You are assuming the fundamental constants could have been different, so each combination of constants participates in the lottery. — Relativist


The fundamental constants could of all been very different:

- The strength of the 4 forces
- The masses and charges of the subatomic particles
- The rate of expansion of the universe

That gives a huge possibility space - and we have only one shot at winning. We won, so it is much more likely it was due to the lottery being rigged (=the universe being fine tuned). — Devans99

Sure, it's a huge possibility space, but you incorrectly treating "we" as participants. Let's be explicit about this universe lottery:

Where ci = a set of values for the constants (e.g. the set of values the constants have in THIS universe)
C = the set of all ci.
n =the number members of C (i.e. the number of possible combinations of constant values)

The possibility space = the participants in the lottery = C. "We" are not participants, so it's invalid to say "we won." Rather, some ci is the winner. We (life) is a consequence of ci having won. We can consider "life permitting" as a characteristic of the winner. In the real-world lottery analogy I gave, this is like identifying the characteristics of the winner (a one-eyed, hemophiliac dwarf) and noting how improbable it is that such a person would win.

If there was a God (lets say there is a 25% chance of that just for arguments sake), life would be a design objective. So we have:

- 25% chance of God * 100% chance of fine tuning
- 1 in a billion chance that we 'get lucky' and have a life supporting universe without God

Which of the above is a more likely explanation? — Devans99

Erroneous. The issue should be: does the FTA increase the epistemic probability of God's existence. Your 25% assumption refers to the prior probability of a God (one who wants to create life). The FTA does result in an increase to this prior probability. That's because we have knowledge of only one universe (this one), and the existence of life is consistent with both possibilities (God existing and God's not existing).

Back to my analogy, a one-eyed hemophiliac dwarf winning is consistent with a lottery that is rigged for one-eyed hemophiliac dwarves, and also consistent with an honest lottery in which everyone has an equal chance. You're treating the mere fact that such a person won as evidence of a dishonest lottery.

But that happens to be the number that gives us a life supporting universe. Do you honestly not find that a staggering coincidence? — Devans99

A coincidence consists of two facts. The only two facts you can be referring two are:
1) life is a design objective
2) there is life.

If you do not treat life as a design objective, there is no relevant coincidence. In my analogy, it's not "coincidental" that one-eyed hemophiliac dwarf won the lottery UNLESS we treat such a person's winning as an objective of the lottery (i.e. the lottery was rigged).

That the universe must be live supporting is a given; the real question is why is the universe life supporting? — Devans99

Would you ask, "why did a one-eyed, hemophiliac dwarf win?" There is a reason for this sort of person winning a lottery only if the lottery was rigged. Similarly, there's only a reason for the universe being life supporting if life was a design objective.

I'll get back to you later.

The Trinity is logically coherent because the concepts upon which it is based can be defined in a logically consistent way.

That said, if one considers the historical development of the doctrine, the Christian Trinity seems a rationalization of Jesus' divinity within a monotheistic framework.

But in this lottery there is only one participant - only one of the billion tickets was bought - as represented by our universe. — Devans99

Not true. You are assuming the fundamental constants could have been different, so each combination of constants participates in the lottery. Let n be the number of combinations. The probability of any specific combination "winnng" is 1/n. Therefore there's nothing remarkable about a 1/n probability participant winning.

You seem to be blind to the fact that you are treating life as a design objective. If you do not treat life as special, your argument falls apart. If you do treat life as special, your argument is circular.

Assume it's possible to make conscious simulated people with enough detail and computing power. They experience their digital world like we experience our world. — Marchesk

We experience qualia. How can these be simulated? If you flip on a bit for the perception od redness (for example), you could program a human-like behavioral reaction, but this is not experiening the world as we do.

By "rebirth", I mean something along the lines of "getting caught up in consciousness/life/world again."...
The idea here is of getting 'caught up' in life in some way again. It already happened once. If the pre-birth and post-death condition are the same, then why would life not again come forth? — Inyenzi

I don't see how any of this makes sense unless you assume there is some "essence" of a person.
i.e. that which makes you YOU, as a unique individual - and this essence cannot be physical, not even partly physical.

But it seems to me that many of the things that make me ME, are physical: memories and conditioned responses seem to be neural patterns. My sex (male) is related to my y-chromosome, and the testosterone that influenced my physical and emotional development. These made me what I am and continue to influence how I evolve.

Can some part of me live on (or again)? Sure- the molecules of my decaying body can fertilize a cornfield, but that isn't what I consider ME.

What this thread needs is more psychobabble.

https://thegrayzone.com/2019/05/07/gabor-mate-russiagate-interview-transcript/ — unenlightened

FWIW: Anyone who "expected" Mueller to develop a prosecutable case for criminal conspiracy by Trump was misguided. On the other hand:

- anyone who suggests there was a "Russian Hoax" is ignoring the facts; there was a great deal of suspicious behavior that showed an investigation was warranted:
-- numerous interactions between members of the campaign and Russians
-- Trump's lying to the public about his (and his campaign's) interactions with Russia
-- Trump's instructing subordinates to mislead, lie and fabricate evidence
-- Trump's activities that (per Mueller) may have constituted obstruction

- Trump tried to impede the investigation and have MAY have actually succeeded in this (read about his dangling of a pardon to Manafort, who subsequently lied and may have continued to not be forthcoming).

- It is reasonable to consider whether or not Trump's behavior constitutes criminal obstruction of justice. This is not "moving the goalposts" (as Trump apologists assert) because there were no goals regarding "getting Trump on criminal conspiracy with Russia" (regardless of whether or not there were individuals who hoped for, or expected that). It is absurd to suggest that an investigator of possible criminality should ignore other criminal behavior that is uncovered during the course of the investigation.

You're overlooking that every one of the billion possibilities had an equal chance of being drawn (1 in a billion), and therefore it's not remarkable that the winner was a 1 in a billion shot. — Relativist


But it is still remarkable that we won at a billion to one - there was only one lucky ticket (the one life supporting universe). Suspiciously remarkable. Fine tuning is a much more likely explanation that a billion to one shot coming off. — Devans99

The universe lottery randomly selects a set of constants, and each set of constants will result in a universe with consequences that are unique to that universe. Life is unique to this universe, but how is this specific uniqueness relevant to assessing whether or not the selection of constants was actually random?

By analogy, consider a real-world lottery in which every person in the U.S. has exactly one chance to win. A name is drawn, and the winner is a one-eyed, hemophiliac dwarf. Consider the odds against a one-eyed, hemophiliac dwarf winning the lottery! Does the improbability of such a person winning give us reason to think the lottery was rigged to favor one-eyed hemophiliac dwarves? The existence of life in this universe is no different: There's no basis for assuming any lottery is rigged based on the post-hoc observation that the winner has some rare or unique attributes, because every possible winner has something rare or unique about it.

I absolutely agree that some opinions (and some guesses or estimates) ARE better than others. But why not just call them opinions or guesses or estimates. — Frank Apisa

Because when we use non-standard terminology, it impedes discussion. I don't have a degree in philosophy, but I've read a bit of epistemology and based on my limited knowledge - "belief" is a general, but core, term. The qualified term "categorical belief" entails treating the belief as a certainty. But epistemology also deals with "degree of certainty" also termed "epistemic probability." There's also a matter of justifying beliefs, and of belief formulation. This toolbag of terms and processes seems adequate to address the (valid!) issues you raise, and if everyone uses them we will at least understand each other better. I'm not saying it's intrinsically better than the terminology you prefer, but its problematic for everyone to use different terminology - you need to attach a lexicon in order to be understood.

The point is that when we come to the "I 'believe' (in) God" kind of thing...we actually introduce a factor of, "We must all respect the 'beliefs' of others"...AND INSTALL IT INTO LAWS we must all follow.

When someone says "I believe in God", I can ask them what degree of certainty they have, how they formulated that belief (with attached level of certainty), and their continued justification. The issue of "respecting" others' beliefs would be a complicated, but interesting, discussion - so I'll defer responding to that for now.

The "belief" in these cases are blind guesses about the true nature of the REALITY of existence. Everyone has a right to his/her guesses...but to change the word "guess" into "belief" and afford it a status above the guess status it deserves...does a disservice to humanity.

This sounds very similar to arguments I've made elsewhere: I often run into theists who proclaim they "know" the nature of reality, and they justify this solely on their proclaiming some particular metaphysics to be the factual basis of reality (Aristotelian-Thomist metaphysics seems popular). It's nonsense, of course, because it's entirely guesswork.

Not sure I understand the question. All possibilities in the lottery are a billion to one - all equally unlikely. So losing is almost 100% certain. So winning is clearly more unlikely than all other possibilities. — Devans99

You're overlooking that every one of the billion possibilities had an equal chance of being drawn (1 in a billion), and therefore it's not remarkable that the winner was a 1 in a billion shot.

If you see a face in the sand on the beach, do you assume it is a random arrangement of molecules or that someone drew it?

It's random. Now map out the exact shape of the grain and consider how improbable it was that the grain would happen to have this exact shape. See the problem? It seems remarkable only if you treat the actual shape as a goal, or design objective.

Mostly we make these 'decisions' unconsciously. We give them little or no conscious attention. So we don't really know if we're trying to make our best guess or not, do we? :wink: — Pattern-chaser

I'm referring to conscious decision making, of course, and we are also free to re-think many of our unconscious decisions. My fundamental point is that there are tools of reasoning available to us IN ADDITION to deduction and numerical probability, that - when applied correctly- lead to better (more reasonable, more rational) decisions than otherwise. You seem to be evading this, and merely stressing that these other tools do not lead to certainty. I agree that we tend to feel more certain than we're warranted, but that doesn't imply we should be abandon all tools of critical reasoning other than deduction and probability.

We know lotteries tend not to be rigged. We do not know if universes are 'rigged'. It could be that universes are not rigged and we just got lucky, but thats very unlikely. — Devans99

Show how this set's winning is more unlikely than all other possibilities. Do so without assuming life is a design objective.

What if a person has been raised from birth to believe killing is good. This person didn't choose his belief, so how can he be considered morally wrong for holding this belief?

"I 'believe' aliens from other planets live among us" does not sound as good to my ear as, "It is my guess that aliens from other planets live among us"...or "it is my opinion (estimate) that..." — Frank Apisa

Fine- call them opinions. There are still 2 important considerations that need consideration; how strongly you hold this opinion (which is a psychological state), and how strongly supported is your opinion (ideally, this entails an attempt to be objective). It seems more reasonable to have strong opinions when the support is stronger.

What I'm trying to get at is that some opinions are "better" than others - i.e. it is more reasonable to hold them. Further, it is more reasonable and rational (and more productive) to strive to hold opinions that are well supported.

Like everyone else, I will continue to use unjustified guesswork in my everyday life. — Pattern-chaser

I'm referring to every day life. Despite there being guesswork to our choices, we still endeavor to to make the best possible guesses. Imagine if you were to refrain from making your everyday choices simply because you could neither prove it optimal, nor compute the probability of your preferred outcome. That is not tenable.

Exactly.

Why does 'a set of constant values does not constitute a coincidence'? Over 20 independent physical constants had to be the way they are for life to be possible. Surely the mother of all coincidence. — Devans99

See what you just said: "for life to be possible." You are treating life as the objective. I am pointing out that life is a consequence of the constants being what they are. A consequence does not constitute a coincidence in need of explanation.

The license plate ARW 357 has nothing special about it Feynman's analogy falls wide of the mark.

You are treating life as special, just is Feynman is facetiously treating this license plate as special.

Yes but we have one instance of the universe being created to discuss. Did it come about by:

1. A billion in one shot coming off and we just happen to get lucky
2. The universe was fine tuned for life — Devans99

The winner of a lottery is "lucky" because his previously purchased ticket is drawn. We didn't have a ticket prior to the "universe lottery." Winning the universe lottery just means some set of constants is actual.

The consequence of random chance does not constitute evidence of non-randomness.

Consider a lottery on which a billion people have exactly one ticket. A ticket is drawn, and there is a winner. His chances of winning were 1 in a billion, and yet he won. Does his low probability of winning imply the lottery was rigged?

It is fallacious to claim the universe is fine tuned for life. Life is a consequence of the universe being the way it is. Only if one assumes that there was a design objective for life can one infer that the universe had to be finely-tuned to produce it.

The "Fine Tuning Argument" leads one to believe there is some "coincidence" that demands explanation, but a coincidence entails two or more facts that unexpectedly "coincide." A set of constant values does not constitute a coincidence, nor does a consequence of the values being what they are: If A causes B, B causes C, and C causes D - it is not an unexplained coincidence that A is "D permitting."

Richard Feynman once said, “You know, the most amazing thing happened to me tonight... I saw a car with the license plate ARW 357. Can you imagine? Of all the millions of license plates in the state, what was the chance that I would see that particular one tonight? Amazing!”

Any particular set of values for the "fundamental constants" is low probability. As Feyman implies: low probability things happen all the time.

And that leads us into epistemology, and the justification of unproven/unprovable "beliefs." Regarding your opening question: no, we can prove causation, but is it more reasonable to believe everything has a cause or to not believe it?

No degree of trust? No, I wouldn't go that far. I don't accept that we "can have" "varying degrees of confidence", but that's because the phraseology is not what I would've chosen. :wink: To say that we assume "varying degrees of confidence" is to describe what we actually do, in RL. Because we have no choice, in practice. But those assumptions are unjustified; they're just guesses, nothing more. But most of the time, our guesses work, so we use them. :up: — Pattern-chaser

I suggest that "to believe" means to accept or treat something as true as a psychological attitude, an attitude that influences our future behavior (including our mental behavior). As you note, we have no choice but to make guesses (i.e. form beliefs in this psychological sense), so why not make the best guesses possible?

— Dusty of Sky

I'm not claiming that particulars, properties and relations can exist independently. But in order to explain what a state of affairs is, don't you need to appeal to the existence of its abstract constituents?

Sort of. The constituents exist (within a SOA), and we can think abstractly about them.

Just because the abstractions are codependent doesn't mean they don't exist. And I don't think it would be helpful to define existence as being exclusive to things which can (hypothetically) exist independently. Because independent SOAs consist of their codependent parts and therefore depend on them.

That's consistent with Armstrong's view. The constituents (e.g. specific properties) actually exist, but only in their instantiations as part of states of affairs. Returning to laws of nature as "relations between states of affairs types" - it shows that there's not actually a dependency on an equation existing as an ontic abstract object. Abstract objects (as ontic objects) are incompatible with physicalism. Constrast this with Platonism, which can assume Newton's law of gravity exists independent of there being objects to which it applies. For that matter, Armstrong would deny the existence of "4" as an abstract object. Rather, there are states of affairs consisting of 4 objects (sub-SOAs), but we can still think abstractly about the universal "4".

The Idea that "all People are Created Equal" is a essentially a useful moral principle: anti-chauvinism. If we treat all others as equals, it is to the benefit of society as a whole.

The "success of science" refers to the success of theory in making predictions. This constitutes evidence (not analytic proof) for the theories being at least approximately true.

You say you are agnostic to all things that are unproven. Compare your position to mine: my position is that if something isn't proven, then we should be open to the possibility it is false. I am agnostic to the degree that we can't have absolute certainty about much of anything. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that I live my life based on believing that a variety of things are (probably) true. For example, I expect my keyboard to correctly enter the letters I am typing, and that the contents of my typing will appear in my reply to you. I would regard as "extreme skepticism" the attitude that one could have no degree of trust in anything that is unproven (the sun might not rise tomorrow; the world external to my mind actually might not exist,...). Are you indeed extreme in that sense, or are you closer to my position - such that you acknowledge uncertainty, but accept that we can have varying degrees of confidence about many aspects of the world?

Interesting, and good to know. But if Armstrong takes the most basic objects in the universe to be states of affairs, then I don't see how he can call himself a physicalist in the traditional sense. States of affairs, as I understand them, consist of relations between abstract entities like properties, relations and particulars without instantiations. — Dusty of Sky

No. A state of affairs is not "relations between abstract entities." Abstract entities do not exist (that would be inconsistent with physicalism). Abstractions are just tools of the mind (useful fictions) they do not actually exist as ontic objects.

Consider actual objects in the real world, such as a rock. Consider the mass of the rock (700 grams). You can't physically separate the rock's mass from the actual rock. There is not a relation between the rock's other properties and the property "700 grams". The rock's mass is an intrinsic property of the rock. You can think abstractly about the fact that the rock's mass is 700 grams, but that doesn't mean "700 grams" exists independently of the rock, or that the rock exists independently of its mass.

Multiple objects can have an identical 700 gram mass: consider all such objects with a 700 gram mass: they can be considered a State of Affairs Type (states of affairs with the property "700 grams mass"). "700 grams mass" is a universal, because multiple objects can have this property.

I hope this helps you understand that a state of affairs is an inseparable package: everything that exists (such as a rock) has properties and relations, but it actually doesn't make sense to say that any of those properties or relations has some sort of independent existence.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think Armstrong's theory is that physical properties are universals which particulars instantiate. So even if physical laws are just functions of properties, the properties have universal natures which exists over and above their particular instances. Are these universal natures real things? They're not physical objects. How do you resolve this problem without admitting non-physical objects into your ontology? — Dusty of Sky

The fundamental thing to keep in mind is that (according to Armstrong), everything that exists is a state of affairs (a particular with its properties and relations). The properties and relations do not exist independent of the state of affairs in which they are instantiated. We can still think abstractly about properties and relations (through the "way of abstraction"), but these are just mental exercises.

Yes, physical properties are universals, and exist in their instantiations. But it's not quite correct to say that physical laws are functions of properties. Rather, physical laws are relations between "state of affairs types" (SOATs). The distinction is subtle, but important, and it's lost if you conflate properties with SOATs:

We can consider there to be a SOAT for each property (i.e. the SOAs that have property x are a SOAT). But it would be incorrect to say "-1 charge" has an attraction to "+1 charge" - which implies a relation between properties (which is incorrect). Rather, we should say "states of affairs with a -1 charge have an attraction to states of affairs with a +1 charge" - which elucidates the fact that it fundamentally a relation between SOATs (a relation that is instantiated in SOAs of those types).

You asked, "Are these universal natures real things?" If a "thing" is an ontic object, then NO, because a property is not a SOA. Nevertheless, the universal "-1 charge" (which is a universal) exists, as a constituent of certain SOAs.

I wonder where/how maths fits in this ensemble? — Wayfarer

The relation between (or among) states of affairs can often be described mathematically. The point is that the equation is an abstraction, and doesn't exist independently of the states of affairs.

Armstrong is a realist regarding laws of nature. He believes there are actual laws of nature, not just regularities. To Armstrong, "laws of nature are dyadic relations of necessitation ... holding between universals." Where a universal is a "state of affairs type".

Electrons and protons are two different "state of affairs types". Each electron has the property "-1 electric charge"; while protongs have "+1 electric charge." It is a "law of nature" that protons and electrons attract one another because of their properties. This attraction is a dyadic relation (involving any electron-proton pair) necessitated by their properties.

Frank - Terminology aside, your views seem pretty reasonable to me. I only brought up the standard terminology to explain how I had interpreted your comments. I wasn't trying to tell you what you "believe" or "know" or whatever words you care to use.

Frank - It's not bullshit, as this shows:

" The classical definition, described but not ultimately endorsed by Plato,[5] specifies that a statement must meet three criteria in order to be considered knowledge: it must be justified, true, and believed. Some claim that these conditions are not sufficient, as Gettier case examples allegedly demonstrate. "

I'm not the semantics police. Feel free to use words however you like, but try not to get mad when this leads to misinterpretation.

Not 'self-contradictory" at all.

I DO NOT BELIEVE statement F.

I KNOW IT. — Frank Apisa

Strictly speaking in philosophical terms, knowledge = a belief that is true, justified, and (somehow) avoids Gettier conditions. So in order to KNOW F, you must BELIEVE F.

Apparently Mueller wrote to him prior to his testimony to Congress, informing him that his summary-not-summary was inaccurate.
— VagabondSpectre

He didn't. He wrote that Barr's summary "did not fully capture the context, nature and substance of this office’s work and conclusions."
6h — Michael

Had Barr's summary fully captured the "context, nature and substance" of Mueller's report, we would call the summary "accurate."

I assume you were perfectly fine with Bill Clinton's statement, " "It depends upon what the meaning of the word 'is' is." IMO, lawyer-speak that misleads is just as dishonest as a direct lie, even if the lawyer-speak keeps you out of jail.

It seems to me to be mostly detrimental to label yourself and/or someone you’re conversing with as “liberal,” “conservative,” or any other tag — I like sushi

I generally agree. Better to state and defend a position on a specific topic rather than to hand someone else a broad brush with which to paint you.

My wife and I also have cat companions, and in almost all cases we've chosen to put them down eventually. The criteria we use is: are they getting some enjoyment from life?

We had one cat that was suffering from failing kidneys (as you know, this is a common problem in older cats), and we addressed this (per the vet's instructions) by giving it subcutaneous fluids once a day. The cat didn't like getting poked and held down, but except for those few minutes each day - he was very happy, playful, and loving throughout the last year of his life. Toward the end, even the fluids were not enough. (My mother did this with her cat for close to 3 years).

A neighbor adopted a cat with feline leukemia. The Vet said the cat should be put down. They chose not to, and the cat lived 2 years, and appeared to be quite happy during most of that time. It finally went into a sharp decline and and at that time, they put it down.

My point is that you needn't be overly hasty with putting them down. Consider whether or not they are having a reasonable quality of life as a factor in your decision.

I, for one, do not do any "believing" at all.

Zero, nil, none, zip. — Frank Apisa

Self contradiction:
Statement F: "I, for one, do not do any 'believing' at all."

Therefore you don't believe statement F.

Why do you consider that extreme?

There are a variety of epistemological approaches for justifying belief. The most stringent is to believe only that which can be logically proven. If you can apply it consistently, it's valid - but I'm skeptical anyone can apply it consistently.

Do you NOT believe you are alive and have to do various things to stay that way? (eat, breath,...). Do you not make choices, and when doing so - do you not sometimes base it on expected outcomes (i.e. outcomes you believe might occur)?

Belief needn't equate to certainty.

And these abstract principles (e.g. F=G(m1m2)/r^2) surely don't exist in the material world. You can't locate them under a microscope. So acknowledging that the laws of physics exist seems to contradict the theory of physicalism. Thoughts? — Dusty of Sky

D.M. Armstrong developed a physicalist metaphysics that is consistent with these abstract principles. In a nutshell:

Everything that exists is a state of affairs (SOA). An SOA is composed of 3 types of constituents:
a particular, its properties, and its relations to other SOAs. The gravitational force between 2 objects is a relation between those objects (states of affairs) that is describable as a function of the internal properties of their respective masses and of the distance between them.

The relation described by the gravitation equation does not exist independent of the objects; it exists only in the objects (states of affairs).

Does it? :chin: Empirical evidence supports causality in some (many/most) instances. But mostly we do not look for or consider empirical evidence. We just adopt causality as an axiom. Does the "success of science" offer useful evidence? I can't see that it does. And should we accept that causality is true, just because science is successful? I can't see why. — Pattern-chaser

Yes, the success of science offers useful evidence. For the practical purpose of advancing science, causality should be assumed. That doesn't prove brute facts impossible, so you can justifiably be agnostic to their existence - as long as you are consistent in your preferred epistemology. Are you agnostic to all things that are unproven? That's pretty extreme skepticism, which (if applied consistently) means you can actually believe very little.

I'm really uneasy about introducing theism or atheism into this topic. Uneasy because I see no justification for that introduction. What does it add to the discussion? — Pattern-chaser

I think the thought experiment is useful. Brute facts can't be proven to exist nor to be metaphysically impossible, but the causal chain provides some reason to think ultinate brute fact is fundamental to existence.

(I wish you'd stop using the semantically problematic term "causeless effect" instead of "brute fact").

Here's my take on brute facts. Consider the Principle of Sufficient Reason (a version popularized by William Lane Craig), which states: Anything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause

Why think this is true? Because it appears everything has been caused. This seems reasonable - within the context of the universe (broadly defined as "all of material existence"). There's a causal chain that reaches back, either into an infinite past or to initial conditions (or "first cause"). Setting aside an infinite causal chain (which I find objectionable), I settle on there being a first cause - which is itself uncaused. What is its nature? EITHER it is something that exists out of metaphysical necessity, or it exists as brute fact. Theists rule out brute facts because we don't know of any brute facts existing. But on the other hand, we don't know of any necessary existents that are causally efficacious (i.e. the only thing we know that exists necessarily are abstractions, like the law of non-contradiction).

Therefore, at minimum, I think it reasonable to argue that that it is at least as likely that brute facts exist as it is for a necessarily existing non-physical creator to exist. I lean strongly toward brute fact because it cannot be shown that a creator has properties that exist necessarily (theists simply assume the properties are necessary).

Perhaps every "effect" has a cause...

...but to suppose (for instance) that "the universe" is an effect just so one can presuppose a "cause" for it...

...is like calling the universe "creation" in order to suppose a "creator."

It is nonsense.

No need for anyone to ensnare him/herself into that trap. — Frank Apisa

Yes, and that's why I actually pointed to the semantics. Cause/effect are semantically inseparable, but that does not entail that everything that exists has been caused (=is an effect). IMO the interesting question is: are brute facts possible?

I am simply pointing out that no one knows if God(s) exists. If Christians actually knew that their God exists, then they could easily provide irrefutable evidence and there would not constantly be disputes by atheists asking for said evidence. — Maureen

Alvin Plantinga believes that he "knows" (in the strict sense) God exists, despite the fact that he can't provide irrefutable evidence of God's existence.

Plantinga's reformed epistemology assumes there is such thing as a sensus divinitatus that informs all proper-functioning humans of God's existence. Analogously: you can KNOW you're holding a rose in your hand, but you cannot prove to me that you are doing so (if I'm not seeing it myself). Same with the Sensus Divinitatus: either you sense it or you don't .

Those of us (like me) who do not sense God's existence are not proper functioning. He acknowledges that if God does not exist, then there is actually no such thing as the sensus divinitatus, but if God exists and he instilled us with this sense, then there can be knowledge of God. It's a cute system.

Trump preached that the wall would solve all important problems, ignoring credible criticism. — Relativist

No Sir. President Trump did not preach that the wall would solve all important problems. — ArguingWAristotleTiff

Trump said in December:
" Our request will add another 230 miles this year in the areas our border agents most urgently need. It will have an unbelievable impact. If we build a powerful and fully-designed see-through steel barrier on our southern border, the crime rate and drug problem in our country would be quickly and greatly reduced. Some say it could be cut in half because these criminals, drug smugglers, gangs and traffickers do not stop at our border. They permeate throughout our country, and they end up in some places where you’d least expect they go all over our country. A steel barrier will help us stop illegal immigration while safely directing commerce to our lawful ports of entry."

No, that is not directly saying that a will "solve all important problems" - but he claimed it would have an "unbelievable impact" on the problems that he's been bringing up since the campaign. He obviously considered it important enough to shut down the government and to declare a national emergency, so I can't see how you could deny that he considers these to be the most important problems.