Prove it.Examined as a whole, the universe at t0 is the cause of the universe at t1. Physical throughout.
— Relativist
False. — MoK
I've shown you at least twice. Read through my posts.We're discussing the error in your op that I exposed. Keep up.
— Relativist
Where is the error? Could you please show it to me? — MoK
Your evasiveness is frustrating. If brain at t1 was not created ex nihilo, then it was created FROM something. What is that something? Answering "not ex nihilo" is not an answer.You didn't answer my question: If not ex nihilo, then what is brain at t1 created FROM?
— Relativist
I did. I explained the creation ex nihilo. Did you get it? And the Mind creates MoK's brain at time t1. The Mind has the ability to cause/create but that requires the experience of the physical first. — MoK
We're discussing the error in your op that I exposed. Keep up.Prove it.
— Relativist
Read the OP. — MoK
Examined as a whole, the universe at t0 is the cause of the universe at t1. Physical throughout.Change entails a cause for that change (per the PSR).
— Relativist
Sure, I am not against this at all. I am however arguing that physical cannot be the cause of its own change. — MoK
Prove it.One physical state of affairs (S1) caused another physical state of affairs (S2).
— Relativist
We assume this all the time but that is false. — MoK
Change entails a cause for that change (per the PSR).S1 includes the potential energy in the tectonic plates that caused the tremor.
— Relativist
That is a mere change and I am not denying it at all. — MoK
No, not unless you remove the ambiguity. If I were to do it myself and identify another problem, you could blame it on my misinterpretation.I already agree that change in physical is because physical has properties. To establish the argument I however only need to accept that physical and awareness/experience exist and they are subject to change. Please read more — MoK
You didn't answer my question: If not ex nihilo, then what is brain at t1 created FROM?If not ex nihilo, then what is brain at t1 created FROM? If you say "brain at t0" then we're back to (brain at t0 plus other factors) causes (brain at t1), because brain at t0 is a material cause.
If not ex nihilo, then what is brain at t1 created FROM?
— Relativist
The creation ex nihilo refers to creation when there is nothing at all but the creator, then the act of creation, and then something plus the creator. Here, I am not talking about the creation ex nihilo then. There is however an act of creation. But this act is related to the experience of the former state of physical first. So, the Mind experiences physical in the state of S1 and then creates physical in another state, S2, later. — MoK
So you don't have a problem with non-reductive physicalsim?But I was talking about the emergence of awareness which is a strong emergence. — MoK
I lean toward reductive physicalism. If it could be established that there is actual ontological emergence, I would accept non-reductive physicalism.Prove it.
— Relativist
So you think it is a weak emergence? — MoK
Under reductive physicalism: both are weak. Are you accepting that non-reductive physicalism has no problems?The emergence of a car: Weak or strong? The emergence of awareness: Weak or strong? — MoK
You asked me to comment on your Op argument. I did. I established that the 1st premise is ambiguous. If you want further analysis, remove the ambiguity. Up to you.I don't need to rephrase my argument. — MoK
If not ex nihilo, then what is brain at t1 created FROM? If you say "brain at t0" then we're back to (brain at t0 plus other factors) causes (brain at t1), because brain at t0 is a material cause.Are you saying the Mind recreates MoK's brain ex nihilo at every instant of time, rather than effecting a change to MoK's brain?!
— Relativist
I already mentioned that physical including MoK's brain does not exist in the future. Therefore, physical must be created to allow a change in physical. And by creation, I don't mean the creation ex nihilo. — MoK
One physical state of affairs (S1) caused another physical state of affairs (S2).You are just claiming that change exists. That is not what I am denying. I am claiming that physical cannot be the cause of its own change. — MoK
Because it was an example of a functional entity.I know you weren't talking about functionalism, but it IS the answer to your question - and to many other objections to physicalism.
— Relativist
If so, then why did you bring up the example of a car that is a weak emergence? — MoK
Prove it.I am talking about the emergence of awareness which is a strong emergence. — MoK
Sure. I hope you can now recognize that your argument depends on assumptions that reasonable people can disagree about. Such is the problem with trying to prove God's existence.Cool. Let's agree to disagree — MoK
I do know the difference. Proceed with your proof.I cannot prove it to you unless you understand the difference between the weak and strong emergence. — MoK
Rephrase your argument accordingly.Anything that changes is no longer the same thing. And sure, physical are subject to change since they have a set of properties..Please replace experience with awareness. — MoK
Are you saying the Mind recreates MoK's brain ex nihilo at every instant of time, rather than effecting a change to MoK's brain?!Then it's true that (MoK's brain at t1) is caused by (Mok's brain at t0 + other factors), because "other factors" includes mind's experience of Mok's brain at t0.
— Relativist
No, MoK's brain is directly caused by the Mind and not by MoK's brain in former time. — MoK
P is #2 — MoK
I know you weren't talking about functionalism, but it IS the answer to your question - and to many other objections to physicalism. It means you can't simplistically deny physicalism on the basis that mental phenomena aren't exhibited by simple objects (rocks; particles). You need to consider functional entities.You had asked, "How could you accommodate awareness in physicalism?" My answer: "functionally".
— Relativist
I was not talking about the functionality of the brain which in fact can be explained by the laws of physics. I was talking about the awareness that as we agreed is a state of being conscious of perceptions, thoughts, feelings, etc. — MoK
Then let's agree to disagree. It can neither be proven nor disproven. We each draw our conclusions about it on subjective grounds. Your fundamental error is in thinking your subjective grounds are objective facts.I think all sorts of physicalism are false — MoK
No. You're reversing the burden of proof. Provide a formal proof that physicalism is impossible, with clearly stated premises.Then please read on the Hard Problem of consciousness — MoK
Then please read the OP and let me know what you think of it. — MoK
It implies that it is highly unlikely that physicalism is provably false.Physicalists are wrong. The fact that the majority of philosophers believe in physicalism does not prove anything. — MoK
Prove it.Physicalism cannot explain the awareness — MoK
But you also made this seemingly contradictory statement:
MoK's brain t1 was not caused by MoK's brain at t0 + other factors.
— Relativist
No, it is not contrary at all. MoK's brain at t1 is due to MoK's brain + other factors at t0 but the MoK's brain at t1 was not caused by MoK's brain + other factors at t0. MoK's brain at t1 was caused by the Mind after experiencing MoK's brain + other factors at t0. — MoK
You need to read about the strong and weak emergence to see that the example of the car is a weak emergence whereas consciousness is a strong emergence. — MoK
Modus Ponens. — MoK
Modus ponens has the form:#3 follows from #2 only. — MoK
By what rule of logic? See: https://cse.iitk.ac.in/users/cs365/2012/rulesLogic.html#3 follows from #2 only. — MoK
"Cannot" implies it is impossible. That's a strong claim that needs to be supported with a proof. Provide it using only mutually acceptable premises.I am arguing that physicalism is false because it cannot explain awareness/experience — MoK
I will deal with those if I choose to argue physicalism is true. In this thread, you have the burden of showing you have a coherent theory, since you put forth a proof.If you think that physicalism is not false then you have to deal with the Hard problem of consciousness, epiphenomenalism, and other problems that I discussed in detail but you didn't reply to it. You cannot resolve these problems. Could you? — MoK
In philosophy, "experiences" correspond to what I've defined as m-experiences. It most certainly does not entail being non-physical. Here's an extract from the definition of experience in the Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy:Experience refers to a phenomenon that has a very clear definition in the philosophy of the mind, namely my definition. — MoK
I defined m-experience as mental experience. If you don't believe there are mental experiences then your entire line of argument is dissolved.I don't agree that there is p-experience or m-experience — MoK
Non-sequitur, and you're ignoring that I answered your question. I regret indulging your reversal of your burden of proof.Functionally. Compare it to the function of a car: the parts of the car cannot function individually as a car. It is their arrangement that produces the function.
— Relativist
Now you are confusing weak and strong emergence here. — MoK
I was indulging you by giving a physicalist ACCOUNT of awareness. The account is consistent with the defintion of awareness.Our brains hold memories. Beliefs are memories that dispose us to behave a certain way. Awareness is the development of short term beliefs about some state of affairs or activity, caused by our sensory input.
— Relativist
No, we already agreed on the definition of awareness which is a state in which we are conscious of mental activities, — MoK
Then what caused MoK's brain at t1? There was no explanation "above". Give me an account of all the causal factors (that's what I was doing with my statement,"MoK's brain t1 was caused by [MoK's brain at t0 + other factors].
— Relativist
I already explained that to you two times if not more. The Mind causes MoK's brain at t1 given the fact that it experiences MoK's brain at t0 plus other factors — MoK
Mind would qualify as "other factors". Explain this apparent contradiction. I'll defer re-asking the other related questions until you reconcile this.MoK's brain t1 was not caused by MoK's brain at t0 + other factors. — MoK
It's an invalid argument! Here it is, with your statements numbered:I already discussed what I mean by change in OP whether the change is in a falling rock or the motion of electrons in a brain — MoK
Knowledge is not a necessary condition for causation.
— Relativist
It is necessary since a change indicates a going from one state at one point in time to another state later. — MoK
Prove there is a dependency on knowledge for the rock to fall, and land when it does.A rock dislodged from a high ledge, by a tremor, will fall to the bottom is strict accord with the gravitational law. — Relativist
If that's not what you meant to say, then acknowledge you were wrong in making such a general statement, and rephrase it in a way you will defend.Knowledge is not a necessary condition for causation. — Relativist
It is necessary since a change indicates a going from one state at one point in time to another state later. So the knowledge of the proper time that the causation is due to, t2 in this case, is necessary. — MoK
First you need to acknowledge that Knowledge is not a necessary condition for causation.I am asking that if you cannot perform that task which requires the awareness of the passage of time then how the physical can do that? — MoK
Knowledge is not a necessary condition for causation. — Relativist
It is necessary since a change indicates a going from one state at one point in time to another state later. So the knowledge of the proper time that the causation is due to, t2 in this case, is necessary. — MoK
You gave an example that INVOLVES application of knowledge. Cause-effect due to (for example) laws of motion do not depend on knowledge. A rock dislodged from a high ledge, by a tremor, will fall to the bottom is strict accord with the gravitational law.Of course, the knowledge of time is necessary. Could you perform a task that is due to a specific time without knowing the specific time or even worse without having the ability to experience time? If you cannot then how the physical can? — MoK
Non-sequitur. You simply re-asserted that knowledge is necessary. A law of nature necessitates an effect. Causation is temporal.It is necessary since a change indicates a going from one state at one point in time to another state later. So the knowledge of the proper time that the causation is due to, t2 in this case, is necessary. — MoK
Knowledge is not a necessary condition for causation.Therefore, the physical in the state of S1 cannot know the correct instant to cause the physical in the state of S2. Therefore, the physical in the state of S1 cannot cause the physical in the state of S2. — MoK
So your "proof" that physicalism is false is based on the assumption that physicalism is false. Circular reasoning.. I agree that the experience or awareness precludes physicalism given my definition of experience. — MoK
You asked me this:I cannot agree with your definition of np-experience, m-experience, and p-experience since to me there is only one sort of experience that I equate to awareness. — MoK
That's what I did. The definitions refer to concepts. Accepting the definitions doesn't commit you to agreeing the concept applies to anything in reality. The difference among the 3 concepts are the nature of our disagreement. Based on those 3 concepts, our disagreement is about whether m-experiences are np-experiences or p-experiences. The definition you gave entails ASSUMING m-experiences are np-experiences. If you don't accept the burden to prove this, then your argument fails because it is circular.Please call a set of processes in the brain another thing — MoK
I didn't misuse terms. I made it clear in my first post that the definition of experience was relevant, and I subsequently rejected your definition because it assumed, not proved, that experiences were non-physical. The discussion did get confusing because we hadn't agreed to a definition. I've addressed this by defining the 3 concepts. If you aren't willing to accept the possibility that m-experiences are p-experiences, then the discussion is at an end because your reasoning is circular.I equate experience to awareness. It was your misuse of terms that caused us all trouble. You define experience as the process in physical. The experience as I mentioned is related to another phenomenon that has a clear definition in the philosophy of the mind. — MoK
Functionally. Compare it to the function of a car: the parts of the car cannot function individually as a car. It is their arrangement that produces the function.How could you accommodate awareness in physicalism considering the basic ingredients of any objects, electrons, quarks, etc. are unaware? — MoK
You're ignoring the context of this part of the discussion. You had given an incoherent account of the mind-body relationship. This is fatal to your argument. You presented this argument in your op, which gives you the burden to defend it. If you can't show that account is coherent, you've failed - irrespective of whether or not physicalism is true.I am not evading at all. I am talking about problems that cannot be addressed in physicalism — MoK
So you aren't denying that you're making an argument from ignorance.
I anticipate that you're strategy is to make an argument from ignorance: find a reason to reject physicalism, and then conclude "...therefore dualism must be true". No, you have to show you have a superior alternative. An incoherent theory is not superior. You DENY that it's incoherent, but you haven't been able to address my objections.
— Relativist
Please see above. — MoK
Then what caused MoK's brain at t1? There was no explanation "above". Give me an account of all the causal factors (that's what I was doing with my statement,"MoK's brain t1 was caused by [MoK's brain at t0 + other factors].You seemed to agree that MoK's brain t1 was caused by (MoK's brain at t0 + other factors). The question is: is the mind one of those other factors. Please answer it. I anticipate that either answer will contradict something you've already said, but we'll see. After you've shown your theory is coherent, then we can further discuss your issues with physicalism.
— Relativist
MoK's brain t1 was not caused by MoK's brain at t0 + other factors. Please see above. — MoK
I had a feeling you were younger than me! I was 8 in Oct 1962., I was seven during the Cuban Missile Crisis, — Wayfarer
In which case, what are we talking about? I'm arguing against physicalist views that your posts are representing, only for you to say 'well, I'm not really advocating them.' — Wayfarer
I absolutely am not trying to convince you physicalism is true. This thread was about an alleged proof that physicalism is false. I've been explaining why the argument fails. That doesn't entail proving physicalism is true; it entails establishing that it is possible — Relativist
I was responded to your suggesting I had not demonstrated physicalism was coherent, because I hadn't accounted for things like meaning. You felt my previous comment about semantics was insufficient, so I expanded on that.Nothing I've said contradicts that. — Wayfarer
Not one neuroscientist or philosopher of mind makes that claim! Rather, physicalists seek to account for the uncontroversial facts in a way consistent with physicalism. All this can do is show that physicalism is possible. In the context of physicalism, that's sufficient - because every other uncontroversial fact is unarguably a natural fact.Whereas it is commonly believed that the physical basis of mind is understood, when it is not. — Wayfarer
So what? Uniqueness doesn't imply physicalism is false.But the fact is, were human minds not able to form and grasp foundational concepts, such as 'equals', it would be impossible for us to learn and practice arithmetic, let alone mathematics. It is an ability the human mind alone has. — Wayfarer
You previously said that referring to "semantics" was inadequate to account for meaning. Then when I went into more detail, it made no difference. I'm not going to indulge you again. I've accounted for basic reason; that's a building block. You seem to expect a complete neurolgical framework, seemingly because "it is commonly believed that the physical basis of mind is understood".That is not an adequate account of the power of reason. Mathematical regularities and symmetries are far more than repetitive patterns. Reason has enabled us to estimate the age and size of the Universe. — Wayfarer
In all cases I was simply responding to you. In my very first post, I brought up the issue of how "experience" is defined, noting that one COULD define it in a way that included a boulder rolling down the mountain. You later seemed to want to limit the discussion to MENTAL experiences, so at that time I began focusing solely on mental experiences. But you defined mental experiences as non-physical, which precludes physicalism with a definition.I didn't mean to insult you at all. I am very sorry if my words hurt your feelings but I didn't intend to do so. When I ask you what is the experience you answer that as a set of processes in the brain. Please call a set of processes in the brain another thing since the experience refers to another phenomenon I tried my best to explain it to you but you constantly denied it. When I discuss whether Rock experience as well, then you changed experience in the case of the brain to mental experience — MoK
Agreed. I hope you can recognize that it would have been easier if you had simply said that in the first place, instead of asking.To me, awareness refers to a state in which we are conscious of mental activities, such as perceptions, thoughts, feelings, etc. — MoK
That is true that MoK's brain at time t is related to Mok's brain at time t-1 plus other factors but that does not mean that MoK's brain at time t-1 plus other factors causes MoK's brain at time t. ...
1) The Hard Problem of consciousness, 2) Epiphenomenalism,
...These issues if not more are serious threats to physicalism. — MoK
Yes, you did:I didn't ask for your definition of awareness — MoK
Given your insult, I now gather that you weren't asking me for a definition, but that wasn't clear. Communication is a 2-way street. Accept responsibility for conveying what you mean, and that your words may not be interpreted in the way you have in mind.What is awareness to you? — MoK
I just demonstrated that I pay close attention.You need to pay attention to my argument and definition of words — MoK
I answered that:So again, why don't your brain's physical processes go in the dark? You are aware of thoughts, sensations, feelings, beliefs, etc. By aware here I mean that the opposite of the dark. You are not living in a dark state. Are you? You are aware of things. You can report what you are aware of too. — MoK
If that wasn't what you meant, then CLARIFY, instead of insulting me for failing to read your mind.Absolutely things can happen to us, and/or to our brains, without our being aware of it. Examples:
-surgery under general anasthesia
-Developing cancer prior to symptoms
-hair growth
-brain damage caused by sudden trauma. — Relativist
You're alluding to some particular theory you have about the nature of individual identity, and to a presentist conception of time. That would be fine, but it impedes communication when you make statements that allude to some theory you haven't described. In this case, it seems possible we largely agree, but maybe not -since you haven't explained. I'll nevertheless try, but contain your anger if my basis isn't consistent with yours. Instead, respond by explaining what you mean.Any physical including the brain does not exist in the immediate future. Phsycail exists at now. The subjective time however changes and this change is due to the Mind (please read my second argument in OP if you are interested). So there is a situation where the immediate future becomes now. Physical however does not exist in the immediate future so it cannot exist in the situation when the immediate future becomes now, therefore the Mind causes/creates the physical at now. — MoK
Then your response didn't answer the question I asked. I haven't disputed that "the brain is caused", but I'm pointing out that the brain @t0 was casused by the brain @t-1 + other factors. Was the mind among the "other factors" or not?#2 referred to your statement "I am not saying that the brain is caused to do something" Are you saying you were wrong? — Relativist
You need to read the rest of my sentence: "I am not saying that the brain is caused to do something but the brain is caused." This was a response to you that you said the brain is caused to do something.. — MoK
This is vague. Be specific as to what is both the cause and the effect, and define what you mean by "experience" in this context - including how an unchanging Mind has experiences.The cause and effect in the case of Mind is the experience of physical and causation of physical. — MoK
What does "experience in the Mind" MEAN? It's unchanging, unaffected by anything going on in the world.TBy this, I mean that the experience in the Mind is due to the existence of the physical. — MoK
Ah! The mind is causing something after all! Be specfic: what is it causing? Just saying "physical" is too vague. So rephrase this in more specific terms. Also explain how something that is unchanging has selective temporal points of interference - and how they are selected -given that the mind isn't learning or anticipating, since it's unchanging.The existence of the physical is however due to the existence of the Mind since that is the Mind that causes physical in the subjective time. — MoK
So we are dealing with vertical causation by this I mean that the physical in the state S1 causes an experience in the Mind. The Mind then causes physical in the state S2. The Mind then experiences physical in the state of S2 and causes physical in the state S3, etc. — MoK
The rock at t1 was caused by (the rock at t0 + other factors). Those other factors did not include my sitting and rising from the sofa. If the mind is existing outside spacetime, it is not "experiencing" events in space time. What exactly is its relation to spacetime? From its perspective, does spacetime exist as a 4-dimensional block? Alternatively, does the mind exist like a photon traveling at the speed of light - from its perspective, it exists simultanously along all spacetime points along its path - but also with no intereractions with anything else along that path (an interaction would entail a termination of the path).Suppose there's a rock sitting under my living room sofa. It is present when I sit on the sofa, and when I get up. It has no causal role and isn't changed during my sitting and changing. How does an unchanging mind with no causal role differ from the rock? — Relativist
Any physical changes even those that seem to be unchanging. The rock is on Earth, Earth is moving so the rock. The particles that make an object are in constant motion even if the object is in space and has no motion. The Mind is Omnipresent in spacetime so it is changeless as I argued in my third argument. — MoK
The mind has non-physical properties, such as the ability to infer meaning and interpret symbols such as language and mathematics. These acts are not determined by physical causes in that there is no way to account for or explain the nature of the neural processes that supposedly cause or underlie such processes in physicalist terms, without relying on the very processes of inference and reasoning which we're attempting to explain. — Wayfarer
I'm not sure I understand the objection, but I'll try to address.this doesn't address the issue that we have to rely on such semantic relations to establish what is ontological - what is, for example, the nature of the physical, and how or if it is separate from the mind. — Wayfarer
The pattens in nature existed before us. Our intellect is based on our pattern recognition skills.the mind - reason - is able to peer into the realms beyond the physical and to bring back from it, things that have never before existed — Wayfarer
It's falsified on the assumption that the actual world mind-dependent. Similarly, a mind-dependent world is falsified by an assumption of physicalism. IOW, these are mutually exclusive assumptions. That is not what I meant.It does falsify physicalism, because it reverses the ontological priority that physicalism presumes, namely that the mind is dependent on or derived from the physical. Its saying that the physical is mind-dependent - the opposite of what Armstrong says. Not seeing it is not an argument against it. — Wayfarer
I think we see reflections of actual reality, and that provides a basis for exploring further. You choose to believe that's hopeless. That's your provilege, but it leaves you with no basis for claiming anything exists outside your own mind. There appear to be other people, but appearances carry no weight with you.But we're never in a position to see an actual world apart from or outside of the way the brain/mind construes it. It's not as if you can step outside of it. We know the world as it appears to us, but not as it is outside that. That is the meaning of the 'in-itself' - we don't see the world as it is in itself. — Wayfarer
A coherent theory will necessarily have circular entailments. That doesn't falsify it; it's a feature that SHOULD be present. The proper question is: can one justifiably believe the world is 100% physical? Your subjective reasons to reject it do not undercut my justification.I've presented a philosophical argument as to the circularity of the physicalist view. — Wayfarer
No; you miss my point. See this post, where I defined a mathematical system.You could develop a metaphysical theory that includes abstract objects, but it's just another unprovable theory.
— Relativist
Not true. What of mathematics? Mathematical physics? — Wayfarer
No, it isn't. Rather, there's a 2-step process:The appeal of physicalism is that it is basically an attempt to reach scientific certainty with respect to philosophy — Wayfarer
Non-reductive physicalism entails ontological emergence. Reductive physicalism assumes all high order properties and relations are the necessary consequence of the properties and relations of lower order constituents. Ontological emergence entails novel properties or relations appearing at higher levels that aren't fully accounted for by the lower levels. Philosophers tend to reject this for the same reason scientists do, not BECAUSE scientists do. It violates the PSR and is unparsimonious.the reductionist program was to bring philosophy within the scope of this model and the 'Australian materialists' notably Armstrong and Smart, were advocates for this kind of ambitious scientifically-based reductionism. I think it's a misapplication of the scientific method. — Wayfarer