I don't think its usefull because free-will doesn't even make sense conceptually.

We are free to act on our will, but not free to choose our will.... We are our will, who would be the "we" apart from our will that wants to change the will.

We can reflect, but without some pre-existing volitional component why would we want to change our will after that reflection. If we would change something, it is just a part of the will (some drive) acting on antother part of our will (another drive).

Free will is a moral/religious concept.

This is an interesting shift to the issue of what free will means. The concept may have begun in relation to religious thinking, with connotations of 'sin'. In that context, there was also the question whether human behaviour was predestined by 'God'.

The different usage of the term is significant. Most discussion in contemporary philosophy focuses upon the extent to which one generates thoughts oneself. It can be argued that even the wish to change is based upon the flow of thoughts. However, this may sidestep the issue of choice of thoughts and pathways of choice in this process.

I don't think that "I" generate thought myself in the sense that there is some agent consciously deciding what to think before I have the thought.

Don't be fooled by language, it not because there is an "I" in "I think" that there is some consious agent behind the thinking.

There is the agency of 'self' in the editing of thought. I am not speaking of self' as an entity but as a central organising process. If this was not the case we would be overwhelmed by stimuli and bombardment of thought, This is as argued by Henri Bergson in his idea of the brain as filter from 'mind at large'. It is only possible to focus on so much in one's awareness in the moment.

However, it may be an active as opposed to passive process because it is possible to select pathways of thinking. Some of it is based on memory but it is possible to change narrative scripts. This may be done through learned experience and intentionality.

It seems to me that a self as a central organising process doesn't solve the issue of what and why the self would choose to edit if it is supposed to be a process that is seperate from the will. And if it is not seperate from the will (so that it can have some preference to choose something over another thing) then that part of the will that is (part of) the central organising self is something that pre-exists and not something we choose ourselves.... and then we again arrive at free will being incoherent.

thoughts and behaviour are determined by nature and nurture. This poses the problem that humans have lack of capability to change, at the level of thoughts and neurochemistry. My own view is that human beings have reflective consciousness, which is the foundation of potential change. — Jack Cummins

these don't seem at odds with each other to me. It can be simultaneously true that thoughts and behaviour are emergent from deterministic stuff, AND true that consciousness is reflective and changing.

The idea of 'self' as 'pre-exists' may be problematic because it would mean that no change or modification is possible. This would be contrary. Wlll is not separate from the self but part of its core basis as motivation. Of course, there are different theories of motivation. The deterministic view would see the scope of modification as limited whereas more cognitive based models would see change as possible through the role of cognition.

There is probably an interplay of determined aspects of thought and behaviour, as well as reflective choices. Complete free will would be impossible because it would be beyond the scope of causality itself. The reflective aspect is that part of critical thinking which can seek new patterns and innovation on the basis of awareness of past 'mistakes'.

The idea of 'self' as 'pre-exists' may be problematic because it would mean that no change or modification is possible — Jack Cummins

Change is possible if one thinks the will is not some unified thing, but rather something compound, or a result of many underlying competing drives. Then some change in circumstance may prompt one part of the will to subdue another part of the will that maybe isn't as appropriate for the changing circumstance for instance.

Can We Change Our Own Thoughts and Behaviour? — Jack Cummins

After you become aware of having a thought, you still have the capability to veto the thought, e.g. ignore it or think of something else.

You don't get to choose (homunculus) what thoughts pop up in your conscious awareness , but you do get to choose to withdraw, distract, focus, or redirect your awareness of thoughts, and change your behaviour accordingly.

Yes, I would agree that the will.is a central aspect of change in the process. It may be viewed as the depths of motivation. Perhaps; that is why choices to make changes from addictions, unhelpful relationships and other situations fail. They may be too superficial and change may require a dramatic shift at the subconscious level. Conscious thoughts may be part of this, probably on a cumulative basis, but will itself is likely to be stubborn, hard to change aspects of automatic thinking and behaviour.

Yes, a person can steer thoughts to some degree. Of course, thoughts can be intrusive, especially negative ones in conjunction with mood. It is complicated because mood affects thinking and, at the same time, thought affects mood and may be the factor which can be a determining factor in altering patterns of mindset.

How useful is this area of brain research to the debate between free will and determinism? I am interested in research and also the nature of personal change and self mastery? — Jack Cummins

Dispensa's work sounds consistent with Peter Tse, in his book. "The Neural Basis of Free Will".

It seems reasonable to believe we truly make choices, whether by impluse or after hours of deliberation. No one made the choice for us, and self-reflection assures us that we actually developed the choice.

However, each choice is the product of our prior knowledge, applying thinking skills we've learned to the facts we have accepted, and to the exclusion of those we've rejected. Every part of this, including the physical apparatus of our brains, was caused. So the process is still consistent with determinism.

The mere fact that every part of our thinking apparatus was caused doesn't erase the fact that we went through the mental process. Suppose the choice entailed moving a rock from point A to point B. Had we not made the choice, the rock would have remained at A. We are agents that affect the world, irrespective of the fact we were caused by prior circumstances. Our choices can matter. That's why I think compatibilism is reasonable, and doesn't entail fatalism

I would agree they tend to fail because they are to superficial. Maybe they require a change at a deeper level, like adjusting ones values (our will), but often more important or just as important I think, is change in lifestyle/circumstances because change of our core values is not allways that easy.

Addictions are usually a result of other underlying problems, they typically serve a function, like alcohol may be self-medication because one is too stressed. If one were to merely stop drinking, but doesn't find other ways to deal with stress, or change the circumstances that cause stress... at some point the chances of starting drinking again are probably rather great.

I my be off-topic here, but I can’t seem to sustain any discussion that touches on the essence or existence of the “I” and “willing” without addressing them generally regardless of any more narrow or more focused aspect of the discussion. So I hope this tangent is somehow instructive.

I see willing and the thing willed (two separate things, one being an act the other being an object) as one thing, or one act. I see paradox as the only explanation. Where I see one thing, there are two things.

When we will, we create the will that wasn’t there before we willed. So when we refer to “my will” as if it was something there beforehand out of which some particular object was chosen, we are not speaking properly. We don’t have to wonder where our will came from; we don’t have to wonder why I want the thing that I want, as if maybe I am only determined and incapable of free-will. The “my” and the thing in “my will” are generated at one and the same moment.

When we are not willing (possibly just observing or watching tv), there is no will and no thing willed; they don’t exist though we are observing or laughing or falling asleep. I don’t have to choose to see something as funny and impulsively laugh at it. But my will can be created in that same instant and resist the laughter. We create the grounds for freedom by willing. It’s one motion.

So the brain and the objects of consciousness are one, in the act of “braining” or “thinking” or “willing.”

No dualistic gap that begs any questions in between a brain and a freely chosen object by a subject needs to be bridged.

We are in each instant determined and purely driven by the physics of things, AND, as humans, at times, we also reflect on this determinism in those same driven instants, and NOW, taking a new position in the reflection (of our own creation), still in that same instant, we can begin to demarcate “I” and “my will”, making the objects of those reflected descriptions (reflections of of those same driven and determined things that came before the reflection). It’s all what being human is, what humans do.

We reflect and either rejoin the deterministic flow or remain in reflection - and that builds the space where any freedom might begin to emerge.

I have no idea how this is, but I also don’t see brain science as the essential part of the discussion. We can summarize the drivers of the deterministic world as the “humors” or “biles” or “chemistry” or cutting edge modern brain/neuro-science. But all of the testing that explains the drivers and the deterministic (brain) functions walks you further and further away from where the will is born, which is only in the reflection of those other things, only during a particular act of “willing” does the object of study persist. A non-deterministic space of possibility where “I” and “will” are first capable of birth.

Something must be particular for there to be a possibility of “my free will” at all. This would quickly seem to be a particular brain. But there needs to also be something else - namely, a reflection of the brain on the brain (which is really a body, which is really a body in an environment, etc…). The free will is born in a reflection of the determined necessities of the brain.

But dualism needs to be resisted to retain the existence of free-will. Constantly resisted as determinism takes hold the moment one is no longer willing to resist.

We have to free ourselves from ourselves in order to first become ourselves and not only be determined. We remain determined in each moment we might be free. And recognize that in the same instant we are free, it is a freedom that can only be used to re-participate with the deterministic necessities.

All of this, just to be a human.

The brain with its self-consciousness - and these are two subjects - at the same time are one subject of the subject is “my free will” - a wholistic view is necessary, with the physicalist aspects being less interesting; these are each the whole, and each a part of the same whole.

We are a contradiction. Saying “I” contradicts myself, which is a “brain saying ‘I’”. We are paradox. We fall from this precarious position when we slip into dualistic explanations, or slip into nihilism (no “I” and “no free will”).

When I say “I am an illusion” I am not admitting that “I am an illusion to myself.”

When I say “I can’t be free”, I am freely consenting to saying so. (Unless we can show there is no such thing as a reflection).

We are better off admitting “I don’t know what ‘I’ is, though I know that ‘I’ is”, and “I don’t know why I will what I will, but I will it when I am willing it, nonetheless.”

But without addressing the above somewhat, I don’t know how to address the ability to shape our own character.

I don't think its usefull because free-will doesn't even make sense conceptually. — ChatteringMonkey

I'm not sure what you mean by this. The question of free will usually arises when we talk about determinism - if everything is determined by the motion of particles and energy that can (theoretically) be predicted by the laws of physics, where is there room for us to truly act freely.

We are our will, who would be the "we" apart from our will that wants to change the will. — ChatteringMonkey

I think this is right and important. It's at the heart of the misconception at the heart of this discussion. Our minds and brains change all the time. Do we make those changes by free will? This turns it into a circular argument - begging the question. Is it I changing me?

Free will is a moral/religious concept. — ChatteringMonkey

No. It's metaphysics, although it might have moral implications.

Don't be fooled by language, it not because there is an "I" in "I think" that there is some consious agent behind the thinking. — ChatteringMonkey

My thoughts (and feelings, memories, perceptions, and a bunch of other stuff) are me.

Most discussion in contemporary philosophy focuses upon the extent to which one generates thoughts oneself. It can be argued that even the wish to change is based upon the flow of thoughts. However, this may sidestep the issue of choice of thoughts and pathways of choice in this process. — Jack Cummins

Our thoughts are us, although there's more to us than just that,

determined things can be reflective, I'm not sure you're getting that

I'm not sure what you mean by this. The question of free will usually arises when we talk about determinism - if everything is determined by the motion of particles and energy that can (theoretically) be predicted by the laws of physics, where is there room for us to truly act freely. — T Clark

I explain what I mean with this the rest of my post(s). Since we are our will, and that is the agency part of us, it doesn't make sense to expect that part also to be determined by us, by itself. We are free to act on our will, not to choose it.

Determinism is looking at things from a different perspective. It doesn't preclude the emergence of biological life with wills that determine how they act. Truly metaphysical free will would be impossible under determinism, but that shouldn't really concern us as that particular concept of free will is incoherent to begin with.

No. It's metaphysics, although it might have moral implications. — T Clark

Well the one doesn't preclude the other, in fact I think most metaphysics are inspired by morality and religion. As meta-physics is by definition not constrained by anything physical/empirical, it usually ends up being shaped by our moral/religious beliefs, which is typically what we are really after.

My thoughts (and feelings, memories, perceptions, and a bunch of other stuff) are me. — T Clark

Yes that is what I meant, there is no I (as a separate agent) doing the thinking, we are our thinking.

How useful is this area of brain research to the debate between free will and determinism? — Jack Cummins

Not "useful" at all as far as I can tell. Scientific research can inform, even solve, empirical problems but cannot definitively answer philosophical questions (i.e. aporia) or "debates". I think the most rational-pragmatic proposal that reframes this "debate" is compatibilism (i.e. imo, embodied – degrees of freedom – volition ).

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/

Our thoughts, feelings, desires, and the like help us to decide in most situations. There are situations in which thoughts, feelings, desires, and the like cannot help us to decide for example when we have doubts. The existence of doubt together with our ability to decide when we have doubt means that we, whether a mouse in a maze, a human who wants to invest in the market, etc. are not deterministic agents.

The existence of doubt together with our ability to decide when we have doubt means that we, whether a mouse in a maze, a human who wants to invest in the market, etc. are not deterministic agents. — MoK

It is an odd thought that all the movements of particles/energy in our brains could cause feelings of doubt about the resolution as they all resolve into the only brain state into which they could possibly resolve.

Yes that is what I meant, there is no I (as a separate agent) doing the thinking, we are our thinking. — ChatteringMonkey

Agreed.

And, not to derail, but just for fun. This reminds me of the thirteen seconds of this fun video, beginning at 5:03.
Fight of the Century: Keynes vs. Hayek - Economics Rap Battle Round Two

Since we are our will, and that is the agency part of us, it doesn't make sense to expect that part also to be determined by us, by itself. We are free to act on our will, not to choose it. — ChatteringMonkey

This is an interesting way of looking at it, but I think many would say if we don't determine our will, we don't have free will. You've defined the problem away, but are we automatic programmed machines or aren't we?

Truly metaphysical free will would be impossible under determinism, but that shouldn't really concern us as that particular concept of free will is incoherent to begin with. — ChatteringMonkey

I don't know what you mean by saying the concept is incoherent. On the other hand, I think the whole free will vs. determinism controversy much ado about nothing.

As meta-physics is by definition not constrained by anything physical/empirical, it usually ends up being shaped by our moral/religious beliefs, which is typically what we are really after. — ChatteringMonkey

This is not true at all, but it's outside the scope of this discussion, so let's leave it at that.

This is an interesting way of looking at it, but I think many would say if we don't determine our will, we don't have free will. You've defined the problem away, but are we automatic programmed machines or aren't we? — T Clark

I don't think there is a real problem, I think there's a problem with the language/concpets we use, i.e. free will. At some level we probably are like "programmed machines", just very very complex ones, and also very different from the machines we build in that we are organic and they are not.

I dunno, it's not because we have a concept for something that that thing necessarily exists.

I don't know what you mean by saying the concept is incoherent. On the other hand, I think the whole free will vs. determinism controversy much ado about nothing. — T Clark

It's incoherent like a square circle is incoherent.... a logical impossibility. If it's will it's not free, and if it's free it's not will.... we have a will, that is all. Construed that way the free will vs. determinism controversy just goes away, because will by itself is not contradictory with determinism.

This is not true at all, but it's outside the scope of this discussion, so let's leave it at that. — T Clark

It's Nietzsche 101, just to be clear where I'm getting it from.

This is an interesting way of looking at it, but I think many would say if we don't determine our will, we don't have free will. — T Clark

This gets into an infinite regress problem though. If you make a choice to control your will in a particular way, then... did you also choose the part of your will that made the choice to control that will? And if you did make that choice, did you choose the will that led to that choice?

At some point, you had to have made a choice based on factors you didn't choose, based on your will being what it was, which was in a state you didn't choose.

Exactly.

If you make a choice to control your will in a particular way, then... did you also choose the part of your will that made the choice to control that will? And if you did make that choice, did you choose the will that led to that choice? — flannel jesus

Yes. We make all choices, from the moment we are aware that we have options.

so an infinite series of choices or finite?

Those who have been alive an infinite time would have an infinite series. The rest of us only go back to our first choice.