From a metaphysical standpoint, Charles Sanders Peirce drew a helpful distinction between reality and existence. The real is that which is as it is regardless of what any individual mind or finite group of minds thinks about it, while existence is reaction with other like things in the environment. Accordingly, abstractions and other immaterial objects do not exist, but some of them are nevertheless real. — aletheist

Hypothetically, suppose there are 2 "universes" (A and B), the products of independent big bangs, but separated by sufficient space (or dimensionally) that they are causally independent of one another. From A's perspective, does B exist? Is B real?

Sure, Trump's a symptom of a cancer, but another term will mean it's metastasizing. Metaphors aside, see my prior posts for some of my biggest concerns that are likely to be better under any Democratic candidate.

What do you see about him that's different? — Pfhorrest

Here's a few biggies:

He would be likely to appoint a replacement for Ruth Bader Ginsberg who will have a similar judicial philosophy, and thus retain the right of a woman to control her own body. Trump will replace Ginsberg with someone likely to deny that right.

He would likely support comprehensive immigration reform (including protection for "dreamers"), whereas Trump wants to limit it as much as he can get away with, and would be fine with deporting "dreamers".

He's support measures to protect and extend Obamacare. Trump will do everything possible to kill it.

He is unlikely to interfere in the criminal justice system, while with Trump - interference is standard operating procedure.

There is a significant problem with that in the context of our present discussion, Relativist...one that should be obvious to everyone. — Frank Apisa

You can use whatever definition you like for purposes of your discussion. I was just making a general comment not directly related to what you were saying.

As far as I can tell, he'd be a significant improvement. Is there anything about Blomberg you"d like to ensure I'm aware of?

OK, but that definition of "miracle" doesn't seem very useful. It's useful to have a term that distingushes between events that are physically possible (consistent with the actual laws of nature), and those that are not.

(1) is clearly rooted in a basic belief (no pun intended)
(2) is rooted in basic belief only if there is a God who speaks to humans and we actually have the faculty to hear it.

I'll stress that Plantinga is not endeavoring to prove God. He's just showing that knowledge of God is possible (in the strict sense of "knowledge"), IF God exists.

Yes, I see that I made an error when I asked, "Why think miracles" possible? " and then shifting to "live" possibility. Sorry. But personally, I lean toward physicalism - which would imply miracles are not possible. I'm not committed to physicalism - I'm willing to consider miraculous explanations, but strong evidence would be needed.

So, let me change the question to: Why do you suppose miracles are not a "live possibility"...whatever that means? — Frank Apisa

A live possibility is one that you include in your epistemic analysis, particularly in abductive reasoning - identifying the best explanation for a set of facts.

I don't consider miracles a live possibility because I think physicalism is probably true. I admit to an anti-miracle bias, but I'm willing to reconsider if a good case can be made.

Enough about me, tell me why you think a miracle should be given serious consideration with respect to anything associated with Jesus. i.e. explain why you think miracles are possible, identify when you should consider a miraculous explanation (i.e. it's a live option), and then tell me what sort of evidence would be needed to establish any specific miracle.

There are no consciousness to consciousness connections. You speak words your mind has formulated, the spoken words are transmitted through the air as sound waves, causing the other person's auditory system to react and ultimately interpret what was said.

That's not correct. Platonism involves mind-independent objects. So, how does your triangle exist without consciousness? — 3017amen

Mind independent ABSTRACT objects, right?

The abstraction "triangle" that exists in your brain is spatially located in your brain, so it is not the identical object located in my brain.

Are the foundational beliefs warranted? What about justificatory regress? — creativesoul

That is the general problem with foundationalism. Plantinga addresses this by arguing that beliefs that are "basic in the proper way" (i.e. properly basic) have warrant. The "proper way" is that it was produced by a sound mind, in an environment supportive of proper thought in accord with a design plan successfully aimed at truth.

In a humanistic sense, are you saying that we all are an interconnected consciousness? — 3017amen

Not really. The relations between consciousnesses seems indirect.

No, because the structural properties exist only in the objects that have them. Platonism would entail their existence independent of those objects.

Although it is quite clear that belief begins simply and grows in it's complexity, and is thus accrued in a way, I do not think that happens in a strictly linear fashion — creativesoul

I agree, but we can still analyse any specific belief to determine whether or not it is warranted. A belief that is fully wartanted would rely only on other warranted beliefs, so there are layers upon layers - until reaching the foundation. At any rate, that's the theory upon which foundationalism is based.

In what way are they foundational? — creativesoul

To be warranted, a belief needs rational justification. Justification means showing how the belief is inferred from other warranted beliefs. Ultimately, there will be beliefs that aren't derived from prior beliefs- these are the basic beliefs, the foundation for one's entire belief structure.

Why think anything not conclusively established as impossible...not to be possible. — Frank Apisa

Not impossible, just not a live possibility. When your dog disappears, you don't seriously entertain the possibility he was abducted by aliens.

What are you getting at with "miracles may not be miracles"? Bear in mind that the only actual fact is that there is an old narrative before us. You seem to be treating the contents of the narrative as the facts. Consider the empty tomb narrative in Gospel of Mark: does this narrative conclusively establish that Jesus was buried in an identifiable tomb that was later found to be empty? The historical record shows that victims of crucifiction were typically left on the cross to rot and be eaten by animals - a visible deterent against committing crimes against the state. This doesn't preclude the possibility of exceptions, but a narrative written decades later in a foreign land by uncritical believers hardly constitutes strong evidence.

I think what I enjoy the most about Sanders is that it is about his ideas, which was also the case for Warren, and not "can this guy beat Trump". I'm sick and tired of the lowest bar having to be met as being a viable option for a President. If politics devolves into running for President because you're more popular than the other guy instead of at least some policy issues, you might as well get it over with and implement an autocracy and enjoy your bread and games. Or in that case the NFL, MBA or NBA and nachos or something. — Benkei

I am doing exactly what sickens you. Here's my reasoning: Trump is a disaster, and it is of utmost importance to replace him. Odds of replacing him are improved by choosing the most electable alternative - as long as the alternative is a significant improvement. All the Democratic candidates are a significant improvement.

Where's the flaw in my reasoning? I'd like to know, because the Texas primary is coming up soon.

The case of Jesus seems unique in history because we have a number of detailed accounts of his life and resurrection. — Gregory

The problems with this claim is that the sources are not independent, the easiest version was written at least 30 years after Jesus' death, and they were written by writers in a different locale, who spoke a different language. Further, the authors , and the people orally transmitting stories before them, were credulous, commited, believers, not dispassionate investigators critically examining the claims. Their motivation was to get more people to believe.

Imagine receiving an analogous document today, written in a Chinese dialect, about a man allegedly rising from the dead in India 30 years ago. Would you consider this to be strong evidence of a miracle?

It doesn't matter if we're considering events from yesterday or 2000 years ago - the same epistemic standards apply.

It seems to me we need to accept some of the miracle claims as real — Gregory

Why think miracles are possible?

Potential doesn't exist independently; it is a property of things that exist. So saying that reality has the potential to exist doesn't seem to be saying anything. Everything that exists has the potential to exist. Future potentials mean something: it means that the current state of affairs could (potentially) produce that thing someday. But no such potential applies to reailty, because reality did not come into being from a prior potential. I don't even think we can say reality came into being.

Aren't you really just saying that reality is possible?

What if the notion of "basic" amounts to something like being foundational to all other beliefs. — creativesoul

That's exactly what a basic belief IS.

Triangular objects exist even if there are no minds to conceptualize triangles.
— Relativist

How is that possible? — 3017amen

A triangular object has 3 sides that are arranged in a certain general way. It's existence and structure is not dependent on a mind analyzing that structure.

Everything that exists is a State of Affairs. It's constituents are; a particular, its attached properties, and its relations to other states of affairs. This acknowlwdges that properties exist only in their instatiations in a state of affairs.

That raises the question, "What do you mean by 'the real world'"? And what do you mean by "something exists in the real world"? — GrandMinnow

Yes, and thus we get into metaphysics. A topic for another day.

The presence of such questions doesn't impugn existential quantification. — GrandMinnow

No, but one shouldn't conflate existential quantification with a statement of ontology. IOW just because we can do some useful math with infinities doesn't entail anything ontic.

That doesn't answer my point that without infinitistic set theory, axiomatizing the mathematics for the sciences gets a lot more complicated. — GrandMinnow

Sorry. I agree with that. They are useful fictions.

I don't think it's Platonism because it assumes an independent existence outside of consciousness. The triangulation of a roof truss exists abstractly. The connection can be 'severed' and independent of the concrete thing itself, the roof truss. — 3017amen

OK, but that's just referring to a concept - a mental object. It is spatially located in your brain, unless dualism is true. Triangular objects exist even if there are no minds to conceptualize triangles. When people speak of the existence of infinity they are not merely referring to the concept that exists in our minds.

Time exists a a relation between states of affairs. I don't believe abstraction exist independently of states of affairs.

There is not an entity called 'infinity' (distinct from a different notion of points on a real extended line or figures of speech such as "as x goes to infinity"). Rather, there is the adjective 'is infinite', and an axiom that entails (with other axioms) that entails certain theorems including the existence of infinite sets. — GrandMinnow

Fair point, although infinites appear in some physics equations, and they are treated ad objects in transfinite math. Regardless, from this viewpoint, the question is: is there something that exists in the real world that maps to an infinite set?

Existential quantification is not inconsistent with the claim that abstractions are not material objects. — GrandMinnow

Agreed. The question remains: do immaterial objects exist? If so, what does it mean to exist? Does Spider-Man exist? Do all fictions, past present, and future exist? What about possible fictions that never get authored?

Of course, we can hold that there do not exist infinite sets. But then providing a formal axiomatization for the mathematics for the sciences gets a lot more complicated. — GrandMinnow

Sets are abstractions. Creating abstraction just means conceptualizing. My point is that abstractions don't actually exist except as mental entities. Mathematical abstractions are useful because they entail analyzable properties Does anyone suggest imaginary numbers exist? Nevertheless, they appear in physics equations.

If a given abstract does not exist for the sole purposes of the creation of a particular concrete thing, by definition, it would then be something independent of the thing itself. — 3017amen

That sounds like Platonism. My problem with ontologies that include platonic objects is that they seem unnecessary. Why posit an independent existence for triangles, when triangles can be accounted for as constituents of triangular objects? Further, how do triangles exist independently? How do they get connected to objects? Can the connection be severed? This makes it even more unnecessarily complex? Can they replaced with squares simply by replacing the connection?

. I don't see the difference, or even how semantics would play a role. — 3017amen

The notation is interpreted by a musician, analogously to a reader interpreting print words. Words refer to objects, concepts, actions etc, while musical notations refer to the various aspects of sounds you mention. The sounds can be reproduced on an instrument, or merely interpreted within the musician's mind.

Abstracts can work both ways. — 3017amen

Both ways are consistent with the way of abstraction. We mentally consider a set of attributes common to all triangles to form the abstraction in our minds, then reverse the process, adding back concrete elements.

He's also tilting at strawmen, — Douglas Alan

It's a strawman that fits the Leibnizian Cosmological Argument proferred by apologist William Lane Craig:

1) Anything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause [A version of PSR].
2) If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.
3) The universe exists.
4) Therefore, the universe has an explanation of its existence (from 1, 3)
5) Therefore, the explanation of the existence of the universe is God (from 2, 4).

Laws of gravity in physics
2. Engineering/Design formulas for; compressive forces, tensile strength, torsional forces, etc.
3. Musical notation — 3017amen

In my view:
Laws of physics are relations between types of things. Things can relate to one another in ways that can be described mathematically. That doesn't entail independent existence apart from the things that relate in that way.

Same thing essentially applies to engineering formulae- they still are due to natural law.

Musical notation isn't an abstraction, it's a semantics that maps to various aspects of sound.

You refer "metaphysical abstracts" - suggesting abstractions actually exist as (what?) Platonic entities? Why think they exist in this way rather than merely as a mental entity, formulated via the Way of Abstraction?

Your argument is implicitly circular. You assume you could take these photos in a finite period of time. If the universe is infinite, your photography expedition will never end.

One thing may not have been clear: Plantinga doesn't claim his theory of the sensus divinitatus provides an objective proof of God's existence. Rather, his claim is that belief in God is as rational as believing solipsism is false. Further, he says belief in God constitutes knowledge, in the strict sense - not even subject to Gettier problems. He also acknowledges that if there is no God, it's not knowledge.

He takes the alleged knowledge acquired by the sensus divinitatus beyond a raw sensory input, analogous to the raw perception of a tree. He suggests it could go so far as to provide a basis for "knowing" the various doctrines of Christianity.

The main slam against this view is that ANY theistic belief could be "justified" in this way. Linus can claim to "know" the Great Pumpkin exists. An Islamist terrorist can claim to "know" God wants him to kill infidels. Plantinga acknowledges this.

My take on it is that his Reformed Epistemology is a worthy contribution to epistemology (it has sparked a lot of published responses). I also think it can be applied to materialism (I use a version to justify dismissing solipsism; solipsism can't be proven false, but our innate properly basic belief in the external world is not undercut by mere possibility). Without the notion of properly basic beliefs, foundationalism has no bedrock foundation.

Are there any specific issues you take with his analysis?

Personally, I've always objected to the notion that contingent brute facts are impossible. It just seems an assumption that is chosen because it entails the existence of a metaphysically necessary creator. I thought Grunbaum sheds some needed light on that.

Platinga seems to be talking about propositions. — creativesoul

Right, he uses that narrow view of belief, but he considers perceptions (including the sensus divinitatus) as part of the belief forming process. Seeing a tree produces the belief that a tree is before us. Perceiving God produces the belief of God.

So not "basic", acquired (only by survivor species) via adaptation. In other words, emergent traits (i.e. habits) not "beliefs", or propositional assertions. Why conflate physiological, perceptual and neurological functions (i.e. inputs-throughput) with epistemic / cognitive states (i.e. reflexive outputs)? — 180 Proof

Being acquired as part of species development doesn't negate the fact these beliefs are innate to the individual, and that is sufficient for being basic.

If materialism is true, what are beliefs? David Armstrong suggests a belief is a dispositional state of mind; it disposes one to behave a certain way. Beliefs don't have to be verbal. My cat believes her water bowl will be in a certain place in the house despite the fact she can't formulate the words to state this. It's no different with us: perception is the acquiring of beliefs (that may be true or false) about the world. We have survived as a species because these perceptions have been sufficiently reliable to allow us to survive.

Has anyone, other than me, read Plantinga"s "Warranted Christian Belief"?

I would argue the belief in gods or a god is a basicality mainly because to get large groups of people to work together you need a false belief or perhaps a real belief — christian2017

That doesn't entail a basic belief, because it is LEARNED. Basic beliefs aren't learned, they are innate. Plantinga suggests we perceive God through a theoretical "sensus divinitatus", analogous to vision, or hearing.