Humans are part of the physical universe, so this suggests redness (that thing we perceive and contemplate) is part of the physical world. — Relativist


This is like saying that Harry Potter and Sherlock Holmes exist in the real world, because the books and films that represent their adventures exist in the real world. I don't think this argument holds water. — Pattern-chaser

Consider the fact that there's nothing unnatural about the fact that there exist fictional narratives with fictional characters - so yes, these DO exist in the real world (as fictions). Fictions exist in our minds, just as redness exists in our minds.

The definition you use for "red" is unusual, and does not include many or most of the shades of meaning used by humans when they say "red"....My view is broader, and tries to embrace all of the meanings that humans conventionally use "red" for. — Pattern-chaser

OK, but this is because of the nature of "redness." I'll relate a philosophical thought-experiment.

Mary is a woman who has lived her entire life in a single room, a room in which there is nothing in it that is colored red (any shade of it), so she's never actually seen anything red. However, she has devoted her life to learning everything there is to know about redness. She understands the physics of light reflection, and even understands the concept of color, by virtue of her perception of other colors. She becomes the world's foremost expert on redness, understanding all the many "shades of meaning" you reference. Can she truly understand red fully and completely, without ever actually seeing it? No - because she would never have had the experience of redness.

The moral of the story is that we can talk around "redness" and no words will be able to convey the understanding of redness that is associated with the experience. I also suggest that the "shades of meaning" aren't essential to a complete understanding of what the quale "red" is - those shades of meaning are anologies, and cannot convey what red actually is.

at what point did a single cell decide it was going to start splitting and growing into a heart?
and if it DID, why?
was it already a brain that knew it needed a heart?
was a Primordial Goo Brain smarter than we are now?
that it (accidentally randomly) knew it needed a complex operating system??
but even if it WAS that smart -- how the heck did it manage to keep the body alive while it was
3D printing itself over a million years? one. piece. at. a. time. when all the pieces function as a WHOLE? — Uniquorn

The evolution of complex structures is not due to decision making. I suggest you read up on natural selection.

Regarding the relationship between MWI and the multiverse, I refer you to this paper: The Multiverse Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.

You've bandied about "arguments from ignorance" for a while I don't recall advancing any -- nor you pointing out any. On the other hand, you're using our ignorance wrt a multiverse as a counter to the FTA. Please be specific as to any arguments from ignorance you think I'm making.

You've reference the Fine Tuning Argument, and I inferred that you were referring to the FTA for God's existence. If I'm mistaken that your agenda is to "prove" God's existence based on the alleged "fine tuning" of these constants, then there's nothing really to discuss. But if that is what you have in mind, then I see an argument from ignorance behind the reasoning: we don't know why the constants are in this narrow life permitting range, therefore it must be due to design.

I'll assume you actually do believe "fine tuning" entails God, so I'll continue.

But, as I keep repeating, the MWI is not evidence against the FTA because every "world" has the same physical constants

And as I keep repeating, we don't know what the true fundamental laws of nature actually are. All we can know is what we have access to, and that's the way the laws of nature manifest in this universe. To avoid continuing to go in circles, I'll interject that our fundamental disagreement is really metaphysics, not the physics. We can agree that known physics does not entail a multiverse, much less variations in the so-called fundamental constants. This takes our epistemic quest out of the realm of (narrowly defined) physical possibility. What is the implication? It just implies the answer is beyond the realm of current physics. If you were to claim, "therefore it must be God" you would be committing an argument from ignorance. Why should we think a supernatural being is more likely than an unknown natural cause? The converse seems more likely because we don't know that there exists anything other than the natural world.

I apologize in advance if I am mistaken in assuming your objective is :"prove" God's existence from the alleged fine tuning, but if I have correctly anticipated this - then my arguments are relevant.

No, the FTA infers that life was intentional from the fact that the variables have the exact values required to produce life.

So what? This universe happened to produce a set of things that we characterize as "living." Why regard this as special?

Suppose you ran a store with only one thing costing $1.59 and a young person plunks $1.59 on the counter, looking at you expectantly. It would be a rational inference to conclude that the child wants the one thing costing $1.59.

You are relating a coincidence (two things unexpectedly coinciding). What is life coinciding with?

Relativist: "Consider any metaphysically possible world W, which contains complex objects of type T. One could argue that W was fine tuned for T.."

This is simply false. For the argument to be persuasive, you need the additional datum at the core of the FTA, viz., that minute variations of W's constants would preclude the existence of Ts.

I considered this implied, but OK, let's formally add it: Consider a metaphysically possible world, W, which contains complex objects of type T which would not exist had the fundamental constants differed from what is actual in that world.

There are many sorts things that exist in THIS world that would not exist had the constants been different.

You are confusing my individual characteristics with what allows me to be called a "human." Aristotle's essences are not individual, but specific. So, "Essence entails the existence of necessary and sufficient properties for individuation" is simply false. "Essence entails the existence of necessary and sufficient properties for delineating 'kinds'" is true.

I believe you're right about Aristotle. I had confused his metaphysics with that of Thomas Aquinas. Thomist metaphyics has the view of essence that I was referring to: it is an integral part of his metaphysics, and yet it is pure assumption that there is such a thing.

My metaphysical framework is dynamic realism -- that "existence" is convertible with "the power to act in some way," and a being's "essence" is a specification of its possible acts. (This isn't Aristotle's definition of "essence,")

Sounds similar to Thomist metaphysics, and it again sounds like an assumption - not something that we know exists due to evidence, but rather something that is postulated. My issue is that if you're going to accept unprovable postulates in your preferred metaphysics, you must accept them in alternative metaphysics to avoid a double standard. Every metaphysical theory depends on postulates (sometimes called "first principles").

Relativist: We weren't discussing evidence. You had alleged the multiverse hypothesis was "mythological" and that it was not falsifiable.

A theory is mythic if it has no evidentiary basis. It is unfalsifiable if no evidence can falsify it. You did not show I was wrong on either count. ("I admit there is no evidence for a multiverse.")

All physics is rooted in empirical data, even when at the stage of hypothesis. Any physics hypothesis may assume physical structures that are not observable- consider quantum field theory. Nevertheless theories are falsifiable, and so are the rigorous multiverse theories, such as Loop Quantum Cosmology which is derived from Loop Quantum Gravity (an incomplete quantum theory of Gravity.

This seems another case of you trying to constrain naturalistic metaphysical theories to known physics, while (I anticipate) availing yourself of unconstrained supernatural assumptions. If you applied your stricture consistently, you'd have to treat "God" as mythic. It certainly fits your definition (no evidence).

You seem confused as to my position. I'm open to the possibility of a multiverse. I even think it's a sensible line of inquiry. What I'm discussing is the current epistic value of the multiverse hypothesis as opposed to the FTA. It should be obvious that any hypothesis lacking supporting evidence (as you agree wrt a multiverse) has no epistic value. On the other hand, the FTA is based on evidence and peer-reviewed calculations. I agree that the FTA is not a "proof," but it does have epistic value. So it makes a far stronger case in the legal sense.

The dependency of life on the universe having these constants within a narrow range is accepted science, but it is still nothing more than a post-hoc analysis. It's somewhat interesting that we wouldn't have existed had these constants differed. The error in reasoning occurs only when attempting "prove" God's existence by this fact. And it most certainly IS consistent with the scientific endeavor to explore whether or not there's a reason for the constants being what they are - and the only valid way to explore this is to consider if and how they could have been DIFFERENT. This has nothing to do with figuring out why there is life, because life just happens to be something that exists in this universe. Some naturalists fall for the bait and try to answer it, but they're as misguided as those who tackle the equally presumptive question: why is there something rather than nothing?

I am willing to grant this is the case. Since my sentence is perfectly meaningful in normal English language discourse, I conclude that Armstrong's metaphysics is inadequate to normal English discourse. You are perfectly free to limit yourself to their framework. I prefer to be open to many complementary projections of reality.

You are mistaken about Armstrong's metaphysics - it's pretty complete, and it's coherent. We don't necessarily need to explore it in detail. And no, I'm not actually committed to Armstrong's metaphysics. I bring it up when other metaphysical assumptions are made to show that any conclusions that are made are contingent upon those metaphysical assumptions being true.

You had made this claim: "These laws are immaterial -- it is a category error to ask what they are made of." Immaterial laws exist in the mind. If you were to claim they exist independent of the things that exhibit the described behavior (e.g. as platonic entities) and they somehow direct or govern that behavior, then you would be making a debatable metaphysical assumption. Of course, I may be mistaken that you had this in mind, in which case this is all moot.

“Existence” is metaphysically-undefined. In any case, no one denies that this physical world is real in its own context, and that your life, and this physical world which is its setting, are real in the context of your life.

Existence is a concept referring to the quality of "existing." To exist is to be in the world (world in the generic sense, not necessarily limited the physical world). The world contains beings (=existents, the things that exist). The set of all beings = the totality of reality.

We understand the concept in terms of our innate belief in ourselves and in the external world. We (all animals with any semblance of a mind) intuitively know that we exist (no one has to be convinced of the reality of their being), and we also intuitively know there are things beyond ourselves - we see them and we interact with them. So this non-verbal intuitive foundation entails a world consisting of the self and that which we perceive. From this foundation we conceive (verbally and non-verbally) of additional elements of the world beyond our perceptions.

You refer to being " real in its own context". That seems an attempt at a meta-analysis. It is in our nature to believe the world actually exists independent of ourselves; no one is truly a solipsist. So we naturally believe the world is actually real, without the qualification you suggest. One would need to come up with reasons to think our intuitive beliefs are false or misguided, which you haven't done.

The finality of that sleep at the end of lives, and the absence of any knowledge, memory or perception that there is, was, or could be, such things as identity, time or events, suggests the use of the word “timelessness”.

"Sleep" seems a poor characterization. Death is the cessation of being, if there is no "afterlife." If there is an afterlife, there is no "sleep" - there's just a transition of states of being. In neither case does the term "timelessness" seem applicable. "Timelessness" suggests to me something that does not experience time. "Sleep suggests subtle change in state of living consciousness, not a cessation of consciousness nor a transition of states of being.

So all you’re doing is defining your “objective existence” as more than hypothetical existence....

I'll clarify. Math and logic use the symbol, "∃" , which is read, "there exists". This is not an ontological claim, it is used to analyze mathematical and logical relations. I label this a "hypothetical existence." It may, or may not, refer to something that is in the world. But (hypothetically) if it exists, we can deduce various things about it.

Regarding "objective existence." This refers to that which exists (not just hypothetically), with the properties it actually has, as opposed to merely what we perceive. I perceive a red ball, you perceive a red balloon. The actual object is a white balloon that we both view through a red filter. The white balloon has objective existence. I suggest that our perceptions provide us a reflection of objective reality, not necessarily identical with objective reality. However, further analysis can lead us in the direction of knowledge about the true nature of reality (a direction to a destination that we may not reach, but it is at least an ideal to work toward).

Relativist:" That there exists an external, physical world is a properly basic belief, an epistemological foundation for all else." — Michael

...for Materialists, of course.[/quote]
Nothing I said is contingent upon materialism being true, and my statement makes no claims about the existence of anything immaterial.

Your experience is the epistemic foundation for all else.

I strongly disagree. Our innate, nonverbal view of the world is our epistemic foundation.

You’ve admitted that you don’t have an answer regarding in what noncircular way you think that this physical world is more than that.

You are imaging things. I did no such thing.

Relativist: "We are not taught that there is an external world "
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There’s undeniably an external world in our experience. That’s what our experience story is about.

No experience required. All us animals that come into the world know intuitively that there is an external world, irrespective of whether this fact is formulated with words.

We’re taught, from an early age, to be little Materialists and Science-Worshippers. Some of us never question that.

Not me. I was raised Catholic. I eventually came to question what I was taught, just as you did.

As animals, we instinctively deal with our surrounding physical world as best we can. Kids, and most people, and (for all we know) all other animals leave it at that, and don’t ask what there really is, or why they’re in a life, or why there’s something instead of nothing.
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…but that doesn’t support Materialism.

Who said it did?

if you say that you don’t know what ontology I believe in, that might be because I emphasize that I don’t claim or assert one.

We have that in common.

"I apply the principle of parsimony."
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It doesn’t support you. Materialism, with its big brute-fact*, fails the Principle of Parsimony.

You've made two errors: 1) you assume I'm a materialist; 2) you don't understand the principle of parsimony.

But no, there’s absolutely no evidence, no physics-experiment, to support a claim that this physical world is other than the hypothetical setting in your hypothetical experience-story, a complex abstract logical system.

I agree that we can't confirm our properly basic beliefs. That does not preclude having rationally justified beliefs. My theory is that we have these properly basic beliefs because we are a product, and component, of this world (and this is true irrespective of whether there is a supernatural creator). This could be wrong, of course, but neither you nor anyone else has given me a reason to doubt it.

None of that supports a claim that this physical world is other than what I said it is.

You repeated this multiple times. You seem to be saying, "nothing you've said has convinced me that my assessment is false." That's great, but I wasn't trying to convince you of anything, I was just sharing what I believe. I hope you realize that such statements don't give me any reason to think I have it wrong either.

I addressed your Subjectivism argument in my previous post.

You are casting my assertions in terms of subjectivism, that is certainly not my claim. Of course, you can believe whatever you like. I hope you aren't trying to convince me of anything, because if you are- you're failing miserably.

To propose an ontology, I’d propose that the physical world is nothing other than part of a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts, and that the describable world consists of nothing other than that.

That is not "an ontology" it is an ontological claim. OK, I hear you and I disagree with you.

You’re the one with an ontology that you aren’t specifying or being clear with us about.

As I said above, I don't believe in an ontology. I do believe certain things exist (e.g. the physical world), and other things possibly exist (such as gods), and I'm just not sure about the nature of the mind (is it really something immaterial?)

At least as discussion-topics, there uncontroversially are abstract facts

I prefer to use the term "fact" to refer to an element of reality as distinct from propositional descriptions of a elements of reality. Abstractions can be the subject of propositions and discussed as such - if this is what you mean, I completely agree.

“Physicalism” (a regrettable two-meaning word for Materialism (or for a philosophy-of-mind position)) is blatantly unparismonious, with its big, blatant brute fact.

I think you may misunderstand the principle of parsimony. It seems to me that whatever is the foundation of reality, it entails a very complex brute fact. An omniscient, immutable God who created material reality is an extremely complex brute fact. But the principle of parsimony is actually an epistemological principle that we should refrain from making any more assumptions than necessary to explain the facts at hand. It does NOT mean that reality is simple.

Relativist:" it seems irrational to believe something just because it is POSSIBLY true"
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And what do you think that I believe in.

You had several similar reactions wherein I tell you something I believe, and then you react in this way (what, inferring that I think you DON'T believe this?). I'm not suggesting what you do, or don't believe, I'm just telling you what I believe.

I emphasize that, in this discussion, I’m not advocating an ontology or metaphysics. I’m merely pointing out that there’s no reason to believe in an ontology that says that this physical world is other than what I’ve said [the physical world is nothing other than part of a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts])"

That's an interesting and bizarre perspective, since you've given no reason to believe "the physical world is nothing other than part of a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts." And of course, I disagree - there are very good reasons to believe the physical world is something other than this. I expect we'll just have to agree to disagree on this.

Relativist:" …, or do you think you can show that your view is more worthy of belief than mine? "
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What belief of mine are you referring to? If I made a controversial claim, what was it?

This one: "the physical world is nothing other than part of a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts"

So you aren’t central to your experience?

Of course I am, but I believe we are also able to contemplate objective reality, that we actually can escape subjectivism. I believe you have things backwards when you claim the physical world is a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts - these abstract "facts" (actually: propositions) are descriptive of what actually IS. Logic is not an existent, it is a rational process, so to claim the physical world is a "logical system" is a category error. Again, we needn't agree - and I doubt we ever will.

“I suggest that this life and the physical world in which it is set, are completely insubstantial”
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Relativist: Why do you believe such a thing?
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I merely claim that there’s no reason to believe otherwise.

I've given you one: we believe it innately, and it is reasonable to think that this is because we are a product of that substantial world. Now you can't make that claim; you have to find a reason to reject what I've said.

let’s be clear which of us is advocating an unverifiable, unfalsifiable proposition.

We both are. But at least mine is grounded in our innate view of the world. I don't have any idea how you came up with your bizarre view.

No need to quibble about how or if the abstract facts exist. I haven’t claimed that they exist other than as subjects of discussion or mention.

If the physical world exists, and it is nothing more than "part of a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts," then you must believe abstract facts exist. If abstract facts do not exist, then the physical world doesn't exist.

Saying that the abstract facts depend on there being someone to discuss them is meaningless, because there are inevitably infinitely-many experience-stories with their complementary protagonists, some of whom discuss abstract facts.

100 years after the big bang, there was no one around to have an "experience story". At that point in time, did abstract facts exist?

what I’ve been saying doesn’t include any assumptions, brute-facts, beliefs or controversial statements.

This is an assumption: "the physical world is nothing other than part of a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts."

An Omni-benevolent God as judged with our limited knowledge? Yes or no?

Our knowledge about everything is limited, and yet we end up believing things anyway. We typically come to a belief based on the information at hand, and that's why the mere possibility of inscrutable reasons doesn't defeat a belief in God's non-existence that is formed based on the information we actually have.

The answer is that the only reason that those in heaven do not sin is because they have chosen to love God.

Christians choose to love God while their on earth, and yet they continue to sin.

Relativist: If a 3-omni God exists, then objective moral values exist

Michael: You're the one insisting that God must be omnipotent.

Nope. I never suggested such a thing.

You’re assuming that God is responsible for this world and your birth in it.
Hardly.

In general, just as it’s best to explain by physical-science what can be explained by physical-science, before invoking higher for an explanation—likewise it’s best to explain within describable metaphysics what can be explained within describable metaphysics before invoking higher.
How does one invoke a metaphysics "higher" than that which is describable, which evidently implies that an indescribable metahphysics? This doesn't seem to make any sense.

You can’t be so sure of your assumption and notion of omnipotence.
I'm not sure of anything. What I have argued is that a 3-omni God seems incoherent, given the world we live in. This could mean there is a God who 2-omni.

As an Atheist, you’re telling us what God must be like, and concluding that your God doesn’t make sense. No argument there.
No, I'm telling you what God cannot be like.

But you’re blithely blanket-applying that characterization and motivation to all Theists.
Nope. Consider the argument I stated in my Op: one premise depends on the Christian assumption that the souls in heaven have free will and do not sin. Not all theists are Christian, and even a Christian could simply deny the premise (e.g. maybe the souls in heaven CAN sin). A non-Christian theist could simply deny there's an afterlife. Take the argument for what it is and what it shows, and devise your own logic to get around it - such as, as you alluded above, perhaps God isn't really omnipotent. Lot's of ways around the argument, and I never claimed there wasn't. I address only a very specific set of beliefs, and that's why I tried to structure my argument pretty precisely.

I’m just answering the question about how anyone could not be convinced by the problem-of-evil argument.
Who asked that question? I've said multiple times that I knew this would not convince a committed theist. My purpose in engaging Christians on this topic was to show them how one might reasonably decide God (as usually defined) does not exist. Some Christians already realize this, and for them there's nothing notable here. But others that I've encountered seem unable or unwilling to believe that a belief in God's non-existence can be perfectly rational - and my mission is to help them be a bit more understanding.



It’s popular to start with the premise that one’s view is balanced, while those of others aren’t.
Consider these potential starting points: 1) The premise: God Exists; 2) the premise:God does not exist;

Neither of these seem "balanced," in that they both entail a presumption.


Tomorrow I'll respond to your earlier post (the one that has nothing to do with the purpose of this thread).

Thanks for the honest and polite conversation!

and as above - the theist answer remains, compensating goods or morally justifiable reasons. Which is why this issue always inevitably spirals to this point and has for many many years

Sure, ...and that's also why some people conclude a 3-omni God doesn't exist. If there is such a God then there are compensating gods, but IF there are no compensating goods, then such a God cannot exist. Contemplate the evil in the world without presumption of God's existence, and seeing no compensating goods, then the conclusion is obvious. (That's not to suggest this need be the end of the epistemic quest)

On P4. Your proposition is assuming there is evil in heaven that the free willed beings in heaven would be free to chose if they desired, but don't because of their nature created by God. I do not think it is a valid assumption that there is evil in heaven. Or at least a case need to be made for it.

My premise makes no assumption like this, but you can suggest this as the environmental condition that results in the absence of sin. But the question becomes: Why would an omnibenevolent God place the creatures that he loves in any OTHER environment? Why did he choose to make us suffer?

What is unnatural about killing cats?

I don't think cat killers were the only victims of the black death. My issue is that an omnipotent God could have seen to it that all humans had a natural immunity to it, or miraculously cured those who contracted it. God doesn't seem to intervene in such ways, which suggests indifference or worse.

When I say that Everett's interpretation is more epistemological than ontological, I am speaking about the "manyness" of the worlds envisioned...It is not many worlds on top of each other, but a mathematical means of representing a single state in as a sum of mathematical forms called "eigenfunctions."

Sure: there is one all encompassing state in a quantum system, but the issue is: how does the classical world that we experience emerge from the quantum system that comprises reality. A realist view of MWI is based on the ontological commitment that physical reality is a quantum system, and that the classical world of experience is an eigenstate of that QM system. So the "world branching" is (technically) just a classical perspective: each eigenstate is a classical "world."
You also mention there being exactly one set of physical constraints, and I agree - but that doesn't mean we have a complete understanding of what the true constraints are, since we can only see how they manifest in our classical world.

So, the physics showing that minute variations in the constants leads to conditions unsuited to life depends on the assumption of design? Would you care to provide an example showing how this assumption changed the calculations? Or even how it could change the calculations? The vast literature generated by naturalists to support the possibility of a multiverse as an explicit alternative to fine-tuning shows that some very prominent physicists and cosmologists take the calculations quite seriously.

It's moot what you see in the literature because you're seeing response based on a flawed premise. The alleged "fine tuning" is a product of post hoc analysis. The FTA has the unstated assumption that life was a design objective. Consider any metaphysically possible world W, which contains complex objects of type T. One could argue that W was fine tuned for T. What is special about life? It's special to us, but that doesn't make it intrinsically special. I feel special to myself, and am the product of a series of improbable accidents of pairs of individuals who happened to reproduce: was I the product of a priori design? If you disagree with my analysis, try reformulating the FTA without assuming life is intrisically special, or assuming the world was "fine tuned" (a question begging concept).

Aristotle was an empiricist. He did not "hypothesize that 'essence' exists." He said that our definitions of universal terms reflect common elements in their instances and that we may name those common elements the object's "essence." In other words, essences are the foundation in reality for essential definitions. I do not see how any empiricist could deny that there are real differences, found in individuals, that allow us to say this is human and this a canary. Biologists do that every time they determine what species an organism is.

Aristotle's reasoning was a product of his time, but with advances in science and analytic philosophy, we can see that the notion of essence has no empirical basis. And yet there continue to be philosophers who embrace the metaphysics (e.g. Edward Feser).

Essence entails the existence of necessary and sufficient properties for individuation and for delineating "kinds." What are your necessary and sufficient properties vs your accidental properties? Would you be YOU had there been a single gene that was different? How about a single day of your life having different experiences?

What are the necessary and sufficient properties for being a horse? Consider the evolution of horse throughout the evolutionary history of its ancestry: it is arbitrary where you draw the line between horse and non-horse. Species is a sortal, based on vague boundaries, not some underlying metaphysical distinction.

Really? "Incomplete" theories now have evidentiary standing? This merits no further discussion.

We weren't discussing evidence. You had alleged the multiverse hypothesis was "mythological" and that it was not falsifiable. I showed that you were mistaken on both counts. I admit there is no evidence for a multiverse, but there are good reasons to think this might be the case - as I discussed. Multiverse is consistent with what we know, and it is entailed by some reasonable extrapolations about what we know (these extrapolations are what I referred to as "incomplete theories"). Science advances in this way; accepted theory does not arrive in its final form.

" So incomplete that it has made no falsifiable prediction and its supporters mix results from logically inconsistent versions. I will not repeat the harsher and less charitable criticisms.

Errors in the analysis are self-correcting - that's what peer review is for.

I merely note that dressing ignorance in mathematical lace doesn't make it a thing of beauty.

Agreed, but this doesn't make metaphysical speculations that are devoid of math any prettier. I bring these things up not because they are necessarily true, but rather to show why we shouldn't be seduced by metaphysical explanations that implicitly rely on arguments from ignorance. We should be agnostic to the existence of multiverse, not hastily dismissing it for insufficient empirical basis while declaring victory for a deism that also lacks an empirical basis.

I have no problem with physics that only works for empirical reality. I am not sure why anyone would -- accept to rationalize a faith position.

That's fine as long as you refrain from arguments from ignorance as I just discussed.

You're arguing skew to the point here. It is not a question of whether we think abstractly or not. The question is: what are the properties of the object of thought. We think abstractly of quanta and fields, yet we know they are material because they have mass-energy and parts outside of parts (extension). We think abstractly of works of art, but we know they are composed of atoms. When we think of the laws of nature, our concept does not involve parts outside of parts -- they are not spatially divisible -- or the possession of mass-energy. Thus, laws of nature lack the defining characteristics of matter -- not because our thoughts are abstract, but because what we are thinking about falls into a different category.

You seem to have some physical/metaphysical framework in mind, and are judging the Armstrong-Tooley framework from that perspective. That is the category error. Armstrong developed a fairly complete metaphysics, and it can account for everything you've discussed - but it of course does so very differently. So, for example, from the perspective of Armstrong's metaphysics, it's meaningless to assert "laws of nature lack the defining characteristics of matter". We don't really need to debate which metaphysics is true, as long as you don't implicitly insist that your metaphysical assumptions form the proper basis for exploring metaphysical truths.

Its important tho consider what sort of thing logic is.

First, what it is not: it is not an object of being, nor is it a property of being. It is a category error to treat it that way (reify it).

What it IS, is a tool for epistemological analysis. I agree with Mollere (above) that it is truth preserving. It is the path of reason through the jungle of possibilities, the path toward contingent truths; and it applies exclusively to propositions.

Look back at the argument. It basically shows that if Christianity is true (premise 4) then God is not omninenevolent (the conclusion). You could reject premise 4, but this is Christian doctrine. That's why I said an omnibenevolent God is not consistent with Christianity.

I realize my argument would not convince a committed theist, but it should sway someone who's tries to objectively weigh God's existence and non-existence without presupposition.

"Not sure I have ever seen an argument that depends on a state of affairs in heaven, as a defense for the argument from evil, Seems like a proposition in conflict with the conclusion to me."
It shows that Christianity is incoherent.

"There are two states of affairs we can identify as good and evil. In order for free will to exist in beings like us, both states must be an available choice. If beings like us were created with an inability to chose evil, there would be no option and no choice, and no free will."
Are you saying the souls in heaven (i.e. the souls of dead, faithful Christians) are not "like us?"

"Where is trauma located?"

That's somewhat like asking, "Where is the piccolo's middle "C" in the 4th measure located within the MP3 file"? It's a category error.

Fair enough, there's more to the evolution of the human mind than direct descent. What's your point? My only point is that the existence of the human mind, as it is, is the product of nature.

Relativist: It is entailed by the many worlds interpretation of Quantum Theory, so in that respect it is entailed by accepted theory.

Dfpolis: No, actually, it is not so entailed. If you actually read Everett's paper, as I have, he does not propose many worlds in any ontological sense, but only in an epistemic sense. What he argues is that as the measured quantum system is represented as a superposition of states, so we should model the brain of the observer as a corresponding superposition of states (a sort of Schrodinger cat). Each sub-state of the brain then represents one possible outcome of the quantum observation. So, we do not have many worlds, but many representations of one world.

Everett wrote: " from the standpoint of our theory, it is not so much the system which is affected by an observation as the observer, who becomes correlated to the system. " and "In our case, we wish to make statements about "trajectories" of observers. However, for us a trajectory is constantly branching (transforming from state to superposition) with each successive measurement."

Irrespective of whether Everett himself was a realist or an instrumentalist, a realist perspective on his interpretation is absolutely ontological .

Even if true, Everett's interpretation is entirely useless in rebutting the fine tuning argument, as each supposed representation has exactly the same physics, with exactly the same (fine-tuned) constants, as every other representation.
Of course it doesn't rebut the FTA on its own, but in conjunction with the potential for more fundamental physics it constitutes a mechanism for actualizing alternative realizations of localized physics.

"What[Everett] argues is that as the measured quantum system is represented as a superposition of states, so we should model the brain of the observer as a corresponding superposition of states"
Everett does not use this characterization in his dissertation, and it would be problematic when you consider potential consequences of different branches (one branched brain states gets one girl pregnant, while another branched state gets a different girl pregnant. This results in different offspring in the two branches).

So, we do not have many worlds, but many representations of one world.
Only with a specific interpretation of Everett's paper. The MWI interpretation has a variety of post-Everett flavors.

Relativist: "a multiverse hypothesis is metaphysical, not mythological"

Dfpolis: "A metaphysical conclusion is one based on our experience of being (existence). A mythological claim lacks an adequate experiential basis -- as does the multiverse hypothesis."

A multiverse metaphysics has as much standing as an Aristotelian metaphysics (consider Aristotle's hypothesis that "essence" exists). Metaphysical theories are not the product of physical experiments. They are explanatory hypotheses that attempt to explain that which exists, and is posited to exist. If your simply making the epistemological stance that we have no right to believe something that is not subject to experimental confirmation, I don't really take issue with it - I just object to applying different epistemological standards in order to argue for something one would like to believe.

Dfpolis: "The multiverse hypothesis not falsifiable (since other universes are, by definition, dynamically isolated from ours), and therefore not scientific, but mythological."
Relativist: "multiverse hypotheses are tied to broader hypotheses (incomplete scientific theories) that are falsifiable."
Dfpolis: "Tied to" does not mean "derived from." When there is no logical implication, a hypothesis must be judged on its independent merits.

Each specific multiverse is actually derivable from an (incomplete) scientific theory, so your objection has no merit. Here's an excerpt from a survey of Multiverse Theories written by P. C. W. Davies:

The problem arises because string theory is formulated most naturally in 10 or 11
spacetime dimensions, whereas the spacetime of our perceptions is four dimensional. The
extra space dimensions are rendered unobservable by a process called compactification:
they are rolled up to a very small size. ... This basic notion may be extended to any
number of extra dimensions, but then the process of compactification is no longer unique.
In general, there are very many ways of compactifying several extra dimensions. When
additional degrees of freedom in string theory are taken into account, compactification
may involve several hundred variables, all of which may vary from one region of the
universe to another. These variables serve to fix the low-energy physics, by determining
what sorts of particles exist, what their masses might be and the nature and strengths of
the forces that act between them. The theory also permits compactification to spaces with
other than three dimensions. Thus string theory predicts myriad possible low-energy
worlds. Some might be quite like ours, but with slightly heavier electrons or a somewhat
stronger weak force. Others might differ radically, and possess, say, five large (i.e.
uncompactified) space dimensions and two species of photons.

This flavor of string theory entails multiple possible "low energy physics" (the physics we observe), and this string theory is falsifiable.

Dfpolis: the physics we have now is more than adequate to many purposes -- just as Newtonian physics continues to be more than adequate in its verified realm of application. So, while we can and should expect further, fundamental, revisions in our present physics, there is no reason to expect that the conclusions of a revised physics would overturn the conclusions of our present physics in its verified realm of application.
Sure, but its "verified realm of application" is limited to this universe. It's premature to declare that the quest for more fundamental physics, and the possible implications of it, are doomed.

As the arguments for the fine-tuning of the various constants are sound applications of present physics in its verified realm of application, there is no rational reason to think that advances in physics would lead to their rejection.
There is no good argument for the "fine-tuning" of the constants! - they all depend on the presumption of design. But there is very good reason to think further exploration into more fundamental physics would change our views on what is physically possible: the Copernican principle (or principle of mediocrity): why should we think our portion of the universe is representative of the whole?

" they can be separated in thought, so they are a different aspect of the universe than its matter and fields -- an aspect which is immaterial in the sense of lacking parts outside of parts and material constituents
The fact that we can think abstractly about some properties of physical states of affairs doesn't imply there is anything immaterial about those physical states of affairs. It seems a tangent to discuss the nature of mental objects, like abstractions.

"It is confusing to call laws "properties."
Get used to it, I didn't make it up. Physicalist philosophers like D.M. Armstrong and Michael Tooley have been using this terminology for years.

In brief: everything that exists is a "state of affairs". A state of affairs has 3 sorts of constituents: a (thin) particular, its relational properties, and its non-relational properties. ("Thick particular" = the particular with its properties).

There are "state of affairs types" - i.e. sets of particular states of affairs that have one or more properties in common. Example: a specific electron is a state of affairs, whereas "electron" (in general) is a state of affairs type.

A law of nature is a relation between states of affairs types. Ergo, under this account, laws of nature are relational properties that exist between states of affairs types. "electrons have an attractive relation to protons" is a law of nature. The law is instantiated in specific pairs of electrons and protons.

It is an explanatory hypothesis that fits the facts better than any other.
— Relativist

No. Such a genetic change has been searched for in human remnants. It's not there. There are a number of alternate theories.

Your claim sounds like it was taken from the Institute for Creation Research, but it's irrelevant to what I said. There are facts available to us, such as the relative intelligence of various primates (including ourselves), the respective genetic structures of primates, and the mechanisms of natural selection and genetic drift. We can deduce the genetic structure of common ancestors, and from this we can deduce the mutations that would lead from that ancestor to ourselves. This is an active area of research. Genetic structure is the direct cause of brain structure, and brain structure is a direct cause of mental capability. Therefore we can conclude that the genetic changes supervene on the mental changes; ie no other causes need be postulated to explain what we see.

"Once we are in the presence of God, we are in the presence of the highest good, fulfilling all our desires. So, there is no reason to choose a partial and incomplete good, and so sin. That need not mean that we have no choices. We could still have many different completely good lines of action open to us."
Then you have to agree there is a possible state of affairs in which there exist free-willed creatures who do not sin. Why wouldn't an omnibenevolent God just place us in that environment to begin with?

I agree that, in most cases, truth is inaccessible. But we need an idealized concept of truth to grasp the very concept that objective truth is usually inaccessible.

" If the best knowledge available turns out to be wrong, should it not have been considered truth before that? "
No! We should be fully cognizant that the things we believe may be false. Only then can we explore why we might be wrong. The biggest obstacle to seeking truth is certainty: if you "know" x, then you won't entertain the possibility of not-x, which closes doors. Even if the truth we seek is unobtainable in principle, it is the direction we should try to head toward.

Kaiser Basileus

18

↪Relativist

 Justified "true" belief is a step too far. If everyone in the entire species thought something was a fact and it turned it not to be, it would still have been true "for all intents and purposes" until the new information came to light.
That is confused because it redefines "truth" by equating it with popular belief or conventional wisdom.

There's lots of problems with your claims.

.

Second, atomist prejudices aside, there is no reason to think that the cosmos is made of particles. Quantum theory uses wave equations to describe the nature of things, with so-called "wave-particle duality" resulting from an unwillingness to give up the old dogmas.
Wrong that this was due to "unwillingness." It was due to the observation that photons exhibit the properties of particles in some cases and the properties of waves, in other cases. The duality has been "solved" with quantum field theory, which considers fields as fundamental and particles as quantized ripples in fields.

Third, our best cosmological theories do not see the universe as ending in collapse, but in an ignominious heat death. Thus, the idea of cycling is passe.
Wrong. Sean Carroll, for example, has proposed that the heat death results in conditions from which a quantum fluctuation can occur which results in inflation ( ie a big bang).

A multiverse is not entailed in any accepted theory. (We have no accepted theory of quantum gravity.)
Not quite true. It is entailed by the many worlds interpretation of Quantum Theory, so in that respect it is entailed by accepted theory. However, no specific interpretation of Quantum theory has been shown to be true.

The multiverse hypothesis not falsifiable (since other universes are, by definition, dynamically isolated from ours), and therefore not scientific, but mythological.
Two errors here:
1) at minimum, a multiverse hypothesis is metaphysical, not mythological
2) multiverse hypotheses are tied to broader hypotheses (incomplete scientific theories) that are falsifiable.

Even if there were other universes, there is no reason to believe that their physics (including their fine tuned constants) would be any different from ours.
It is a presumption to claim the constants are "fine tuned." The real issue is: should we believe the physics that we know is truly fundamental? No- and that's because it is clearly incomplete and incoherent. The true fundamental physics would almost certainly have different expressions.

These laws are immaterial -- it is a category error to ask what they are made of.
That is a metaphysical assumption, not established fact. The "laws" of physics are abstract descriptions of the physical relations among the things that exist in the universe. The relations are due to the properties of the existents. Properties and relations of physical things do not exist independently of the things that have them.

It is an explanatory hypothesis that fits the facts better than any other.

"A fact is an individual instance of truth just as a choice is an individual instance of freedom. Knowledge is equivalent to epistemological warrant. "

Then I take it that a fact = a true proposition = a truth.

So when you ask "What does fact mean? " you're asking "what makes a proposition true?"
The most commonly accepted theory of truth is correspondence theory of truth. What makes a proposition true is that it corresponds to some actual aspect of reality. The proposition "the ball is read" is true if the ball is actually red.

(I questioned semantics, because epistemologists often use the term "fact" to refer to the element of reality to which a proposition corresponds, if true. )

You also asked," Under that definition/understanding of 'fact,' is 'fact' applicable where there is no knowledge"
Knowledge = a belief that is true, justified, and (somehow) avoids Gettier problems. Can there be a fact (i.e.a true proposition) if no one has knowledge of that proposition? Absolutely: I believe X, but I believe it for a bad reason, therefore I don't have knowledge of X. Nevertheless, X is actually true (i.e. it's a fact). There's an example of there being a fact without knowledge.

Perhaps you're using the term "knowledge" in the less technical, but more common sense, as equivalent to a belief, one that may or may not be justified. That makes for a more controversial analysis: is there a fact (true proposition) if no one actually believes that proposition? It depends on your stance on propositions. If (like me) you consider propositions as a set of words formulated by, and contained within, minds - then if no one has formulated a proposition then it doesn't exist. Consider the universe 100 years after the big bang. There were no true propositions (facts) at the time because there were no minds to formulate and contain them.

On the other hand, some treat propositions as abstractions, like numbers - they consider there to exist a proposition to describe every aspect of reality, irrespective of whether anyone has actually articulated it They would say, "yes, truths/facts exist even if no one believes the truth/fact/proposition".

According to Romans 6:7: " anyone who has died has been set free from sin"

Do you agree this means that the souls in heaven do not sin? Don't they have free will, or does God remove our free will when we die?

My point is that this suggests there can exist free willed beings who do not sin, despite your claims to the contrary.

It not the simple inference you state, it's an inference to the best explanation.

If a 3-omni God exists, then objective moral values exist and we have the capacity to discern right and wrong - not infallibly, but our moral judgments should be expected to be generally trustworthy. This provides grounds to judge God's actions and inactions against the objective moral values we are confident are correct. For example, we know that it is wrong to allow a person to die when we could have prevented the death - particularly if the act of prevention does not place ourselves, or anyone else, at risk. We might judge this erroneously on occasion, when there are extenuating circumstances of which we're unaware, but we can be expected to get it right most of the time. Out of the 100,000,000 who died in the black death, it does seems unlikely that we're judging it wrong each of those times. This is just one natural calamity, which I brought up because it was such a big one - but there's uncountably many of these throughout history. Children are born blind, or without limbs. Some are born with degenerative diseases, like Muscular Dystrophy, who grow more feeble each day of their short lives. Throughout history, countless people have suffered needlessly because modern analgesics and antibiotics didn't exist at the time. I could go on.

There's no reason to think that an omnipotent God couldn't have created a world without these afflictions and without the various natural disasters that have occurred. If we assume God performs miracles on a few, why doesn't he perform miracles on everyone and eliminate the afflictions entirely?

What is the best explanation for all the evil the world has seen and has continues to see? Is the best explanation an omnibenevolent God who chose to create a world with the many evils this one has, despite there being no apparent reason why he couldn't have create a world without these problems?
Or is the better explanation that there is no such God - and nature simply takes its course?

The latter answers all questions about the evil in the world. The former answers none of them. Sure, it's possible there are answers that we are simply not capable of seeing, but why believe this to be the case?

My argument to the best explanation considers both God's existence and his non-existence, and concludes that his non-existence is more likely given the evidence. Your position seems to assume God exists, and rationalizes the evil he allows based on the mere possibility that there's a billion billion good reasons that we are simply incapable of discerning. If God exists, then that surely must be so. But start with a balanced view, as I did, and that rationalization doesn't make for a good explanation.

A feature that appears due to genetic drift can (in some way) enhance survival."
And when it does, it has a better chance of proliferating.

"Mind evolving by natural selection would require a population which includes both minded and non-minded individuals (both arising randomly) "
That makes no sense. Humans aren't alone in having minds, we just have the most sophisticated ones. So the proto-human population didn't suddenly have some individuals with minds, among all the others who didn't. Rather, some individuals happened to have genes that gave them more intelligent minds than the rest of the population. This would seem to confer a survival advantage.


"That scenario couldnt be any more than speculation since we don't know the origins of what we label "mind".
We know quite a lot about how we fit into the animal kingdom. Our similarities with other primates gives us a pretty good idea about how we differ from them. Our mental difference with chimps are due to genetic differences, and there's really not all that many genetic differences.


"Human evolution is mostly genetic drift due to small population size. "
Sure.

I admit to having overlooked that you stipulated, "Given that solipsism implies epistemological certainty of ones world".

This stipulation indeed entails an absence of doubt - trivially, since certainty = an absence of doubt. I just question that this is a standard view of solipsism. One could, in theory, believe his mind is all that exists - based on a standard view of belief - which admits of varying degrees of certainty. Such a person could therefore have some degree of doubt, and it seems to me this fits a definition of solipsism, even if not the definition you choose to use.

I don't understand why you make the distinction "if I were a solipsist." Do you define "belief" differently for solipsists? Previously you said you said you agreed that "belief entails certainty," so this suggests that you are absolutely certain about all your beliefs, irrespective of whether you are a solipsist.

" an unnecessary adherence to what you perceive as the “conventional” isn’t helpful in philosophy"
Sure, but unconventional positions must be explained and supported, whereas conventional positions are generally understood. You are presumably criticizing my position, which is perfectly fine, but if your counter depends on some unconventional views, you have the burden of explaining and supporting them - and you haven't really done this. It has seemed more of a guessing game where you make some assertion and then I have to guess at what you mean, then you reply that I got it wrong and hint at some more things for me to guess at. I havent even discerned whether or not you are a theist.

"no one is ever convinced here by anything that someone else says, because everyone evidently is only trying to support their already-chosen beliefs and positions. …as opposed to honest, open, interested discussion with willingness to question our assumptions."

Seems like a false dichotomy. My views have absolutely altered as a product of discussions like these, and I think that is common. One learns by striving to understand alternative points of view. I am finding it a bit tedious to understand yours. Perhaps you feel the same, since you have questioned some of my terms. In particular, you have questioned my term "ontological status, so I'll clarify: the ontological status of X entails: does X actually exist? Does it exist hypothetically? What properties does X have, and what relations does it have to other things that exist? Does it exist necessaily or contingently?

"I was referring to your Subjectivism objection."
What subjectivist objection? I didn't know I made one, so this might be a misunderstanding on your part.

"Saying that the abstract facts depend on there being someone to discuss them is meaningless, because there are inevitably infinitely-many experience-stories with their complementary protagonists, some of whom discuss abstract facts."

It is relevant if someone claims the actual world is a consequence of abstractions, which I thought you had implied. Did I misunderstand?

"if you say that you don’t know what ontology I believe in, that might be because I emphasize that I don’t claim or assert one."

I gather that you don't claim or assert a complete ontological system (you and I have that in common), but you DID makethe ontological claim (or claims with ontological implications):
"this life and this world are a blip in timelessness”
This implies that timelessness exists, that this world exists, and that the latter's existence is within the broader context of tbe former. You added:

"What makes this life (or finite sequence of lives) a blip in timelessness is the temporariness of this life or finite sequence of lives."
This does not establish the existence of timelessness as a state of affairs, as something that actually exists as a context for the temporal world.

"“But doesn’t there have be timelessness for us in order for you to validly say that?”
.
Sure, and I’ve mentioned the timeless sleep at the end-of-lives (or at the end of this life if there’s no reincarnation). …which, by its finality in our experience, and its timeless nature, is the natural, normal, usual state-of-affairs."

Our short temporal lives exist within the context if the temoral existence of the universe. This therefore does not establish the existence of timelessness

"timeless sleep at the end-of-lives (or at the end of this life if there’s no reincarnation). …which, by its finality in our experience, and its timeless nature, is the natural, normal, usual state-of-affairs."

Please explain what you mean by your claim that our experience has a " timeless nature". It appears to me that our experiences are entirely temporal. Death seems to me the temporal endpoint of our consciousness, so I see no reason to think this entails "timelessness."

"I’ve supported those statements by the uncontroversial statement that there’s no such thing as oblivion."
What is "oblivion"?


"Materialism, with its big brute-fact*, fails the Principle of Parsimony."

You are confusing my position with materialism. I simply have the uncontroversial belief thst the physical world exists. I am agnostic regarding the existence of anything immaterial. That, of course, makes your assertion relevant to me: show that materialism fails the principle of parsimony - this could shift my view.

"TBA" = is my autocorrect's translation of "TBH" = "To Be Honest". I apologize for my tablet.

It is impossible to assess the impact of any individual advertising campaign, whether allowed by law or not. Nevertheless, in the aggregate, it is pretty clear that advertising is somewhat effective.

If you're right that it was nothing more than a few facebook ads, then it is much ado about nothing. But it was certainly at least a bit more than this, and possibly a good bit more. We need to wait and see.

Under your premise that belief entails certainty, your conclusion that a solpsist cannot doubt is trivial. But I'm curious: do you actually regard all of your beliefs as absolute certainties?

Not that all facts must be known, but that to be a fact, there must be content in the fact.

Three broad questions have surfaced here: 1) are true and fact synonyms? Do they mean the same thing? 2) What does fact mean? 3) Under that definition/understanding of "fact," is "fact" applicable where there is no knowledge? Or, in order to be a fact, does not the fact have to comprehend something as knowledge of that something - in simplest terms, to aver possession of a fact is to claim to have knowledge? — tim wood

These are questions of semantics. Are you just trying to get a consensus on the meaning of the terms, or are you looking for the implications based on some particular definitions you have in mind?

Because it confers a survival value. Genetic drift is due to randomness.

Are you 1) claiming belief entails certainty; 2) (re)defining solipsism as the certainty that only the solipsist's mind exists; or 3) suggesting certainty is entailed by something in the common definition of "solipsist"?

Discuss the implications and/or consequences of such an idea. In particular, I think it would be interesting to(for the sake of argument) accept that that claim is true, and then offer possible relevant scenarios where it would matter.

Nevermind that that would put a president above the law, not just one law, but all of them. If that were the case, a president would be virtually untouchable(legally) for anything and everything he may wish to do. Odd. I'm being reminded of places that are not republican(representative) forms of government. — creativesoul

First of all, the reason a President mind not be able to be found guilty of a crime would be because he couldn't be arraigned and taken to trial while President. That would not preclude being charged when he's out of office. That is not an absence of justice, it is a deferal of justice.

More immediate justice would be possible through impeachment/conviction. Of course, in practice, this would only occur if the House is majority opposition party and the Senate has a significant opposition majority.

I'm only suggesting that the mind is consistent with natural selection: there is a survival value. The consequence of natural selection (survival) is not driven by a goal, rather it is a mathematical consequence of the natural process.

No. As I said, belief does not entail absolute certainty.