Would Sartre contend that freedom is a product of our biology ontologically speaking? — Justin5679

I would be surprised if Sartre would take a stand on the issue. His aim is to describe existence as it is rather than how it may be that it is as it is. For Sartre, it is not relevant whether existence is a product of biology?

Fair enough.

I think I may have found the quote pertaining to universal determinism which would encompass the notion of biological determinism. I am using Sarah Richmond's translation. "Indeed, if we allowed that the question might be determined in the questioner by a universal determinism, it would cease not only to be intelligible but even to be conceivable. In point of fact, a real cause produces a real effect, and a being that is caused is wholly engaged by its cause within positivity: to the extent that it depends on its being on its cause, it cannot contain the slightest germ of nothingness within it; insofar as a questioner must be able to take a sort of nihilating step back to relation to the thing he is questioning, he escapes from the causal order of the world and extricates himself from the glue of being." (Sartre, J.P.; Richmond, S., 1943, 2018, pg. 59)

Sartre, J.P. (1943). Being and Nothingness. New York, NY. Washington Square Press. Translated by Sarah Richmond, 2018: pg. 59.

So in other words, questioning is a form of liberation. Therefore, Sartre would spurn biological determinism.

Think of it like this: there you stand on the precipice of an unmade future, and this is an abiding condition, that is, there is no way out of this for it is the very constitution of your existence, to be at this threshold. This is our freedom. Most of the time, we are, in Sartre's vocabulary, in bad faith, meaning we deem ourselves like things with a nature or essence, and we simply go along with the world as a teacher, an electrician, a mother, lover of cheddar cheese, and everything else in your "totality" to use a Heideggerian term, and it never occurs to us that we can bring these roles on life's stage under review and gainsay them. But once this happens, and you interrogate your auto-pilot living in habits (Kierkegaard) and routines, you see that everything that can be done by you can be brought before judgment. So there you are, again, on this precipice of a decision to go to the market, feed the cat, collude with the Nazis (as lots of Frenchmen did), and here one has to see that as one stands in this "place," no possibility for action escapes notice. If it does, and you just don't think about it, then your freedom cannot review it and you are beneath responsibility (this is entirely derivative of Kierkegaard's Concept of Anxiety. Reading this book one finds over and over, oh, here is where Sartre gets it). One cannot be responsible for what one doesn't explcitly know, as I am not responsible for ritual greeting practices in some remote society, for in the choice, one cannot reject or accept it.

As to psychology: I refer to Heidegger, and Sartre is the same, I am sure. When one chooses freely, it is a choice made from the "potentiality of possibilities" of one's own existence. When one chooses, the nature of the choice cannot exceed these possiblities any more than I can choose to marry or not marry according to 19th century Zulu customs; I don't even know what these are. The psychology of it is more the way choices are finite within a culture. Nazi collusion among the French during occupation, which Sartre resented greatly and wanted to argue that this was freely chosen behavior, was in full knowledge of the moral context this was in. Sartre was saying excuses for collusion were not acceptable. They knew.

Therefore, Sartre would spurn biological determinism. — Justin5679

What is this about? What is it that you mean by biological "determinism?" Certainly Sartre accepts that freedom as he conceives of it is circumscribed by the biological organism in which our consciousness seems to be embedded?

Is it not safe to say that Sartre will "spurn" any all "isms" insofar as they suggest that we are any less free than Sartre considers us to be?

Is there any doubt that Sartre will always come down on the side of free will?


Good stuff.

Would Sartre contend that freedom is a product of our biology ontologically speaking? It would seem that he would not because he believed in radical freedom. I do not know what is your opinion? — Justin5679

Isn't ontological freedom a misnomer? Ontology doesn't have anything to do with freedom. Ontology deals with the issues on existence i.e. what is to be existent or non-existent? viz. Does God exist? Does soul exist? Can nonexistent object exist? ... etc etc.

Freedom is a property of actions, motions and thoughts.
X is free to move, do, go, carry out, decide ...etc.
Y is free from contamination, illness, breaking, mistake, death ...etc.

Isn't ontological freedom an inappropriate combination of the words? Maybe Sartre had some argument for making up the combinatory concept. If he had, could you further elaborate on it?

Is there any doubt that Sartre will always come down on the side of free will? — Arne

Freedom, not free will. Sartre was not an anti-determinist. Freedom is not a concept, but a structure of consciousness. Phenomenologists are descriptive, and freedom is evident when one stands before choices and is free to choose. A tree or a stone doesn't have choices, this is the basis for positing freedom.

Isn't ontological freedom a misnomer? Ontology doesn't have anything to do with freedom. Ontology deals with the issues on existence i.e. what is to be existent or non-existent? viz. Does God exist? Does soul exist? Can nonexistent object exist? ... etc etc.

Freedom is a property of actions, motions and thoughts.
X is free to move, do, go, carry out, decide ...etc.
Y is free from contamination, illness, breaking, mistake, death ...etc.

Isn't ontological freedom an inappropriate combination of the words? Maybe Sartre had some argument for making up the combinatory concept. If he had, could you further elaborate on it? — Corvus

It is OUR existence. Freedom, that is.

It is OUR existence. Freedom, that is. — Astrophel

Isn't OUR existence devoid of freedom? Everyone on earth came with no choice of theirs. According to Heidegger, we are all thrown into the world by chance. Having biological bodies mean you are not free either. You must eat, drink, sleep, breathe ... in order to keep the life get going, while getting older. Then the body you have been carrying all your life suddenly will give up on you one day for certain, whether you wanted or not. That is no freedom is it?

Freedom is a relative concept. One is free only in certain conditions, movements and actions and thoughts. It is a limited concept too. But existence is definitely not free.

Yes I get your point I think. Let me try to paraphrase what you are discussing. There are rational choices and choices that go beyond one's scope. However, Sartre was aiming for a type of freedom that would allow normal citizens to reflect on their habits of thought that could hinder them doing anything about evils that exist in the world. Is this what you are getting at? Yes, Sartre definitely disliked the idea of an essence. I think Sartre disliked it, because he thought it was an excuse to do nothing about what is in one's power to do something even if it is miniscule. Heidegger would understand it as related to Dasein and how "Zuworfenung" or throwedness. I think one's existence is constantly a struggle to actualize oneself as Aristotle might say. Thank you for your insight.

Yes I did not see it that way. That is a good point. Is ontology a function of ascertaining abilities or is it a means of delineating the mechanisms behind the abilities? I see what you are getting at, I believe. Yes his title is kind of paradoxical considering an essay in phenomenology was antithetical to Husserl's idea of phenomenology.

Yes that is right. Husserl was trying to get to some common ground between various experiences by explaining different tiers of consciousness, in my opinion. They all were trying to describe experience, so I guess Sartre was not so antithetical to phenomenology after all.

Yes I see what you mean but Heidegger uses the word facticity and factical, to relay these concepts. You are not wrong though.

Isn't OUR existence devoid of freedom? Everyone on earth came with no choice of theirs. According to Heidegger, we are all thrown into the world by chance. Having biological bodies mean you are not free either. You must eat, drink, sleep, breathe ... in order to keep the life get going, while getting older. Then the body you have been carrying all your life suddenly will give up on you one day for certain, whether you wanted or not. That is no freedom is it?

Freedom is a relative concept. One is free only in certain conditions, movements and actions and thoughts. It is a limited concept too. But existence is definitely not free. — Corvus

Thrownness is the source of freedom. Look at it like this: Freedom is what is provided as possibilities for choice. One, by being-with others (mitda-sein) is thereby freed FOR being with others, that is, because one is capable to be with others--and in the mundane sense this means the obvious, sharing, describing, confessing, commiserating, sympathizing, and on and on, one thereby has certain possiblities open to their freedom. One can now do all those things because one has this "with-others" within one's own existence.

It may sound like an odd way to put it, but Heidegger sees freedom as something that issues from a "potentiality of possibilities" which is, essentially, one's history. Because I lived in the suburbs of a Connecticut city, I am now free or enabled to talk, criticize, recall, etc. about this kind of suburban life. We are free because the future is unmade, and when we realize that our unmade future is "open" we are no longer determined in our actions and thoughts. It is when one simply goes along with the world, believing, acting, obeying as if we were nor free to choose, that one is not free.

But no, we don't choose our existence. We choose IN our existence.

But no, we don't choose our existence. — Astrophel

Sounds correct. Existence is not free. Existence is random, contingent, limited and fated to become nothing.

We choose IN our existence. — Astrophel

Not sure if we are IN our existence. Aren't we existence?

Yes that is right. Husserl was trying to get to some common ground between various experiences by explaining different tiers of consciousness, in my opinion. They all were trying to describe experience, so I guess Sartre was not so antithetical to phenomenology after all. — Justin5679

Sartre was a phenomenologist, and he followed it the tradition of both following Kant and rejecting Kant. Kant was the one who said all we can ever know is phenomena, and nothing more, separating knowledge from the metaphysical Real and denying phenomena its rightful ontological standing. Phenomenologists refused to throw experience under the bus like this, and argued that our finitude IS existence not secondary to anything.

Sounds correct. Existence is not free. Existence is random, contingent, limited and fated to become nothing. — Corvus

But that rewords it in a way I can't agree with. All there is for us to witness is our existence and other things that appear in our existence. What is contained therein is a matter to be determined. Important to see that these terms, fandom, contingent, limited, are ALL themselves indeterminate. They have meaning, but these meanings are themselves contingent. This is hermeneutics. To me, the revealing power of phenomenology is the foundational indeterminacy, the openness that one stands in when one's language potentialities proceed in open inquiry and discover the threshold, and NO words are fit to do the foundational work. One does as Heidegger, later on, suggested with his term gelassenheit: one yields, bends to attend to what is there.
For me, this leads only one place, which is value-in-being.

Not sure if we are IN our existence. Aren't we existence? — Corvus

An excellent point to make. Both. Being-in IS our existence. Questions like that beg for a reading of Being and Time.

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Questions like that beg for a reading of Being and Time. — Astrophel

Absolutely.

Not sure if we are IN our existence. Aren't we existence? — Corvus

Great question. Existence is a "mode" of being (other modes of being are "present to hand" and/or "ready to hand."). And existence is the mode of being of that being that IS "being-in-the-world." And the being that is being-in-the-world" is "Dasein." Ergo, existence is Dasein's mode of being.

Astrophel is correct, your question begs a reading of Being and Time.

Freedom, not free will. Sartre was not an anti-determinist. — Astrophel

I agree that Sartre was not an "anti-determinist" but he was also not a "determinist". And that can be seen with my comments considered as a whole.

I suspect Sartre, like Heidegger, would consider the determinism/free-will issue to be philosophy as industry and would have no interest in engaging on the issue (as I also suggested in my initial comment.).

I was answering a hypothetical and my intent was to suggest that Sartre is never going to be backed into a determinist corner. Perhaps I should have used those words rather than suggesting he would always come down on the side of "free will."

Your point is well taken.

This is hermeneutics. To me, the revealing power of phenomenology is the foundational indeterminacy, the openness that one stands in when one's language potentialities proceed in open inquiry and discover the threshold, and NO words are fit to do the foundational work. — Astrophel

Well said.

An excellent point to make. Both. Being-in IS our existence. Questions like that beg for a reading of Being and Time. — Astrophel

Great question. Existence is a "mode" of being (other modes of being are "present to hand" and/or "ready to hand."). And existence is the mode of being of that being that IS "being-in-the-world." And the being that is being-in-the-world" is "Dasein." Ergo, existence is Dasein's mode of being.

Astrophel is correct, your question begs a reading of Being and Time. — Arne

:nerd: :pray: Being is closely linked with temporality i.e. past present and future. Men is not just Being but Dasein viz "Being There in the world". I did read Being and Time a few year ago. It was a tough read. Will need to read it again to refresh the points. Recall there had been reading groups for Heidegger in here too.

Contrast to Sartre (please correct me, if this point is wrong), Heidegger doesn't seem to say a lot about freedom and Being. Rather Beings are limited by temporality which are destined for deaths. Death is the final events for all Beings which happens to the Being in most personal intimate way i.e. strictly alone to the Being itself.

I agree that Sartre was not an "anti-determinist" but he was also not a "determinist". And that can be seen with my comments considered as a whole.

I suspect Sartre, like Heidegger, would consider the determinism/free-will issue to be philosophy as industry and would have no interest in engaging on the issue (as I also suggested in my initial comment.).

I was answering a hypothetical and my intent was to suggest that Sartre is never going to be backed into a determinist corner. Perhaps I should have used those words rather than suggesting he would always come down on the side of "free will." — Arne

Yes. These phenomenologists are descriptive, and because we make choices, and "things" don't, freedom is the ontological description of a being who makes choices. We have options and possibilities, but where THESE come from is, and this comes from Heidegger, historical, our words and our culture, and where THIS comes from stops there, because no words are determinate or fixed. Even the term "determinate": thinking of Wittgenstein's emphatic insistence that certain terms are just nonsense, like "the world" and "ethics" and its "value". Of course, we use these contextually all the time, but in philosophy where terms are understood at the most basic level, their meanings vanish because language cannot talk about language. Even modus ponens is "conceived" to be what it is. Does this mean we have a grasp on its foundational ontology? Of course not. We live and breathe in the indeterminacy of anything that is spoken. Derrida showed this, but then, Derrida was no ethical or moral nihilist! You see, that too would be talking about the enigmatic and impossible IT of the world.

Simon Critchley wrote that philosophy was the great spreader of doubt and despair because nothing survives inquiry. But I disagree. Like the Hindu's jnana yoga, philosophy is a liberation from tthe presumption of knowing.

Simon Critchley wrote that philosophy was the great spreader of doubt and despair because nothing survives inquiry. But I disagree. Like the Hindu's jnana yoga, philosophy is a liberation from tthe presumption of knowing — Astrophel

Heidegger determined the span of history from Anaximander to Nietzsche as being beholden to the guiding question of philosophy, ‘Why is there something rather than nothing’? This guiding question was based on a thinking of being as objective presence, and truth as correctness. Heidegger wanted to replace the guiding question with the basic question, ‘how does be-ing essentially occur’? This thinking no longer opposes subject to object , existence to nothingness, truth to untruth.

Heidegger doesn't seem to say a lot about freedom and Being — Corvus

No, he does not speak directly in terms of freedom. However, authentic Being-one's-Self is a choice. Please see Being and Time at 312-313.

Heidegger doesn't seem to say a lot about freedom and Being
— Corvus

No, he does not speak directly in terms of freedom. However, authentic Being-one's-Self is a choice. Please see Being and Time at 312-313 — Arne

In being-ahead-of-oneself as the being toward one's ownmost potentiality-of-being lies the existential and ontological condition of the possibility of being free for authentic existentiell possibilities.

With the factical existence of Da-sein, beings are also already encountered. That such beings are discovered in the There of its own existence is not under the control of
Da-sein. Only what, in which direction, to what extent, and how it actually discovers and discloses is a matter of freedom, although always within the limits of its thrownness. (Being and Time)

This thinking no longer opposes subject to object , existence to nothingness, truth to untruth. — Joshs

A liberation from these with only one authority remaining: ethics.

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