You seem to be going in the same circle. If existence is a real predicate that applies to all actual objects, then it is by definition a universal predicate of all actual objects. And if there are no other predicates universal to all actual objects, then we are "justified" [your word] in calling existence a "special case".

And I am not even saying I agree with the proposition, I am simply saying "existence" as a special case is inherently justified within the proposition.

For the most part, I tend to agree with Kant in that "existence" [at least in the way it is generally used] is not a real predicate.

Excellent. Heidegger is definitely a bit murky on the issue. And limiting oneself to just Being and Time is no help. But his failure to be more precise in Being and Time does not affect the overall ontological thrust of his work.

In that context, I say:
"Discourse" is the process whereby one expresses an interpretation of an understanding rooted in the intelligibility of being-in-the-world.

And language is just one of the many ways for engaging in that process.

For those who are unable to conceive of "Discourse" in non-verbal/non-linguistic terms, then I simply say:
"X" is the process whereby one expresses an interpretation of an understanding rooted in the intelligibility of being-in-the-world.

And language is just on of the many ways for engaging in that process.

Had you actually replied directly to me, I would have responded days ago.

Oh well.

he is obviously talking about existence as a universal property of all objects. Because one property may have to be a property of all objects does not necessitate that all properties be a properties of all objects. and you already know that.

are you sure you are talking to me? I made no request for "plain language." As for Heidegger and neologisms, are you really going to claim that words do not accrue baggage? Is there a single one of us for whom the word "reality" is not pregnant with a particular ontological disposition? Does the realist mean the same by "reality" as the idealist? Neologisms are essential to breaking new ground. Does Being and Time often lack clarity? Of course it does, But it was put together on time constraints and the body of Heidegger's work (both before and after) is well suited to providing clarification.

When I turn the oven to 425 degrees in order to bake a potato, I have just expressed my understanding of the appropriate temperature at which to bake a potato. Every act is an expression of an understanding and every such expression is discourse.

I disagree. And I am particularly puzzled about Wittgenstein's and your notion of futility regarding "some" or "many" "so called" discussions. Doesn't that merely beg the question? Certainly Wittgenstein would deem worthy the discussions he joined or started and I suspect you would do the same. Or do the both of you engage in "futile" discussions? Or is that an adjective reserved for discussions that you do not find "worthwhile?" Just asking.

1. There is being-in-the-world.
2. There is the intelligibility of being-in-the-world.
3. There is an understanding rooted in the intelligibility of being-in-the-world.
4. There is an interpretation of an understanding rooted in the intelligibility of being-in-the-world.
5. There is a rendering explicit of an interpretation of an understanding rooted in the intelligibility of being-in-the-world.
6. There is language as a method (one of several) for rendering explicit an interpretation of an understanding rooted in the intelligibility of being-in-the-world.

Language does not make an appearance in the primordial order of being-in-the-world until level six and even then it is just one of several methods for doing what it does.

I agree that language plays a pivotal role in reflection and I suspect Heidegger would also agree. However, he would maintain that the role of reflection is quite minimal in our average everydayness. Only for the novice does reflection play a role in most of the routine things we do each and every day. That in fact the better we get at doing things (rendering explicit our understanding of what we are doing) the less thought we give them and the less thought we need to give them.

!! I do not disagree with that. Partly because I have not read enough of Nietzsche or those who have. But again, my primary appreciation of Kaufmann is the historical context he provides, particularly regarding what Nietzsche's sister did with his unpublished works following his descent to madness. He would never have condoned the interpretation she gladly pushed upon the Nazis. As for the continental philosophers in general, you may be correct regarding the general public. As for myself and even though other interpretations are useful, I prefer my Heidegger main line. (though sadly, I do not read in German). Give it to me straight doctor, I can take it!!! :smile:

I agree. and the notion that Shakespeare's plays are "contrived" (I believe that was the word) is in and of itself relative. They may well be contrived by today's standards, but can the same be said regarding the standards of his day, whatever they may have been? So again, are people upset because the standards seem to be based upon opinions or are they upset because the opinions upon which they are based do not include theirs? and that is a fair question.

oh well

as true as the starting point may be, many seem to argue that there is nothing wrong with opinion being the basis of what constitutes art, but only object to whose opinion ought to matter. the deeper issue is what is art aside from the various constituencies who feel entitled to have their opinion determine the issue.

that toward which we are drawn. thoughts are useful to rendering explicit that to which we are drawn. they are not the cause.

existence is not a real predicate (Kant)

interesting. I agree.

high school science should be sufficient. I majored in philosophy and geology was the only college level science course I had. You will be fine.

then it would not be rule by the people, it would be rule by some of the people. which pretty much describes every form of government other than democracy. words have meaning.

which only reinforces my primary message. it is difficult to understand Nietzsche directly.

except Kaufmann does far more than translate. He provides historical perspective.

the argument over free will is nothing more than philosophy as industry. if there is free will and you live as if there is not, that is tragic. If there is no free will and you live as if there is, you could not have chosen to do otherwise.

Nietzsche will always be difficult to understand first hand. I found it extremely useful to read Walter Kaufman's seminal assessment of Nietzsche.

only a being in a world could question whether there was world.

Objectivity is an adopted disposition useful for purposes of assessment. It is not our natural state of being. You cannot be more on the inside than we are. And when we mistakenly think objectivity can be a constant state of being, we mistakenly think we are on the outside looking in. As a result, we are on the inside mistakenly believing we are on the outside looking in and that is a formula for maximum cognitive dissonance.

1.13
The facts in logical space are the world.

What is logical space?

and if the facts in logical are the world, then there can be no other space within the world that is not subsumed by logical space?

and states of affairs. — Posty McPostface

is the difference between "states of affairs" and "atomic facts" reconcilable?

It is my understanding that they are not synonymous?

It is also my understanding we are using the Ogden translation?

ok

It's a matter outside of the applicability of logic, proof and words. — Michael Ossipoff

I like that.

And I agree.

I'm not posing an objection as much as a skeptical worry that you're a flesh and blood animal employing concepts which you acquired in the course of participating in an earth-bound human form of life and it seems bad philosophical practice to investigate the nature and origin of both all that is and the existence of entities as such without first giving some consideration as to why you feel entitled to hold that these abstract concepts are capable of doing that sort of work. — John Doe

That is an extremely long sentence that I like even though I do not care for long sentences because they contain multiple ideas and I am not so good at following multiple ideas because they have a tendency to confuse me and be exceptionally hard to follow for people that. . .

But I do agree.

:smile:

ok. I think. :smile:

I like puppies more and people less each and every day.

shouldn't the question be whether the universe was created? why do you presume it was created? Perhaps it has always been or is a eternal recurring process of sorts?

This is the thread. — Srap Tasmaner

is there an agreed upon text?

is there a proposed schedule for their timely completion? Please advise. — Arne

All will be revealed in due time. — Posty McPostface

you can never get me that information too soon. I have started Tractatus a couple of times and just could not get into it. Reading it in a structured way with others could make the difference. At least that is my hope. — Arne

And now I am saddened.

so my biggest fears have in fact been realized. Is there a separate thread? What am I expected to have already read? Is there a reading schedule? What edition is being used? Is there one post that contains all of this information? Now I am unhappy.

Are you unhappy with how things are being handled thus far? — Posty McPostface

No. I am not unhappy.

Certain posts lead me to mistakenly believe the collective reading has begun and someone forgot to tell me or I did not notice.

I am excited about the prospect of the group and am therefore anxious.

As long as you don't forget me when it comes to launch time, you may disregard my childlike impatience.

:smile:

All will be revealed in due time. — Posty McPostface

It would be good if all of the comments on this thread were made within the context of a reading group that is off the ground. Just saying.

In talking with Frank yesterday regarding the concept of "dread", he referred a couple of times to Heidegger's essay What is Metaphysics?. Not have read the essay, I deferred. I have read it. And as always with Heidegger, it is tough going but it is worth the read.

What I find most fascinating within the context of the OP is that "nothing" is not experienced as the negation of being or as separate from being. Instead, Heidegger maintains that certain moods (such as boredom) reveal being as a whole. But of course moods are impermanent. And with the slipping away of the sense of the wholeness of being, nothing rushes in. What is Metaphysics? At 45-47.

-- Mark Wrathall, How to Read Heidegger — frank

good book.

Each of us is an understanding of being. We are driven towards and drawn to (1) that which is consistent with our understanding of being, (2) that which facilitates our interpretation of our understanding of being, and (3) that which facilitates our articulation of our interpretation of our understanding of being.

I fail to see how arguing for or against the notion that we prefer what we are driven to or drawn towards contributes any substance.

the entire post rests upon a distinction between preference and reason and I suspect that if there is any such distinction, it is chimerical at best. Most people consider their preferences rooted in reason, i.e,. they have reasons for what they prefer. And your thesis supports that our apparently reasoned positions are simply overlays of argument upon philosophical positions adopted out of preference. So we have reasons for our preferences and preferences for our reasons and you have presented no argument as to why the reducibility of each to the other provides either with a deeper ground?

in fact, if we push your premise, your preference for preference as the ground of philosophy that all reasoned positions are the product of preferences and there is, therefore, no room for reason as an alternative primordial ground. As a result, even your distinction between preference and a reasoned position is a distinction without a difference.