I would use the word material rather than physical. That there is a spectrum of material including subtle (mental) materials. With physical material at the more dense, or concrete end of the spectrum. I go further in that I regard within the domain of subtle materials, a transcendent super subtle material for which mind (which is on the spectrum) is the correlate of physical material as seen at the bottom of the spectrum and the super subtle material is a higher, or transcendent mind. — Punshhh

As you noted, naturalism is more open-ended. Materialism is less so, and physicalism is most restrictive. More restrictive= a more parsimonious ontology, which is why I go with it.

The point at issue is what exists prior to the act of measurement. Prior to measurement there’s no determinate object with intrinsic properties. — Wayfarer

Here are 2 aspects of the model you are overlooking:

1. Strict identity means conforming with Leibniz' law. Individual (strict) identity does not endure over time, because from one instant to the next, the world changes - and therefore relations change. What we refer to as an individual identity over time is a perdurance. A perduring identity is something we reference; it is not a fundamental ontological category of existent. So it's necessarily false to say that an object has set of properties s1 at time t1, and that identical object has set of properties s2 at time t2.

We can reference a loose (perduring) identity by pointing to the intersection of s1 and s2. This looslely defined object perdures between t1 and t2.

2. A pure state quantum system has definite properties: it evolves deterministically per a Schroedinger equation. These properties are not classical properties. The act of measurement entails that system becoming entangled with something external to that quantum system- producing classical relations to the measurement device.

Here's a sequence of events:

t0 (prior to measurement) there is a 2 "object" state of affairs consisting of a pure state quantum system and a measurement device.

t1 (point of measurement): the original 2 object state of affairs perdures into a new state of affairs that includes an entanglement between the quantum system and the measurement device. As a consequence of the entanglement, the quantum system has new, classical relations that didn't previously exist. Of course, this is a subjective view, from the perspective of humans; what is physically going on is dependent on whichever interpretation of QM is correct- but I see no reason to think there isn't law-directed behavior going on.

[

I've said before, quantum physics demolishes such a Newtonian conception of reality. At the fundamental level, the properties of sub-atomic primitives are indeterminate until measure. But of course, that can be swept aside, because 'physicalism doesn't depend on physics'. It's more a kind of 'language game'. — Wayfarer

You're referring to complementary properties, like the position & momentum of an electron.

These are not intrinsic properties of an electron (like -1 electic charge, and 0 mass). They are relations (relational properties) to other objects. In a dynamic system, relations are constantly changing; e.g. the distance to your home changes as you drive toward it. At exactly one point in your path, a distance relation of 5km emerged. So the emergence of new relational properties is perfectly consistent with the model.

I agree with this admission and your position on philosophical zombies. It does leave a rather large gap for “non-physical alternatives” to creep in though.
I tend to steer clear of the division between physical and non physical, because I don’t see why there is necessarily such a distinction. The so called non physical mind and physically existing things, though appearing entirely separate, may be part of the same external manifold that we are not aware of, which may be undiscoverable, but in which the two are grounded. — Punshhh

I start with natural: That which exists (has existed, or will exist) starting with oneself, everything that is causally connected to ourselves through laws of nature, and anything not causally connected (such as alternate universes) that is inferred to exist, to have existed, or that will exist, through analysis of the universe. Naturalism= the thesis that the natural world comprises the totality of existencr.

I further narrow it down to the thesis that everything that exists has a common ontological structure: a particular with intrinsic properties and extrinsic (relational) properties to other existents. This implies everything is the same kind of thing, which I label, "physical".

But if there is no detectable effect, why suspect there is something undetectable present? — Patterner

I started by saying it's possible there is some aspect of reality that accounts for feelings, that is otherwise undetectable. This doesn't justify believing there is some such thing, but it counters the notion that physicalism is impossible if feelings cannot be accounted for by known aspects of reality.

It's a bit like dark matter. There were measureable gravitational effects that were inconsistent with General Relativity. Naively, this might be treated as falsification of GR. But GR explains so much, and it made many verified predictions. So dark matter was proposed to explain those apparent anomalies, despite there being no direct evidence of it.

Similarly, physicalism is successful at accounting for almost everything in the natural world - so it seems more reasonable to assume there's something we're missing than to dispense with the overall theory.

And I only wanted to make it clear that I don't think you have. But, sure, let's take them up elsewhere. — Wayfarer

What part of your original question did I not answer? You had asked:

what you think physicalism explains, other than in its role as a methodological assumption in science. — Wayfarer

I gave you a pretty thorough answer.

Do you REALLY want to get into each of those topics? That would extend this long discussion several more years. I've contributed to threads on all these topics, and am likely to do so again, so lets's not go there now. I only brought these up to answer your question.

And after all these months of conversations, I'm still at a loss to understand what you think physicalism explains, other than in its role as a methodological assumption in science. — Wayfarer

It's a metaphysical underpinning for that methodological assumption: the world is a natural one, evolving entirely due to laws of nature; that everything that exists is an object with properties and relations to other existents. So what it explains is the nature of what exists, and what to expect as new discoveries are made.

It provides a broad, consistent perspective for evaluating philosphical claims. I defend its implications: e. g. compatibilism, a natural (evolutionary) basis of morality, the nature of abstractions (including mathematics), a theory of truth, and quasi-necessitarianism. Any forum topic I comment on will always be based on this position, unless I'm just entertaining other possibilities to see where they lead.

No, and I fully expect that nothing ever will. It’s not the kind of view which is amendable to falsification, as it is a metaphysical belief. — Wayfarer

Yes, but it's a cautious belief - I know it's not necessarily true - it will always ONLY be a best explanation. I don't think you'll admit it, but it's rational to accept best explanations as provisionally true. Compare it to a belief about a historical fact deduced from data too limited to be conclusive.

You will notice, incidentally, that I do not advance a ‘theory of mind’.

I know, and that's why you aren't in position to refute my "best explanation" analysis. I think I said as much, months ago.

The related question that comes to mind is whether you think consciousness is possible absent feelings and whether you equate consciousness with first person experience. Is it possible to have feelings without a sensate body? — Janus

Sorry I overlooked your question. A being that was built,which lacked feelings is generally referred to as a "Zombie." The being would have experiences, that created memories that might affect its future behavior - so in that sense, it would be a sort of first-person experience. It could behave in ways identical to humans - reacting as we do to bodily injury; crying at a funeral, having the outward physical effects of sexual arousal..., and learning to behave differently based on the experiences.

But it wouldn't be the sort of experiences that we have (IMO). It seems to me that feelings are the direct impetus for all our intentional behavior. This seems to be the relevance of the so-called "first-person-ness" of our minds: feelings are exclusively first-perseon experiences. Zombie behavior could be perfectly understood from standard programming. Real human behavior would need something to produce feelings.

:clap:

You say 'feelings are the only thing problematic' as if that's a minor footnote, but feelings - qualia, first-person experience - is the whole point at issue! So, why keep saying I'm the one 'missing the point', when this is the point? — Wayfarer

It's a point I've acknowledged from the very beginning of our conversation, months ago. As I've repeatedly pointed out, every theory of mind has explanatory gaps. I accept physicalism as inference to best explanation - it accounts for all known facts, more parsimoniously than alternatives, with the fewest ad hoc assumptions.

Critically, qualia do not falsify physicalism. I've provided two ways they could be accounted for:

-illusionism (see this): the notion that, although qualia have a causal effect (i.e. they aren't epiphenomenal) the "experience" of a quale is illusion.

-there is some aspect of reality that manifests only as qualia, and is therefore undetectable. As I've mentioned to you before, Michael Tye proposes such a theory in "Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness".

You have neither falsified physicalism nor proposed a theory that is arguably a better explanation, so you have given me no reason to change my view.

I think one could reasonably reject physicalism because of the explanatory gap, but then he should reject any theory of mind that has an explanatory gap - which is all of them (i.e. reserve judgement).

It is a methodological decision to represent our mental processes on the model of the information technology that we already understand. Nothing wrong with that. But it means that feelings can't be represented. They require, it seems to me, a different methodology. — Ludwig V

Fair point, but until we have such a methodology, this comprises an explanatory gap. IMO, it's a narrower explanatory gap than alternative theories - so I justify accepting physicalism as an inference to best explanation.

If a component is physical, why would it be undiscoverable? — Patterner

To be discoverable, there needs to be some measurable influence on known things. So there could be particles, or properties, that have no measureable influence on particles or waves we can detect. String theory may true, but there seems to be no means of verifying that. If it IS true. there could be any number of vibrational states of strings that have no direct measurable affect on anything else.

That’s the point physicalism doesn’t touch. It doesn’t matter how much complexity you add or how programmable the processes may be. A functional specification is not the same thing as the reality of existence — and existence is the philosopher’s concern, not the engineer’s abstraction. — Wayfarer

You miss the point. If the processes can be programmed, then an artificial "mind" could actually be built that had 1st person experiences. You conflating the specification with the actual execution of the program. That's analogous to conflating the bits in a jpg file with the image that it helps convey.

Until that is accounted for, saying physicalism “best explains all the facts” simply assumes what is in question. — Wayfarer

You have identified no facts that can't be explained.

And as a software guy, you must recognise the impossibility of writing a true functional specification for the unconscious and preconscious dimensions of mind — without which consciousness would not be what it is. — Wayfarer

What makes you think the background mental processing couldn't be programmed? It's algorthimically complex, involving multiple parallel paths, and perhaps some self-modifying programs. But in principle, it Seems straightforward. .As I said, feelings are the only thing problematic.

Your response is to concede that consciousness may indeed imply ‘something non-physical’ ... — Wayfarer

I didn't say, "non-physical", I said it may be partly due to "components of world that are otherwise undiscoverable."

....but this also misses the crucial point of phenomenology. This that consciousness in never mething we are outside of or apart from. Until that basic fact of existence is understood we’ll continue to talk past one another.

You haven't established that this is a problem, just that there's something unique about first-person-ness that third-person description cannot capture.

I suggest that this uniqueness is due to there being aspects of consciousness that are not describable in words: there are non-semantic mental attitudes (dispositions, beliefs, feelings...). So it's a "Mary's room" issue: one can't convey redness in words, nor can one convey particular pains, or feelings of anxiety, or many other things.

It's also complicated by the complexity : the brain is doing many things concurrently (processing input from each of the senses, bodily sensations - pains, hunger, triggering of memories, autonomic functions,....), and nearly everything can affect everything else, in a feedback loop that never ends. We're all unique: we start out with physical differences, and we are changed (uniquely) by every experience we have.

All this is enough to explain why I can never know what it's like to be you (or a bat). So this uniqueness of each individual's first-person-ness seems a red herring. What is relevant to judging physicalism is considering whether or not some identifiable mental process is consistent with a plausibly physical functionality. As a former software guy, I look at in terms of whether it is programable. Most things seem to be, but feelings do not- and I freely admit this is a weakness. But it is not sufficient to defeat my judgement that physicalism best explains all facts I'm aware of.

Materialist theory of mind does not entail reifying the process of consciousness- considering it a thing.
— Relativist

That is exactly what this does. and when I posted it, you agreed with it. — Wayfarer

You are misrepresenting what I said. Here it is:

I agree that consciousness is neither a thing nor a property: it is a process. — Relativist

I have consistently said that processes are not things (objects). That's why I agreed consciousness is not a thing

Physicalism entails that mental activity (including consciousness) is produced by physical things.

Reminder: I do not insist that every aspect of the natural world is discoverable through science. It may very well be that there are aspects of mental activity that are partly grounded in components of world that are otherwise undiscoverable. This is worst case, but it is more plausible than non-physical alternatives.

This seems trivially true
— Relativist

Not when consciousness is treated as an object (per Materialist Theory of Mind) :brow: — Wayfarer

Materialist theory of mind does not entail reifying the process of consciousness- considering it a thing.

It’s not about falsifying the third person perspective, but pointing out its implicit limitations — Wayfarer

I brought up the limitation of the 1st person perspective, by asking you:

Other than the fact of one's own existence, what else can one infer? (by deduction, induction, or abduction) — Relativist

I don't see how you can even satisfy yourself that solipsism is false. On the other hand, analysis from a third person perspective has been fruitful.

We can learn more about the nature of consciousness (including accounting for first-person-ness) from this third-person approach than we can by pure, first-person introspection.

If it's a process, then it isn't some "misleading name we give to the precondition for any ascription of existence or inexistence."
— Relativist

Bitbol says it's 'misleading' precisely because it is reifying to designate 'consciousness' as an object of any kind, even an 'objective process'. To 'reify' is to 'make into a thing', when consicousness is not a thing or an object of any kind. — Wayfarer

The quote you asked me to respond to did not mention process. He alleged consciousness isn't "comprehensible". My position is that it IS comprehensible in terms it being a process. A process is not an existent. "Runs" are processes, not things.

He's saying, before we can say anything about 'what exists', we must first be conscious. Or, put another way, consciousness is that in which and for which the experienced world arises. It is the pre-condition for any knowledge whatever. — Wayfarer

This seems trivially true. Only conscious beings "say" anything; What you mean by "the experienced world" is more precisely: conscious experience of the world; so again: trivially true (consciousness is needed to have conscious experiences).

saying that the neural correlate of consciousness (often taken as its “neural basis”) may exist or not exist, amounts to saying that consciousness itself may exist or not exist in the same sense.

"Exist" is the wrong word for process. "Occur" or "take place" are more precise. Neural processes take place, and may very well account for consciousness. IMO, the only real difficulty is accounting for feelings. Given feelings, consciousness entails processes guided by feelings, and producing feelings.

Phenomenology and the existentialism that grew out of it, are not concerned with scientific objectivism, but with lived existence and meaning, as providing the context within which the objective sciences need to be interpreted. — Wayfarer

It's perfectly fine to concern oneself with "lived existence and meaning", but it doesn't falsify a "3rd person" approach.

I agree that consciousness is neither a thing nor a property: it is a process.

If it's a process, then it isn't some "misleading name we give to the precondition for any ascription of existence or inexistence."

"phenomenologists are settled in the first-person standpoint, whereas physicalist researchers explore everything from a third-person standpoint. "
Sure. But the 1st person standpoint is not analyzable. It just treats 1st person-ness as a primitive.

"From a first-person standpoint, anything that exists (thing or property) is given as a phenomenal content of consciousness. Therefore, consciousness de facto comes before any ascription of existence."
OK, but does this lead anywhere? Other than the fact of one's own existence, what else can one infer? (by deduction, induction, or abduction)

Nothingness entails non-existence. The notion that nothingness preceded somethingness is nonsensical: it suggests non-existence existed - which is self-contraductory.

I suggest that a finite past is feasible; it would entail an initial state, not an event - an event is a point in time, which means there were both a prior and a later states.

An initial state would have to be uncaused, because causation entails a temporally prior cause.

An initial state raises the question of what time is. I don't know what it is, but I do know that time is not as it appears to be- special relativity proves that. So does the Page-Wooters* mechanism.

The Page-Wooters* mechanism, suggests the experience of time is localized, and due to quantum entanglement. From the point of view of an external observer, there is no passage of time in an observed quantum system. But observers within that system experience time as a sequence of events. At minimum, this demonstrates that we don't understand the nature of time, so we ought not to draw conclusions based on a traditional view of time.

*
"In this paper we provide an experimental illustration of Page and Wootters' quantum time mechanism that is able to describe two-time quantum correlation functions. This allows us to test a Leggett-Garg inequality, showing a violation from the "internal" observer point of view. The "external" observer sees a time-independent global state. Indeed, the scheme is implemented using a narrow-band single photon where the clock degree of freedom is encoded in the photon's position. Hence, the internal observer that measures the position can track the flow of time, while the external observer sees a delocalized photon that has no time evolution in the experiment time-scale." - https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.00707

Your logic seems reasonable, but a theist will see an escape hatch between these 2 premises:

Premise 3:A world where all sentient beings are equally omniscient and omnipotent would contain no involuntary suffering, no vulnerability, and no inequality, since each being could prevent harm to itself and others.

Premise 4:A perfectly omnibenevolent being necessarily prefers the outcome that maximizes well-being and minimizes suffering.

A theist could reason, that this "god" considers there to be some benefit to having beings who are not omnipotent/omniscient but must actually struggle with their choices. This forces them to have to earn their reward. Compare this to a child who has to do the work to achieve some goal, vs the child whose parents give him everything. Or there's always the old excuse "we mere mortals aren't equipped to understand God's reasons".

The "universe" knows itself? How so?

Man is that part of reality in which and through which the cosmic process has become conscious and has begun to comprehend itself. His supreme task is to increase that conscious comprehension and to apply it as fully as possible to guide the course of events. In other words, his role is to discover his destiny as an agent of the evolutionary process, in order to fulfill it more adequately. — Wayfarer

It's perfectly fine to have such an outlook on humanity, but projecting this onto the universe as a whole is unjustified: After humans inevitably cease to exist, the universe will return to the state it started as: as unconscious as a rock.

Indeed they can, and nothing I've said denies that. But the metaphysical points remain. First, reality is far greater than what we know exists. — Wayfarer

There's certainly much to be discovered, and probably much that isn't discoverable. But this doesn't falsify any metaphysical theories (including, but not limited to, physicalism).

And also that to imagine the universe as it must be, without any subject, still assumes the implicit perspective of a subject, without which nothing could be imagined.

I have not disputed that. What I've noted is that this doesn't preclude making true statements about reality, from a human perspective. The statements would reflect information about reality. For this reason, a metaphysical theory could be possibly true. The notions of perspective and the "world as it is" do not undermine this.

I'm arguing against the attitude which sees humanity as a 'mere blip' (Stephen Hawking's derisive description of man as 'chemical scum'.) We are the 'mere blip' in which the Universe comes to know itself.

The "universe" knows itself? How so? Humans know something about the universe, but humans are not the universe. As we've discussed, knowledge of the universe is distinct from the universe itself. You also agree that the universe existed for billions of years before we existed, which implies there were no minds "knowing" anything. Of course, my observation is based on a human perspective, but it's nevertheless true.

I do value humanity and knowledge, and agree we are more than scum, but the universe doesn't seem dependent on us, or on the existence of knowledge about it.

in no way can this be interpreted as 'a feature of objective reality'. It is the grounding truth of Descartes' first philosophy. — Wayfarer

There are 2 facts that I think you agree with:
1) mind-independent, objective reality exists
2) You (Wayfarer) exist.

I infer that you regard each of these as objective facts. I assumed you would consider #1 a comprehensive fact, and #2 as less comprehensive. I.e : #1 subsumes #2. So I labelled the subsumed, a feature. I don't care about the label. My point is that there is this subsumed relationship of #2 to #1.

Given this relationship, there are 2 possibilites: you are equivalent to objective reality (=solipsism) or you are something less, but included in objective reality. This opens the door for other subsumtions.

The quote from Descartes appears to express an attitude of reserving judgement toward solipsism - not that it's merely a remote possibility, but that there's no epistemic basis to decide yes or no.

Of course, Descartes isn't discussing epistemic bases for beliefs, he's discussing what is provable. If you reject solipsism (believe it likely to be false), as I expect you do, it cannot be because you can prove it, so you must have an epistemic basis. What is the basis? What caused you to believe it? How do you justify the belief?

That's what I mean by an 'implicit perspective'. Take that out, and we can't make sense of anything, as there is no perspective. So the empirical view is not truly 'mind-independent'. — Wayfarer

Making sense of something necessarily entails a perspective. The notion of a "thing as it is" does not imply that there can be no true statements about the thing.

What 'mind independence' is, is an extrapolation based on the scientific principle of bracketing out the subjective view, but mis-applied to reality as a whole. — Wayfarer

It's conceptual analysis, not science. "I think, therefore I am" is a statement of existence- and provides a ground for the concept of existence. If you believe you exist, then you believe there is existence. Reality is existence - so it's not a mis-application.

It mistakes the methodological step of 'bracketing the subjective' for a metaphysical principle 'the world we see is the same as would exist were we not in it.'

I think you're equivocating.
We have a mental world model, and it includes ourselves. We can mentally subtract our presence and envision the revised world, unproblematically.
In the comparison, we are never contemplating "the world as it is" much less "the world as it would be", because it is devoid of information. It's analgous to drawing conclusions based on objects: P1. Marble P2. Water C. Therefore ???


A point I've been trying to make is that "the world as it is" ="objective reality"= "mind-independent reality" can be referenced. I just referred to it 3 ways, and they entail some true statements about it. Same with the point I made at the beginning of this post.

You have an inherent existence, do you not? You know this because you think, but your existence is surely not merely a phenonenol truth.
— Relativist

Any being does, but already said you think cogito ergo sum proves nothing. The point, which I return to, is that the fact of one's own being is apodictic, cannot plausibly be denied. For to doubt it, one must first exist. — Wayfarer

Yes, but I was using this as an example of "feature": this one indisputable fact is a feature of objective reality (not merely phenomenal reality). Are there other features? If solipsism is false, then it is logically necessary that there are other features. Not(solipsism) is disputable, but do you actually reserve judgement on solipsism?

— Wayfarer

But suppose we simply say that physicalism's model applies specifically to phenomenal reality. Your objection vanishes, does it not? I have much more to say about this, but I first want your reaction. — Relativist

So: phenomena already imply subjectivity, and the physical already presupposes form, as if it has no form, it has no identity. The error of physicalism is to say that the physical has determinate reality sans any act of observation or form - that's what I mean by 'inherent reality'....
The context of my question was Kant's view of TRUTH as a correspondence with phenomenal reality. You said you accepted this. So I'm asking you to assess whether or not physicalism is possibly true, in terms of it possibly corresponding to phenomenal reality, in this Kantian sense. This has nothing to do with "inherent reality". It only has to do with the theory of truth you accepted.

The whole point of my argument is the refutation of the idea that an object has an inherent existence absent any mind. — Wayfarer

You have an inherent existence, do you not? You know this because you think, but your existence is surely not merely a phenonenol truth.

Not quite. Absent cognition, the universe is featureless, because features map against the capacities of the ‘animal sensorium’. Again, that what we see as shapes and features has an inextricably subjective basis. — Wayfarer

I used the word "features" in an attempt to generalize beyond our framework. It's non-specific, except it is clear that one feature you can't deny is your own existence. This cannot be the only feature, unless solipsism is true.

If “physical” just means “whatever exists,” then physicalism is no longer a metaphysical thesis but simply another way of talking about ontology. — Wayfarer

In another thread, you challenged what is meant by "physical". I acknowledge that the term is ambiguous (is a gas "physical"? Is a quantum field? What if a "many worlds" interpretation is true?- are the inaccessible worlds physical? )

I embrace reductionism, and reductionism entails the notion that everything that exists is composed of the same kinds of things. Not monism (one thing), but (at least potentially) a set of things. That set of things is what I'm referring to, to avoid a semantics debate about what it means to be "physical".

I'd really like you to respond to this:

But suppose we simply say that physicalism's model applies specifically to phenomenal reality. Your objection vanishes, does it not? I have much more to say about this, but I first want your reaction. — Relativist

What I’m denying is that object-hood itself—given as discrete, bounded, enduring units—is something we are entitled to project into reality as it is in itself. — Wayfarer

You are damning knowledge for being what it is. Knowledge can only be a reflection, or interpretation of what exists. It's logically impossible for knowledge to be what reality "is in itself". Propositional knowledge can only be descriptive. Perceptual knowledge (e.g. familiarity with visual appearance, sound, smell) can only be a sensory memory. The proper questions are: is the description accurate, and complete - these are the ideals to strive for with propositional knowledge. (We can never know that a description is complete, of course, that's why I call it an ideal).

You skipped a key point I made:

You're assuming, without support, that the actual world lacks objects, or any aspects that a human perspective might consistently identify as an object. — Relativist

If we can consistly identify something as an object, then we are warranted in applying the label to represent the concept and use it as a reference. The concept is useful for studying the world- it is a component of our perspective that has led to fruitful exploration, and discovery.

Let’s begin with a thought-experiment: Imagine that all life has vanished from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed. Matter is scattered about in space in the same way as it is now, there is sunlight, there are stars, planets and galaxies — Mind and the Cosmic Order, Chap 1

The universe we are imagining DOES have the same shapes, there is sunlight, stars, etc- because we're imagining this world from our perspective, and as we understand it, simply unoccupied by us. And this understanding is not false, it's simply a description in human terms - as a description must be.

So what he seems to be saying is there would be no humans to describe the universe this way. This reiterates my point that descriptions are not the object described. The only question we should be asking is: is the description accurate and complete?

Another animal, or another kind of intelligence altogether, could inhabit the same underlying reality while carving it up into entirely different unities, boundaries, and saliencies. In that case it would still be “the same reality,” but not the same objects — Wayfarer

Of course! But that does not invalidate our descriptions. It's analogous to comparing Newton's gravity theory to General Relativity: they are both correct, within a certain context. More extreme: pre-Copernican descriptions of the motions of stars and planets-they could correctly predict the motions. Neither Newton's nor pre-Copernican methods were entirely correct, but they had a degree of accuracy. Even if modern physics isn't precisely correct, it's clearly closer to correctness than its predecessors.

Right! But don’t loose sight of where this all started - with the argument over physicalism. And acknowledging this surely undermines physicalism. Physicalism isn’t just the claim that physics is successful or that scientific models work (which incidentally is not in question); it’s the stronger metaphysical claim that the fundamental constituents of reality are physical. But if we also say (as you’ve just done) that science doesn't, in principle, establish a final ontology, that its models don’t guarantee true ontology, and that all description is perspectival, then the core physicalist claim has been abandoned. — Wayfarer

I have not been defending physicalism in this thread, I have been defending the discipline of ontology, of which physicalism is but one example. You haven't undermined any ontological theory at all, you've simply shown that an ontology can only be described from a human perspective. The fact "the thing itself" is distinct from a complete description of the thing doesn't matter, because no one would claim a description IS the thing. You've provided a reason to be skeptical of any ontolological theory, but you haven't falsified any.

Regarding physicalism: it's a tautology to say everything is physical, because its just a label for the things that exist- objects, or states of affairs: the theory that everything that exists is an object, with intrinsic properties and relations to other things that exist. The labels are descriptive.

But suppose we simply say that physicalism's model applies specifically to phenomenal reality. Your objection vanishes, does it not? I have much more to say about this, but I first want your reaction.

(I don’t think the notion of the in-itself is incoherent at all. It is, by definition, what lies outside any perspective — that’s what the term is doing — Wayfarer

The notion of something existing without there being a description of it is coherent. The notion that we can conceive something that way is incoherent, in that there's nothing to make sense of; it can't be a topic of discussion beyond the point of referring to "the thing in-itself". Our conceptions are necessarily descriptive. I suggest that we capture the same point by simply acknowledging that there's a distinction between an existent and a description of that existent. Then we can discuss it's attributes in the usual manner.

The “model” is not a representation standing over against a separately existing world. The modeling activity and the world it yields are the same process viewed from two aspects. There is no second, independently formed object for the model to correspond to. The very features by which something counts as an object—extension, mass, persistence, causal interaction—already belong to the structured field of appearance itself. We can test and refine the model and develop new mathematical terminology and even new paradigms (as physics has since Galileo), but this testing takes place entirely within the same field of appearances, through coherence, predictive stability, and intersubjective invariance—not by comparison with a mind-independent reality as it is in itself. — Wayfarer

You're assuming, without support, that the actual world lacks objects, or any aspects that a human perspective might consistently identify as an object.

I have argued that our senses, and the mental image of the actual world, is a reflection of the actual world- because it's caused by that world and because we necessarily interact in that world to survive. These are reasons to believe these reflections have a degree of accuracy. You rule this out even as a possibility. That is unwarranted. It is making too much of a mere possibility.

You are right that we can't compare the phenomenal world to the mind-independent reality, but that follows from the observation you made that we necessarily have a perspective. The mental act of understanding necessarily entails a human perspective, but perspective does not entail falsehood. I suggest that the success of science validates our perspective as being fairly accurate.

We have previously discussed the fact that the smallest particles (in the standard model of particle physics) do not have certain definite properties, such as position and momentum. This is not an indictment of our perspective, because we have been able to make this detemination FROM our human perspective. I could easily agree that there's much we don't know, and that the models we've created (such as the standard model, which is a particle perespective of QFT) are not necessarily correct. I have never argued that science gets everything right, nor that science is somehow destined to eventually figure everything out. I merely argue that successful science is giving us some true information about actual reality- and I can't imagine how you could deny that.

Nothing about scientific method demands that it concerns 'things in themselves' — Wayfarer

How could it? You have defined '"things in themselves" in terms of an absence of perspective, which strikes me as incoherent. Descriptions are necessarily in terms of a perspective. Successful science entails accurate predictions. It does not entail accurate ontology. Consider Quantum Field Theory, a model that theorizes that all material objects are composed of quanta of quantum fields. The math and heuristics are successful, but that doesn't necessarily mean it is a true ontology. It will never be possible to establish a fundamental ontology through science - the best we can hope for is a model that is successful at making predictions. If it does that, then it is giving us some true facts - facts that correspond to reality.

Your implicit perspective is from outside both your mind and the world you live in, as if you were seeing it from above - but we really can't do that. — Wayfarer

I have never said that our perspectives are from "outside our minds". Rather, I embrace our perspectives and argue that we can develop true beliefs about aspects of objective reality. This includes scientific models, like QFT - but they should be considered in terms of what they are, and what they are not.

I'll go further: we are also justified in proposing ontological models, for the same reason it's justifiable to propose scientific models: prediction, analysis, and discourse. The true, fundamental ontology is not accessible, but we can still utilize a hypothetical model that is coherent and has all necessary explanatory power. Different models can be compared, and we can justifiably choose one that we judge to be the "best explanation".

-----------------------------

I had asked you to define truth. You replied:

I do not disagree with Kant on this point. It IS the point! Nothing about scientific method demands that it concerns 'things in themselves'. — Wayfarer

So...you do accept correspondence theory, where the correspondence is limited to phenomenal reality. What you haven't done is to account for phenomenal reality. I argue that phenomenal reality is a direct consequence of objective reality. Do you deny that?

You do seem to accept that there is an intersubjective human perspective - a view that depends on a 3rd person point of view. I explain this in terms of our common machinery - our brains and sensory apparatus are similar, we have commonslity in languages (translation is generally feasible), so I infer that we all have similarities in our perspectives about the world at large. How do you reconcile it? It seems inconsistent with your 1st-person view of perspective? You think, therefore you are- but you can't say that about anyone else except by indirect evidence.

You are applying a different definition of "belief" than I.
— Relativist

I use the regular definition. — Wayfarer

You seem to have not read this part:

The mental construct I have labeled "belief" is present, irrespective of any definition you may use for belief. I don't want to debate semantics (what is the proper definition of belief?), I simply ask that you accept that this is what I mean when I use the term. I'd be happy to clarify any issues you see. — Relativist

The "mind created world (model)" is a mental construct that fits my definition. You argue that this construct is distinct from objective reality (I agree), but raise doubts that it is an accurate image of objective reality. The implication: it is (strictly speaking) a false image of reality. If it were a true image, your theory would be moot. You also agreed that it is possible to make true statements about objective reality. So true/false is applicable to this construct, just as it is with beliefs (in a typical definition). It is this fact that the truth-condition applies that is relevant; I simply choose to apply the word "belief" to any intra-mind construct that can be considered true/false. I'm open to an alternative term, but not to simply brushing it away due to a semantics dispute.

The flaws in the definition arise when we ask what is meant by “agreement” or “correspondence” of ideas and objects, beliefs and facts, thought and reality. In order to test the truth of an idea or belief we must presumably compare it with the reality in some sense. — Randall, J. & Buchler, J. Philosophy: An Introduction, 1957, p133

I

Truth, it is said, consists in the agreement of cognition with its object..... For since the object is outside me, the cognition in me, all I can ever pass judgement on is whether my cognition of the object agrees with my cognition of the object. — Kant, 1801. in Lectures on Logic.

You're quoting Kant out of context. He accepted correspondence theory, but noted an implication. I rebutted that point earlier, you must have skipped over it. What I said was that "testing" or "judging" a truth is an act of truth verification, and is thus irrelevant to the concept.

My understanding is that Kant believed that we only can have genuine knowledge and truth about the phenomenal world, but not about things-in-themselves (noumena) as they exist independently of our experience. However, you acknowledged the possibility of making true statements about the actual mind-independent world, so you must disagree with him on this point.

I also had asked that if you reject correspondence theory that you identify which truth theory you DO embrace. You use the term, "truth", but you reject correspondence theory - so how do you define the term?

The 'mind created world' thesis is a rational and defensible argument based on philosophy and cognitive science. It's is not appropriate to describe it as a belief, as the subject is a factual matter. — Wayfarer

It's unclear what you mean by a "factual matter", since I regard facts as true beliefs. I'll elaborate of "facts" later, but first discuss "belief".

You are applying a different definition of "belief" than I. Here's a rough outline of my definition:


Belief: a mental state that encompanses an intentional stance - it makes one apt to behave or think in a way that is consistent with the belief; it entails an assumed correspondence with reality.

It includes, but is not limited to, propositional beliefs - which are intentional stances toward the meaning of the proposition. Many, but not all, non-propositional beliefs can be expressed as propositions.

Even the meaning of a word would constitute a belief, because it is the meaning that influences the thoughts or behavior. Adopt a different definition of the word, and the subsequent behaviors and thoughts will shift.

A sensory perception is a belief: it produces behavioral reactions consistent with whatever it is the perception represents. Your driving along a road and you see a person in your path, and you react by slowing or stopping your car. You implicitly believe a person is in your (believed) path, and you implicitly believe you will injure this person if you maintain your path and speed.

From this point of view, a "mind created world (model) is a belief - a complex one.
‐-------------
The mental construct I have labeled "belief" is present, irrespective of any definition you may use for belief. I don't want to debate semantics (what is the proper definition of belief?), I simply ask that you accept that this is what I mean when I use the term. I'd be happy to clarify any issues you see.

‐--------------

This is the last time that I'll say it, but I don't deny the reality of the external world nor the validity of objective facts — Wayfarer

What is a "fact"? Is it mind-independent? I define it as a true proposition. Scientific facts are propositions that describe some aspect of physical reality (if the proposition is true). "God created the universe" is considered a fact by theists. So what a person regards as "fact" is, actually a belief. You and I could intersubjectively agree to certain facts.

Some philosophers (e.g. Wittgenstein) treat "facts" as elements of reality, rather than as descriptions of (what is assumed to be) reality. And yet, we often refer to a scientific discipline as embodying a set of "facts", even though these alleged "facts" are falsifiable and possibly false. That makes it cumbersome. Clarity is needed when using the term.

Yet another semantic issue. I asked you, "whether or not there exists objective, mind-independent reality." You responded with different words: "I don't deny the reality of the external world nor the validity of objective facts".

I shall interpret your answer as "yes" - that you agree there exists objective, mind independent reality. No need to respond if you agree.

But please answer my other question about the meaning of "true". In particular, do you accept my definition - that "true" = corresponds to objective, mind-independent reality? If not, then provide your definition.

All of this has bearing on your acceptance of "scientific facts", and whether or not you can justify belief in those facts.

His statement (cogito ergo sum) does not account for WHY we believe in our own existence.
— Relativist

He says: my existence is apodictic (impossible to doubt) because in order to doubt, I must first exist. — Wayfarer

Irrelevant to my point. He is not establishing that I exist. Our belief in our own existence is, as you put it, a "pre-commitment", although not in any active sense of committing - it's not derived from prior beliefs. It is a properly basic belief.

Similarly, the belief in a mind-independent world is also properly basic. The correct question to ask about properly basic beliefs is: what caused it?

You're right, but only in the strict sense of knowledge (beliefs that are true, and justified so strongly that the belief is not merely accidentally true). We could perhaps agree that the phenomenology of sensory input and the brain's creation of a world model establishes the impossibility of knowledge (in this strict sense) about the world.
— Relativist

You're getting close to the point now, but still brushing it aside. What do we know of 'the world' apart from or outside the mind or brain's constructive portrayal of the world? — Wayfarer

I'm well beyond your point. Try to grasp mine: the "mind created world(model)" is a belief (a compound one) and it's core is properly basic. Please acknowledge this, instead of brushing it aside by simply reiterating what I"ve already agreed to. Make an attempt to understand what I'm saying. You can then challenge it, and explain why you disagree. But so far, you've mostly ignored it.

survival entails having a functionally accurate view of reality.
— Relativist

Functionally accurate in what sense? — Wayfarer

It means sufficiently accurate (i.e. consistent with the actual world) to successfully interact with it. A predator doesn't need to distinguish the species of his prey, but it needs to be able to recognize what is edible. Animals with superior mental skills can discriminate more finely. The most intelligent demonstrate an ability to think reflexively. But in all cases - a correspondence is maintained with reality - that's never lost.

But evolutionary biology is not concerned with epistemology in the philosophical sense. — Wayfarer

Of course it isn't, but it nevertheless is a discipline that consists of a set of "facts" (any discipline fits this model). But what is a fact? A fact is a belief, and rational beliefs have justification. Science progresses through testing and confirming explanatory hypotheses that explain a set of data (which are also facts/beliefs)- this is the justification. If we were to conduct a thorough logical analysis of the discipline - justifying every fact, we would inescapably hit ground at the level of our sensory input and properly basic beliefs. You deny those ground floor beliefs; so you have no foundation for accepting any science as true. And yet you do. You're inconsistent.

Their behaviours need not be understood in terms of their ability to grasp or express true facts. It is only necessary that their response is adequate to their circumstances. A bacterium's response to its environment is 'functionally accurate' when described this way, but plainly has no bearing on the truth or falsity of its ideas, as presumably it operates perfectly well without them.

I sincerly doubt that bacteria have ideas. I covered the issue your alluding to:

When we evolved the capacity for language, the usefulness of language entailed it's capacity to convey that same functionally accurate view of reality; had it not then it would have been detrimental to survival. So our ancestors accepted some statements (=believing them as true), without needing the abstract concept of truth. — Relativist

You referred to "true facts", but you haven't defined what it means to be true.

I've given you mine: correspondence with reality - objective, mind independent, reality. This is the concept, not the methodology for seeking/verifying truth.

You still haven't answered my question about whether of not there exists objective, mind-independent reality. Without it, truth can only be relative to perspective. So...are you the "relativist"?

In Descartes example, to the apodictic truth of his own existence - cogito ergo sum - which then served as the foundation-stone for his philosophy. But notice that the unassailable confidence that one has to exist, in order to even be decieved, is of a different kind or order to knowledge of external objects. — Wayfarer

Consider this: His statement does not account for WHY we believe in our own existence. He was not solving a controversy, in which people were unsure of whether or not they existed. We confidently hold the belief (implicitly) that we exist even without Descarte's identifying a rationale for this belief. A rationale, determined post hoc, does not cause belief. My position is that the cause of our basic beliefs is critical.

It is true that cognitive scientists would generally assume a naturalistic outlook. But I anticipated this fact: 'It might be thought that a neuroscientific approach to the nature of the mind will be inclined towards just the kind of physicalist naturalism that this essay has set out to criticize.' — Wayfarer

You miss my point. It's not their naturalistic paradigm that matters, it's that you believe (accept as true) their results. What makes it true? Does it correspond to reality? You can't say it does. It seems to me that you can only accept it as a set of entailments of a paradigm you reject. If you reject the paradigm, you have no basis for accepting those entailments.

Concentrate on the bolded phrase: 'the world we perceive is actively constructed by the brain'. You will say, but there's a world apart from the one actively constructed by the brain.' To which the reply is: indeed there is, but you can never know what it is. — Wayfarer

You're right, but only in the strict sense of knowledge (beliefs that are true, and justified so strongly that the belief is not merely accidentally true). We could perhaps agree that the phenomenology of sensory input and the brain's creation of a world model establishes the impossibility of knowledge (in this strict sense) about the world.

But GIVEN the impossibility of knowledge, we can nevertheless develop justified beliefs - many with strong justifications, but always short of strictly defined knowledge. This is the best we can do, so embrace it CONSISTENTLY! You are inconsistent, by accepting science but rejecting the possibility of justified beliefs about the actual world.

Long ago, I mentioned that my metaphysical beliefs are entwined with my epistemology. I hope this helps you start to understand why I said that. I try to apply my epistemology consistently.

Crocodiles have survived unchanged for hundreds of millions of years without having to understand anything whatever. Evolutionary biology is not an epistemological model. — Wayfarer

Evolutionary biology, as a discipline, consists of a set of beliefs - so in that sense, it is epistemic.

Beliefs connect ourselves to the real world, when they are true. THIS is what you fail to consider in your mind created world(model). You write of it as if there is no such connection.

Re crocodiles: They still interact with the real world, they (in effect) trust their sensory input. When they see prey, they (in effect) believe it to be present and accessible (although they do not reflect on this). We could just call it stimulus-response, although clearly some mental activity is involved with deciding which prey to pursue.

We have more complex minds that are capable of thinking reflexively (we reflect on our beliefs), which adds more mental activity between stimulus and response; more complex decisions can be made. This provided a survival advantage. Crocodiles (among many other species) survived for different reasons, but always because their skills were adequate to survive in their environment.

Plantinga, who you mention, argues on that very basis, that if beliefs are a product of evolutionary adaptation, then we have no warrant for believing them true — Wayfarer

You're referring to his "Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism". It's described in this wikipedia article. I've read about it, debtated it, and debunked it elsewhere - on the basis that survival entails having a functionally accurate view of reality. All life depends on this. When we evolved the capacity for language, the usefulness of language entailed it's capacity to convey that same functionallyaccurate view of reality; had it not then it would have been detrimental to survival. So our ancestors accepted some statements (=believing them as true), without needing the abstract concept of truth.

The wikipedia article includes published criticisms of Plantinga's the flawed argument.

Think about Descartes famous Meditation II where he resolves to doubt the existence of the world, which could, for all he knows, be the projection of an 'evil daemon'. This was not an empty gesture. It is the kind of thoroughgoing scepticism which philosophy drives us to consider. But he found that, even though the external world might be an hallucination or a delusion, that he could not doubt that he was the subject of such delusions or hallucinations. Hence the famous 'cogito ergo sum'. — Wayfarer

Where does this "thoroughgoning skepticism" lead to? It seems to me that if skepticism (of even your innate beliefs) is your starting point you have no rational basis for any claims you might make. You think you know where your keys are, but this means trusting your memories and your senses - that these were not deceptions by an "evil daemon", or part of an imaginary world your mind conjured. And yet, you are indeed confident of the whereabouts of your keys. This is in conflict with extreme skepticism, and is suggestive of self-deception: you indeed know where your keys are, but fail to accept the broad implication that knowing this implies your "mind created world(model) is consistent with the actual world.

I begin with this "common sense" notion: we DO trust our memory and senses (despite no rationally derived basis), so let's accept that it's true. It's innate: no one has to teach us these things. I also question whether it's even possible to fully divest of this belief. If you only do it part-way, you're being inconsistent- which seems less virtuous ( in terms of deontology) than fully embracing the common view.

In contrast metaphysical naturalism starts at the opposite end. It starts with the assumption that the sensible world is real. Basically many of your questions amount to 'prove to me that it's not'. I don't regard that question as being philosophically informed.

I haven't asked you to prove to me it's not; I've asked you to identify a flaw in my reasoning - explain why I shouldn't maintain this belief that you once had. I took a guess at why you changed your mind: that it was because you could find no rational reason to believe it in the first place. But if we're the product of either nature, or design, in a world we must interact with to survive, then we would be likely to have a natural sense that the world we perceive is real, at least to the extent to allow successful interaction with it. The belief would not be rationally derived, but it also wasn't derived IRrationally. So I suggest that inertia wins, because the mere possibility we're wrong is not a defeater. There has to be a compelling reason to change a belief; mere possibility is not compelling.

Where I'm coming from draws on all of that, but it's informed by cognitive science (hence the references to Pinter's book.) Cognitive science understands that what we take as the real objective world is generated in the brain. — Wayfarer

Two issues:

1) cognitive science assumes the world exists and can be understood through empirical analysis. How can you justify believing it, given it's supposedly questionable basis?

2) It's not in dispute that the brain generates the world-model. The question is: is this world-model (essentially) accurate? There are good reasons to think it is: it's critical to survival. Why would a false image be generated?

Not that nothing is real, that nothing matters, or anything of the kind, but again, an awareness that the way that we construe our sense of what is real is always in accordance with our prior conditioning or metaphysical commitments... — Wayfarer

Yes, but also the way we're wired. You have challenged, what I argue to be, an innate belief - not one developed by reasoning from prior assumptions.

So the reason I don't propose to answer what is fundamentally real, is because it is something each individual must discover for themselves in their own unique way. — Wayfarer

That pertains to question 2:

You're blending 2 questions:
1) does there exist a mind-independent objective reality?
2) what is the nature of this mind-independent objective reality? — Relativist

I had asked you to answer question 1. You identified my affirmative answer as a pre-commitment, from which I infer that your answer is either "no" or "I don't know". And yet, you make use of knowledge you obtained in the world- which seems contradictory. So...what is your answer?

If we take away the subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves would disappear, and as appearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us — Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B Edition, B59

It depends on the premise that the "nature and relations of objects" lack objective existence- they depend on "the subject".

Similarly, it also depends on the assumption that space and time have some dependency on "the subject".

While our concepts of space, time, and objects reflect a human perspective, I believe they are metaphysically grounded and thus true statements can be made about all of them.

I’m not trying to be uncharitable but your responses while intelligent and well articulated show some pre-commitments that need to be made explicit. — Wayfarer

No world view can avoid an epistemological foundation, so of course I have pre-commitments: properly basic beliefs that include the innate trust that our senses deliver a functionally accurate reflection of the reality in which we live. I believe that earlier in life, you shared this innate trust, and wonder why you would abandon it. The mere possibility that we're wrong is not a rational reason to drop a belief. My suspicion is that you abandoned your innate belief because you could think of no rational basis to believe it in the first place. I'll come back to this, below.

I believe that (mind-independent) objective reality exists - irrespective of whether or not any metaphysical theories are true
— Relativist

OK I will enlarge a little. That is a pre-commitment. You begin with a pre-commitment to the indubitable reality of the sensible world. — Wayfarer

Yes- and as I said, it seems to be an innate belief- more specifically, a properly basic belief (PBB). A PBB innate is possibly false, but rational to maintain in the absence of a defeater. I'll elaborate.

My epistemological theory is a variation of Alvan Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology. He addresses a flaw in epistemological foundationalism (EF). EF necessarily entails basic beliefs that are not derived from prior beliefs- they are foundational. The problem is that this would imply the foundational (basic) beliefs are irrational. He addresses this by suggesting that a basic belief would be rational if it was caused by forces that would be expected to produce them. Such beliefs are "properly" basic. Plantinga suggests God would be expected to produce a sensus divinitatus - innate knowledge of God. He acknowledges this is not an argument for God's existence. Rather, it's a demonstration that belief in God is rational - if God exists.

I'm an atheist, but the concept of properly basic beliefs seems sound. If the world would produce living beings that were to survive in that world, those beings would need to be able to successfully interact with that world - so functionally accurate access to that world would be expected - and therefore consistent with the realty we experience. No, this doesn't prove anything about the world- but it demonstrates rationality - if it's true that there is such a world.

What if there's not such a world? Then I'm wrong. But on what basis could one decide such a world does not exist? Not a rational one, because the only basis for abandoning our PBBs is because they are possibly false. Possibility is not a defeater: it is irrational to abandon a belief solely on the basis that it is possibly false.

My suspicion is that you pondered your properly basic beliefs about the world, correctly noticed they were not based on other beliefs, and this led you to abandon them- because they seemed arbitrary and irrational. This left you with no epistemological ground - no precommitments, and this led you to idealism - a framework that focuses on the impossibility of a rational epistemological foundation. This strikes me as an epistemological dead-end; if it's true, then no beliefs are rational - because there is no rational foundation. Even your belief about where your keys are is unjustified, because there's ultimately a dependency on certain basic beliefs that you reject.

I see you've given a second reply, but I don't have time to read and reply (we're decorating our xmas tree, then I'm driving out of town). I'll try to get to it later.

My claim is different: that what we call the “objective world” has an ineliminably subjective foundation—that objectivity itself is constituted through perspectival, experiential, and cognitive conditions. In that sense, the world is not “self-existent” in the way naïve realism supposes; it lacks the kind of intrinsic, framework-independent reality we ordinarily project onto it. — Wayfarer

The epistemic foundation is subjective. But I believe that (mind-independent) objective reality exists - irrespective of whether or not any metaphysical theories are true. Like all beliefs, this belief of mine is subjective. But if the belief is true, then it is the case that objective reality exists; IOW, this would be objective fact.

The modern discipline of ontology is the study of being, where "being" encompasses what exists, and covers all of actual reality, so my stated belief about objective reality constitutes a first principle of my ontological (AKA metaphysical) theory - one that I am fully committed to (in contrast to my considering naturalism the best explanation for all facts).

This is not a denial of realism in the sense of stable, law-governed regularity, but a rejection of the stronger metaphysical thesis that the world, as described by physics, exists exactly as it is described, wholly independent of the conditions of its intelligibility (i.e. 'metaphysical realism').

I don't believe that objective reality is exactly as described by physics either. But I do believe that if one chooses to embrace a metaphysical theory (=ontological theory), that at minimum it must be able to account for all known facts. So in that sense, it must be consistent with physics. This consistency need not include the "ontological models" physicists discuss (including, for example, interpretations of QM).

modern physics—especially quantum theory—has undermined the idea of observer-free, self-standing physical reality. Hence Einstein's question!

It only does this if one commits to a particular sort of interpretation of quantum mechanics. I am generally agnostic to specific interpretations, because I see no means of justifying a belief in a specific one. AFAIK, the so-called "observer dependent" interpretations have been supplanted by generalizing "observer" to include anything classical (like a measurement device) that interacts with the quantum system.

So what's your justification for embracing an interpretation that treats observers in a special way? Is it because it dovetails a commitment to a denial that there exists an observer-free reality (if that's what you believe)? If you're choosing it because it's consistent with your predisposition, then it doesn't serve as support for that predisposition (that would be circular).

To say of yourself “I am objectively existent” is already to adopt a third-person stance toward your own being and then retroject it into the first-person. In other words, you are importing the conditions under which others know you into the conditions under which you exist for yourself—and that distinction is precisely what the claim glosses over. — Wayfarer

That's not entirely correct. You are imposing your perspective of what is entailed by my claim. My belief that I am an objective existent is actually a consequence of my reasoning about reality: people, society, and the world at large and considering my role in these contexts. Regarding my relation to people: I recognized that I am similar to other people. I engage in thoughts (and have sensory sensations), and I infer that they do, as well. I also infer that the qualities that comprise my first-person-ness to me, also applies to them: I conclude that everyone is egocentric, so that my own egocentricity is not unique or special.

Label this a "third-person stance" if you like, but the label does not entail an obvious reasoning error on my part, but feel free identify an error.

So when you say that ontology can be pursued “in spite of” the phenomenological and perspectival conditions my essay focuses on, what you are really doing is presupposing precisely what philosophical ontology is meant to examine: namely, the conditi

ons under which objectivity, mind-independence, and even “being a thing” are first made intelligible to us. — Wayfarer

More or less true. Why should I not? It doesn't entail denying the role of phenomenology and perspective that you discussed. As I said, having a perspective doesn't imply falsehood. Do you believe it is impossible to make true statements about objective reality, under the premise that there does exist a mind-independent objective reality?

My claim is different: that what we call the “objective world” has an ineliminably subjective foundation—that objectivity itself is constituted through perspectival, experiential, and cognitive conditions. In that sense, the world is not “self-existent” in the way naïve realism supposes; it lacks the kind of intrinsic, framework-independent reality we ordinarily project onto it. — Wayfarer

You're blending 2 questions:
1) does there exist a mind-independent objective reality?
2) what is the nature of this mind-independent objective reality?

What is your answer to question 1?

You keep pressing me to affirm some alternative “substance” to take the place of the physical—some immaterial stuff, or “mind as substance.”...My critique targets the shared presupposition of both physicalism and substance dualism: that ultimate reality must consist of self-subsisting things. — Wayfarer

I don't demand you describe alternative substance; rather, I've asked if you can propose an alternative metaphysical model of reality. It's fine if your answer is no, perhaps because you consider reality to be inscrutable. That seems justifiable. But just because (I assume) you can justify this doesn't imply there is no justifiable basis for another person to think that reality actually does consist of "self-subsisting things".

Incidentally, "justify" does not mean a sufficiently strong warrant, to qualify as knowledge. It can be weak- merely a reason to hold a provisional belief - generally treating it as true, but remaining open to being supplanted.

I have mentioned I published The Mind Created World on Medium three weeks before ChatGPT went live, in November 2022 (important, in hindsight). A couple of weeks back, I pasted the text into Google Gemini for comment, introducing it as a 'doctrinal statement for a scientifically-informed objective idealism' (hence Gemini's remarks about that point.) You can read the analysis here. I take Google Gemini as an unbiased adjuticator in such matters. — Wayfarer

I haven't objected at all to your version of idealism, which I believe I understood. My criticism is that the essay does not provide a justification for claims you made in our discussion in this thread. Here's what sent us off in this direction:

What I'm looking for is your own epistemic justification to believe what you do. You previously shared the common view - it was a belief you held
— Relativist

I've laid it out in the OP, The MInd Created World. It makes a rational case for a scientifically-informed cognitive idealism. We had a long discussion in that thread. We'll always be at odds. Simple as that. — Wayfarer

What I was referring to was this prior exchange:

So when you say:

"I am an objective existent. I engage in mental activities; I experience qualia."

you are illicitly fusing:

The organism that can be studied objectively, and

The subjectivity in virtue of which anything is experienced at all.
— Wayfarer
I'm "Illicitly fusing?! You seem to implying my view is the idiosyncratic one. Hardly. Nearly everyone on earth does this implicitly! You have devised a dichotomy that is counterintuitive - at odds with our innate view of ourselves and the world - you need to make the case for why the intuitive/innate view is wrong, and your claims are correct. It seems unnecessarily complex - you need a reason to embrace this complexity over a simpler, more intuitive view. — Relativist

To focus on one thing: I indeed believe that I am an objective existent- an element of mind-independent actual reality. Your essay does not undercut this belief, and it does not justify referring to this as an "illicit fusing" - because it's possibly true - even though it entails judging through the lens of beliefs within the context of a "mind created world(model).

A metaphysical theory (e.g. The Thomist metaphysics that Ed Feser defends, or essentialism or physicalism) is a theory about the actual, real world. Your idealist theory only adds a layer to the analysis - a layer that may add a level of doubt, but it does not falsify any theory. My criticisms concern what your essay does not do. You have wrongly inferred that I am misunderstanding it. My quibbling with some instances of ambiguity are intended solely to relate your idealistic theory to ontology (theories about the real world). IOW, my position is that ontology can be entertained (and beliefs can be justified) in spite of the phenomenology and logical necessity of a perspective that your essay focuses on.

You say I should distinguish between "judgements about the world" and "judgements about the mind-created world(model)." — Wayfarer

I said no such thing. I said you should avoid using words ambiguously. It's not hard to avoid the ambiguity: judgements about the real-world are made through analysis of the world(model). IOW, we can entertain ontology and can justify beliefs in statements about the real world.

The issue I've repeatedly brought up is that this mental world(model) is BELIEF: it constitutes beliefs about the real-world. Judgements are made by analyzing these beliefs ; the resulting judgement is also a belief, grounded in the prior beliefs. Your essay doesn't put it this way, but I'd like you to understand that it is valid to consider one's mentally constructed "world" as belief- belief that is possibly true.

that there is no meaningful way to refer to "the world" apart from how it shows up within some framework of intelligibility. Not because mind creates or invents the world, but because "world," "object," "tree," "exists"—all these terms only have content within a cognitive framework. — Wayfarer

Of course there is, as long as one acknowledges that there IS a real-world. And notice that the term "real-world" is not ambiguous. An extreme skeptic might claim that it's inaccessible and therefore a complete mystery, because of the phenomenology/perspective-ness,, but even so - it is something we can refer to.

I won't adopt your terminology, because it presupposes the very thing at issue: that we can meaningfully refer to a "real world" wholly independent of cognition, and then compare our "models" to it. We cannot. Every comparison is already within cognition. — Wayfarer

You literally just referred to the "real world". Further, you acknowledged there is a mind-independent reality in your essay when you said: "there is no need for me to deny that the Universe is real independently of your mind or mine, or of any specific, individual mind."

The next sentence begins reasonably, but ends problematically:

But what we know of its existence is inextricably bound by and to the mind we have, and so, in that sense, reality is not straightforwardly objective.

"It's" clearly refers to the real world mind-independent universe. I agree that what we "know" (an expression of belief) is bound to the mind, but then you shift from real world to mental model by saying "reality is not straightforwardly objective. Here's a re-wording that I suggest expresses your point unambiguously:

But what we know of the mind-independent universe's existence is inextricably bound by and to the mind we have, and so, in that sense, our understanding of actual reality is not straightforwardly objective.

Even if actual reality is inscrutable, it is nevertheless present. And since I'm dealing with ontology, the distinction is critical.

This incidentally harks back to an earlier discussion about correspondence in respect of truth.

the adherents of correspondence sometimes insist that correspondence shall be its own test. But then the second difficulty arises. If truth does consist in correspondence, no test can be sufficient.... — Wayfarer

This does not imply that correspondence theory should be rejected. The meaning of the word "true" is what matters. The quote merely argues that we can never directly verify the correspondence, which is irrelevant to the concept. Your observations about phenomenology could be treated as an argument against the possibility of knowledge (strict sense) of the real world- which could possibly be rational. But we need a concept of "true". There are other truth theories; correspondence is just the most widely accepted among philosophers (and for good reason).

Again, you think that by saying that, I'm claiming that the world is all in the mind or the content of thought. — Wayfarer

No, I had understood that you do not believe that. My complaint is that the language you use is prima facie ambiguous in the context of discussing "the actual, real world" - which was what I was discussing.

It is logically possible that some elements of our mental image of the real world are true- that they correspond to the actual, real world. You don't confront this possibility, but this doesn't stop you from judging that physicalism (which is a world(model)) is false. I do regard this as a flaw in your essay, because you include no reasoning for the judgement.

As noted, understanding necessarily entails perspective, and perspective does not entail falsehood.
— Relativist

I didn't say that perspective entails falsehood. I said that perspective is necessary for any proposition about what exists, and that only the mind can provide that perspective. — Wayfarer

I hadn't accused you of saying that, and I agree that perspective is a logical necessity for even entertaining propositions about the real world. That also follows when we examine this on the basis of beliefs. Beliefs are mental constructs, so a mind is necessary.

My statement was just another way of saying that HAVING a perspective doesn't preclude having true beliefs about the real-world (irrespective of whether those beliefs are justified- that's another discussion).

The reason I'm not making an ontological statement, is because I've already stated 'Adopting a predominantly perspectival approach, I will concentrate less on arguments about the nature of the constituents of objective reality, and focus instead on understanding the mental processes that shape our judgment of what they comprise. ...You, however, will interpret that as an 'ontological statement' because of your prior acceptance of the reality of mind-independent objects — Wayfarer

No, it's not because of my acceptance of mind-independent objects. It was because of the words you used*. Can you understand why "mind is foundational to the nature of existence" sounds like an ontological claim? This is the root of what I referred to as equivocation. You don't fully cure this with the disclaimer (i.e. the text I underlined in the above quote) because you are discussing "judgements we make about the world" - and here, you appear to be referring to the real world. Then again, maybe you're referring to "judgements we make about the mind-created world(model)". I'm sure you aren't being intentionally equivocal, but your words ARE inherently ambiguous. Own this- they're your ambiguous words! Don't blame the reader for failing to disambiguate the words as you do. Rather, you should refrain from using terms like "world" and "nature of existence" to refer to the content of minds. It's easily fixed, just as I did when revising "mind-created world" to 'mind-created world(model)"

Also, I must point out that the "real world" (i.e. actual ontology) is lurking behind what you say, even though you "are concentrating less" on it. How else could you consider your essay to be critical of physicalism (your words: "physicalist naturalism that this essay has set out to criticize")? Physicalism is an ontology, and therefore a criticism of it is indirectly dealing with ontology. As I said, most of what you say in your essay is consistent with (i.e. does not directly contradict) physicalism. You may find it implausible that a mind grounded in material could account for a "mind-created world (model)", but the mere fact that we each have one of these in our minds does not falsify physicalism.

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* I actually did discern that you might not be making an ontological statement. Here's what I said:
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Mind is foundational to the nature of existence
You could have justifiably said that mind provides the foundation for an understanding of existence, but as written, it was an unsupported ontological claim. — Relativist

I'm not saying that 'objects are an invention of the mind' but that any idea of the existence of the object is already mind-dependent. What they are, outside any cognitive activity or idea about them, is obviously unknown to us. — Wayfarer

But the concept of "object" is within minds, and therefore dependent on minds, just as each individual conceptual object (tree, dog, toilet...) is a mental construct.

The word "unknown" doesn't even apply. I suspect you're speaking in terms of a reality from which we subtract perspective - which we agree is impossible. You haven't analyzed WHY it's impossible, so I'll give you my take.

As you noted, "perspective is essential for any judgement about what exists". But perspective, in this sense, does not entail falsehood. It just means that understanding entails a perspective. Reality itself is perspective-less, because it just IS.

Understanding entails a mind grasping some aspect of reality - which means mentally relating sets of concepts. What else could it be? (This pertains directly to the quote of mine that 180 Proof just referenced).

What 'an object' is, outside any recognition of it by us, is obviously not anything. Neither existent, nor non-existent.

Aren't you refering to the impossibility of a perspective-less account of some named object? Refer to the bold part of my above comment.

"though we know that prior to the evolution of life there must have been a Universe with no intelligent beings in it, or that there are empty rooms with no inhabitants, or objects unseen by any eye — the existence of all such supposedly unseen realities still relies on an implicit perspective. What their existence might be outside of any perspective is meaningless and unintelligible, as a matter of both fact and principle." — Wayfarer

As noted, understanding necessarily entails perspective, and perspective does not entail falsehood.

When you say, "must have been..." you seem to be referring to something about the way the world actually was, at an earlier point of time. Right? That implies it is ontological. Yes, your description depends on a perspective, but this is because descriptions (and understandings) are necessarily based on a perspective.

So why say "supposedly unseen reality" when it is reference to a past, unseen state of actual reality?

I am not positing 'metaphysical beliefs'. I am pointing out the inherent contradiction in the concept of the mind-independent object. — Wayfarer

You made these assertions that apply to ontology:

1. Mind is foundational to the nature of existence

2. To think about the existence of a particular thing in polar terms — that it either exists or does not exist — is a simplistic view of what existence entails. In reality, the supposed ‘unperceived object’ neither exists nor does not exist. Nothing whatever can be said about it."

Both of these pertain to ontology (metaphysics). By stating them, you are expressing something you believe. Hence, they reflect metaphysical beliefs.

There is no "inherent contradiction" in the concept of a "mind independent object", but I think I understand why you say this: "object" is a concept - an invention of the mind. But this overlooks the possibility that there is a real-world referrent for the "objects"; and that there are good reasons to believe this is the case (irrespective of whether you find these to be compelling)

"determinate object with specific properties" is already a description that presupposes a framework of conceptual articulation. — Wayfarer

Agreed, but that fact does not entail that there are not determinable objects with specific determinable properties in the actual world. By "determinable", I simply mean that the mental object (along with identified properties) corresponds to something in the real world. It seems as if you deny this.

It's as if you think the fact of the "mind created world (model)" makes it impossible to have true beliefs about the actual world. (where "true" = a correspondence between the mental concept and the actual world). Is this indeed your view? If not, then clarify.

This isn't a rival metaphysical thesis. It's pointing out that the foundational claim of metaphysical realism—that objects exist as determinate things-in-themselves wholly apart from cognition—cannot be coherently formulated. — Wayfarer

My objection: it's irrelevant that our descriptions of objects is mind-dependent- because it's logically necessary that they be so. What is relevant is whether or not the descriptions MAP to reality (i.e. it corresponds).

Consider a tree. Our descriptions of the tree do not constitute anything ontological, but these descriptions may very well correspond to something ontological.

I'll turn again to your assertion, Mind is foundational to the nature of existence

It's undeniable that mind is foundational to understanding anything - because "understanding" is entirely mental.

But does "nature of existence" refer to the mind-independent (billions of years old) real world that you acknowledge? Whether or not your inclined to talk about it, the real world is something we can talk about, and we can talk about its "nature". That's an integral part of ontology, as a discipline. So I feel justified in asserting "mind is not foundational to the nature of existence". This does not contradict the notion that the "mind-created world (model)" is the cognitive basis for all our claims about the world.

The real world object (rock, tree...) exists irrespective of our ever having perceived it
— Relativist

This is the whole point at issue — Wayfarer

Your equivocate on this point.