophical practice to investigate the nature and origin of both all that is and the existence of entities as such without first giving some consideration as to why you feel entitled to hold that these abstract concepts are capable of doing that sort of work. — John Doe

That is an extremely long sentence that I like even though I do not care for long sentences because they contain multiple ideas and I am not so good at following multiple ideas because they have a tendency to confuse me and be exceptionally hard to follow for people that. . .

But I do agree.

:smile:

ok. I think. :smile:

I like puppies more and people less each and every day.

shouldn't the question be whether the universe was created? why do you presume it was created? Perhaps it has always been or is a eternal recurring process of sorts?

This is the thread. — Srap Tasmaner

is there an agreed upon text?

is there a proposed schedule for their timely completion? Please advise. — Arne

All will be revealed in due time. — Posty McPostface

you can never get me that information too soon. I have started Tractatus a couple of times and just could not get into it. Reading it in a structured way with others could make the difference. At least that is my hope. — Arne

And now I am saddened.

so my biggest fears have in fact been realized. Is there a separate thread? What am I expected to have already read? Is there a reading schedule? What edition is being used? Is there one post that contains all of this information? Now I am unhappy.

Are you unhappy with how things are being handled thus far? — Posty McPostface

No. I am not unhappy.

Certain posts lead me to mistakenly believe the collective reading has begun and someone forgot to tell me or I did not notice.

I am excited about the prospect of the group and am therefore anxious.

As long as you don't forget me when it comes to launch time, you may disregard my childlike impatience.

:smile:

All will be revealed in due time. — Posty McPostface

It would be good if all of the comments on this thread were made within the context of a reading group that is off the ground. Just saying.

In talking with Frank yesterday regarding the concept of "dread", he referred a couple of times to Heidegger's essay What is Metaphysics?. Not have read the essay, I deferred. I have read it. And as always with Heidegger, it is tough going but it is worth the read.

What I find most fascinating within the context of the OP is that "nothing" is not experienced as the negation of being or as separate from being. Instead, Heidegger maintains that certain moods (such as boredom) reveal being as a whole. But of course moods are impermanent. And with the slipping away of the sense of the wholeness of being, nothing rushes in. What is Metaphysics? At 45-47.

-- Mark Wrathall, How to Read Heidegger — frank

good book.

Each of us is an understanding of being. We are driven towards and drawn to (1) that which is consistent with our understanding of being, (2) that which facilitates our interpretation of our understanding of being, and (3) that which facilitates our articulation of our interpretation of our understanding of being.

I fail to see how arguing for or against the notion that we prefer what we are driven to or drawn towards contributes any substance.

the entire post rests upon a distinction between preference and reason and I suspect that if there is any such distinction, it is chimerical at best. Most people consider their preferences rooted in reason, i.e,. they have reasons for what they prefer. And your thesis supports that our apparently reasoned positions are simply overlays of argument upon philosophical positions adopted out of preference. So we have reasons for our preferences and preferences for our reasons and you have presented no argument as to why the reducibility of each to the other provides either with a deeper ground?

in fact, if we push your premise, your preference for preference as the ground of philosophy that all reasoned positions are the product of preferences and there is, therefore, no room for reason as an alternative primordial ground. As a result, even your distinction between preference and a reasoned position is a distinction without a difference.

Preferences would be irrational as they aren't reasoned positions. — TheMadFool

you seem to be expressing a preference for the reasoned position?

and why would preferences not be a reasoned position?

don't most people have reasons for their preference?

in fact, couldn't one consider a preference to be the result of a previous reasoned decision rendered default?

if you are going to suggest that a preference is not a reasoned position, then what type of position is it?

is it just built in?

and if you want to suggest philosophy is ultimately about preference, then why would that be limited to just philosophy?

philosophically oriented people strike me as more contemplative than the average bear?

if they are going to make their decisions based upon preference, why are they spending all of that time thinking, reading, and writing?

and couldn't one argue that a reasoned position is simply a preference supported by argument?

As an aside: I normally frown heavily on the psychologising of philosophy, but in this case exceptionally I think it is legitimate, because the philosophy is itself founded on the psychological phenomenon of dread — unenlightened

I agree.

The invitation to psychologize is built in.

Sure, but the reality of the psychological effect of birth trauma is speculative. — Janus — unenlightened

Strikes me as consistent with the nature of reality in general and with the concept of dread in particular.

If I've offended anyone, I apologize. — Ciceronianus the White

You could be right.

But two technical points and both reflect failures on my part.

First, only Dasein is "in" the world. All entities not having the characteristics of Dasein are "within" the world that Dasein is "in." I do not think that affects your views/conclusions but I do hope it enhances your understanding of Heidegger.

Second and more important to this particular discussion, I should not have used the word relate(s). Instead, I should have used the word refer(s).

Heidegger is saying that what dread refers to (unlike what fear refers to) is not "within" the world that we are "in" and therefore by definition can not be traced back to us as its source. Though I suspect he would agree that it is related to us.

Though substituting refers for relates does impact your views/conclusions, I do think refer has a more outward sense to it than does relate. And as a result, it produces a more accurate presentation of Heidegger.

I certainly do not want anyone to misunderstand Heidegger based upon what I say. And if someone disagrees with my interpretation of Heidegger, I would hope they could and would tell me why. I do not know Heidegger well enough to intentionally present any extreme interpretations of his work. I am confident that any interpretation of mine that appears as extreme is a result of a mistake on my part.

But I certainly do not expect or insist that everyone or anyone agree with Heidegger or with me.

You're out of the know my friend. Welcome to AP. — frank

Left that sinking ship thirty years ago. Waved goodbye to Chalmers as I went.

he can describe anyone he wishes. But the notion of self identification can only go so far. It walks like a Cartesian and quacks like a Cartesian. . .

Most of us lean toward ontological anti-realism. An example of clarity: — frank

You can't shed the Cartesian baggage by changing the name of the school.

Name a contemporary Cartsian. Most of us lean toward ontological anti-realism. An example of clarity: — frank

And he lacks clarity from sentence one. "The basic task of ontology is 'What exists?'" That is the basic task of metaphysics. The basic task of ontology is the nature of what exists.

What are the odds that clarity would be lost in the very first sentence of an article you consider to be an example of clarity.

Philosophy is so much fun. :smile:

Name a contemporary Cartsian — frank

Searle.

And the rest of us.

We are all Cartesian.

There are some philosophical paradigms that permeate culture from top to bottom.

Cartesianism is the most recent.

Prior to that it was Aristotle.

Since H consciously walks on past the sign that says "End of Logic, Only Phenomenology Ahead" — frank

Have you read Heidegger's Metaphysical Foundations of Logic?

I actually had a hard time tracking down a copy of that one. Barnes and Noble had it listed as the Metaphysical Foundations of Love.

Since he seemed to lack interest in clarity, I say every person's interpretation is equal. — frank — Arne

and when it comes to clarity, which ontological treatises prior to Heidegger would you consider having adequate clarity? And if they have more clarity, is that even the test? After 500 years of Descartes, the Cartesian's believe they can explain the interaction of subject and object by calling it transcendence and then pretending that they are not using the word as if it were a synonym for magic.

Since he seemed to lack interest in clarity, I say every person's interpretation is equal. — frank

don't you find that to be a bit convenient? Certainly there are aspects of Heidegger to which all serious Heidegger scholars would concur? And certainly you would agree that some people are simply better at articulating their interpretation than others? Or perhaps you have a different understanding of interpretation than I? Is there anything regarding the interpretation I have offered that you think any serious Heidegger scholar would dispute in any significant way? I doubt if I am on the fringes. On the other hand, I do not interact with many people who have more than a passing understanding of Being and Time.

This dread of unknown etiology is just the case where the nothing is revealed to consciousness. — frank

I think Heidegger would agree with Wittgenstein's notion that the world is everything. And since dread (for Heidegger) refers to no entity within the world (which is everything) then dread necessarily refers to "nothing." And it reveals to consciousness that to which it refers.

then I defer. What is Metaphysics is on my list. I will bump it up a notch.

Maybe, but not in this essay. Pay attention to his references to Hegel. This essay is not complete gibberish. It seems like you're suggesting that it is. — frank

I am not suggesting it is gibberish.

I am not using unintelligible as a synonym for gibberish.

For Heidegger, the only entities that can be rendered intelligible are entities that have reference within the world that we are in.

And dread (unlike fear) has no reference within the world that we are in.

As a result, we are simply incapable of rendering intelligible the nothing to which Heidegger argues that dread refers.

What I am thinking however is that nothingness implies somethingness. To say "nothing exists" is a malformed proposition, an incoherent idea, for the fact is that if nothing existed, then this includes the fact or proposition that nothing exists. "Nothing exists" is a performative contradiction. — darthbarracuda

I disagree.

The only meaningful thing implied by nothingness is that considerations were given to the apparent temporal aspects of being.

To treat "nothing" as implying "something" is to reduce it to a present to hand entity.

It is an existenzial of Dasein (and it is experienced as dread).

Try to think about what "being" means — tim wood

You may rest assured, I am familiar with the concept of being.

If memory serves, you suggested that the issue raised in the OP was not properly a philosophical consideration.

If I misunderstood, then my apologies.

If I understood correctly, then offer some arguments that actually support the claim.

I will wait here.

Science doesn't pay attention to being as such. I just mentioned What is Metaphysics because H explores why science doesn't pay attention to the issue of being. Plus I just read it. :razz: — frank

:smile:

I like that. I think.:smile:

If what you're worried about is the spookiness of the language — csalisbury

In some sense, "nothing" draws people in.

I sometimes think nothing and unintelligible are significantly synonymous for Heidegger. Not to mention that unintelligible is an apt description for the end result of most conversations in which people attempt to discuss "nothing."

I think "nothing" is sometimes (most times) shorthand for those who tire of dealing with the apparent temporal nature of being and/or those who are incapable of saying "I do not know."

They are. H talks a lot about the way science ignores being in What is Metaphysics. — frank

are we limited to H's conception of the nature of being?

there are a thousand definitions of metaphysics that all sound very much like "metaphysics is a branch of philosophy that explores the nature of being, existence, and reality." I am pretty sure that big bang thing fits in there somewhere. and that is sciency for sure.

the best you can say is that science is interested only in a particular realm of being. but certainly they are interested in the nature of being of those beings that fall within the realm of being in which they are interested.

and thanks for cluing me in about that capitalization thing.

almost as if entities have no being.