Then he doesn't have a categorical belief that his team will win. Rather, he believes it probable that his team will win.
— Relativist

I'm not big on that distinction. For starters, as a falliblist, upon analysis all my beliefs are graded (probabilistic or else comparable) - this even though I will typically address them in the categorical "yes/no" format. — javra

Sure, but then you have some loose epistemic probability in mind, and a more precise statement of your belief would identify this. So it is not strictly true that the guy believes his team will win. Rather, he believes it more likely than not that they will win, or that it is a near certainty, or some other probabilistic qualification.

If "Joe believes it more likely than not that the Columbus Spinsters will win on Saturday" then "Joe believes it is true that it is more likely than not that the Columbus Spinsters will win on Saturday". This is the "equivalence theory" in theory of truth.

Intuitions are not formed to be consistent with reality. According to evolutionary theory they are shaped by some sort of survival principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

The "intuitions" in question are relevant to survival. If there is a world external to ourself, it would be necessary to have a functionally accurate view of that world. If there is not such an external world, what would explain this false intuition?

Why think our abstractions about space and time are false?
— Relativist

There is much reason to think that our conceptions of space and time are false, spatial expansion, dark matter, dark energy, quantum weirdness. Anywhere that we run into difficulties understanding what is happening, when applying these abstractions, this is an indication that they are false. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was referring to our primitive (pre-science) abstractions of space and time. As I said, they are valid and true within the context of our direct perceptions.

Well sure, these conceptions are true in the context of our sensory perceptions, that's how we use them, verify them, etc.. But if our sensory perceptions are not providing truth, that's a problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it's not. Our sensory perceptions aren't oracles that magically know truths beyond what we could possibly perceive. Further, the error has not prevented science from learning more precise truths- such as a more precise understanding of space and time.

I acknowledge that our descriptions (and understandings) are grounded in our perspective, but we have the capacity to correct for that.
— Relativist

How would you propose that we could do that? How do we verify that our sensory perceptions are giving us truth? — Metaphysician Undercover

See my prior comment.

Are you then in search for infallible proof. — javra

No.

This is not always the case in real life applications, most especially when it comes to beliefs regarding future facts. If John believes his team will win the game then he might bet accordingly while nevertheless having a great deal of doubt regarding this same belief. — javra

Then he doesn't have a categorical belief that his team will win. Rather, he believes it probable that his team will win.

Constructive Empiricism seems to me to go to far, by denying that science tells us anything about reality. I'm more aligned with Structural Realism:

...the most powerful argument in favour of scientific realism is the no-miracles argument, according to which the success of science would be miraculous if scientific theories were not at least approximately true descriptions of the world. While the underdetermination argument is often cited as giving grounds for scepticism about theories of unobservable entities, arguably the most powerful arguments against scientific realism are based on the history of radical theory change in science....
...Structural realism was introduced into current philosophy of science by John Worrall in 1989 as a way to break the impasse that results from taking both arguments seriously, and have “the best of both worlds” in the debate about scientific realism.
...

According to Worrall, we should not accept standard scientific realism, which asserts that the nature of the unobservable objects that cause the phenomena we observe is correctly described by our best theories. However, neither should we be antirealists about science. Rather, we should adopt structural realism and epistemically commit ourselves to the mathematical or structural content of our theories. Since there is (says Worrall) retention of structure across theory change, structural realism both (a) avoids the force of the pessimistic meta-induction (by not committing us to belief in the theory’s description of the furniture of the world) and (b) does not make the success of science (especially the novel predictions of mature physical theories) seem miraculous (by committing us to the claim that the theory’s structure, over and above its empirical content, describes the world).

I believe I've stayed faithful to this approach in all my replies to you.

You would have to defeat my belief in an external, minds-independent world.
— Relativist

That's a bit confrontational to me. And, as I previously expressed, I'm not interested in so doing. — javra

It's not confrontational. The term "defeater" is just standard epistemology. A defeater=a reason to give up a belief. It's shorthand for what I've previously asked for.

I hope you understand why it's relevant. I absolutely believe there is an external world that exists independently of minds. I can't possibly accept idealism unless I drop this belief, and that would require a defeater (not just the mere possibility it is false).

As to your other replies, they sidestep the questions asked without providing answers. E.g. are non-veridical beliefs of themselves physical? — javra

I was defending physicalism, so I didn't see the need to state that it entails the claim that beliefs are physical. Indeed, establishing a belief would entail a physical change in the brain. More specifically, it is a change that will affect behavior.

BTW, to the person hallucinating X, the physical reality of X will be a veridical belief ... this up until the time reasoning might intervene (it doesn't always).

That's not what it means. A verdical belief is one that is actually true, i.e. it corresponds to an aspect of reality. If a person believes X, then he necessarily believes X is true.

If the protagonist in the movie had hallucinations that he believed were false because his psychiatrists convinced him they were false, then the belief in their falsehood was an undercutting defeater of the (seemingly true) hallucination.

Mind in part consists of thoughts. How are thoughts physical? — javra

Physicalism being false does not entail non-solipsistic idealism being true. It just means idealism is logically possible. I already acknowledge it is logically possible.

Regarding your claim, you seem to be reifying an action. Engaging in thought is an activity of the brain- a behavior. It often results in the establishment of a new belief-a disposition. Having a belief makes us apt to behave certain way.

we perceive physical realities, but then - given the entailment of physicalism - how is a bona fide hallucination of itself physical? — javra

Our perception of our physical surroundings establishes a complex belief (a disposition) about those surroundings, which will influence how we behave within those surroundings. An hallucination is a non-veridical belief.

But if not everything that does or can occur is physical, then physicalism so defined can only be false. — javra

Sure, but physicalism can be false and idealism still be false. You've provided no reason to think it's true. I'm somewhat agnostic as to a metaphysical theory. I tentatively embrace physicalism because it explains the most and assumes the least. I could switch my allegiance if there were an alternative that bested it. You haven't given one. You would have to defeat my belief in an external, minds-independent world.

The point is, claiming that everything that exists is physical becomes problematic if we can’t definitively say what kind of existence the wave function has, as in quantum mechanics, the wave function is central to predicting physical phenomena. If we take its predictive power seriously, it’s hard to ignore the question of its ontological status without leaving an unresolved gap in the theory. — Wayfarer

But there IS this unresolved gap in our physics. We really don't know. Therefore one can't claim it's inconsistent with physicalism.

Besides this, nothing you said is a refutation of my position as to what I consider physical.

I may misunderstand, but it sounds also bit like you're suggesting that we should reject physicalism if physics doesn't have a complete, verifiable description of reality.
— Relativist

As I said before, as a materialist, D M Armstrong believes that science is paradigmatic for philosophy proper. So you can't have your cake and eat it too - if physics indeed suggests that the nature of the physical eludes precise definition, then so much for appealing to science as a model for philosophy! — Wayfarer

It sounds like I had it right: you think physicalism should be rejected if physics doesn't have a complete, verifiable description of reality.

Armstrong's model is consistent with what we do know, so it's not falsified. A stipulation that the wave function is non-physical would technically falsify physicalism, but if the wave function behaves in a law-like manner, why make that stipulation? It would still be a coherent metaphysical model, save for using "physical" as a qualifier. That's why your objection seems forced: "let's label the wave function as non-physical (or just say it may not be physical) so we can dismiss every physicalist metaphysical theory".

I wouldn't put it in personal or pejorative terms, but I do believe that philosophical and/or scientific materialism is an erroneous philosophical view. — Wayfarer

My position is that Armstrong's theory is not necessarily true, but it's superior to other theories in terms of explanatory scope, parsimony, and ad hoc-ness.

The fact that it's consistent with what we know about physics is a point in its favor, while the fact that there are gaps in our understanding of physics is irrelevant. It's irrelevant because a theory can only be expected to account for what we know: that's the nature of abductive reasoning. Abduction entails comparing explanatory hypotheses - and what needs to be explained are the agreed facts. Unknowns do not constitute facts that need explaining.

Reasons such as these?:

That mentioned, I agree that the sometimes tacitly implied notion of physical reality being somehow metaphysically independent of the individual minds which, after all, are aspects of it—such that physical reality could be placed here and minds there without any dependency in-between—is a logical dud. A close second dud is the attempt to describe minds, and all their various aspects, as purely physical (such that, for one example, all ends one can conceive of and intend are all physical in their nature). — javra

No. You expressing your judgement is not a reason for me, even with a vague allusion to some questionable assumption that it seems based on.

Yes, I can provide them, but I don't think reasons will here much help. We are all typically attached to the notions we are habituated to hold, in this case that there was physicality long before there was any type of awareness, ergo physicalism. — javra

I may agree that we're "habituated" to hold the view that there exists a mind-independent reality.

If we're a consequence of evolutionary tendencies, then we would necessarily have the implicit belief that there exists a world external to ourselves. How we then think about this (e.g. that this external world exists independently of ourselves) could be a cultural habituation. I'm willing to entertain an alternative, if there's a good enough reason.

My reply to this will be that of panpsychism - this in the sense that awareness pervaded the cosmos long before life evolved into it (i.e., in the sense that the physical is, was, and will remain dependent of the psychical). This conclusion for me, though, is only a deduction from the premise of a non-solipsistic mind awareness-created world. — javra

You're indicating panpaychism is a logical step beyond the "premise of a non-solipsistic mind awareness-created world." I'm just asking why should entertain that premise.

And I do not claim to have any great insight into how panpsychism works - nor into any metaphysically cogent explanation for how life evolved from non-life (the physicalist explanation that "it must have" doesn't much console me either as far as metaphysical explanations go - I find it just as comforting as the explanation of "God did it"). — javra

If your answer is that this feels right, and/or provides you comfort, I have no objection. I'm not trying to convince you that you're wrong. I'm just seeking my own comfort- I'd like to know if there are good reasons to think I'm deluding myself with what I believe about the world.

Trump’s opponents never accepted the 2016 election, therefor they had fascists tendencies, like Hitler. — NOS4A2

You are mistaken. Hillary Clinton conceded defeat and never attempted to overturn the election. To some degree, she was being a sore loser when she labeled Trump's election "illegitimate", but she at least had a rational basis for her claim: Russia helping Trump, and Comey hurting her chances. These things actually occurred, although it's impossible to know their impact.

By contrast, Trump's claim that he was cheated is based entirely on falsehoods - falsehoods that he actively drummed into his supporters. Trump lied about fraud, lied about what people said to him about fraud, and he pressured others to lie - in an active attempt to overturn the legitimate election. So to equate the two is absurd.
.

Replace "heap of sand" with "the physical world" and "individual sand particles" with "individual minds". The same relations will hold. This can thereby lead to the logically valid affirmation that, in a non-solipsistic mind-created world, the physical world occurs independently of me and my own mind, even though it will be dependent on the occurrence of a multiplicity of minds in general. — javra

OK, I think I understand. But as I said before:

I believe there exists a world (AKA "reality") independent of minds. I also believe nearly everyone agrees with me. That doesn't mean we're right, of course, but I'd like you or Wayfarer to give me reasons why I should reject, or doubt, my current belief. — Relativist

When I say "independent of minds", I mean that the world at large exists irrespective of the presence of any minds at all. I believe the universe is about 14B years old, and there were almost certainly no minds within it for quite a long time. Can you give me a reason to reject or doubt this belief of mine?

All objects that can produce multiple human beings are individual human beings. A mother, for instance, can do that. But this is also true of asexual reproduction. An individual amoeba, for instance, can produce another amoeba. Unfortunately (and oddly), we may have to think of one zygotic twin as the parent of the other. — NOS4A2

You're proposing a sufficient condition, but not a necessary one. I reject this as a sufficient condition: we could theoretically produce multiple humans from each stem cell in your body. Each stem cell fits your stated condition.

would never deny you or other women your privileges, but your distinctions are completely arbitrary. Worse, they are inapplicable to those with developmental disabilities

I referred to a "properly functioning human being". This doesn't imply one must be proper functioning to be a human. I wasn't even trying to suggest a necessary condition; I was defining a typical human being, not excluding the atypical.

At any rate, the reduction of humanity and dignity to that of “material” is the name of the game for anyone who wants to end such a life.

You're reading that into what I said. I do happen to think that humans are material; the only alternative is immaterial; it's a well defined dichotomy. Nevertheless, I never said humans are nothing more than material. Being a human is absolutely something in addition to being material.

It occupies its own unique and distinct position in space and time. A zygote is alive. At no point does a zygote die and get replaced by another living being. If left to live a zygote can continue his life, without interruption, for upwards to one hundred years.

Twins are individuated at the zygote level until it reproduces asexually, then there are two individuals. — NOS4A2

This is a tangent. I have no problem with identifying an individual identity as a series of causally-connected spatiotemporal stages. The objection I have is in defining the "natural kind" (for lack of a better term) of "individual human being". This would have to be based on a well-defined set of necessary and sufficient properties, that unambiguously identify an object as either being one of these, or not. An object that can produce multiple human beings cannot possible be said to be an individual human being, even though it is commonly in the developmental history of human beings. The same is true of blasotocysts- clusters of cells, that may produce multiple human beings at several stages.

So my position is that an individual human being (i.e. an object of that type) is something that emerges. gradually during fetal development. I regard a properly functioning individual human being as a self-sustaining organism with certain physical and intellectual capabilities, including a sense of self. You can disagree, because there is no unequivocally correct answer. But you have no rational basis for denying me (or women) the privilege of deciding for ourselves.

If you re-read what was my initial reply to MU, you'll see that I also believe there exists a world independent of individual minds, and so I too agree with you on this count - even if, as the case is, I simultaneously believe this same world is contingent on the occurrence of mind as a generality. — javra

How can an external world exist independently of human minds AND be contingent upon human minds?

Being contingent upon entails a dependence, does it not?

Agreed.

Provide your complete principium individuationis. My issue is that there is no such thing because "individual human being" is a concept with vague boundaries. A zygote isn't a strict boundary because a zygote can produce multiple individuals. If we focus on the histories of a set of twins, they are clearly not individuated at the zygote level.

Sure it does. But what about this requires that the fundamental constituents are actually physical? What does 'physical' mean, when the nature of the so-called fundamental particles is ambiguous, as has been discussed? — Wayfarer

It seems uncontroversial to stipulate that the objects of our ordinary experiences are physical. It seems most reasonable to treat the component parts of physical things as also physical, all the way down to whatever is fundamental.

And as for something non-physical, the wavefunction Ψ is an ideal candidate: — Wayfarer

A "wave function" is a mathematical abstraction. I see no good reason to think abstractions are ontological. So I infer that a wave function is descriptive of something that exists.

My definition of the physical: the ordinary objects of experience, and everything that is causally connected, through law-like behavior, to these ordinary objects of our experience.

Quantum systems fit this.

I may misunderstand, but it sounds also bit like you're suggesting that we should reject physicalism if physics doesn't have a complete, verifiable description of reality.

The difference is this is the one thing in there with its own distinct and unique genetics, occupying its own unique and distinct position in space and time, and will remain as such until the end of its life. — NOS4A2

Identical twins begin with the same genetic material, they lack this uniqueness you mention. So unique genetics can't be the basis for identifying an individual human life.

It's true that every adult human's existence can be tracked back to a specific zygote. Similarly, every oak tree can be traced back to a specific acorn - but an acorn is not an oak tree. An acorn merely has the potential to develop into an oak tree, and a zygote merely has the potential to develop into 1 or more human beings.

We obviously perceive space and time...
— Relativist

I don't think so Relativist. Kant names these as intuitions which are the necessary conditions for the possibility of sensory perception. So from that perspective space and time are prior to perception. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why would we have these intuitions, if they aren't consistent with reality (i.e. true within the scope of our perceptions).

Another type of ontology would hold that space and time are logical abstractions, posterior to perceptions. We deduce from our perceptions, the conclusion that there must be something which we conceive of as "space", and something we conceive of as "time". But there is no indication that we actually perceive whatever it is which we call "space", or "time".

Why think our abstractions about space and time are false?

Special relativity demonstrates that our perceptions of space and time aren't universally true, but it also explains how it is true within the context in which our sensory perceptions apply.

I acknowledge that our descriptions (and understandings) are grounded in our perspective, but we have the capacity to correct for that.

But you're making an error if you think materialism requires these scientific models to be correct depictions of reality. The metaphysics does not depend on these models to correspond to reality.
— Relativist

So, what does it depend on, then? — Wayfarer

Physicalism = the thesis that everything that exists is physical. It is false only if there exists something non-physical. It depends only on this being true.

So our time perception is not necessarily an adequate representation of the time that occurs in the actual world. — javra

Absolutely! The fact that we (i.e..Einstein) developed a theory that transcends the "human perspective" of time is a testimony to our ability to transcend our own perspective, and endeavor to be objective.

It is well known that the nature of the existence of former, in particular, is rather ambiguous, to say the least. Although I don't want to divert this thread too far in this direction, this is where the Copenhagen interpretation of physics is relevant. This says that physics does not reveal what nature is in itself (or herself, some would say) but as how she appears to our methods of questioning. So these 'elementary particles' are not mind-independent in that sense - which is the implication of the observer problem. — Wayfarer

The fact that models makes successful predictions demonstrates that we know something about the nature of physical reality, and that's really the basic thing I'm defending.

Quantum mechanics indeed shows that reality is not identical to that which we directly perceive, but this fact is itself a relevant truth about reality. Re: the "observer problem", don't jump to a conclusion consistent with your confirmation bias. No interpretation of QM is verifiably true, but it's a near certainty that reality actually exhibits the predictible law-like behavior that we observe.

As for genes, and whether these comprise a fundamental explanatory unit, again, the emergence of epigenetics has given rise to an understanding that genes themselves are context-dependent. That is not downplaying the significance of the discovery of genes (or quantum theory, for that matter) but the role they are both assigned by physicalism as being ontologically primary or fundamental. — Wayfarer

So you aren't denying that genes exist. You're pointing to the fact that there are other factors that influence growth and development. So once again, genetics does tell us something about life: more objective facts.

I don't know how you could come to that conclusion. We know all manner of things about the world. I'm not denying that scientific knowledge is efficacious. What I'm questioning is the metaphysics of materialism, which posits that 'Elementary particles, moments in time, genes, the brain – all these things are assumed to be fundamentally real. — Wayfarer

Sorry I didn't understand, but that's how it sounded to me. Glad we could clarify that you agree scientific knowledge is efficacious- so I assume you agree that we indeed have some knowledge about the world external to minds.

But you're making an error if you think materialism requires these scientific models to be correct depictions of reality. The metaphysics does not depend on these models to correspond to reality.

transcendental idealism still maintains that in a fundamental sense, the mind provides the intuitions of time and space, within which all such empirical judgements are made — Wayfarer

I completely agree with this; it makes perfect sense. My issue has been that these intuitions don't preclude discerning aspects of reality.

Read the op, and what I said in my last post. Only minds provide a spatial-temporal perspective, and without assuming such a perspective, all these supposed mind independent things, the world, the universe, even "reality" itself, are completely unintelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover

The very notion of a perspective entails having a mind. We are sufficiently aware that we can recognize the fact we even have a perspective.

We obviously perceive space and time, so why doubt that this is an aspect of the actual world? The mere fact that we have a perspective does not entail that this perspective is an illusion.

You're ignoring my point: a zygote is not identical with an individual human being. Rather, they are a material that have the potential for developing human being(s).

In theory, your skin cells (which contain a complete set of your DNA) could be manipulated into developing into human beings.

I've said, I don't deny the reality of there being an objective world, but that on a deeper level, it is not truly mind-independent." - Wayfarer

These two clauses seem to be contradictory. If there is an objective world external to ourselves, then it exists independent of our minds.
— Relativist

Just say this quibble between you and Wayfarer. As I've just tried to illustrate, the quibble can be resolved by differentiating "mind" as generality (which occurs wherever individual minds occur) and "mind" as one concrete instantiation of the former (such that in concrete form minds are always plural and divided from each other) ... this in the term "mind-independent". Physical reality is not mind-independent in the first sense but is mind-independent in the second sense, this in any system of (non-solipsistic) idealism wherein the world is contingent upon the occurrence of minds. — javra

That doesn't address the issue I raised.

I believe there exists a world (AKA "reality") independent of minds. I also believe nearly everyone agrees with me. That doesn't mean we're right, of course, but I'd like you or Wayfarer to give me reasons why I should reject, or doubt, my current belief.

I think the idea of a mind-independent reality is really incoherent. Reality is something which minds create, as pointed out by the op. If you try to imagine the world as existing without any point-of-view, from no perspective at all, it becomes completely unintelligible, so it cannot be imagined. That's because "reality" as we know it, is point-of-view dependent. So the idea of a mind-independent reality really is incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you think the idea of a mind-independent reality is incoherent, then you can't believe there exists a mind-independent reality. I believe there is. Can you give me any reasons to change my mind? Understand that I acknowledge that physicalism could be wrong, but the belief in a mind-independent reality isn't dependent on physicalism being true.

No, but they're also not understandable outside the scientific context within which they were discovered. — Wayfarer

I don't understand why you say that. Please elaborate.

I've said, I don't deny the reality of there being an objective world, but that on a deeper level, it is not truly mind-independent.

These two clauses seem to be contradictory. If there is an objective world external to ourselves, then it exists independent of our minds.

Which is another way of saying objectivity cannot be absolute.

It seems obvious to me that there are objective facts about the world that we know or can come to know. It is objective fact that we live on the third planet from the sun, which we orbit. How is this anything other than an absolute fact?

Why does this matter?
— Relativist

As for whether you're defending physicalism, the link to this discussion was made from this post in another thread in which you claimed to be 'representing David Armstrong's metaphysics'. I see the above arguments as a challenge to Armstrong's metaphysics. As I'm opposing Armstrong's metaphysics, this is why I think it matters. — Wayfarer

That's fine, and we can discuss it, but do you agree it has no practical significance? That's what I meant.

I'm willing to defend Armstrong's metaphysical theory against alternatives, so I need to understand what alternative you propose. I don't claim it's necessarily true; I simply think it's the best explanation for what we know about the world -broadly. It's conceivable that everything in the world is physical, except for minds.

Is his theory of mind the only thing you object to, or do you think there are flaws that are unrelated to his account of mind?

FYI, when we get to specifics of Armstrong's theory of mind, I won't be limiting myself to Armstrong's specifics, but I will stick with physicalism in general.

In the meantime, I need to better understand your position. If you don't believe we can know truths about the world, that seems more significant than whether or not the mind can be adequately accounted for through physicalism. I don't see how you could propose a superior alternative with such a background assumption.

I happen to think the non-essentialist process is the better process. It is why we rarely find a clear line between anything. It is why Heraclitus was the wisest of them all. It is why Aristotle is easy to dismiss (although he was the second-wisest). It is why Kant's phenomenal veil will always be pulled over our eyes. It is why Hegel may be the third wisest. It is why eastern thinkers who take essence and show how it must implode as it crystalizes are also wise...

But there is no speaking, no significance to any word, if we don't acknowledge gray, fuzzy lines of difference. It is easier to talk in essentialist terms, so essentialism is more like a tool of language.

You have to sound like an essentialist to say "beard versus clean-shaven" at all. To avoid essentialist speak is to conduct tiresome linguistic acrobatics to bring us to the same place anyway - the difference between this and that. — Fire Ologist

No, you don't have to be an essentialist to say "beard versus clean-shaven" or "individual human person" or not. As you've noted elsewhere, essentialism is the notion that there are necessary and sufficient properties that define what is the "essence" of a thing (or type of thing). Essence is a metaphysical concept.

Without appealing to essences, we can define SORTALS - a set of properties that we use to segregate objects into sets. It is conceptual, like set theory, not metaphysical. So we could define "having a beard" as "facial hair growth with a mean length of 5cm", and thus sort men into the bearded and unbearded in this way. My point is that there's no objective basis for defining a sortal in this way, when there is vagueness in the concept of what we're trying to distinguish.

We could define "individual human being" in such a way that we could sort the objects of the world on this basis. But there will be some degree of arbitrariness to it, at the boundaries. For most purposes, the boundary conditions don't matter. For abortion, it does.

If that is an human zygote, every person who has ever existed goes through this stage in their lifecycle. What leads you to believe it is not a person? — NOS4A2

A zygote can develop into multiple persons.

I acknowledge that we'll never understand much about the mind through a physical analysis of brain structure. — Relativist


It matters for materialist theories of mind, such as D M Armstrong's and others, surely. They all proclaim the identity of brain and mind. — Wayfarer

No, it doesn't. Hurricane behavior is not best understood in terms of particle physics, but there's no reason to doubt that it is fundamentally due to the behavior of particles.

Dualism could be true. We could be descended from ancestors who were directly created by a God, and it doesn't change anything: there is still an external world and our senses deliver a functionally accurate understanding of it. Why doubt that? You seem to either deny it, or at least doubt it. Why? It's not dependent on physicalism. — Relativist


My issue with dualism, in the Cartesian sense, is that it tends to reify consciousness, treat it as a spiritual 'substance', which is an oxymoronic term in my view. I think some form of revised hylomorphic dualism (matter-form dualism) is quite feasble, one of the reasons I'm impressed with Feser's 'A-T' philosophy. I'm impressed by many of his arguments about the nature and primacy of reason, such as Think, McFly, Think. But he is critical of Cartesian dualism, at least as it has come down to us, and I think the 'Cartesian divide' is the source of many of the intellectual ailments of modernity. — Wayfarer

I'm not defending physicalism here, I'm defending the existence of the external world and that we are able to determine some truths about it.

Behind the Blind Spot sits the belief that physical reality has absolute primacy in human knowledge, a view that can be called scientific materialism. In philosophical terms, it combines scientific objectivism (science tells us about the real, mind-independent world) and physicalism (science tells us that physical reality is all there is). Elementary particles, moments in time, genes, the brain – all these things are assumed to be fundamentally real. By contrast, experience, awareness and consciousness are taken to be secondary. The scientific task becomes about figuring out how to reduce them to something physical, such as the behaviour of neural networks, the architecture of computational systems, or some measure of information. — The Blind Spot

Do you deny that science can tell us much about the real, mind-independent world? Are elementary particles and genes pure fiction?

Is the mind your sole focus? I'm happy to discuss that further, but I need to understand your perspective of everything in the world BESIDES minds.

To put it bluntly, the claim that there’s nothing but physical reality is either false or empty. If ‘physical reality’ means reality as physics describes it, then the assertion that only physical phenomena exist is false. Why? Because physical science – including biology and computational neuroscience – doesn’t include an account of consciousness. — The Blind Spot

Why does this matter? No metaphysical account of the mind is without flaws, and none can be proven as true. A person could practice psychology without a metaphysical account of the mind. On the other hand, neurology depends mostly on the physical - but often relating it to the "magic" of behavior (both physical and mental). But even here, a metaphysical account doesn't contribute to the practice of the discipline.

The field is not an ontological concept, but a phenomenological one. If we were as small as a photon, we could formulate an ontology of the very smallest. And only then would there be a unified physical theory. — Wolfgang

Quantum fields can be considered ontological, although you aren't compelled to do so.

it makes no sense to try to apply quantum mechanics to the macroscopic world — and this also applies to philosophical conclusions. — Wolfgang

Quantum effects have an impact on the macroscopic world, so it can't be ignored.

Why don’t classical and quantum physics go together? Are we dealing with two different worlds or are they just two different descriptions? — Wolfgang

There's only one world, and it seems to be fundamentally quantum mechanical (subatomic particles do not behave like classical objects). But there is clearly a disconnect in our ability to describe the macro world in quantum terms. That doesn't disprove reductive physicalism, but it does leave room for one to deny it-perhaps there is ontological emergence.

Where I take issue with physicalism is that it accords the objective world with an inherent or supposedly mind-independent reality, so that it would remain just so, regardless of whether any being perceives it or not. Within that framework, the mind is considered a consequent fact, a faculty which owes its existence to the vast prior period of material and biological evolution that preceeded it. But this is dependent on viewing the mind as an object among other objects, so it is a judgement that is implicitly made from a perspective outside of the mind. Which is, of course, an impossibility - the inherent contradiction of materialist theories of mind... — Wayfarer

"Supposedly" a mind-independent reality?! Do you really doubt there exists a mind-independent reality? I read the following statement as indicating you agree there is a mind-independent reality:

though we know that prior to the evolution of life there must have been a Universe with no intelligent beings in it, or that there are empty rooms with no inhabitants, or objects unseen by any eye — Wayfarer

Which implies you agree with the "judgement" that this is the case, even if you don't make that judgement on the same basis. The question of whether or not there exists a mind-independent reality does not depend on physicalism being true.

I have taken pains to word the essay we're discussing in such a way as to avoid solipsism and subjectivism. — Wayfarer

I know that, but I was explaining why I believe there is an external world: it is necessarily the case that our perceptions provide some access to this world that is at least functionally accurate.. So, even though your are rejecting solipsism, you seem overly skeptical that we can know something about the external world. I fully accept that our image of the world is rooted in our human perspective, but that fact doesn't imply our understanding is false or even suspect. I think it just means we need to take ourselves, and our perspective, into account when seeking objective facts about the world.

Thus we see, on the one hand, the existence of the whole world necessarily dependent upon the first conscious being, — Schopenhaurer

Taken literally, I think this is absurd - it contradicts my view that there is an external world, that we have a functionally accurate image of it through our senses, and that this provides a foundation for learning objective facts about the world.

But maybe he's using "the whole world" to refer to our human concept of the world. That's a bit more palatable, but it still seems to imply we're too detached from it to discern object truths about it. If I'm correct about this, why would anyone believe this? This seems like unjustified skepticism.

For heuristic purposes, we can behave as if the external world is mind-independent and exists just it would without us. But that is a methodolical axiom, not an existential fact. The error arises from regarding the contingent facts of scientific inquiry as possessing a form of absolute veracity which they don't have. — Wayfarer

Why think this is not an existential fact? Why think our inherent belief in a world external to ourselves is false or completely inscrutable?

Why are you calling the facts of scientific inquiry "contingent"? Is it because they can't be rigorously proven and theories are necessarily falsifiable? That doesn't preclude getting some things right, nor of getting many or most things at least partly right. I just don't understand why one would have such a pessimistic view.

the world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. — Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology, p144

I completely agree with this statement, because "meaning" is a term that pertains specifically to conscious beings.

Treating consciousness as part of the world, reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousness’s foundational, disclosive role. — Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology, p144

Dualism could be true. We could be descended from ancestors who were directly created by a God, and it doesn't change anything: there is still an external world and our senses deliver a functionally accurate understanding of it. Why doubt that? You seem to either deny it, or at least doubt it. Why? It's not dependent on physicalism.

Since consciousness is presupposed in all science and knowledge, then the proper approach to the study of consciousness itself must be a transcendental one — Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology, p144

I acknowledge that we'll never understand much about the mind through a physical analysis of brain structure. Does this quoted statement have broader implications?

What is the subject of "The universe exists"?

You acknowldge that we can discover objective facts about the universe. Isn't "the universe exists" an objective fact?

I can buy into the notion that all of our knowledge is grounded in ourselves. We individually develop language because we interact with the world, perceiving that world in our uniquely human way. But my point is: there is an actual world that we are perceiving.

My argument for denying solipsism is related to this, so I'll describe it.

We innately believe there exists a world external to ourselves. This is a basic, non-verbal belief- it's not derived logically from other beliefs. Importantly, it is a properly basic belief because it is a consequence of the way the world actually is and of the necessity of interacting with that world for our survival. (If you've read Alvan Plantinga, this will sound familiar. He argues that belief in God is rational - if there exists a God who instilled within us a sensus divinitatus).

Even a properly basic belief could be false. It's possible solipsism is true, but that mere possibility doesn't defeat the inherent belief that we have. I also acknowledge that IF solipsism is true, our belief in the external world is irrational. But that possibility doesn't worry me in the least, because my belief in the external world is so strong - I literally have zero doubt.

This is not an argument that proves solipsism is false. Rather, it shows that belief in an external world is rational, if it is true that there is an external world that produced this innate belief of ours. It is rational to maintain a belief that has not been defeated.

So, irrespective of what anyone else may believe, I am justified in believing there to exist a world external to myself, which I am a part of. If this belief is true (as I am convinced), it is an objective fact, not a subjective fact that is only true for me. It is an objective fact even if everyone else holds a false belief in solipsism.

It seems to me, this basic objective fact, that there exists a world outside the mind, is a reasonable starting point to derive additional objective facts about the world.

Trump hasn't done shit other than having a perfect sense of the direction in which US democracy is falling. — Benkei

Trump has leveraged the perception that US society is "failing" by permitting things like same-sex marriage, sensitivity to LGBTQ concerns, and ostensibly permitting non-white immigrant to enter the country illegally, "poison our blood", commit crimes, and take jobs.

[Quote[Trump is a symptom of the righteous distrust common people have of the political elites and rich people. [/quote]
So they support a rich person because he voices the same irrational concerns they have. Political elites are a problem because most people don't have the capacity or inclination to make well-informed voting decisions.

Distrust informed by their moral intuition that something simply isn't right and most things are unfair.

Moral intuitions that are often rooted in ignorance and prejudice.

This will not go away unless the US government repairs and regains trust by - I don't know - actually improving the material conditions of all its citizens instead of those that are already rich enough to lobby for favours.

How ironic. Encouraging racism, Christian nationalism, undermining rule of law, and embracing a demagogue isn't likely to "repair" the US government.

And that distrust is fueled by selfrighteous pricks decrying they are deplorables, garbage or aren't voting in their self-interest, thereby really only affirming that they don't trust "the other side" and therefore aren't to be trusted by "the other side".

Amplifying inappropriately worded comments to incite outrage in one's followers doesn't contribute to good voting choices. Truly demonizing "the other side" is more pervasive among the Trump cult.

The best way to win someone's trust, after all, has always been to call the other side "dumb shits".

And yet, that's exactly what Trump does- and his followers find it appealing. "Are you an Democrat or an American?" was posted on the Trump campaign website, and repeated by many on social media. A person on my neighborhood's facebook page said we need Trump because the Democrats want to "sexualize children". “These are horrible people,” said Trump at a North Carolina rally, referring to Democrats. “Oops, we should get along with everybody. They’re horrible people. Some people you just can’t get along with.”

suppose there was a breakthrough in cosmology that showed strong evidence that the universe was cyclical, that the Big Bang would be followed by an infinite series of other Big Bangs. Would you still want to push the brute fact line? — Count Timothy von Icarus

My objection to an infinite past is not based on cosmology. Rather, I am persuaded that an infinite past is logically impossible.

I first came to this view after analyzing William Lane Craig's defense of the Kalam Cosmological Argument. His defense of a finite past wasn't persuasive but it got me thinking. I landed on the fact that an infinite past entails an infinite series being completed in a sequential, temporal process. That seems logically impossible.

I don't know that cosmology can necessarily establish this. The big bang doesn't: it just raises the scientific question of what conditions led to the big bang.

Perhaps a theory of the nature of time could support it - if it could be shown that time (as we know it) is an emergent aspect of something more fundamental. I understand that Sean Carroll is working on something like this.

I am making clear the sense in which perspective is essential for any judgement about what exists — even if what we’re discussing is understood to exist in the absence of an observer, be that an alpine meadow, or the Universe prior to the evolution of h. sapiens. The mind brings an order to any such imaginary scene, even while you attempt to describe it or picture it as it appears to exist independently of the observer. — Wayfarer

This makes perfect sense. But the following does not:

In reality, the supposed ‘unperceived object’ neither exists nor does not exist. Nothing whatever can be said about it. — Wayfarer

This seems to contradict the bolded portion of the first quote. I could grant that a subjective perception of some aspect of reality exists only if it is perceived, but this doesn't account for your statement of neither existing nor not existing".

What I’m calling attention to is the tendency to take for granted the reality of the world as it appears to us, without taking into account the role the mind plays in its constitution. — Wayfarer

Fair point. We do need to take our subjectivity into account. But this doesn't preclude our determining some objective truths about reality. You seem to acknowledge that the universe exists. This is an objective truth, even though the words in the statement rely on minds to give them meaning.

This oversight imbues the phenomenal world — the world as it appears to us — with a kind of inherent reality that it doesn’t possess. This in turn leads to the over-valuation of objectivity as the sole criterion for truth.

I don't understand this. Truth is not subjective, although there are truths about subjective things. Objective truth: "The universe exists". Truth about something subjective: "The images of the 'Pillars of Creation' produced by the Webb telescope are beautiful".

the existence of all such supposedly unseen realities still relies on an implicit perspective. — Wayfarer

I can accept this if "unseen realities"=The subjective perspective of something in the world.

It's a philosophical claim in support of idealism. It is developed in more detail in The Mind-Created World OP and its linked essay. — Wayfarer

Thanks. I'll read it, and respond in that thread.

The review suggests that she doesn't actually make a case for God's existence.
— Relativist

Curious, then, that the title of the book is The Case for God. — Wayfarer

I read some addition reviews. This one says, "Armstrong is not presenting a case for God in the sense most people in our idolatrous world would think of it...Armstrong promises that her kinds of [religious] practice will make us better, wiser, more forgiving, loving, courageous, selfless, hopeful and just. Who can be against that?"

So I surmise that she is making a case for religious practice, or having God in one's life, not an intellectual basis for establishing the alleged fact of God's existence. If you've read the book and see something these reviewers missed, please identify it.

Sure, but that doesn't refute the objectivist claim that at a fundamental level, the objects of scientific analysis are 'just so', independently of any knowledge of them. They are not, in that sense, truly mind-independent. — Wayfarer

What do you mean by"refute"? Do you simply mean the objectivist claim hasn't been proven logically impossible? That would be an unreasonable standard. A better question is: how does an objectivist justify believing what they do?

What we believe ought to be based on evidence and reasoning. So what's the basis for claiming the world is actually mind-dependent? Then we can analyze whether that is a rational belief.

Notice the common thread in all these titles. It says something serious about the limitations of objective science and the conundrums that modern physics throw up. And I don't think Armstrong's style of objectivist materialism has the resources to deal with that. — Wayfarer

It's perfectly reasonable to believe there are aspects of reality we will never figure out, and it's also true that a metaphysical theory can never be verified, but it could be falsified if there's some known aspect of the world that is incompatible with the metaphysical theory.

So...is there something incompatible with Armstorong's theory? If so, then what is it?

...just because we don't understand everything about the way the natural world works does not imply there is something unnatural at play in the world. To argue that would be an argument from ignorance.
— Relativist

No, it's an argument from epistemic humility. — Wayfarer

Are you suggesting remaining agnostic to the existence of the unnatural? What is a reasonable attitude toward something that is merely logically possible?

It is an established fact that the forebrain of h.sapiens evolved explosively ...My claim is that due to this, h.sapiens crossed an evolutionary threshhold that cannot be explained purely in terms of biological theory... — Wayfarer

I don't see how you could justify such a claim. It's true that a retrospective analysis of our evolutionary history tracks with increasing brain size. I imagine the evolutionary history of giraffes tracks increasing neck size. But how can you evaluate how long a feature should take to evolve? Evolution proceeds through such things as genetic mutations, genetic diversity within the populations, changing environmental pressures, population size, and gene flow between populations - all of which would influence the time for adaptive change. We don't have data about these factors to form the basis of a fair judgement. So, again, I see no basis to claim the evolutionary sequence was too fast or "explosive" to be due to natural processes.

I get it, that to a committed theist, God's involvement is always a live possibility - but how can one apply this, in practice, without getting in the way of actual scientific advance? Couldn't God be sufficiently clever to simply get the ball rolling when he created the universe, without needing to intervene along the way? Did he also kill the dinosaurs, who's continued existence would have changed the subsequent paths evolution took? I suggest that the most intellectually honest position to take is to simply assume God is responsible for everything, but in unknown ways- rather than inserting him as the answer to any scientific unknown.

The book I referred to was by Karen Armstrong, published around 2009. To give you an idea, here's a review by philosopher Alain de Botton, and also an OP by Armstrong, Should We Believe in Belief? — Wayfarer

Thanks. The review suggests that she doesn't actually make a case for God's existence. Instead, she criticizes religious fundamentalist and polemical atheists. Good for her. I agree with both sets of criticisms.

↪Relativist

Spontaneous generation" connotes coming into existence after a time at which it did not exist. Rather, an initial state just entails existing uncaused, with no point of time at which it does not exist.

No it doesn't, per your own explanation. There is a state before which there are no prior states. Call it S1. Now you claim that some thing or things had an S1 for no reason at all. They existed in S1 having not existed in any prior states. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This doesn't undercut anything I said.

Now, why can't anything else have an S1, starting to exist when it has existed in no prior state, for "no reason at all?"

The state of affairs didn't "start to exist", because it exists at all points of time. Rather, time begins as the state evolves.

You are trying to read some prior time before S1 back in, which is a strawman. — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, I'm not. Time begins; the foundation of reality does not begin.

I'll try to make this clearer. I'll assign a label to whatever exists at S1: F (standing for the foundation of existence).

F can have failed to exist only if it exists contingently. But F is contingent IFF there exists something to account for it being contingent. If F were the product of quantum indeterminacy, it would be contingent: F could have failed to obtain, while an alternative F' obtained instead. But this can't be, in our case, because quantum indeterminacy entails a quantum system existing prior to the indeterminate outcome. Nothing precedes F.

F could be a quantum system, such that what follows is the product of quantum indeterminacy. In that case, what follows from F is contingent (F accounts for what follows), but F itself is not contingent.

Let's consider contingency more broadly. Here's a general approach to accounting for contingency*:

x is contingent IFF there exists A, which accounts for x, and A can also account for ~x.

IOW: A accounts for (x or ~x).

But F is uncaused, so there is nothing that accounts for its existence. Therefore there can be no A that accounts for (F or ~F).

You seem to be conflating conceptual possibility with metaphysical possibility: you can conceive of F', so you erroneously assume F' is metaphysically possible. This ignores the need to account for contingency.

Anyhow, you have entirely ignored the question of why any certain thing should begin to exist in S1 rather than any other. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I've answered that now. F did not begin to exist, and F does not exist contingently.

This seems to me like a God of the Gaps solve it all to be honest.

Then you haven't followed.

"God of the gaps" is a form of argument from ignorance. I've made no such argument. My position is consistent with both deism and naturalism, and it follows logically from the premises I stated as axioms (first principles). Your error seem to be: 1) conflating conceivability with metaphysical possibility, and 2) ignoring the stated need to account for contingency. I hope I've sufficiently clarified these points.

You can reject the metaphysical axioms I've stated: I haven't claimed they are logically necessary. But I do think they are a better explanation than the alternatives, and I think I've shown that. We can discuss that further, once you accept the coherence of the framework I've stated.

------------------
* I've tried to convey my view of contingency in my own words, as clearly as I can - but if it's still unclear - here's an alternative description, taken directly from Amy Karofsky's book, A Case for Necessitarianism:

"A theory of contingency offers a metaphysical explanation for ways things could have been and for the possibility that some actual thing might have been otherwise than it is by explaining why an entity is such as it is rather than not. Such a metaphysical explanation of contingency describes: that in virtue of which a contingent entity could have failed to have existed (obtained, held, happened, etc.); what it is that provides for the possibility that an entity could have been otherwise than what it is; and that which accounts for the ways in which an entity could—and the ways it could not—have been different.

"Metaphysical explanation is often tied to the concept of grounding. Kit Fine explains that “philosophy is often interested in questions of explanation—of what accounts for what—and it is largely through the employment of the notion of ontological ground that such questions are to be pursued.”… Thus, a metaphysical explanation for a contingent entity provides the reason why the contingency is such as it is, rather than not, by pointing to an ontologically prior entity that is that in virtue of which the contingency could have been otherwise.”

Suppose C is an existing object or past actual event. If C is contingent, this means ~C is a non-actual possibility. What makes ~C truly possible? How do we (metaphysically) account for a non-actual possibility? Here’s how: suppose E is the metaphysical explanation for C. If C is contingent, then E must account for this contingency. So E explains: C & possibly(~C).

Suppose B is a brute fact, meaning that it exists for no reason and therefore lacks any further ontological grounding. B exists, and (trivially) B is therefore possible. But is B necessary or contingent? Contingency implies ~B is possible. But B doesn’t fit the above: there is no explanation for B, and thus no explanation for B & possibly(~B). So if a brute fact exists, it exists out of metaphysical necessity because there’s no ontological basis that accounts for possibly(~B).
.

My point is that the set of properties that emerge are objectively present — Relativist


And mine was that they're not objective until they're measured. And even then, there are experiments which indicate that those measurements will vary for different observers, which again throws their objective status into question. — Wayfarer

That's not entirely true. Consider position and momentum: it is not that they lack a value at all, it is that the they don't have a precise value. Position and momentum are examples of complementary variables. There is a distribution of possible values that the pair will have when a measurement occurs. This distribution constitutes objective information about these particles, and it hints at something weird about fundamental reality that is beyond what we'd expect from our ordinary perspective. My contention is that our perceptions provide a reflection of objective reality, not identical to it, but we can have success at uncovering additional objective truths about reality.

Also, consider that quarks and antiquarks have a color charge, while leptons and antileptons do not have a color charge. Even if the value of the color charge is a complement of another property, it's still an objective fact that color charge is a property that that quarks have, but leptons do not. It's also an objective fact that everything in existence is composed of the elementary particles identified in the standard model (I'm setting aside the fact that the standard model may not be complete, and that it may not actually be the most fundamental basis of reality. I embrace the spirit of structural realism, so that the standard model points to something objectively true about reality, even if not completely accurate).

As we ourselves understand logic, we are able to create systems that perform logical operations. But that doesn't mean that the mechanistic analogies for organism or natural thought, such as those often entertained by materialism, provide an account of the nature of logic. Materialists never tire of telling us that the Universe is devoid of logic and that everything we see is a consequence of the undirected physical 'laws of nature'. So how an organism (if that is indeed what we are) which is purportedly a product of those same undirected forces can come to some degree of understanding the Universe is rather a mystery, isn't it? — Wayfarer

Of course there's more about reality than we truly understand at this time, and I believe it likely that there are aspects of reality that we will never understand. But just because we don't understand everything about the way the natural world works does not imply there is something unnatural at play in the world. To argue that would be an argument from ignorance. Arguments from ignorance can be corrected by recasting as an abductive case, arguing that the chosen hypothesis is a better explanation than alternatives. But it seems to me that any non-physical account will be at a clear disadvantage, because it will depend on ad hoc assumptions that raise more questions than answered.

What seems more likely?: 1) that intelligent minds would gradually develop in isolated instances (as few as once), somewhere in a vast universe that's evolved in a myriad of ways over the billions of years of its existence, or 2) that an intelligent mind (with a vast store of magical knowledge that just happens to exist without cause) would just happen to exist by brute fact?

I haven't seen a case for the latter, whereas the former is consistent with statistical entropy.

Right. And practically every other species apart from h.sapiens has survived, often for hundreds of millions of years (such as crocodiles) with no capacity for logic whatever. And trying to account for reason in terms of evolutionary theory reduces reason to an adaptation serving the purposes of survival. But if that is what it is, why do we place trust in reason? — Wayfarer

It's not true that homo sapiens are the only organisms that think logically. At its core, logical reasoning entails remembering cause-effect relationships. Many animals exhibit behavior that entails multiple steps to achieve an objective. This is basic logical thinking. Humans differ from most by the fact that they have language and a more fully developed ability to think abstractly, but it's aligned with such behavior.

Why trust reason? Because we each intrinsically trust our sensory perceptions and the inherent reasoning we are born with. Were it not effective, we would not have survived.

I've pointed out a number of times that it's not clear that the 'laws of nature' are themselves physical. We never observe the laws, but only predictable outcomes which indicate that they exist. Physics can be carried out without reference to such laws, which is instrumentalism or pragmatism. Some have used abductive reasoning as evidence for a higher intelligence. So the point is, the existence of laws is not evidence for physicalism. — Wayfarer

The existence of laws of nature can't be deductively proven, but their existence seems the best explanation for what we observe. We could test that if you'd care to offer an alternative.

The existence of laws IS evidence for physicalism, in the general sense. I think you mean that the existence of laws does not entail physicalism, which is true. However, abductive reasoning entails determining the best explanation for a set of facts - the set of facts are "evidence" for any of the proferred explanations. Explanatory scope is one aspect of abductive reasoning, and it entails explaining more facts, so all facts are potentially relevant - they are evidence.

I say that Armstrong's type of philosophy is hanging on to the remnants of the Christian belief in divinely-ordered nature, sans God, which was replaced with the scientist. — Wayfarer

It's not "hanging on" for the sake of hanging on. It wouldn't make sense to deny the existence of laws of nature just because past natural philosophers identified them as laws ordained by God. Alchemists also got some things right. Human endeavors, including science and philosophy, advance by building on - and correcting- past achievements, not by starting afresh.

Regarding a case for God, I'd be interested in hearing more. I've examined traditional arguments for God, and found none of them at all compelling. They invariably depend on questionable metaphysical assumptions (which seem carefully contrived), and often make the unjustified assumption that magical knowledge is plausible (i.e. knowing things without developing the knowledge, and having this knowledge exist without being encoded - it's just there).Perhaps worse, none of them make a case for a God of religion. Even if sound, they only make a case for deism- a potentially indifferent creator.

First of all, it is incorrect to suggest that an initial state entails "spontaneous generation". "Spontaneous generation" connotes coming into existence after a time at which it did not exist. Rather, an initial state just entails existing uncaused, with no point of time at which it does not exist.

The initial state of reality necessarily exists uncaused, because causes temporally precede their effects*, and it is logically impossible to temporally precede an initial point of time.

Could this brute fact of an initial state be contingent? No, and here's why.

Classical (non-quantum) physics entails strict determinism: a specific type of cause will necessarily produce a specific effect. If all laws of nature were of this sort, there would be no contingent things in the universe.

Contingency in the universe arises only with quantum systems when the wave-function collapses (i.e. quantum indeterminacy). This is the only known source of contingency in the world. The initial state of the universe is not temporally preceded by a quantum system that collapses, hence there is no source of contingency for the initial state. Therefore it exists out of necessity. This is not strict logical necessity; it is metaphysical necessity because it is the logical consequence of the metaphysical principle that contingency requires a source of contingency*.

If there is a divine creator, the initial state of reality consists solely of this divine creator, existing uncaused, and with no temporally prior state. Therefore it exists as a necessary brute fact (brute fact, because there's no explanation for the specific, actual creator existing rather than not). This creator is a source of contingency for whatever it creates, and it implies everything, other than itself, exists contingently (at the will of this creator).

If there is no divine creator, then there is no source of contingency for the universe, so the universe (the totality of reality) itself exists out of metaphysical necessity. So my analysis doesn't preclude a divine creator, but it clearly shows that a creator is not entailed. It simply implies that something exists uncaused, and that its existence is metaphysically necessary.
---------------------
* Notice that I have stipulated two metaphysical axioms:

1) causation is temporal (causes temporally precede effects). This is not an arbitrary first principle, it is consistent with everything we know about reality.
2) Contingency requires a source of contingency. Also not arbitrary: the only known contingency in the world is a consequence of quantum indeterminacy.

The many-worlds interpretation of QM entails no contingency at all: all possible outcomes of a (seemingly) indeterminate quantum effect are actualized. It could entail an initial state of a quantum system, that is comprised of a multitude of eigenstates- each of which evolves into a "universe" (a system of stars, galaxies, etc), causally isolated from each other, except they share a common initial, quantum state.