Yes, I'm aware that you believe the mind is not physical, and therefore not on par with physics and chemistry. But the extent of what you told me you believe about mind is just this negative (supposed) fact: it's not physical. This means you answer no positive questions, account for no aspects of reality, so it's logically impossible for this singular negative fact to constitute a better explanation for reality (including, but not limited to, mind) than a comprehensive metaphysical theory.

I also do understand that you don't have much interest in a general metaphysical theory, and I'm fine with that. But you haven't grasped that this means you aren't positioned to judge my inferrence to best explanation. Instead, you seem to think that your objections to a physicalist account of mind are so objectively strong that no well-informed, rational person could fall for it.

For clarity’s sake do agree with this depiction of materialism by D M Armstrong?



Might help to understand what is meant by physicalism. — Wayfarer

I hadn't seem this post when I gave my prior reply.

I mostly agree with it, but have a problem with the terminology.

Regarding a definition, I recall that you quibbled with the definition of "physical". "Naturalism", as I defined it, dispenses with the semantics debate.

But being disposed to do or say something merely describes what someone ls likely to do. It doesn't describe what they ought to do. — Wayfarer

Not merely "likely" - it's a certainty, given the right conditions. As I said, an "ought" is a belief/disposition. Believing that you ought to pay for your groceries (rather than steal them) will result in your paying for your groceries, unless other factors are present (eg you're hungry and destitute).

More generally, this directly relates to "free will". Physicalism entails compatibilism: any choice you make will be the product of deterministic forces, a set beliefs (dispositions) that are weighed by the mental machinery, and can only produce one specific result. In hindsight, it only SEEMS like a different could have been made. In actuality, no other choice could have been made, given the set of dispositions that existed when the choice was made. So the collective set of dispositions necessarily leads to whatever choice that is actually taken.

This comes off as arguments from incredulity.
— Relativist

That definitely cuts both ways. — Wayfarer

No, not in the context of our discussion. I'm not trying to persuade you that physicalism is true. I was satisfied to agree to disagree, for reasons I had stated. But you refused to do that, and could not respect my position because you were confident you could demonstrate physicalism is false. My only task is to defend the reasonableness of my position. Your insult "disposed" me to continue the conversation, even after you stopped responding.

This dam is a perfectly satisfactory, save for the hole in it.'

Comment on the Armstrong passage above. If you think it's right, what is right about it? If you think not, what is wrong with it? — Wayfarer

I already did:

However, all theories of mind have problems. Those problems tend to be glossed over, or given ad hoc explanations (when one abandons naturalism, one feels free to entertain any magic that is logically possible). But that cannot result in a theory that is MORE plausible than physicalism*, on the basis of its one problem and its speculative solutions. You aren't even in position to justifiably disagree, because you don't embrace any particular theory of mind (much less, a metaphysical theory). — Relativist

*Perhaps you forgot: I embrace physicalism (generally, not just as a theory of mind) as an Inference to Best Explanation for all facts. You can defeat this only by providing an alternative that better explains the facts.

Can you demonstrate that feelings cannot be programmed into a Turing machine? I outlined a simple way to do it in my OP. — noAxioms

There's much I agree with in your op, but I don't see anything in it that suggests the qualia "redness" or "pain" could be created through computation.

A Turing machine can't create the experience of "redness". It could compute the conditions that give rise to it, and the aspects of the world that it represents. But if you have a solution, I'd be interested in hearing it.

Physicalism gives you causal accounts of how neurons fire, how circuits activate, how information gets processed. None of that touches the normative structure of logical reasoning—the “oughts” built into validity, soundness, and necessity. — Wayfarer

This is an outdated objection to physicalism. Here's the boilerplate response:

"Oughts", intentions, and beliefs are dispositions. Being disposed to do X, means that under suitable circumstances, the individual will do X. X can be a thought.

Logical reasoning is guided by dispositions (beliefs) about entailments, conjunctions, disjunctions, etc.

I understand that, but it is too simplistic an example to support the contention. The simple association of words with sensations hardly amounts to a model of language. — Wayfarer

Model of LANGUAGE?! Are you seriously suggesting that if I can't provide a bottom up account of the development or grasping of a language model, that this falsifies physicalism? That's ludicrous.

The fact that language can be interpreted by AI is sufficient to demonstrate that language is consistent with physicalism. Language doesn't mean anything to a machine- that's the one genuine difference, and that's why I focused on meaning. Incidentally, AI can engage in logical reasoning.

Instead of trying to falsify physicalism, you seem to be simply providing reasons why you are unconvinced. This comes off as arguments from incredulity.

As I told you, I'm not trying to convince you of anything. I embrace physicalism because it's the best explanation for all facts (including, but not limited to, science facts). Any mental behavior that is consistent with an algorithmic approach is consistent with physicalism. As I've admitted, feelings are not algorithmic- they are the sole, legitimate issue. They still don't falsify physicalism, but it's a legitimate problem. However, all theories of mind have problems. Those problems tend to be glossed over, or given ad hoc explanations (when one abandons naturalism, one feels free to entertain any magic that is logically possible). But that cannot result in a theory that is MORE plausible than physicalism, on the basis of its one problem and its speculative solutions. You aren't even in position to justifiably disagree, because you don't embrace any particular theory of mind (much less, a metaphysical theory).

It's a matter of picking the least problematic. Or not picking at all. — bert1

:100:

You are both describing a philosophical zombie, — Punshhh

I've been discussing the role of feelings - the qualia that zombies lack. My position is that this is the only serious problem for physicalism, but also that it doesn't falsify it.

I'm aware of 2 ways feelings can be accounted for:
1) illusionism - this means feelings are not directly physical because they exist exclusively in the mind- a mental construction. It depends only on mental causation (which I've defended). It also accounts for the action of pain-relievers, which mask the pain by interfering the brain's construction of the sensation.

2) Feelings are due to some aspect of the world that has not been identified through science, and may never be. This is open-ended; it could be one or more properties or things.

Why should anyone consider these? Every theory of mind has some problem, such as the interaction problem of dualism. Physicalism is the theory that is most consistent with everything we do know through science about the mind-body relationship. More significantly: physicalism is consistent with everything else we know about the world - outside of minds.

My point was: 1) that most aspects of consciousness can be described algorithmically- this is what materialist philosophers of mind do.
...
2) on the other hand, feelings cannot be created via algorithm.
— Relativist
It's a parallel process, but any parallel process can be accomplished via a Turing machine (presuming no weird reverse causality like you get with realist interpretations), so I disagree, the operation of any physical system at all (if it's just a physical system) can be driven algorithmically.
So your point 2 is one of opinion, something to which you are entitled until one starts asserting that the statement is necessarily true. — noAxioms

I am a physicalist, but I see no reason to believe feelings could be programmed into a turing machine, unless we treat feelings as illusions: a belief that the sensation is real, along with the behavioral reactions it induces. An alternative is that there is some aspect of the world that manifests exclusively as the feelings we experience. I'm open to other possibilities. Do you have something in mind?

Please notice what you are glossing over or assuming in saying this. Philosophers have spent millenia puzzling about the relationships between mind, world and meaning, here you present it as if it is all straightforward, that all of this can simply be assumed. Which is naive realism in a nutshell. — Wayfarer

Your response expresses a judgement, but fails to specify what you think I failed to do. Your burden is to show that some aspect of mental processing cannot possibly be grounded in the physical. In this instance, you were suggesting that logical reasoning cannot be accounted for under physicalism. I was merely explaining why I think it can. If you think this inadequate, then explain what you think I've overlooked. If there's insufficient detail, I can explain a bit more deeply.

My argument is that physicalist philosophy of mind conflates physical causation with logical necessity. — Wayfarer

You didn't give an argument, you simply noted that physical causation and logical necessity are different, and that you apparently assume that a physical mind could only "reason" in a manner that is directly attributable to physical cause/effect. THAT is naive.

Computers can do logic. They don't do it the same way humans do, but it nevertheless proves that physical processes CAN do logic. One important distinction between humans and computers is that the statements that we apply logic to, have meaning to us. I outlined a physicalist account of meaning. I also noted that logic is nothing more than semantics, and that fact also pertains to meaning.

So what is it, exactly, that you think cannot possibly be accounted for physically?

As for your 'pain' example...It is an extremely basic account which attempts to equate intentional language with physical stimulus and response. A dog will yelp if it stands on a hot coal, but a dog yelp is not a word. And regardless, it fails to come to grips with the point about 'multiple realisability', against which it was made. — Wayfarer

What I was trying to get across is that meaning is grounded in our interactions with the world (and in our physical structure). In this case, the true meaning of pain is the unpleasant sensation. Attaching a word to it seems trivial to account for physically (relating memory of a sound sequence to a memory of a sensation).

I addressed multiple realizabilty by pointing you at another post I made that described criterial causation (a physical process) to account for mental causation. I suggest that mental causation is the key, because it entails functionalism: it is the function of a mental state that matters, not the physical manifestation of that functional state.

You have previously acknowledged that memories depend on the physical brain, as evidenced by memory loss due to disease and trauma to the brain. Surely you don't think that 2 people with a shared experience have their memories manifested identically in their respective brains. They wouldn't need to- they just need to provide the same functionality (e.g. recall of images, events, sounds...).

because the same mental state can be realised by indefinitely many different physical structures, the mental state cannot be identical with a physical state — Wayfarer

Non-sequitur. A mental state is a functional state; any physical structure that produces the same function can therefore produce that mental state.

Pain' is also utterly inadequate as an example, because it completely fails to come to terms with the intentional and semantic structure of language. — Wayfarer

Invariably, I address a specific issue you bring up, you fail to acknowledge that I addressed it, and bring up a related issue outside the scope of what I was addressing.

In this case, I was simply giving an example of how meaning is attached to experience, in this case: a sensory experience. In this particular case, pain is clearly linked to intentional behavior: it's an experience to be avoided.

Meaning and intentionality are generally considered the more challenging to account for. Semantic structure seems trivial, because it's simply something that is learned.

The philosophical implication is that while physical causes explain physical events and processes, logical necessity defines the rules for how we can reason and establishes unavoidable truths (like 2+2=4 or geometric axioms) that hold regardless of any physical event. — Wayfarer

Sure, but logic is semantics - it is not some aspect of the world. It applies to statements, not to things. Truths are statements that correspond to reality, These "defined rules for how we reason" consist of applying precise definitions to certain words.

1. If language mirrors only the contingent physical process rather than the necessary logical content (the final, valid definition), the statement equates the psychological fact of concept acquisition with the logical structure of the concept itself. — Wayfarer

It is not the case that language mirrors "only the contingent physical process". I said it mirrors the mental processes. The concept of "true" seems perfectly straightforward - a recognition that a statement corresponds to (say) what is perceived, vs a statement that does not.

It's notable that I countered 100% of your claims — Relativist
Only in your own mind. — Wayfarer

Of course! But you haven't rebutted my counters in your responses. Mostly, your objections reflect either: a misunderstanding of physicalism (e.g. conflating with science), a lack of imagination (failing to figure out a physicalist account might address your issue), or an attempt to judge it from an incompatible framework (e.g.the way you treat abstractions). When I've addressed these, you do not respond directly, then you sometimes repeat the countered claim in different words. So that's why I feel I've countered your claims. Here's the latest example in which you seem to have overlooked or misunderstood what I was saying about "meaning":

To treat a brain state as having meaning (as representing a proposition) or logical order (as representing a valid step in an argument) is to already inject a non-physical, intentional, or normative element into the physical description to assign semantic content to to a physical state. — Wayfarer

A brain state does not have meaning. I never claimed it did. Here's what I said:

Meaning entails some connection to our instinctual reactions to elements in the world and within ourselves. You and I both feel pain when we grab a hot pan. We cognitively relate the word "pain" to this sensation, so it's irrelevant that our respective neural connections aren't physically identical (i.e. the "meaning" is multiply realizable). — Relativist

You might have asked for clarification or pushed back, but instead you made a claim that was nowhere close to what I'd said.

On further thought, as you often say that I'm engaging in speculation or unthethered philosophizing uninformed by science, could you point exactly to where I'm doing that? — Wayfarer

I don't insist you depend on science, but rather that you develop and utilize hypotheses with some epistemic justification in mind. For example, if you were to suggest that a thought were an ontological primitive - you'd need consider how you would eventually justify the claim. One way to do that would be to work toward a more complete, coherent metaphysical theory that includes that hypothesis.

You're not doing that here. It's reasonable to point to the gaps in our scientific understanding of the physical processes involved with reasoning. Kudos for not using this as a basis for an argument from ignorance against physicalism, at least not in this post. I assume it's obvious to you that physicalism isn't falsified by gaps in our scientific knowledge.

t
We're going in circles here. Bottom line: logic is not physical nor can be reduced to physical forces and categories, but I'm not going to press the point further. We've been arguing since Nov 5th 2024 - I remember the date, because it was the eve of the US Presidential Election, I see no purpose being served by continuing. — Wayfarer

You have established that you have no rational basis to claim physicalism is falsfied. All you've done is to to reify an abstraction ("logic") and assert that this reification cannot be reduced to "physical forces".

The APPLICATION of logic entails process. Computers operate by applying logic, and this demonstrates that APPLYING logic is consistent with physicalism.

As I previously discussed, the abstract concept "logic" is describable in language. That language mirrors the mental processes involved with defining/learning the concept. When we use the word ("logic") we are drawing on the memory of those mental processes by which we mentally connected the word to the concept.

It's notable that I countered 100% of your claims, and of course - you don't see it, and instead dismissively assert that we're going around in circles. We go in circles because your thinking about these issues is within the framework of your own internalized paradigm (your personal, subjective "mind-dependent world"). You are essentially attempting to falsify the physicalist paradigm on the basis that it's inconsistent with your own. You have not, and cannot, falsify physicalism this way. And in case you forgot, this is the burden you gave yourself - that you could show physicalism cannot be true. I don't expect a reply, but I do suggest that you accept the fact that you cannot actually falsify it or at least that you cease asserting that you can. You don't need to falsify it to reject it. Both acceptance and rejection of a "theory of mind" paradigm entails subjective judgement, and since I understand this, I would never suggest one is irrational for disagreeing with my judgement.

"Wayf doesn't accept that conscious activity can be reduced to neural correlates"

Nothing profound or wrong going on there. Maybe the gripe is with people who seem to think materialism is provable. That seems to me, demonstrably not the case (and perhaps, demonstrably not possible). But that doesn't actually make it untrue. Its awkward. — AmadeusD

I beg to differ. The position that "conscious activity cannot be reduced to neural correlates" is a strong claim- it implies impossibility. My position is that there's no basis to claim it's impossible ("not impossible" is a modest claim).

I would certainly not claim that "materialism is provable", but I believe I can provide a reasonable justification to believe in materialism. In brief: as a metaphysical theory, it is a Inference to Best Explanations for all available facts about the world. Every known phenomenon is consistent with it, and it most parsimoniously accounts for these facts. One could reject this, on the subjective grounds that we know too little to draw a conclusion, but I don't think there's a defeater.

there's an implicit conviction, again. that science provides the court of adjutication for philosophy. — Wayfarer

You're reading that into it. Stephen Hawking and Richard Dawkins have said something along these lines, but they aren't philosophers. I have not asked for defenses on empirical (or scientific) grounds. I've asked for any kind of justification.

the capacity to grasp reasons, recognise valid versus invalid inferences, and understand causal relations as relations is categorically different from the physical processes described by neuroscience. — Wayfarer

Sure, it's categorically different - but this doesn't entail an immaterial ontological grounding. Process is categorically different from existents, but grounded in the physical.

Physicalism, naturalism, and materialism generally seek to naturalise cognition in terms of evolutionary theory and neuroscience. — Wayfarer

You're conflating the philosophy with the science. Science indeed fails to account for all aspects of mind, but science is limited to what humans have figured out. Philosophical materialism/physicalism is broader - it's as free of the human limitations of scientific investigation as any metaphysical theory. It is limited only by what can be deemed material/physical.

even if human reason is not magical, it is extraordinarily uncanny. To think these 'featherless bipeds' descended from homonim species that evolved capturing prey on the savanahs over thousands of millenia are now able to weigh and measure the Universe. — Wayfarer

Sure, it's extraordinary (given our limited knowledge of the steps and the mechanisms), but this is insuffficient grounds to conclude there was anything unnatural involved. There's much we don't know, may never know. This doesn't mean we should emulate our ancient ancestors and assume supernatural forces are involved.

I have indeed considered it, and this is precisely where the argument from multiple realisability bites. Even if you can verbally describe a concept, the physical or neural realisation of that concept can vary enormously. This isn’t an incidental feature — it’s structurally unavoidable.

A single sentence can be expressed in English, Mandarin, Braille, Morse code, binary, or handwritten symbols, and the meaning is preserved across all of these radically different physical forms. That shows that meaning is not identical with any one physical instantiation. — Wayfarer

All languages are descended from a common, early langauge. But more significantly, they are all grounded in our common structure (sensory/cognitive/emotional/hormonal...). Meaning entails some connection to our instinctual reactions to elements in the world and within ourselves. You and I both feel pain when we grab a hot pan. We cognitively relate the word "pain" to this sensation, so it's irrelevant that our respective neural connections aren't physically identical (i.e. the "meaning" is multiply realizeable).

So the fact that we can describe a concept verbally doesn’t help your claim — it actually illustrates why semantics and reasoning can’t be reduced to any one class of physical patterns. The level of explanation is simply different. — Wayfarer

Strawman. It's irrelevant that the relevant connections can be realized in multiple physical ways.

And this is precisely where the significance of universals shows up. Feser says 'A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once.' — Wayfarer

Sure, mental objects are private. But we have nearly identical capacities to recognize patterns, and to apply words to these patterns, and thus to communicate with each other about them. Our respective mental images of the world have a lot in common because our neurological structures have a lot in common. Plus, the patterns are REAL! Humans have developed concepts and language to refer to them. This doesn't imply the mental objects have objective existence; it just means there are real patterns that we can name, describe, and learn to idealize.

physical processes are governed by causal relationships; reasoning is governed by norms of validity. The latter can't be reduced to the former. — Wayfarer

Non sequitur. Peter Tse proposed a neurological model he calls "criterial causation", that would account for mental causation with multilple physical realizability. I discussed it in this post.

Tse's model may be wrong (it's not verified science), but it shows you're wrong to say "the latter can't be reduced to the former. It indeed can.

Of the large number of possibilities which one could theoretically come up they can be arranged into two groups, those where there is a mental origin, or ones where there is a non mental, or physical, origin. These categories are derived from the two things we know for sure about our being, 1, that we are, have, a living mind and 2, there is a physical world that we find ourselves in. If you can provide an alternative to these two, I would like to know. — Punshhh

And yet, some people seriously entertain solipsism and idealism - because they are not provably impossible. This is the sort of thing I'm complaining about. I'm fine with the focus you suggest.

When it comes to philosophical enquiry into our existence, philosophy is mute, blind, it can’t answer the question. — Punshhh

This tells me you are not a theist. Philosophically minded theists often think they can "prove" God's existence through philosophical analysis. Debating these issues is what drew me to learn a bit about philosophy.

I’m not going to talk for Wayfarer, but the impression I had was that the philosophical interpretation of the physical world (including our scientific findings) is what he takes issue with. — Punshhh

Actually, he accepts science. His focus seems to be philosophy of mind. He takes issue with materialist theory of mind. Issues SHOULD be taken with it, but I object to declaring materialism (in general) false on the basis of the explanatory gap, while meanwhile taking flights of fancy (mere possibilities) seriously.

Not according to Edward Feser, it isn't. — Wayfarer

His FRAMING of universals isn't consistent with physicalism. The issue would be: what facts of the world are explainable with one's definition, and which one's aren't. A physicalist definition covers the facts adequately.

Armstrong is not a realist about universals in the classical sense at all. — Wayfarer

Irrelevant, if all facts are adequately accounted for.

You have made the false claim that I defer to science, but I see you deferring to ancient philosophy, as if that makes it somehow authoritative. You're free to embrace what they said, but you'll need do defend it - I won't accept an argument from authority.

It was, "what justified beliefs does it lead to?"
— Relativist

The justified belief that knowledge cannot be solely objective — Wayfarer

The law of noncontradiction is objective fact. Your assertion could apply to a posterior beliefs, and the logical consequence is that we have no a posteriori knowledge - because it's logically possible for it to be false. One can also arrive at that conclusion by considering Gettier problems. This is why I stress justified belief, rather than knowledge.

If an insight leads to a dead-end,
— Relativist

Then it's not an insight. But the fact that someone doesn't recognise an insight doesn't mean it's a dead end. — Wayfarer

Consider me guilty of not recognizing this alleged insight on my own, but also recognize that I'm asking you to point out what I'm overlooking. I get it, that it entails the fact that our perspectives are inescapably subjective, but I arrived at that conclusion on my own without this alleged insight. What you call a "mind-created world" I have called a "paradigm".

the relationship 'north of'. It doesn't exist in the same sense that Edinburgh and London exist, — Wayfarer

It's semantics, describing an actual physical relation in terms relative to a cartological convention. It is a fact that Edinburgh and London have a specific, spatial relation to each other that is ontological.

the whole idea of existence depends on the mind's ability to grasp these intelligible relations — Wayfarer

The IDEA of existence depends on our cognitive abilities, but given that we have this ability, it is reasonable (justified) to believe this idea represents an aspect of the world.

This is important, don't brush it aside.The reason it's not noticed is because we rely on the mind's ability to discern these relationships, without which we wouldn't be able to form an idea of the world. So that's the sense in which the world is 'mind-dependent' - not going in or out of existence, depending on whether you yourself see it, but because the whole idea of existence depends on the mind's ability to grasp these intelligible relations (which is elaborated in The Mind Created World op). Which we don't see because (as Russell says) they don't exist, they're not 'out there somewhere'. If there's a single insight that empiricism cannot grasp, it is this one and dare I say the apparent inability to grasp it, is an illustrative example. — Wayfarer

You should stop referring to the world as "mind-independent", because you know it isn't. You make it clear in that op that you're referring to the fact that it is our mental view of the world that is mind-dependent. When described correctly, it seems less profound: a product of the mind is mind-dependent.

But I think you're trying to argue that there's something magical about the fact that our minds can do what they do (where "magical"= not even possibly a consequence of material processes.) This is where your focus should be, and what you should try and make the case for. If you have a case to make, don't repeat Feser's approach of framing the issues in immaterial terms. Consider the mistake you made when you suggested that a thought might be a primitive: you hadn't considered that thoughts entail processes. IMO, the best physicalist accounts of all things mental are based on processes, not objects (and not static brain states). Concepts are not objects, they entail a sequence of thoughts and draw on memories. Consider a concept that can be described verbally: this act of description could be parallel to the mental processes involved when we formulate or utilize the concept. You don't seem to have considered this.

It’s possible that one explanation of existence is an intelligent source (as opposed to a physical source). I see no reason to reject this possibility out of hand, because it can’t be demonstrated. Because it plays a useful role in further philosophical enquiry. If the entirety of philosophical enquiry is to be bracketed out, because it has shaky empirical foundations, then again we are doing the bracketing out that Wayfarer keeps pointing out. — Punshhh

The problem I have with this is that there are infinitely many possibilities. There needs to be a reason to pluck one from the infinite set of possibilities and see where it leads. In practice, the reason may simply be that it's subjectively appealing. We're intellectually free to explore, and gain some amusement (intellectual stimulation), or driven by wishful thinking ("I don't want to die! So let's explore the possibility of an afterlife). But unless the track of enquiry leads to some objective justification to accept it, it's never more than amusement or wishful thinking.

I don't object to people amusing themselves, or thinking wishfully. I object only when they try to use these possibilities to supposedly undercut theories that ARE justifiable to accept. This is the issue that triggered my debate with Wayfarer (intermittent over a number of months and several threads). I argued that metaphysical materialism can be justifiably accepted as true. He responds by pointing to the explanatory gap, and he has raised some extreme counter possibilities (e.g. perhaps a thought is ontologically primitive). He doesn't merely say, "here's why I don't accept materialism" (which would be perfectly fine by me); he insists materialism is demonstrably false. And yet, he has not demonstrated it. I conclude that he can't, but won't admit it.

I distinguish between factual knowledge and beliefs — Wayfarer

Knowledge of X entails belief of X.

What I am critical of is the appeal to science as the authoritative basis for philosophical justification. — Wayfarer

Who is defending THAT? I've simply suggested that to hold a rational belief X, that one needs (at minimum) something more than X is possible.

And recognising the role of the observing mind in the construction of knowledge is not a “factoid.” It is a philosophical insight. It does not produce new empirical claims — it clarifies the conditions that make empirical knowledge possible in the first place — Wayfarer

My question was not "what empirical claims does it lead to?" It was, "what justified beliefs does it lead to?"

If an insight leads to a dead-end, it doesn't seem to have practical significance, except for historical purposes.

My point about universals is simply that they are real but not physical; as Russell put it, they are not thoughts, but “when known they appear as thoughts.” Their reality is intelligible rather than phenomenal — they can be grasped by a rational mind, but they do not exist as physical particulars or states of affairs. — Wayfarer

We agree that (in some sense) universals exist. My view is that they exist immanently within objects- such as the 90 degree angle that exists between the walls of a room. This 90 degree relation between walls is a universal with no dependency on minds.

I seem to recall you agreeing with this immanent existence, but that you consider the (intra-mind) abstraction the universal. Perhaps you could clarify.

Scientific facts are not matters of belief. If you know something to be factually true, then belief is superfluous. — Wayfarer

Then you don't understand what a belief is. In the strictest sense of the term, "knowledge" is true, adequately justified belief ("adequate" = sufficient to not be merely accidentally true). It's debatable whether or not scientific facts constitute "knowledge" in the strict sense, which is why I'm merely asking for a belief + its justification - something to raise it above mere possibility (I don't insist on knowledge).

You’re still treating the point I’m making as if it were an empirical claim about the contents of the world — something that could be justified the way a scientific hypothesis is. — Wayfarer

Then you misunderstand. I was simply asking what positive claims you can make about the structure and/or contents of the world other than scientific facts, and how you can justify the claim. You do make one in your reply, specifically about universals. I'll get to this shortly.

You invariably defer to the authority of science. But mine isn’t “untethered philosophising”: it’s philosophy. — Wayfarer

What I've said about science is that it produces justified beliefs about the world. Indeed, scientific "facts" are justified based on empiricism and abductive reasoning. It's interesting that you seem to treat scientific facts as something more than "beliefs". Although this suggests you misunderstand the term, "belief", it also implies that you indeed have a high regard for the understanding of the world that we have developed through science.

But I must stress that I have not made the claim of scientism, that science alone can produce justified beliefs about the world. I grant that there are aspects of the world that can be understood, and justifiably believed, independently of science. But this seems limited to fundamental concepts like universals, not to fuller metaphysical theories, not a comprehensive metaphysical theory, or even a theory of mind. Here's where you've only given me possibilities and negative facts, not justified beliefs.

Relativist: "Science can't establish which interpretation of QM is correct, but neither can philosphizing. What I object to is trying to justify belief in some metaphysical claim on the basis that it fits one particular interpretation. These resulting beliefs are better justified than philosophical speculations that produce a myriad of mutually exclusive, possibilities"


Such as? — Wayfarer

Such as the myriad of possibilities which derive from the negative fact that reductive physicalism has an explanatory gap associated with consciousness.

Nothing in [Feser's] argument is speculative. It is critical — Wayfarer

He is making a case for the reality of universals - justifying believing these exist. That's reasonable. It's also consistent with physicalism. It's a basic aspect of reality that we largely agree about. I'm looking for justification for claims you make that we disagree about.

Everyone agrees on the equations and the experimental results [of QM]; what is disputed is their meaning. If your view were correct, these interpretive disagreements could be resolved simply by “consulting the science.” — Wayfarer

Wrong again. I have never suggested that science can answer all questions. I also addressed this point explicitly in my last post when I said: "The various interpretations of QM aren't testable hypotheses, and does establish a limit to what we can justifiably know about the world- but it's a boundary that's been reached through science, not by untethered philosophizing."

Concepts are real, but not material.
They can only be grasped by a rational intelligence.
They do not exist as physical particulars or “states of affairs” in the world.
Yet science would be impossible without them. — Wayfarer

So what? You still accept scientific facts as true. You haven't suggested making any alteration, nor specific addition, to the set of (science based) beliefs about the world as a consequence of this insight. Instead, you just restate the same thing, about the role of our sensory/cognitive framework in developing these true, physical facts about the world. Other than being an interesting factoid that is folly to ignore, you haven't inferred any additional insights from it - not insights that can constitute justified beliefs. My impression is that you infer from this that reductive physicalism is false (a hasty judgement, IMO), but I haven't seen you defend some alternative.

Tye's theory what what this property is, is pretty vague. He refers to it as "consciousness*" (with the asterisk) to distinguish it from "consciousness" (without an asterisk). The latter is the thing we normally refer to, while consciousness* is the lowest level building block. If you do read it, I'll be interested in hearing your reaction.

because the alternative (philosophical speculation untethered to empirical data) cannot produce justified beliefs.
— Relativist

Is this also true of mathematics? — AmadeusD

Not to pure mathematics. I'm discussing the justified beliefs we can derive about the actual world. Beliefs derived from science have a good justification, whereas beliefs derived from metaphysical speculation seem (to me) unjustified, or only weakly justified. We see lots of philosophical theories tossed around, but I'm not seeing much of a defense of them- other than it being possibly true.

I agree that physicalism does not have a good answer for qualia, but I'm just arguing that qualia is the only serious problem with physicalism.

I recently read Michael Tye's book, "Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness". Tye regards himself as a physicalist, but he rationalizes consciousness as due to some inherent property of matter that manifests only in brains of a sufficient level of complexity. I don't complete buy into his hypothesis, but it's virtue is that it's considerably less extreme than alternatives that dismiss physicalism altogether because of the explanatory gap.

So when you say that my view implies “we can’t get the world as it is,” or that recognising our cognitive structure gives “no additional insight,” that’s simply out of step with the scientific history. — Wayfarer

It was you who said:

My point is that the actual world is never given “as it is in itself,” but only as disclosed through the structures of perception, embodiment, and understanding that are the conditions for any intelligible world at all. — Wayfarer

And you seem somewhat dismissive of science, and yet you're now suggesting that science can indeed give us some insight into "the world as it is".

My position is that science is our best means of learning information about the world as it is, because the alternative (philosophical speculation untethered to empirical data) cannot produce justified beliefs.

My view on the role of our sensory/cognitive framework is that it's not really an impediment (as you seem to suggest) but the explanations (of the world as it is) developed by science will necessarily be expressed in human terms, and that's not the least problematic -understanding by humans is necessarily going to be in human terms.

By contrast, you have been dismissive even of Ontic Structural Realism- which makes the modest claim that successful science provides some true information about reality.

So when you say that my view implies “we can’t get the world as it is,” or that recognising our cognitive structure gives “no additional insight,” that’s simply out of step with the scientific history. The 20th century forced physics itself to confront the limits of the classical, observer-independent picture of the world. You can disagree with Copenhagen, but you can’t say the issue isn’t philosophically significant — physicists have spent decades wrestling with it (and it is still the predominant attitude).

SCIENCE identified an aspect of reality that is counter-intuitive, based on measurements - not on detached philosophizing. It was able to do this DESPITE the limitations of our sensory-cognitive structure and perspective that you focus on. There is no viable alternative. Aristotle could have philosophized for thousands of years, and he would never have developed the insight that empirical science has given us.

There is, of course "philosophizing" in science, but it is philosophizing on explanations for empirical data, a means of generating testable hypotheses. The various interpretations of QM aren't testable hypotheses, and does establish a limit to what we can justifiably know about the world- but it's a boundary that's been reached through science, not by untethered philosophizing.

Science doesn’t “produce beliefs.” It produces models that organise and validate observations within a conceptual framework... — Wayfarer

Science does produce beliefs: scientific facts that are grasped and accepted by an individual are beliefs that the person holds. These resulting beliefs are better justified than philosophical speculations that produce a myriad of mutually exclusive possibilities:

But it does not — and cannot — investigate the preconditions that make observation, measurement, and intelligibility possible. That is where philosophical analysis is indispensable. Not everything about human existence, or about the structure of experience, is amenable to empirical methods — and ignoring that doesn’t make the questions go away.

Identify something you believe about "the preconditions that make observation, measurement, and intelligibility possible", and provide your justification for believing it.

I don't think what you are describing is the feeling of self-awareness that you and I have. And I don't think that feeling is the programmer's intention. I don't see how any number of physical events can create such a thing. I'm not aware of any theory that attempts to explain it. — Patterner

I am suggesting that the "feeling of self awareness" is decomposible into feelings (qualia, including pain, pleasure, joy, sensory perceptions.) + thoughts, some of which are triggered by these qualia, and by neurological responses to other bodily activities (neurological, hormonal).

This is pure hypothesis on my part, but its epistemological virtue is that it minimizes the magic (i.e. the elements of consciousness that seem inconsistent with reductive physicalism).

My point is that the actual world is never given “as it is in itself,” but only as disclosed through the structures of perception, embodiment, and understanding that are the conditions for any intelligible world at all. — Wayfarer

But acknowlegement of the fact that we are dependent on our cognitive structure leads to no additional insights about the world: it's impossible to escape our inherent perspective.

More importantly, it doesn't imply that our human-centric understandings are false. In fact, if we don't accept the truth of our human-centric understandings, then we have no means of advancing knowledge about the world.

Philosophy can inquire into what lies beyond the limits of objectivity in a way science cannot. — Wayfarer

Philosophy is still being done by humans, so the same limitations apply: you aren't going to get closer to understanding the world "as it is" this way.

More importantly: science produces justified beliefs about the world. What justified beliefs can be produced by these philosophical inquiries? It appears to me to do no more than generate possibilities.

Most aspects of consciousness seem amenable to programming in software. Feelings are not amenable to this.
— Relativist
Is this an assertion or is there evidence of this? I mean, something totally alien to you is probably not going to feel human feelings. Despite the assertion above, I seriously doubt bacteria experience warmth the way we do. I'm not even sure if it's been show that they react to more/less favorable temperatures. — noAxioms

My point was: 1) that most aspects of consciousness can be described algorithmically- this is what materialist philosophers of mind do. There isn't evidence that this directly maps to neurological function, but it defeats the claims that materialism can't possibly be true. 2) on the other hand, feelings cannot be created via algorithm.

To your point: perhaps other life form have different feelings, or perhaps they have some of the same feelings, but the cognitive context is vastly differen

I don't think subjective experience of all that is programmable. we can program feedback loops, but we can't program those feedback loops being aware of themselves. — Patterner

We could program an "executive function" that integrates sensory input, memories that these trigger, and other memories, that induce thoughts and directs activity. Is there more to awareness?

This is not solipsism, nor the denial of an external world, but an insistence that the world we inhabit is inseparable from the activity of consciousness that renders it intelligible. And that, of course, is the bridge to both phenomenology and enactive cognition. — Wayfarer

If you mean this literally, it's absurd because it assumes the actual, external world depends on (human?) consciousness. If you believe that, I doubt you could provide a reasonable justification for that belief.

It would not be absurd to say the world as we perceive and understand it is inseparable from our consciousness. Although it's trivial.

It seems to me that the limits you assume to our abilities to understand the external world makes your position self-defeating: it implies that our knowlwdge of the world is too limited to judge that it's too limited.

If the reality we experience is the only thing that we have experienced, how do we know that there isn’t anything beyond our reality? — an-salad

We can't "know" there's more (in the strict sense of "knowlwdge"). But we innately have a sense that there is a world beyond ourselves, and this constitutes a rational basis. Given that we have this belief, it is rational to maintain it unless it is defeated by other facts and valid reasoning. The mere fact that it is possibly false is not a defeater.

this rewind possibility is the standard framing. — Mijin

I believe you're referring to the PAP: Principle of Alternative Possibilities, which suggests a rewind could have produced a different choice.

But LFW does not necessarily require that. One could agree that the rewind can't produce another choice, but if the choice is not the product of natural determinism- it is still a product of free will.

This is the view of molinists; it entails a means of rationalizing free will with God's foreknowledge of choices you will make. William Lane Craig (a molinist) explicitly rejects the PAP on these grounds, while still insisting that choices are freely willed. This is not, of course, a good reason to believe in LFW; rather, it's a rationalization of LFW (assumed to exist in order to justify accountability to God) with divine foreknowledge.

I'm an atheist, so I reject the molinist rationalization, but it does make a bit of sense to decouple LFW from the PAP.

As far as I can tell, consciousness (=experiencing being conscious) entails the set of sensory sensations, thoughts and feelings one has in the present, where "the present" is a short period of time, not an instant of time.

These are all intertwined. Sensations and feelings can induce thoughts, and thoughts can induce feelings. It is the feelings aspect that the hard part, of the "hard problem". Most aspects of consciousness seem amenable to programming in software. Feelings are not amenable to this. IMO, feelings are the one aspect of consciousness that is inconsistent with what we know about the physical world. That doesn't mean it's necessarily inconsistent with naturalism - it could just mean that there are aspects of the natural world that are not understood and may be inscrutable.

If "free will" just means that we make some choices without being forced by something external to ourselves, then indeed we have free will.

If "free will" means that our will operates independently of the laws of nature (wholly or partly), then it's impossible to know that.

I think the only meaningful question is "why does the universe exist?" — Ciceronianus

Why must there be a reason?

Why is this an open universe? My gut tells me a bilateral infinite series towards both poles doesn't accommodate discrete boundaries. What sort of boundaries contains the now? Time is the universal solvent that keeps us in the now. What ever stops time? — ucarr

It's at least logically possible the universe is finite to the past, and therefore closed to the past. My personal opinion is that this is indeed the case, because an infinite past would entail a completed series of steps of finite duration (call these "days"). It is not logically possible to add up to infinity through increments of finite duration.

Being open to the future doesn't have any problems I can think of. Proceding forward in time, each day is a new "now", but the process will never "reach" infinity. In this context, an infinite future just entails an unending process. I guess if you embrace B-theory of time ("block" time), it would be a problem because it would entail a block that is infinite in extent - but IMO, this is an argument against block time.

“Why not nothing?” elicits the reasoning that reveals that math, logic, and science are incomplete and also that the universe is open (it didn’t start from nothing) and cannot be closed. — ucarr

Gödel proved that any mathematical system is necessarily incomplete, but this does not imply the "universe is open". Given the fact that there is a universe, it follows that there is not, and never was, a 'state of nothingness", that preceded it (temporally or causally). The reasoning is parallel to your support of your premise 1.

I suspect you wish to assume there did exist a prior state of "God sans universe". That's logically possible, but it's an unwarranted assumption. Here's why:

Define ToE: The Totality of Existence. If naturalism is true then ToE={the universe}; if deism is true then ToE={universe+God}

In either case (ToE) was not preceded by a "state of nothingness", for the reason I just mentioned: it is logically impossible for a "state of nothingness" to precede that which exists.

So, feel free to assume a God exists - but don't fool yourself into believing you can prove it to be the case.

Premises:

[1] Epistemically, belief and thought are identical.
[2] Preexisting attachment to an idea motivates a rhetorical shift from “I think” to “I believe,” implying a degree of veracity the idea lacks.
[3] This implication produces unwarranted confidence.
[4] Insisting on an idea’s truth beyond the limits of its epistemic warrant is irrational.


Conclusion ∴ All belief is irrational. — Millard J Melnyk

In [1], you seem to be suggesting that saying "I think X" is equivalent to saying "I believe X".
But then in [2], you seem to be implying the "I think X" and "I believe X" mean different things.

Then in [3], you're noting that when a person says "I think X" they're conveying a belief that is unwarranted.

But this means [4] applies exclusively to statements "I think X", and not necessarily to all expressions of belief. This makes your conclusion non-sequitur.

Independent of this analysis, I'll point out that your conclusion has an absurd implication: that all beliefs are equally irrational - and therefore all beliefs are equally arbitrary. That's prima facie absurd: it implies it's just as reasonable for a pedestrian at an intersection to walk straight into traffic as it is to wait for the light to change and oncoming traffic to stop.

So there can be warranted confidence in a belief - and that's what we ought to strive for.

Oh, OK. That weakens their claim to be real, perhaps, perhaps not. Maybe they are real, but not in the sense of having an independent existence from the systems they govern. I'm not familiar with the view. — bert1

It's not weak at all. It's referred to as existing "immanently". In metaphysics, an immanent property is one that exists within an object itself, as opposed to a transcendent property that would exist beyond or outside it.

The -1 electric charge of an electron exists immanently in an electron. It seems to me that immanent properties make more sense then having properties be independent things because then you'd have to account for how these properties attach, and explain what they're attaching to (are they attaching to a thing lacking any properties at all?!)

The attraction between an electron and proton is a relational property that exists imminently in an electron-proton pair. There's no evidence that their attraction is contingent on anything other than the properties of each of the objects and their proximity.

- is the generation of objects governed by laws, or do the laws only exist once the object exist? — bert1

Yes and no.

The laws exist iff the set of objects exists in the arrangement that exhibits the law. If inflation theory is correct, then there was a time in the universe in which no particles existed - so there were no electron-proton pairs, and thus no laws could be exhibited between them.

However, the fact that such a law would be exhibited when protons and electrons came about would have been baked into the physics of the quantum fields - so ultimately (and assuming reductionism is true) the electron-proton law is just exhibiting more fundamental natural law that would always have been present.

Why does the same type of law always occur with the same type of objects?

Remember that the existence of laws of nature is a hypothesis, one that best explains the empirical evidence. I argue that this hypothesis is an "inference to best explanation" for these regularities. You could counter this claim by presenting an alternative hypothesis that you can show to be a better explanation. The hypothesis seems to be consistent with what we know about the world through physics.

But GIVEN the hypothesis that there are laws of nature, it is the case that a set of objects arranged in a particular way that exhibits a law of nature will do so necessarily. That's simply what it means to be a law: it is a necessary relation that exists between types of things.

Why is there consistency across space and time?

Because the relevant objects in the past are the same sort of objects that exist in the present and future.

But it raises a lot of questions about the details of this objective, but invisible and all-powerful, existence that laws partake of. Are the laws all omnipresent? If so, how does that fit with them being numerically distinct? Or is there really one big law that explains everything? Do laws change? Eternal god(s) without the personality? — bert1

"All powerful"? Whatever gives you that idea?

According to the theory, laws are relations between types of objects. These relations exist when and where these types exist. This removes the mystery associated with a platonic view of laws, by proposing they exist as part of the ontological structure of the world.

There's no reason to think they would change. Bare possibilities are irrelevant, because the theory is an inference to best explanation of regularities we observe in the world. The theory isn't dependent on the tentative current state of the discipline of physics; if an apparent "law of physics" were to change, it would be imply there's more to this "law of physics" than we thought.

Is there one big law? That might be the case if monism is true. But these questions are irrelevant to the theory.

Because laws are descriptive and don't really explain anything. — bert1

That is not the view of law realists. They suggests there to be an ontological basis for the observed regularities.

Example: two objects with opposite electric charge (e.g. electron & proton) have a force of attraction between them. This force is a necessary consequence of their properties. The properties and force are ontological.

That's pretty much correct.

But are laws of nature not codifications of observed invariances? — Janus

No. The hypothesis I discussed is that laws of nature are ontological.

I distinguish laws of nature from so-called "laws of physics". These are, at worst, codifications of these invariances. But they are more than that. when they make predictions that are later confirmed, predictions about things not previously observed. These give us good reasons to think the law of physics may be a true law of nature.

But it still may be they later become falsified by new evidence. This only means the law of physics isn't an accurate description of the ontological law of nature. .