You begin with "On the Values Necessary for Thought" and end with 3 paragraphs on "Fear of the Lord is the Beginning of Wisdom." And you raise many issues in between. I do not wish to discuss all the issues raised and I do not know which of the many issues raised is the one you wish most to discuss.

I too am concerned about the almost knee-jerk disrespect for those wishing to affirm or entertain the possibility of the existence of God. And my experience is that I receive more disrespect from those who consider themselves enlightened than from believers. Such disrespect is okay on Facebook. It is out of place on this forum.

No, he does not speak directly in terms of freedom. However, authentic Being-one's-Self is a choice. Please see Being and Time at 312-313 — Arne

— Joshs

Thank you, Josh My bad. I did not intend to imply that "freedom" is a term Heidegger never uses. But it does not carry the same gravitas for Heidegger as it does for Sartre. Not to mention, I have a deeper interest in Division One of Being and Time than Division Two. I should have taken more care with my answer.

Thanking you again.

.

Heidegger doesn't seem to say a lot about freedom and Being — Corvus

No, he does not speak directly in terms of freedom. However, authentic Being-one's-Self is a choice. Please see Being and Time at 312-313.

it's moral character exists only in the minds of those experiencing it — AmadeusD

A sense of "evil" is a physiological phenomenon not limited to only those who experience evil. I have never experienced evil yet nonetheless have a sense of what it is. An evil act is repugnant to nature.

I am going to bed now.

but it's moral character exists only in the minds of those experiencing it — AmadeusD

Are you suggesting that "only" those "experiencing it" can grasp the moral character of "it"? And even if that is correct, what is the basis by which their grasp of the moral character of "it" is to be rendered null and void?

And I concede in advance that natural rights, if they exist, are the rights of beings with minds and that is certainly where they are to be found.

So rather than inferior to or equal to the logical thought which philosophy uses to try to grasp it, it rather precedes it. — Noble Dust

Some, such as Nietzsche, argue that the formative forces of art and the formative forces of philosophy are the same.

I haven't considered him an artist. — Ciceronianus

Your OP is entitled the "Nature of Art." It would be a mistake to presume only artists have meaningful things to say about the "Nature of Art."

but it's moral character exists only in the minds of those experiencing it — AmadeusD

Then you are correct, we have little to talk about.

And I would agree that it's not useful to reclassify philosophers as artists. What I was saying was that there is an artistic sensibility, an artistic creative power behind some philosophical visions/works. And that (perhaps) the act of philosophy can also be considered an artistic one, as per Janus below - — Tom Storm

I agree. Not all with an "artistic sensibility" are artists. And Nietzsche goes so far as to suggest that the primary formative forces that frame the "reality of art" for the person of artistic sensibility frame the "reality of existence" for the person of philosophic sensibility. And he makes a damn good argument.

Your OP is entitled "The Nature of Art." Philosophy historically is very much concerned with the "nature of being." Reason alone suggests that the nature of being would include the nature of art.

I strongly recommend Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music and Heidegger's Origin of the Work of Art..

Abstract concepts like being, self, and consciousness are expressed using language, and most of the time, their terms don't have a unified meaning.
— Abhiram

The lack of what you call a "unified meaning" reflects a lack of consensus, hence a diversity of opinion. This diversity is the source of the richness of philosophy, not a problem to be overcome. Your proposal is essentially one of linguistic despotism. — Pantagruel

The lack of a "unified meaning" to fundamental terms over hundreds (thousands?) of years suggests that the terms may be beyond the ability of language to define in a manner sufficiently precise to yield anything close to a consensus.

And no philosopher worth their salt is going to allow anyone to decide what they mean by the terms they use. It is not going to happen.

I don't see the philosophy of Kierkegaard in 'jeopardy' because his concept of anfægtelse lacks having a unified concept. — javi2541997

and in the world of philosophy, putting it in jeopardy would likely cause a revival. The Kierkegaardians would be coming out of the woodwork.

philosophers would be the last group of people to ever agree to a unified language.

So what would be the point of needing what you cannot have?

Won't they mean something in that we can point to the evil being done in their violation?
— Count Timothy von Icarus

This seems to beg it's question. The 'evil' seems to consist in the violation of a right. If so, without hte right, there is no evil. — AmadeusD

I am not certain I agree with that. The law and morality are not the same and whether "evil" is outlawed by the former does not sever it from the latter. The absence of natural rights or the absence of law does not cleanse any behavior of its moral character.

.

The West does not think, and all the people who live in this undefined western region do not think with one mind. Nor do they all share the same values, or even interpret specific values in the same way. "The West" is a diverse, incoherent and frequently self-contradictory human construct. — Vera Mont

This is well said. And to some degree, the same can be said when we begin talking about the X community or the Y community as if they shared the same brain. In some sense, a "human construct" is simply a useful "illusion."

This is hermeneutics. To me, the revealing power of phenomenology is the foundational indeterminacy, the openness that one stands in when one's language potentialities proceed in open inquiry and discover the threshold, and NO words are fit to do the foundational work. — Astrophel

Well said.

Freedom, not free will. Sartre was not an anti-determinist. — Astrophel

I agree that Sartre was not an "anti-determinist" but he was also not a "determinist". And that can be seen with my comments considered as a whole.

I suspect Sartre, like Heidegger, would consider the determinism/free-will issue to be philosophy as industry and would have no interest in engaging on the issue (as I also suggested in my initial comment.).

I was answering a hypothetical and my intent was to suggest that Sartre is never going to be backed into a determinist corner. Perhaps I should have used those words rather than suggesting he would always come down on the side of "free will."

Your point is well taken.

Not sure if we are IN our existence. Aren't we existence? — Corvus

Great question. Existence is a "mode" of being (other modes of being are "present to hand" and/or "ready to hand."). And existence is the mode of being of that being that IS "being-in-the-world." And the being that is being-in-the-world" is "Dasein." Ergo, existence is Dasein's mode of being.

Astrophel is correct, your question begs a reading of Being and Time.

Questions like that beg for a reading of Being and Time. — Astrophel

Absolutely.

.

Therefore, Sartre would spurn biological determinism. — Justin5679

What is this about? What is it that you mean by biological "determinism?" Certainly Sartre accepts that freedom as he conceives of it is circumscribed by the biological organism in which our consciousness seems to be embedded?

Is it not safe to say that Sartre will "spurn" any all "isms" insofar as they suggest that we are any less free than Sartre considers us to be?

Is there any doubt that Sartre will always come down on the side of free will?


Good stuff.

Would Sartre contend that freedom is a product of our biology ontologically speaking? — Justin5679

I would be surprised if Sartre would take a stand on the issue. His aim is to describe existence as it is rather than how it may be that it is as it is. For Sartre, it is not relevant whether existence is a product of biology?

Resentment and Ressentiment are not the same. For Nietzsche, ressentiment is a reactionary generating of new values and a normative re-evaluating of existing values within a hierarchical context.

But time exists if space exists independent of whether change exists or not. — MoK

you are putting the cart before the horse. The greatest change in the history of the universe is the Big Bang. There would be no space/time without the Big Bang. Ergo, there would be no space/time without change.

yes I did.

Time and space are twisted and are parts of a single manifold called spacetime. This means that you have time if you have space. — MoK

Thank you.

I already know that.

And nothing I said is inconsistent with it.

Logic does have its limits.

And sometimes those limits are determined by the way in which we choose to assemble the language.

For example, one could just as well say: time is the measure of change rather than a pre-requisite for it. There would be no time in the absence of change. Time is not in the nothing anymore than time is in the something.

And of course we would have a different set of logical implications.

/

I wish you nothing but the best.

Still mad props for finding the quote. — Vaskane

I wish you nothing but the best.

that teaches me nothing — Vaskane

But it does reveal the truth of you.

I wish you nothing but the best.

your weak ability with understanding — Vaskane

ignorant dumbass — Vaskane

your rashness — Vaskane

you being an idiot — Vaskane

getting your ass handed to you — Vaskane

after I had slapped you around for saying stupid shit. — Vaskane

that worm-like reason — Vaskane

Ty now shut up — Vaskane

No. I will not shut up.


I wish you nothing but the best.

I think Pandora's Box would be the better analogy — Wayfarer

Agreed.

I don't know what commentators have made of that, but it is a telling comment. — Wayfarer

And consistent with his notions of technology as the cat that has been let out of the bag or the genie that has been let out of the bottle. Control is an illusion.

how being might take us beyond notion of god. Or something like that. — Tom Storm

Philosophy strikes me as "fools gold" for both the theist and the atheist. And Heidegger's philosophy is no exception.

If the but-you-have-faith-too rhetoric targets me, I could accept that and use it as basis of definition of what faith means to the believer. So, when I get on a plane or cross a street, do I think I can never be hit by a car, or that planes never crash? Obviously not. That which I put my faith in is fallible; I know it to be fallible; and that faith is predicated on that fallibility. I need to put my faith in say a pilot or car drivers, precisely because I know they could mess up and harm me (or even deliberately harm me, who knows?). This works for person-faith, too: you commit to your relationships; you don't let go of that trust easily. And in turn you attempt to act trustworthy, too.

But abstract enough, apply it to God, and I, an atheist, am left with... nothing that makes sense. What it looks like to me is this: From early on, you put your trust in God the way you put your trust in your parents. And by the time you differentiate between fallible people and the triple-omni God, that faith is in place and it needs a target. The meaning of the concept is quite literally what you put your faith in. Basically, faith constitutes God by way of the trust-people metaphor. — Dawnstorm

Fascinating. Faith in entities you know to be fallible and faith in entities you believe to be infallible. If these are different varieties of faith, then the non-believer would subscribe to the former while the believer would subscribe to both? That in and of itself strikes me as a sufficient response to the idea that "you have faith too."

Of course as a good atheist, I have had to deal with a range of apologists and many times had to run through the various well-worn and shop-soiled arguments, which for me come post hoc. — Tom Storm

We have similar experiences. As a good non-atheist, I have had to deal with a range of apologists and many times had to run through the various well-worn and shop-soiled arguments, which for me come post hoc. It can be exhausting. But I am just too lazy to stop. :-)

whose reading of H may not be seen as adequate these days — Tom Storm

Interesting. Sometimes I think it is "fashionable" to diss on Dreyfus. When it came to American Heidegger scholars, there was a time when he was essentially a lone voice in the wilderness. It is nonsensical to hold any person under such circumstances to contemporary standards of adequacy. I suspect there is no philosopher who did more to mainstream Heidegger to American universities.

And many of the most pre-eminent Heidegger scholars of the 21st century studied under Dreyfus, including Mark Wrathall now at Oxford, Sean Kelly now at Harvard, William Blattner now at Georgetown and the late John Haugland who spent most of his teaching career at Pittsburgh. And every one of them loved Dreyfus. I defer to them on the issue of adequacy.

I suspect his thinking is too lofty to incorporate a personal god. — Tom Storm

I disagree. Nothing in his thinking precludes a personal God. Though he was far from being a humble man per se, it would not surprise me if he considered no philosophy to be lofty enough on the issue. And I am confident the least he would say is that it is an issue for theology rather than philosophy. But more than anything, I have come across nothing in his history or in his work to suggest he ever had any significant philosophical interest in the issue.

And my experience is not that Heidegger is difficult to understand because his thinking is lofty (which I don't think it is). Instead, I find it extremely dense and jargon dependent. And my solution is to just keep reading it over and over again.

All the Dreyfus class lectures (N=28) on Division One of Being and Time can be downloaded at:
https://archive.org/details/Philosophy_185_Fall_2007_UC_Berkeley

I believe I also found, downloaded, and still have copies of the syllabus for the Dreyfus lectures and it does list the pages that one is expected to read prior to the lecture. It was pretty cool being able to read Being and Time in sections and then listen to the Dreyfus lecture on that section. I still listen to the lectures from time to time but generally as background while I wander around the house or around the yard tending to matters.

Sean Kelly's class lectures were once available for download on Harvard's website but I do not think that is still the case. I am glad I downloaded them when I did. But they were recorded early in his career at Harvard and so his approach is recognizably and understandably modeled on Dreyfus. Still, the audio quality of his lectures is superior.