If your point would be that human beings have a certain telos (or design), and therefor morally (the way humans should act) is objective, I would disagree with that for a specific reason.

Evolution did not design human beings like we design basketball. But maybe you could say that biological lifeforms do have evolved a kind of telos. The point I would make is that while that is true generally for most life, humans are a special case because part of our telos as eu-social language using beings, is to develop culture. Because culture is not something that is set in stone, but changes over time and from place to place, there is an inherently indeterminate element in our telos… an element that I would argue gets filled in with the intersubjective.

Edit: The term intersubjective is maybe not entirely the correct term for it. It's more something akin to cultural materialism, where the intersubjective/cultural is also in part determined by the specific material circumstances a group finds itself in.

The problem you are noting is that we invented basketball, but this doesn’t make the internal goods to basketball subjective—that’s the key you are missing. These internal goods are relative to the design, irregardless if that design was imbued by a subject or subjects.

If it were subjectively the case that Lebron is a good basketball player, then I would be equally right to say right now that he is a terrible basketball and you wouldn’t be able to say I am wrong—because no one is actually right or wrong about it. — Bob Ross

I agree with all of this, never disagreed about this really.... but that is I think besides the point for the OP.

The point is that different societies have invented different designs, to use your terminology here. It isn't "subjective" what is right or wrong, because it objectively follows from the design, indeed. But what is right or wrong will differ from society to society because they have invented different designs. Maybe it's a bit like american football and soccer (i.e. real football), there is a different design, so a good football player will be something different depending on what design we are talking about.

That is why I argue that it isn't these 'in-group' moral standards that should be used to determine how one acts geopolitically, because they are particular to a certain society, but instead the standards that follow from what is agreed upon in the "internalional community" or in diplomatic dialogue between states.

I'm not sure this will come across because I have been restating basically the same point since the beginning.

No, no. A moral judgment is expressing something objective if its truth is independent of non-objective dispositions; and whether or not someone is good at some form of farming, chess, playing basketball, etc. is objective. E.g., it is not relative to anyone’s beliefs or desires that Lebron is a good basketball player—and, in principle, it couldn’t be the case. — Bob Ross

I don't disagree that Lebron is objectively a good basketball player, I'm saying that we have decided what constitutes a good basketballplayer collectively (or intersubjectively)... and then we can go comparing a specific player like Lebron to that conventional standard, and conclude on the basis of objective facts that he is indeed objectively a good player.

As an Aristotelian, I would say that there are objective, internal goods to things when those things have a Telos. E.g., a good farmer, a bad chess player, a good watch, a bad human, etc. — Bob Ross

I'm not sure what you mean with a Telos or internal good, because we invented farming, chess and clocks. These concept did not exist until we invented them... so how does one make sense of them having an internal good aside from the subjective values and goals we had in mind when devising them. I mean sure, good farming practices for instance will also be informed by objective things in the world, by how plants grow, or how weather fluctuates between seasons, but what it ultimately depends on is on what we decided farming should do for us (i.e. producing food, without to much work, in sustainable ways maybe etc etc).

If there is no actual badness, like you claim, then there is no such thing as a bad farmer. A bad farmer is a farmer that is actually bad at farming—this is not relative to anyone’s beliefs or desires about it. — Bob Ross

I'm saying there is no objective badness, and you're turning that into actual badness... as matter of definition it seems.

What is considered good or bad farming is subjective, in that you do have different ways of farming that have different values in mind (like say conventional, organic, permaculture etc etc...), where the one only is concerned with producing the most food, and other may be concerned more with doing it in an enviromentally healthy way. Once we agree on the cirteria good farming must meet (the standard of judgement is not objective), then we can go and look if a specific farmer meets those criteria (and that does depend on objective factors). I think you are confused between the standard of measurement and the measurement itself in relation to that standard.

Survival doesn’t actually matter under your view: the best you can say is that if you value surviving then you should care about your society. — Bob

That’s what it means: I don’t think you understand what actual goodness entails—it is objective goodness: those are synonyms.

If you say something actual matters, then you are claiming to know at least some moral facts.

That you actually value something, is not the same as that something actually mattering. In other words, that you actually believe or desire for something to matter does not entail that it actually matters. For something to actual matter, it must matter independently of non-objective dispositions. — Bob

That you actually value something, is not the same as that something actually mattering. In other words, that you actually believe or desire for something to matter does not entail that it actually matters. For something to actual matter, it must matter independently of non-objective dispositions. — Bob Ross

That is true for facts about the world, but not for morality because those are not about "truth" in the sense of corresponding to some objective state of the world.

I just don't agree with what you seem to think follows from definition/is axiomatically true. I don't get what an objective value could mean, how do you find these in the world?

Then, you have to deny that there is such a thing as a bad farmer. — Bob Ross

I don't see how you got there.

Morality is useful for knowing what the right thing to do or not do is. — Bob Ross

Not everything is about morality. Morality pertains to human behaviour in relation to the group, by and large. People can and do value things that don't have a lot to do with morality... and can base their decisions for what to do on that. Geo-political decisions also rarely made predominately on the basis of a morality.

Ok, so it sounds like your view is a form of moral anti-realism; because you are denying that moral judgments express something objective; instead, they are inter-subjective. This is just as meaningless to me as if it were straightforwardly subjective: why should anyone care what some group of people think? It literally doesn’t matter, because you are denying that there is anything that actually matters. — Bob Ross

It does matter if you rely on your group for survival, which is generally the case outside maybe modern affluent society to some extend. You risk exclusion from the group.

And I don't think the realism/anti-realism distinction is very helpful here. It's real enough that a certain group of people, grown up with certain moral institutions and traditions, will have certain moral ideas which make them behave in corresponding ways... Morality has real imprints in they way groups are organised, in the people and also real consequences.

Also why should something be objective to actually matter? I don't get it. If I value something 'only subjectively', I do value it... why should I need something extra to actually matter?

I do believe they are doing something wrong according to my own (non-realist/non-universal) moral framework, but I don't necessarily think that should be a or the (only) determining factor in deciding to go to war with another country.

If there is no ‘objective’ morality, then your ethical theory isn’t really useful. It doesn’t matter if you believe that they are doing something wrong but not in the sense that it is actually wrong. — Bob Ross

There is no actual objective wrong, only conventional wrongs, yes.... that's just how it is descriptively. Usefull for what, to be able to declare war?

Is that like moral cultural relativism? — Bob Ross

It is relative between cultures sure, but not for individuals. They are beholden to the morality of their group... so it's not anything goes/up the the individuals choice, if that's what you're worried about.

It sounds like, contrary to your previous statements, you are a moral realist. Moral cultural relativism is a form of moral realism—although I don’t think it works. — Bob Ross

It's neither totally realist nor anti-realist I think. Morals are very real in that they exist as conventions for people to follow within certain groups, and are therefor not merely subjective expressions or choices of individuals... but they are also not the things you go looking for and can find as objective facts in the world. We create them over time.

Ehhh, then I submit to you that you should be amoral: don’t meddle into matters of right or wrong behavior—because you don’t think there is such a thing. I don’t know why you would even care if North Korea is committing mass genocide because you don’t believe they are doing anything wrong. — Bob Ross

I do believe they are doing something wrong according to my own (non-realist/non-universal) moral framework, but I don't necessarily think that should be a or the (only) determining factor in deciding to go to war with another country.

I'm a social constructivist, so yes morality would typically only apply within a certain group, within the group that develloped those morals. But typically there's a dialogue between groups/countries too, and you get trade agreements, treaties, pacts, allies and enemies etc etc.... that would be the geo-political analogue for the social contract, but then between states instead of merely within the group. And so I think justification of wars should be evaluatted within those geo-political conventions, and not solely on the bases of the morals of a particular in-group (like you seem to be doing as a moral realist).

Of course you can. That’s how ethics is done. What you are arguing for is moral particularism—which doesn’t work.

The reason it matters to analyze imperialism on its own merits, is that it changes how one thinks about politics ideally. If you are absolutely anti-imperialism; then you will never try to subject another nation to one’s nation’s values out of principle—irregardless of the consequences. — Bob Ross

Yeah, we have a different sense of what morality is it seems... I'm not sure we can get over this in this discussion. I'm not a moral realist, and I don't think this is how we should do ethics at all.

None of this is true. China abuses the environment and does nothing about it. They are the largest annual emissions since 2006, and their total energy-related emissions is twice that of the US. — Bob Ross

The West has been exporting its production to low-income countries like China for decades to get its products cheaper, it's the production-center of the globalised world... and China's population is three time the size of the US like I said, of course it will have larger emmissions at this particular moment. But it seems hardly fair to only judge a country on that singular metric without regard to historical context.

Then you have no good reasons to ever attack a country; for you are not basing it off of what is actually good, which belongs to ethics. — Bob Ross

Yes, I don't view things in terms of some overarching actual good.... "Actual good" in war is usually merely things valued from the perspective of the one citing it as a justification for war.

That’s true, but despite the point. — Bob Ross

Besides the point you are trying to make maybe, but I think these situational practical concerns typically are more important than any moral concern in deciding to go to war. I don't think anyone should be morally obliged to attack the US for instance, whatever it does, if only because they would loose that war horribly.

Really? If you could invade and conquer North Korea with no casualties nor with starting any other wars (with other countries), you would choose to let the north korean people continue to be butchered and tortured? — Bob Ross

I don't think you get to strip away everything that is salient about a concrete situation, and still have something usefull or applicable to say about how to act in that situation. There usually are casualities in a war and allies that join in... why would we want to ignore all that to determine the morality of an action?

China is the biggest polluter; and renewable energy produces more pollution to manufacture and maintain than fossil fuels. — Bob Ross

China is at least acknowledging the problem and trying to do something about it. It also pollutes way less per capita because it has 3 times the population, and has less historical pollution build up... The US is also the architect, protector and main driver behind this whole global system we have that is the main cause of all of this, so I really don't think there is much of a case to made for not seeing the US as the main culprit... if we had to assign blame anyway.

If it actually were an existential-planet-threat and other countries actually had a way to significantly reduce pollution (other than population control), then yes. I can do you one better: what if the US decided that they were going to detonate a 1,000 nukes for fun—why wouldn’t other countries try to stop them? — Bob Ross

Does it really need to be an existential threat? I don't think so, there's plenty of non-existential damage that could be totally unacceptable, like say the damage we are on track of doing because of climate change. And if the US was a threat to earths biosphere, or if it detonated 1000 nukes for fun, than I guess it would be justified for other countries to try to stop it because that would be a threat to the security of all those countries. So maybe my counter-example wasn't the best example for the point I was trying to make, that morality by itself seems like a poor reason to attack a country.

So, if the Nazis would have stayed in Germany, then you think no one would be warranted in stopping them? — Bob Ross

I don't think you have to invade them, no, if they have no intention of attacking you or your allies... there are other measures. Besides avoiding WWII seems like another solid argument no to do it.

He's a question for you. Now Trump is elected one could make an argument that the US poses a treat to the health of earth's biosphere, as it is one of the biggest polluters and under Trump it also has no intention of doing something about it. Are other countries morally obliged to attack the US in order to prevent further damage to earth's biosphere?

However, that’s because countries were taking each other over for bad reasons. — Bob Ross

The reasons for the war don't necessarily have a lot to do with successful installation of a new political system... it's one factor of many maybe.

That's partially fair; but I would note that imposing important and vital political systems is good. E.g., if you are against imperialism completely, then we wouldn't have any justification to take over North Korea, Talibanian Afghanistan, etc. Nations have a moral obligation to imperialize sometimes. — Bob Ross

I would say they only have a moral obligation to conquer other land if it's in their own vital security interests. But to the point of imposing political systems, would you say historical track records are good for these kind of projects?

For those who are upset at my rhetoric (and perhaps the lens by which I am analyzing this), I challenge you to try to justify, in your response to this OP, e.g., why Western, democratic values should not be forcibly imposed on obviously degenerate, inferior societies at least in principle—like Talibanian Afghanistan, North Korea, Iran, China, India, etc. Some societies are so obviously structured in a way antithetical to the human good, that it is virtually impossible to justify leaving them be in the name of anti-imperialism. E.g., if we could take over North Korea right now without grave consequences (such as nuclear war), then it is obviously in our duty to do so—and this is a form of imperialism. Why would you not be a Western supremacist? — Bob Ross

I would be in favour of some kind of in-group supremacism for all groups, a healthy culture should celibrate itself, but I would be against imperialism because of issues of scale and cultural context. The justification for anti-imperialism would be the scale of imperialism. I believe a "culture" is something that is tied to a specific land and everything that comes with that, a certain climate, what kind of foods you can grow etc etc... There also need to be a certain sense of being culturally unified to speak of a culture, which implies that you cannot spread it to thin geographically. The problem of imperialism is that it disconnects peoples from the traditional ways of their land and their context, which typically causes problems done the line for centuries to come no matter the intentions.

We also have habits and instincts, yes. And many perfectly reasonable decisions that we don't dwell on, simply because they're obviously the correct response to a situation. Reason can't have been invented in response to being challenged: that's the wrong way around. Who was there to challenge an action prior to the concept of rational thought? — Vera Mont

No, but what I'm saying is that "reasons" are not necessarily the result of conscious rational deliberation either. Instincts are obviously prior to all of that, and instincts are to some extend already reasonable. Instincts are the original 'reasons'... then great apes evolved language as a tool of communication as social group animals, then we develloped rationalisation or justification, i.e. delineating and expressing in language, after the fact, the reasons already inherent in behaviour guided by the instincts (or perhaps expressing reasons that weren't even there in case of dissimilation). And then eventually, socrates put forwards the notion that we should have conscious rational deliberation prior to the act as the golden standard.... rational thinking instead of instinct.

You act as if a mind or a self is a thing. A brain is a physical thing, a mind is merely a kind of metaphor for what the brain does. Strictly speaking we do no 'have' a mind, we have thoughts following eachother. That's why I don't think any of this matters a lot, 'en matière'... one mind/two minds, a mind is just a kind container concept to point at the amalgam of thoughts the brain produces. One forest, two forests, a bunch of trees together, to some extend its arbitrary where you want to draw the lines for the concepts you are using.

I prefer to be carefull not to reïfy things, because usually that muddles more than it clarifies... So I'm happy leaving it at "I have conflicting thoughts and drives" without any talk of minds, selfs or wills.

Didn't people have a reason for their actions until somebody forced them to explain? — Vera Mont

I dunno, that is the question right? And that question in turn depends on what you would consider "a reason". Does a chicken have a reason the scratch the ground when looking for food? As I alluded to in a previous post, the chicken also seems to be scratching the floor when it doesn't seem to make a lot of sense. So a lot of that behaviour seems to be instinctual. I do think there's a reason, or a 'rationale' to a lot of these instincts, but I also think those are not the result of some conscious rational deliberation... what one would consider "rational thinking".

I think a lot of what we humans do is more or less the same, we do seem to do a lot of things without conscious rational deliberation, out of instinct. Most of these behaviours are probably "reasonable" in that they do serve a purpose or goal, without necessarily having a reason in mind. And so no, often it's only afterwards, when asked, that we consciously think of "reasons".

It seems to me that part of resolving tensions in what you want is resolving what you can or could do. — Harry Hindu

I don't know, I don't get it I think, the tension is in what you want... and then you maybe refrain from doing certain things to resolve the tension in what you want.

Maybe an example can help. Let's say I want two things that compete with eachother. I want to be healthy, and I also want to smoke (because I'm addicted). The one (smoking) has an adverse effect on the the other. To resolve the tension in favour of health, I should try to reduce my addiction, my wanting of nicotine, otherwise I will keep having to deal with these two conflicting wants. The way to do that is to try and refrain from smoking. The first couple of weeks after I quit, I'm probably still addicted to nicotine, I still want sigarettes. But then this addiction gradually wanes the longer you stop with it, until you don't want it anymore. At that point, it's not that you have to limit yourself, you just don't want it anymore.

You speak as if everyone has split personality disorder where multiple personalities, or wills (subconscious and conscious) battle to control the decision-making process. There is one will that has many options at any given moment. I enjoy chocolate but I also like to be healthy. I have a decision to make. It doesn't necessarily have to be a black and white issue. I can eat chocolate in moderation thereby achieving both eating chocolate and being healthy. Notice how I was able to explain it using just one will - I. — Harry Hindu

One thing with many aspects, or many things that combine and "fight" to result in one outcome at a particular time seem philosophically the same to me. I'm not sure how one would differentiate between to two empirically?

So it seems like maybe this is just quibling over how we would want to name and frame the same underlying thing.

And ultimately I think my kind of framing is closer to how I experience it. I really do sometimes seem to be torn between two minds. One simple example is, I want to stay fit as a longer term goal, but then I also like eating food that isn't the best for reaching that longer term goal. Is that one will with two aspects, or two wills that battle with eachother? Does it really matter how we frame it ultimately?

I'm going to answer in a somewhat longwinded way, but this is a philosophy forum so...

Do animals have rational thinking? Do animals have communication skills? Is intuitive thinking rational or maybe something better? — Athena

I'd say instincts are to some extend rational, if by rational we mean doing things that furthers attaining desired ends. A chicken for instance will instinctually scratch the ground periodically while eating. In doing so there's a chance that they reveal all kinds of tasty stuff like worms or grains that where previously not visible. So the instinctual behaviour of scratching the surface could be said to be rational behaviour if we assume the goal they want to attain is getting food.

The difference with humans is they can't seem to adjust these instincts very much to fit changing circumstances. If you give them a bowl of grains for instance, they will still tend to scratch the surface eventhough in that instance it does very little as they have enough food in the bowl. Humans have an extra capacity to reflect on and reason about certain behaviour, which enables them to adjust more to changing circumstances.

Is it rational to believe illnesses are caused by the gods? Is it rational to believe a god created man from mud? — Athena

I think in this case something similar is going on as with instinctual behaviour of animals. We are social animals, and tend to create religious/mythological superstructures that promote certain values and social cohesion that benefits the group overall if you would compare it to a group that doesn't have members adhering to their superstructure. Piety, i.e. believing in and adhering to the traditions of your group, promotes social cohesion (Asabiyyah), and can from that point of view probably be considered "rational" in that social cohesion improves overall survivability of the group (which can be considered as the desired end). The flip-side is that like animal instincts it isn't very granular and adjustable to specific circumstances... it's rational only viewed in the context of the longer historical and evolutionary arc.

Socrates (and Plato) thought we could do better than that and started questioning the Gods and turned to rational thinking instead. We will have to see (although we probably won't be there anymore :-)) if that turns out to be a better strategy long-term.

There is probably a continuum of strong and weak wills. This is likely based on the degree of strength which a person has learned. Also, it is possible to be weak in some areas but strong in other aspects. For example, a person may be strong in resisting violent impulses, but be weak in bingeing on chocolate. — Jack Cummins

It certainly is a continuum. And yes the idea is that you give up on/sublimate some desires or values that are contradictory with others that you do want to pursue more.

But some self-control I would presume would typically be part of that process, and that probably would include resisting both bingeing and violent impulses.

Does not "resolving its own inner tensions" involve limiting the amount of choices one has going forward vs being "consumed by contradictions" which would be having more choices, some of which are contradictory but are still options one could choose? Most people are equating freedom with choices. So the more choices, contradictory or not, is really just more freeom you can jave. Should I buy a new computer or not buy a new computer? I can't do both but both are options I can choose. By limiting contradictory options are you not limiting your options, and therefore your freedom? — Harry Hindu

You are resolving tensions in what you want, not in what you can or could do. So you still have the choices, you just don't want it anymore... so I would say no it doesn't limit your choices, it just give you a more clear idea of what you really want so you don't get pulled in all direction getting nowhere ultimately.

Maybe this is not what you're looking for, but I would suggest one can maybe better and more clearly speak of what you are pointing to in terms of weak and strong wills, instead of in terms of free and unfree will.

As I think truely 'free will' is a logical impossibility as it leads to a kind of infinite regress (previous posts), what we really are pointing to is a will that isn't overly constrained by outside social forces, and/or a will that resolved some of its own inner tensions (strong will) and a will that is more influenced by outside social forces, and/or weakened or consumed by its own contradictions (weak will).

And in that quest, for a more unified unconstrained will, philosophy definitely can play a role I would say in resolving some of conflicts in values, and in inoculating oneself from social manipulation/propaganda/plain bad ideas that are floating around.

Exactly.

This is an interesting way of looking at it, but I think many would say if we don't determine our will, we don't have free will. You've defined the problem away, but are we automatic programmed machines or aren't we? — T Clark

I don't think there is a real problem, I think there's a problem with the language/concpets we use, i.e. free will. At some level we probably are like "programmed machines", just very very complex ones, and also very different from the machines we build in that we are organic and they are not.

I dunno, it's not because we have a concept for something that that thing necessarily exists.

I don't know what you mean by saying the concept is incoherent. On the other hand, I think the whole free will vs. determinism controversy much ado about nothing. — T Clark

It's incoherent like a square circle is incoherent.... a logical impossibility. If it's will it's not free, and if it's free it's not will.... we have a will, that is all. Construed that way the free will vs. determinism controversy just goes away, because will by itself is not contradictory with determinism.

This is not true at all, but it's outside the scope of this discussion, so let's leave it at that. — T Clark

It's Nietzsche 101, just to be clear where I'm getting it from.

I'm not sure what you mean by this. The question of free will usually arises when we talk about determinism - if everything is determined by the motion of particles and energy that can (theoretically) be predicted by the laws of physics, where is there room for us to truly act freely. — T Clark

I explain what I mean with this the rest of my post(s). Since we are our will, and that is the agency part of us, it doesn't make sense to expect that part also to be determined by us, by itself. We are free to act on our will, not to choose it.

Determinism is looking at things from a different perspective. It doesn't preclude the emergence of biological life with wills that determine how they act. Truly metaphysical free will would be impossible under determinism, but that shouldn't really concern us as that particular concept of free will is incoherent to begin with.

No. It's metaphysics, although it might have moral implications. — T Clark

Well the one doesn't preclude the other, in fact I think most metaphysics are inspired by morality and religion. As meta-physics is by definition not constrained by anything physical/empirical, it usually ends up being shaped by our moral/religious beliefs, which is typically what we are really after.

My thoughts (and feelings, memories, perceptions, and a bunch of other stuff) are me. — T Clark

Yes that is what I meant, there is no I (as a separate agent) doing the thinking, we are our thinking.

I would agree they tend to fail because they are to superficial. Maybe they require a change at a deeper level, like adjusting ones values (our will), but often more important or just as important I think, is change in lifestyle/circumstances because change of our core values is not allways that easy.

Addictions are usually a result of other underlying problems, they typically serve a function, like alcohol may be self-medication because one is too stressed. If one were to merely stop drinking, but doesn't find other ways to deal with stress, or change the circumstances that cause stress... at some point the chances of starting drinking again are probably rather great.

The idea of 'self' as 'pre-exists' may be problematic because it would mean that no change or modification is possible — Jack Cummins

Change is possible if one thinks the will is not some unified thing, but rather something compound, or a result of many underlying competing drives. Then some change in circumstance may prompt one part of the will to subdue another part of the will that maybe isn't as appropriate for the changing circumstance for instance.

It seems to me that a self as a central organising process doesn't solve the issue of what and why the self would choose to edit if it is supposed to be a process that is seperate from the will. And if it is not seperate from the will (so that it can have some preference to choose something over another thing) then that part of the will that is (part of) the central organising self is something that pre-exists and not something we choose ourselves.... and then we again arrive at free will being incoherent.

I don't think that "I" generate thought myself in the sense that there is some agent consciously deciding what to think before I have the thought.

Don't be fooled by language, it not because there is an "I" in "I think" that there is some consious agent behind the thinking.

In fact, when you get right down to brass taxes, who's doing much rational thinking at all that leads to anything concrete? We do plenty of post hoc rationalizing to make us feel good about our irrational behaviour though. — Baden

Post-hoc rationalisation probably was the original form of 'rational thinking', as social group-animals it was pretty important to justify/rationalize our actions.

So you know, it seems that Plato/Socrates (contra the Sophists) got us on the wrong track with this weird ideosyncratic notion of rational thinking to arrive at the truth.

I don't think its usefull because free-will doesn't even make sense conceptually.

We are free to act on our will, but not free to choose our will.... We are our will, who would be the "we" apart from our will that wants to change the will.

We can reflect, but without some pre-existing volitional component why would we want to change our will after that reflection. If we would change something, it is just a part of the will (some drive) acting on antother part of our will (another drive).

Free will is a moral/religious concept.

It should try to be less reliant on the US for its defence by building up one itself, try to establish more of a foreign policy agenda of its own to weigh on its periphery in the first place, and protect its internal market effectively as protectionism is threatening to replace globalism.

All of this means - if it actually wants to make progress on these issues - that it should seek to integrate the EU even more into a real federal entity instead of the half-baked thing it is now.

Should it succeed in these directions the US might even come to value Europe more as an ally, and then Trumps antics maybe won't matter as much.

Failing that, it doesn't look to good for Europe, even without Trump. Trump makes things worse probably, but ultimately it's just a small part of the challenges it faces.

Well, if we learn, we tend to learn from adversity... so maybe we can find something positive somewhere on the way down.

But specifically to the 'worst' imaginable part, we used to just move to some other part of the globe when faced with ecological problems... the problems we are facing now are global and from a human perspective almost eternal. There is no escape... it's almost metaphysical what we are facing.

What, like glaciers and islands disappearing, 50C heat and widespread extinction, while Putin waves his nuclear missiles around like an angry baby with its rattle? — Vera Mont

Yes, something like that :-) ... fire-apes with weapons of mass-destruction on an overheating globe is definitely a concern I would say.

Indeed. But we do seem to live in an era which is consistently selling the idea that this is the amongst worst eras imaginable and that deep state or secularism, liberalism, the Left or the lizard people are to blame. It seems we need to return to a golden era - for Trumpists it's the MAGA fantasy, for some philosophers it seems to be Platonism or God. — Tom Storm

Yes, and for socialists it's a workers utopia, for enviromentalists it's a pre-agrarian garden of eden...

I do think the idea that we are living in the worst possible eras imaginable sells itself to some extend because of certain ecological and social issues we have.

Ok, thank you for your efforts to make your points more clear.

During any age, there is always an ethos, an ethic by which that age develops its political character and social personality. While certain ages had more prevalent and identifiable characters, ours is one that hides its nature, and maintains its values in a sub-active manner, that is meant to say without a title, or a movement, or party representation. In fact, the greatest and most powerful attribute of this age’s ethic is its invisibility. — EdwardC

I think I agree with this by and large, but I probably come at it from an opposite angle. If our culture has an ethos, it's a secularized protestant Christianity pushed to its furthest extend in its concern for individual victimhood above all other values.

This is basically the thesis of philosophers/historians like Nietzsche, Tom Holland, John Gray that I'm reiterating here. Since the dawn of civilization until Christ you basically had strength/power as the highest value. This was understood and made very explicit by, among other things, monumental architecture that served to emphasize the strength of the ruler in various ways.

Romans initially hung criminals and defeated opponents on the cross to signal debasement and humiliation... to signal the worst of the worst. Christianity took this symbol of utter humiliation as the central symbol of their movement, and inverted the valuations that came before by turning good/noble into evil, and bad/base into good... the meek shall inherit the earth, the last shall be the first etc etc. As the Roman empire was degenerating further and further, Christianity took hold of the empire and became the state religion.

Fast-forward a good millennium after Christianity had consolidated itself and basically had become synonymous with European culture, you get the renaissance and a couple of heresies developing out of that, like Protestantism which put even more emphasis on the individual and his personal relation to God. This eventually turned into the enlightenment and secularism, which did away with God but still kept this basic value of elevation and emancipation of the individual above everything else. Those heresies focused more on the individual became dominant especially in the Anglo-Saxon world (unlike most of continental Europe), which later became the dominant empires spreading its ideologies all over the world.

Out of this also came the currently dominant political ideologies like liberalism, socialism and communism (all of them concerned with the emancipation of the individual), which are not in opposition to religion (as it is typically construed), but a secular continuation of the valuations of a very particular religion that arose in the middle East out of Judaism, and further developed in Western Europe.

So the circle back to your point, if every age has an ethos, than I would say our current ethos is something like secular liberalism/Protestantism which is the implicit religion of the current hegemon in a globalized world, the US. You could easily make the link to Wokism/identity-politics and the like as the pinnacle of this elevation of victimhood, but I don't really want to open that particular can of worms here.

But yes, it is invisible insofar people don't even see it as an ideology, as a faith of a particular group in some value, among possible others, but as universal objective morality itself... morality construed as the avoidance of all suffering as its only goal.

What Tom Holland for instance observes is that we in the West periodically have these religious revolutionary emancipatory movements because of this Christian inversion of values that is inherently unstable and self-undermining. This is how we presumably could arrive at this secular hyper-individualist ideology, because it continuously has the tendency to erode its own institutions that seek to propagate their powerbase.

So to circle back to another point you made, I don't think these private actors deliberately seek to undermine traditional values or inject a sense of "hypersexuality" or tribalism into the collective conscious, as much as they just opportunistically make use of tendencies already present in current culture or make use of the void that has been left by a religion that has eroded its own institutions over the millennia. Bread and circuses... appealing to the "baser demons of our nature" is always a good bet to sell something.

I don’t know. I think there is a deliberate character to an age. You’re right that it’s often something about the weak vs. the powerful, but other than that, I’m not sure how much of this you related to… — EdwardC

Yeah, I've read your post several times to figure out what exactly you were pointing to. And I'm still not sure. While I don't necessarily disagree with most of what you said, I seems very specific to me... as if you are abstracting and generalising from a concrete local history that really happened.

What stood out to me was a sense of decadence/corruption in general as I alluded to.

But aside from that I don't think I agree with an age having a 'deliberate' character in the sense that there is some cabal consciously and consistently channeling culture in certain ways to benefit from it... I think these things happen far more opportunistically and by accident than as the result of conscious deliberation.

I think you are reading to much into this, most civilisations tend to suffer from entropy over time and slide into decadence.

And the reason for this cycle is pretty straightforward. At the start of their ascend a people generally have strict norms and values, and high social cohesion because they find themselves in a precarious situation being surrounded by older and bigger neighbours... that is the only way to survive essentially.

Then as they become more powerfull, and as generations get replaced with new ones, the pressing need for these strict norms and social cohesion disappears because they don't have to fear their neighbours so much anymore, and they generally have more than enough wealth... and so they tend to erode over time. It's hard to keep simulating a need when it isn't there.

I think we are just seeing the latest example of an empire running on fumes. But, there are a lot of fumes, and some kind of temporary re-invigoration isn't impossible, so it could take a while.

Are you asking if that is what Plato said, what his view on it was. Or if what Plato said is true in reality, in how things play out?
— ChatteringMonkey

Well, I was only asking about your opinion about whether you think Plato was not accounting for the needs of the individual in Plato's Republic. — Shawn

In the sense that the individual doesn't get a say in where or what he has to contribute to society? Yes I would say that his political philosophy is indeed a bit totalitarian and leaves little room for the individual to develop himself in more organic ways.

But this wouldn't be my main problem with his views, as I do think that liberalism for instance has gone to far in making society cater to the individual, rather than the other way arround. Insofar as he values the collective above the individual, I would agree with him on that point because individuals are ultimately a product of society. And so if everybody only looks to what he wants as an individual and nobody takes care of the whole, or no sacrifice can be asked from individuals for the whole, then you get a bad functioning society... and as a consequence also badly formed individuals.

My main problem with Plato's political views would be that they seem very theoretical and idealist to me. You almost never actually get to draw up a society from scratch, but have to work from existing societies and try to improve on those with all the real-world limits and restrictions that come with that.