So the question is “what does or does not ‘evoke’ the passions?”, the words or you? — NOS4A2

The evocation occurs in the listener, as his brain interprets the words.

The better term is "emotive language", which refers to: "words that do not merely describe a possible state of affairs. "Terrorist" is not used only to refer to a person who commits specific actions with a specific intent. Words such as "torture" or "freedom" carry with them something more than a simple description of a concept or an action.They have a "magnetic" effect, an imperative force, a tendency to influence the interlocutor's decisions.They are strictly bound to moral values leading to value judgements and potentially triggering specific emotions. For this reason, they have an emotive dimension. In the modern psychological terminology, we can say that these terms carry "emotional valence", as they presuppose and generate a value judgement that can lead to an emotion (Wikipedia article)

Example: When you hear about a child being raped, this likely triggers emotional reactions in you: horror at the act, sadness for the victim, and anger at the perpetrator.

Do you think reason is a useful means of evaluating conceptions of God? I'm aware of its historical use in Natural Theology to 'demonstrate' the divine, but I wonder how far that can be taken. Everyone is convinced their use of reasoning is unassailable. Particularly the Thomists and their Preambula Fidei. — Tom Storm

Sure, we can evaluate and compare different conceptions of God, but I'm sketical this can lead to actual knowledge of God.

Thomism has pros and cons. In its favor: it's a fairly complete, coherent metaphysical theory. I've read a couple of Ed Feser's books on the topic, and he seems to have embraced Thomism because he sees it as a framework for answering all the important metaphysical questions. That said, it's still an untestable, unfalsifiable hypothesis. If one believes in God, it may be satisfying because of its competeness.

I wonder how useful a ground of being is to us as a concept and what it can mean, other than nebulous notions of foundational guarantee for truth, goodness and beauty. — Tom Storm

I'm thinking strictly of an ontological bottom layer of physical reality, and (possibly) something deeper than the physical. I suppose one could choose to use the foundation to account for minds and beauty.

Libertarian free will implies a person chooses which actions he will take. These choices will be made based on his beliefs and his passions. There are both positive and negative passions. A positive passion will tend to influence our choices in positive ways (e.g. acts of charity). A negative passion will tend to influence our choices toward negative behaviors (e.g. hurting others).

When we hear or read words spoken by others, our passions can be evoked. This can lead to negative behaviors. It's true that the perpetator is morally accountable for his actions, but it's also true that the conveyor of the evocative language is a contributing factor or cause. I previously discussed contributing causes with you here.

This is the issue we are confronting, from my perspective. Tell me which portions you disagree with.
.

I'm interested in conversations about more sophisticated and philosophical accounts of theism. — Tom Storm

IMO, the philosophical accounts do not point to a God of religion. There may very well be a ground of being, but the big question is: does it exhibit intentionality? If not, then it points to a natural ground of being, not a god.

Is there a good reason to believe the ground of being acts intentionally? IMO, the only reason one might think so, is that teleology requires it - so the question becomes: is there good reason to believe teleology? I haven't seen one.

There is no argument for censorship save for superstition and magical thinking. — NOS4A2

I think you're saying that those of us who support some restrictions on speech are basing this on false beliefs about the effects of the speech. Is that correct?

And if so, do you agree this is the pivotal issue? Can you please attempt to state exactly what false beliefs we hold, in objective terms, rather than with judgemental terms?

Also state your position on free will. Do you believe humans possess libertarian free will? Reading some of your exchange with @Michael, this seems relevant.

It's a good question, but I see no strong basis to answer it. Speculative answers are easy, but cannot be well-supported epistemically. It seems to me that people are drawn toward specific answers for personal reasons. That's fine for them, but I'm too pragmatic for that.

Although physics, along with other theories of consciousness, will eventually, I believe, move toward consciousness as being the primary driver of physical reality. All of reality swings on the "hinge" of consciousness. — Sam26

This strikes me as relevant to identifying who your argument would and wouldn't appeal to.

To be honest, I find the objections in this thread to be very weak, so there's not much to overcome. — Sam26

When you claim you can overcome the objections, I think this means you didn't find them persuasive. But reflect on the fact that you persuaded no one to come closer to your view that there's a spirtual basis for NDEs (the objections explain why). Some who already believed in an afterlife may have may have gained comfort from your reasoning. So I just suggest specifying your target audience.

I hope that, in your book, you take into account the objections raised in this thread. Although I doubt you can overcome these objections, you could perhaps identify the sort of person (his background beliefs) that you believe you can persuade.

The simple statement goes like: "I ask scientists how they are able to trust their theories without a belief in a purpose-driven evolution." — PartialFanatic

This sounds a lot like Plantinga's (flawed) evolutionary argument against atheism.

If we are rational because we were purposefully directed, then we simply could not have had the capacity to be irrational. — PartialFanatic

Purposeful evolution may have only been directed toward faith in God. Rationality can be an obstacle to that.

Alternative decisions are possible if we have the power of LFW which gives us exactly that: the ability to make alternative decisions. — A Christian Philosophy

You've simply restated your assertion, and haven't considered the decision process.

Deliberative decisions entail a series of thoughts that lead to a decision. These thoughts entail consideration of immediate perceptions (sounds smells, tastes, shapes. textures...), beliefs, dispositions, and conditioned responses. All of which are considered within a specific state of mind (e.g. mood, energy, feelings). The particular sequence of thoughts (which even your "king" must go through) leads to a decision. It makes no sense to suggest that the same sequence of thoughts (by the same "king"), in the same state of mind, could have reached a different conclusion, because there can be no reason for it. Simply declaring that LFW accounts for other, non-actual, possibilities ignores these mental processes.

Could one of the intermediate thoughts have differred? No, because each intermediate thought developed similarly, or is simply a recall of a prior belief, disposition (transient attitude, general dispositions, mood), some immediate sensory perceptions (e.g. smell, sight, sound), or a conditioned response to a prior thought or sensation.

So why do we tend to think we could have chosen differently? Because we are reflecting on a past choice based on our new mental context - different state of mind, the benefit of lesson learned, gaining additional knowledge, or considering additional impacts that were previously overlooked. Entertaining these counterfactuals creates an illusion of contingency.

In your video, you claimed that we ought to trust our intuition that we could have made a different choice. My above analysis counters that: when reflecting back, we are considering a past choice from a new perspective. This does not entail winding the clock back to the prior set of mental conditions.

Another issue: you claimed Occam's razor (principle of parsimony) should be applied to this intution of contingency, suggesting it's a "simpler explanation". That is a misstatement of parsimony. Newton's gravitational theory is simpler than General Relativity (GR), but we choose GR because it explains the fuller set of facts.

The fullest set of relevant facts includes everything we know about the natural world, which is mostly a product of science. The success of physics at describing the evolution of the universe through laws, is strong evidence that the universe evolves strictly according to laws - implying determinism is true. So it becomes UNparsimonious to assume humans are an exception to determinism. What could account for this exception? A deterministic universe could not produce an object that behaves INdeterministically.

A theist would reply that God accounts for this indeterminacy - he directly creates a soul/will/"king". That takesGod's existence for granted. To actually prove free will exists, you would assume the burden to prove God exists. God+LFW is inherently unparsimonious, compared to compatibilism. So your "Occam's razor" argument fails.

I'll defer addressing your moral argument for now, but it will also fail.

There are no physical forces outside of you but all the factors that necessitate your actions originate from outside of you. — A Christian Philosophy

You are committing 2 errors:

1) You assume that if A causes B, and B causes C, then B lacks causal efficacy. This is absurd.

2) You ignore the fact that every part of a person has been caused even under your paradigm. You came into existence from the development of a zygote that was created from your parents union (they were each created the same way). This established (i.e. caused) your intrinsic nature.

As you matured, you were shaped by your environment (a causal effect). It influenced what you came to believe and how you think. You are changed a bit by every new experience, each of which you process through the lens of your existing world view- an ever evolving perspective that shapes your subjective interpretations of the experiences.

You can interject your belief that there is a non-physical inner soul/will/"king", that is part of your core identity, but even so - this thing did not pop into existence uncaused. You assume God caused it. So even if your LFW paradigm is correct, everything about you was still caused.

Libertarian free will (LFW) and randomness are similar in that they are both free — A Christian Philosophy

But how can a person have actually made a decision that differs from the one actually made? I have been arguing that, irrespective of LFW or compaitibilism, our choices are made due to a set of mental factors, and that GIVEN those factors, no alternative decisions are possible. Can you falsify this?

You seem to apply this logic:

1. We have LFW (premise).
2. LFW entails our choices are contingent
3. Therefore our choices are contingent (i.e. there are non-actualized possibilities)

I can understand that you believe premise 1, but you haven't provided an argument that establishes this premise. If your logic is different, then please provide it.

Can you explain the "capacity to initiate action"? It seems to me that if the entire causal chain is determined, then there is never a point where an action is initiated by the agent, since, as you said, all the things necessitate the agent's decision.

I choose to lift my arm, and voilà : my arm lifts. I can initiate this action any time I like. I am lifting it, not forces outside of me. Another example: I am writing this response to you - I initiate every keystroke, not something external to me.

God's foreknowledge does not entail fate; rather, He observes us in the future as though it is happening in real time. — A Christian Philosophy

This contradicts omniscience. Omniscience entails knowledge without a process of learning or observing.

I asked the question because I wondered if you embraced Molinism. The Molinist view: God knows every freely-willed choice you will make in every metaphysically possible world. He "chooses" to create the world that results in the best possible world. (God's "choice" is not deliberative; he knows the correct choice through omniscience).

under libertarian free will, all these things are real and they inform and influence our decisions but do not compel - like a king listening to his advisers, the free will has the final say. — A Christian Philosophy

Either these things necessitate the decision, or there is some randomness to the decision. Consider any deliberative decision a person makes: he evaluates from a set of options that have come to mind; he weighs pros and cons, based on his prior-existing beliefs and dispositions, and finally makes a reasoned choice. How could your "king" make a different choice, given the complete set of mental conditions that led up to it? He couldn't, unless the deliberative process included some random element (e.g. randomness in the set of options that came to mind, the weights assigned, the antecedent beliefs...). If the difference is randomness, that's not a manifestation of some additional control.

So the decision-making process does not seem to be a meaningful point of distinction between compatibilism and incompatibilism.

real metaphysical agency (not merely the perception of agency) necessitates freedom, i.e. contingency. — A Christian Philosophy

That is a unique definition of "agency". You're attempting to "win" this debate by creating a non-standard definition of agency that is inconsistent with compatibilism. I previously pointed you to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on agency (again here). As I noted, agency entails
-the capacity to act intentionally
-the capacity to initiate action
-reflection on, and caring about, our actions

In the compatibilism/incompatibilism debate among philosophers, the term "agent," is not in dispute. Rather, they debate what sorts of freedoms human agents require (for example) to be held morally accountable.

I'm also curious how you account for free will given God's foreknowledge. You are not free to make a choice other than the one God knows you will make. No alternatives are possible.

position is also inconsistent with the existence of any real metaphysical agency - which you seem to believe in — A Christian Philosophy

Identify this alleged inconsistency. The comment you referred to doesn't do it:

I dispute that necessitarianism is compatible with intentions, free choice, control, and agency. Consider the statement "water streams look for the path of least resistance". The word "look" is used here in a non-technical sense. Metaphysically, water streams do not literally look for anything as they are just molecules driven by gravity and friction. — A Christian Philosophy

Water streams are not capable of intentional behavior. Human minds are.

Our minds retain memories, develop beliefs. We perceive needs and develop wants. Streams of water do not.

the point remains that the definition of libertarian free will does not match the definition of compatibilist free will. — A Christian Philosophy

It matches the definition you provided:

"the ability to choose without being compelled by external factors (meaning factors other than our will)". — A Christian Philosophy

You may have a different concept of what is meant by "the will", but I regard this to refer to our capacity for intentional behavior - not as some non-physical object. This capacity exists, in varying degrees, in other animals. Example: thirst establishes an intent to drink water, and engage in behaviors to achieve that.

This capacity for intentional behavior, perception, memory etc is the product of evolutionary forces on the development of our central nervous system. Your specific brain was "caused" by the physical development that began with a zygote. From birth, onward- we learn, establishing knowledge that influences our thinking. The collection of all these things (central nervous system, innate cognitive ability, memories, conditioned responses, etc are what makes us who we are. And we are organisms that engage in intentional behavior guided entirely by what is within us. You are trying to define us into non-existence.

any cause other than our free will or soul is an "external factor" and it includes not only the environment but also beliefs, desires, genes, etc. In that light, my definition of libertarian free will does not match a compatibilist definition of free will. — A Christian Philosophy

So you're simply stipulating that a soul exists, and on this basis - you "prove" a god exists.

To be clear, I have not been trying to convince you that compatibilism is true. Rather, I'm explaining my point of view. You reject it, and that's fine - I realize my position is inconsistent with theism.

However, I would like you to realize that God's existence can only be "proven" by stipulating certain metaphysical assumptions - assumptions that no naturalist would accept.

Embrace your faith, but recognize it depends on FAITH.

My choices seem free, and compatibilist free will is consistent with the PSR. But under necessitarianism and compatibilism, no choice is actually free. Thus, necessitarianism and compatibilism are inconsistent with the observation that my choices seem free. — A Christian Philosophy

You have not identified an inconsistency. Here's how you defined "libertarian free will":

"the ability to choose without being compelled by external factors (meaning factors other than our will)" — A Christian Philosophy

This definition matches a compatibilist definition of free will. Our choices are entirely the product of internal factors (whims, beliefs, desires, needs...). Surely you don't deny that all these internal factors have causes, do you? What aspect of the decision making process is uncaused?

I can try a few more times to show why I disagree but then we may have to call it quits. — A Christian Philosophy

Remember, you said:

I accept the burden of proof to defend the existence of libertarian free will. — A Christian Philosophy

Of course you disagree, but my point all along has been that your alleged "proof" of God depends on unsupported assumptions.

Necessitarianism does not allow for alternate future possibilities, right? — A Christian Philosophy

Correct, but this overlooks that our intentional acts, help cause the future through the choices we make- through our agency. Our motivations are all real, and they are part of who we are. The knowledge we employ can be true, and our reasoning can be valid.

You have identified no point in the decision making process at which an alternate decision could have been made - given the person's beliefs, perceptions, state of mind, set of factors that happened to come to mind, etc. You obviously want to believe there's something outside the deterministic chain of causation - a soul, for example. Which implies circularity in your argument.

I agree that we have real agency, and yet this is not possible under necessitarianism where all actions from every part, like cogs, are necessary. — A Christian Philosophy

Assertion without argument. You refuted none of the 3 aspects of agency I identified:
-the capacity to act intentionally
-the capacity to initiate action
-we reflect on, and care about, our actions

I agree that fatalism is a wrong view, and yet under necessitarianism, we have no power over future events since the future is fixed. — A Christian Philosophy

You're ignoring everything I said. If you're very sick, you choose to seek medical care because you believe it improves your chances of recovery. If you lacked that belief, you wouldn't bother. A fatalist wouldn't bother, because he assumes his outcome is fated to occur and any actions he takes are futile.

Compatilists refer to the "principle of alternate future possibilities" - the set of choices before us. I am free to make a choice among options before me. This is distinguished from the "principle of alternate possibilities" (implying past choices were contingent) that most incompatibilists consider essential to libertarian free will. This principle implies that our past choices could have differed from what they were.

A compatibilist, like me, recognizes that our actions influence the future, and so we make choices accordingly. In one sense, past choices could have been different - but only if there were something different, like a different (or stronger) belief.

Your choices seem free to you, I'm sure. You agreed the decision process is consistent with the PSR, so exactly what can you show to be inconsistent with determinism?

B is essential for C to occur, but this does not dismiss fatalism. E.g. cog A is connected to cog B which is connected to cog C. Cog B is essential for cog C to spin, but cog B has no control over the outcome. — A Christian Philosophy

Two problems with this:
1. We have agency:
- the capacity to act intentionally
-the capacity to initiate action
-we reflect on, and care about, our actions

2. Fatalism entails an attitude of futility in the face of future events. If you're sick, your recovery (or death) is fated to occur - and this will occur regardless of whether or not you seek medical care. This is obviously not the case: we typically choose to act a certain way in order to achieve a desireable outcome. We choose medical care because we anticipate that it will improve our chances of recovery.

I don't see that libertarian free will can do any more: decisions are still based on reasons.
— Relativist
In other words, you are asking how libertarian free will could be compatible with the PSR. — A Christian Philosophy

No. I'm pointing out that because decision making is consistent with determinism (and thus, the PSR)- there is no basis for insisting we have libertarian free will. You choose to believe we have it, but I do not accept that as a premise.

I understand your view of compatibilism but I don't understand why this does not entail fatalism. If all choices are the product of factors (internal or external) and all these factors are caused by something else, then all our choices are caused by something else. — A Christian Philosophy

Here's the logic you may be applying:

Assume A causes B, and B causes C, then:
A causes C (the logic is transitive)- Implying B is irrelevant. This is a fatalist view.

My point is that B is not irrelevant. Logic is transitive, but causation is not. Our acts of will are "B", and the mental processing that we perform is essential for C to occur.

Compare this to a computer: input- processing- output. The processing is a necessary step - essential to producing the output. "A" consists of the physical parts of the computer, the software, electricity running through the circuits, and the specific input it was given. All those components are essential to producing the output ("C").

The underlined sentence is a prescriptive statement, a "should", which implies a freedom to do X or not. If all prescriptive statements were going to occur necessarily, then the prescription is merely an illusion — A Christian Philosophy

If I decide not eat cookies (a "should"), this decision establishes a disposition- a factor that will influence, but not necessitate, my future behavior. The craving induced by the scent may create a disposition that may be stronger. The prior disposition is not an illusion, it was simply ignored and the impulse acted on.

I accept compatibilism- an account of free will that is consistent with determinism. It does not entail fatalism. Fatalism is the view that you have no real choices. Compatibilism is the view that our choices are under our control. Choices are the product of internal factors: knowledge, beliefs, desires, wishes, genetic predispositions, learned conditioned responses, dispositions, impulses, mood...

These factors were all caused, but they are bundled uniquely into each of us. They are what make us who we are.

Under compatibilism, we can still entertain past possibilities - the things one might have done, but it correctly recognizes that something would have had to be different: some missing bit of knowledge, improved impulse control. I don't see that libertarian free will can do any more: decisions are still based on reasons. And new experiences and knowledge change us, so that our future decisions will be made on a different basis.

There are no absurd conclusions at all. It doesn't trivialize modal reasoning, because we can still conceptualize how things might have been in counterfactual conditions. We all make use of this, learn from it. "If I hadn't done X then Y (an unfortunate consequence) would not have occurred." Lesson: in the future, avoid doing X.

Concieiving this way doesn't imply that X was metaphysically contingent. Consider why you made decision to do X. If it was an impulse, then something led to the impulse (e.g. the scent of freshly baked cookies induced an impulse to eat one). If X was a deliberative decision, it was consequence of the factors that came to mind. that you weighed in a certain way. There's no obvious source of contingency, so why believe it was actually contingent? Conceivability can lead to modal illusion.

So I don't think it's reasonable to ever assume contingency, unless one can point to a source of contingency.

I suppose that's true; just like we are able to talk about impossible worlds. Nevertheless, modal collapse should still be avoided when we talk about metaphysically possible worlds. — A Christian Philosophy

I continue to take issue with the notion that "modal collapse" must be avoided. I believe that modal collapse translates to necessitarianism in ontology: the notion that everything that exists could not have failed to exist, and that there are no non-actual possibilities (non-actual possibility= something that could have happened, but did not).

What would prevent necessitarianism from being true is some source(s) of contingency. No proposed source of contingency can be proven. You correctly noted that quantum collapse isn't necessarily contingent, and I pointed out that libertarian free will does not necesarily exist.

Even if it were true the amount of information one would have to have to calculate how many satellites a given planet could have is unknowable in practice, — Wayfarer

We're discussing possibility/impossibility of a state of affairs, not the computability.

And furthermore, natural laws are based on idealisations and abstractions — Wayfarer

That conflates textbook laws of physics with ontological laws of nature. As you know, I am a law realist. The present discussion is an alleged proof of God's existence, and I'm demonstrating that the proof depends on debatable metaphysical assumptions. I'm not trying to prove anything, other than the fact that conclusion is epistemically contingent on unproveable metaphysical assumptions.

Sorry to but in, but surely the number of moons a planet has, and the number of planets a solar system have, is not determined by any laws of nature. — Wayfarer

It's determined by the set of physical steps that led to the existence of the solar system. Each step is necessitated by laws of nature. Laws of nature necessitate their outcome. (We're assuming QM is deterministic). You'd have to assume random things happen for no reason, contrary to the PSR.

. I would then also add free will as another possible way to get contingency....Overall, it seems we are almost in agreement, except for the possibility of inherent existence and quantum. — A Christian Philosophy

I agree that IF libertarian free will exists, then it is a source of contingency. Would you agree that IF quantum collapse is indeterminate, the it is a source of contingency?

If we found out that all outcomes in the actual world occur out of necessity, then conceiving a possible world with some different outcome would necessarily have a logical error in it. — A Christian Philosophy

Conceiving of a counterfactual world does not imply that world is physically or metaphysically possible.

Examples:
1.I can conceive of a possible world in which earth has 2 moons instead of 1. Is that world physically possible? No, because the single moon is present as a result of the deterministic laws of nature. There is no source of contingency in the physical world to account for the counterfactual 2-moon earth. Conceivability doesn't align with what is physically possible. In terms of possible worlds: the set of conceptually possible worlds is not identical to the set of physically possible worlds.

2. Assume the PSR is metaphysically necessary. I can nevertheless conceive of a world in which the PSR is false: so there is a conceptually possible world in which the (metaphysically necessary) PSR is false.

I don't agree with point 2 but I hope this is not critical and that we can leave it alone because I'd rather not venture into any quantum discussion. — A Christian Philosophy

Point 2 defined the ontological basis for contingeny, and it is critical. I referred to quantum collapse only to illustrate how to apply the contingency principle. Notice that I said, "assume" it is not determinate.Point 5, which you agreed with, depends on point 2.

I believe that inherent existence is a sufficient explanation that fulfills the PSR for the OG. You also called that "de re necessity" earlier. — A Christian Philosophy

I reject de re necessity It treats necessity as an ontological property. IMO, an OG is necessary simply because could not have bern otherwise. It could not have been otherwise because there is nothing ontologically prior that accounts for (OG or ~OG) (the principle I explained in #2).

we can entertain the idea that the OG is a designer with free will, which is something the OP points to. With this, we preserve the idea of possible worlds (free will means the OG is free to have chosen otherwise), — A Christian Philosophy

Possible world semantics is just a convenient means of entertaining counterfactuals under some implicit or explicit modality. The "idea of possible worlds" is intact irrespective of whether or not there is metaphysical contingency in the world.

My issue is that IF there is metaphysical contingency in the world, THIS is what needs to be accounted for. @Banno's question (how do we explain why this world is as it is?) has an answer: because it could only have been otherwise if there is metaphysical contingency in the world. But we don't know if there is. It's conceptually possible there's an OG with free will that accounts for contingency. It's also conceptually possible quantum indeterminacy (or perhaps some unknown feature of the world) accounts for indeterminacy.

I'm not OK with jumping to intellectual nihilism.
— Relativist

So, you believe that 'idealism' (or in modern terms 'constructivism') is nihilistic, because it denies the external world? — Wayfarer

No. It's an implication of mistrusting our basic instincts, our senses and our cognitive structure. If those are denied, no beliefs can be justified- that would be intellectual nihilism. Does anyone take idealism that far? I don't know. I was just identifying what I think would be going too far. My point is better understood in the context I wrote it:
"If this just means we should be willing to question everything, I'm OK with it. I'm not OK with jumping to intellectual nihilism."

I was bookending it between a innocuous extreme and a noxious one.

you are conflating the belief with an 'external world' in generale and a 'physical world' in particular. I would say that abandoning the second is certainly counter-intuitive and probably incorrect but not necessarily 'irrational'. — boundless

I'm just suggesting that we innately believe (intuitively, not deductively or verbally) there is an external world. Classifying it as physical, material etc depends on some later learnings.

I would say that if one denies the existence any kind of external reality (solipsism) or affirms that, at most, there might be something else but we do not interact in any way with that is irrational.

I agree. That is contradicted by our basic intuitions.

If knowledge about the 'physical world' is empirical, it is true IMO that, in fact, what is directly known to us are sensations and perceptions (i.e. sensations organised within a conceptual framework). It seems to me that he is right that we can't conceive anything 'physical' with no relation with the 'world of experience'. — boundless

I can accept that there is SOME relation to the world of experience. It's iterative: we start with out innate instincts, then have experiences we interpret through the lens of our instincts, creating a revised lens through which the next tier of experiences are interpretted. Rinse. Repeat.

you would agree that 'the world we experience' is, in fact, a mental construction of sorts. In which case, an external 'physical' world would be somethin we haven't direct access to and we have no way to verify if it is really 'there' or not ( — boundless

Agreed.

The (strictly) 'ontological' idealist would say that the 'fact' that we imagine that the 'external physical world' in terms of the 'world of experience' is a reasonable reason to deny that there is something different from either minds and mental contents. The epistemic idealist would say that the same 'fact' leads us to the conclusion that we can't know anything about such a 'world' (note that Kant, in my understanding, rejected traditional metaphysics because he thought that it could not give us true knowledge... not sure about what he would say to someone who asserts that he doesn't claim to have certain knowledge but confident, but not certain, beliefs...). — boundless

Based on your description, I'd consider the strict ontological idealist irrational, because he has no rational basis to defeat his innate belief. The reasoning seems to be: I'm possibly wrong therefore I'm wrong.

The epistemic idealist could be rational, but only if he applies that this skepticism consistently - which entails general extreme skepticism.

Personally, I don't think that Bradley's argument is decisive or anything like that. But, certainly, it is not something to be overlooked. — boundless

If this just means we should be willing to question everything, I'm OK with it. I'm not OK with jumping to intellectual nihilism.

What do you think about this [matrix scenario]?

Excellent analogy. I see your point- it makes perfect sense.

Are you open to attempting to express your ideas in a more standard form? — Banno

No. IMO, that obfuscates the ontology. I did not assert the OG exists necessarily as a premise. Rather, it's necessity follows from my ontological account of contingency and the nature of the OG (here, you could refer to the facts about the OG).

Many philosophers treat contingency as the default: X exists contingently unless provably necessary. I believe this is wrong. Contingency should be accounted for ontologically. What is actually contingent in the world? Classical laws of nature necessitate the outcome, so they don't introduce contingency. If everything in the universe were a consequence of classical laws of nature, where would contingency come in?

Quantum collapse seems to have contingent outcomes (deterministic interpretations notwithstanding). But in these cases, the contingency is accounted for as I described: the thing that accounts for the outcome could have NOT produced that specific outcome. There could be other sources of contingency operating similarly.

By definition, an OG is not accounted for by anything ontologically prior, so it can't fit my assumption that contingency must be accounted for as I described.

When you translate this to facts and apply logic, it risks collapse the reasoning into the entailment of those facts.

But you could cut through all this and focus on the OG: either it is contingent or necessary. Either it's contingency needs to be accounted for or its necessity. Ignore my arguments and its a coin toss. But BECAUSE of my arguments (I have more supporting arguments, BTW). I'm on the side of it being necessary.

First let's look at the idea of ontological grounding. What we want is for an explanation as to why the world is as it is, and not some other way. If something could have been otherwise, it cannot explain why something is necessarily the case. So any ontological grounding must be necessary. But then it would be the same in every possible world. And in that case, it could not explain why this world is as it is. — Banno

Several issues.

1. An OG exists autonomously. This means without dependencies of any kind (causal or otherwise). If it had such a dependency it could not be the OG
2. For an object, X, to be ontologically contingent, there must be some C that accounts for X, but C could have accounted for ~X. Example: assume quantum collapse is not determinate, and C is a quantum collapse in which X emerged. X is contingent because C could have collapsed to Y. I express this as:
C accounts for (X or Y), or more generally: C accounts for (X or ~X).
3. If an object is not contingent (as identified in #2) then it is necessary.
4. Compare this to the outcome of a deterministic law of nature: the law: C causes X. Because it's deterministic, it means: C necessarily causes X. If C is contingent, then there X inherits this contingency (whatever accounts for the contingency of C, also accounts for the contingency of X).
5. An OG is not contingent because there is no C that accounts for the OC (that would entail a dependency - see#1). Therefore it exists necessarily.
You have 2 general choices:
6. If you embrace a version of the PSR that requires everthing to have an explanation, then you are committed to an infinite series of dependencies, and should reject the existence of an OG.
7. If you are committed to an OG, then you should reject any version of a PSR that requires everything to have an explanation. You could accept "necessary" and/or "autonomous" as sufficient explanation.

IMO, possible world semantics can obfuscate the issues. It's valid, but one should avoid conflating conceivability with metaphysical possibility. IOW, you could conceive of possible worlds with OG1, OG2, OG3 as their respective ontological grounds, but per my analysis the actual OG is the only METAPHYSICALLY possible one.

You can, of course, reject my view of contingency. But this is my basis for rejecting the theistic argument that was presented.

What kind of necessity are you referring to? There are only two kinds of necessity: internal and external; that is, logical (or inherent) necessity and causal necessity. — A Christian Philosophy

I'm referring to metaphysical necessity/possibility, which pertains to existence. Logical possibility pertains to the semantics of logic. Conceptual possibility refers to what we can conceive. Epistemic possibility refers to what is logically possible per the logical implication of a body of facts. That's the broad set of modalities.

There is no "internal" possibility - although it may refer to something like (Christian Philosopher) Alvan Plantinga's "de re necessity" -wherein he proposes "necessary" to be an intrinsic property of God. It's a contrivance to "prove" what he already believes: God exists. You're doing the same thing: contriving a metaphysical framework that entails God.

You correctly reject causal necessity because the OG has no cause. It follows that it has existence by logical or inherent necessity. Existence by inherent necessity fulfills the PSR and is not dependent on anything else.

My position is that X exists contingently (meaning it is metaphysically possible for X to have not existed) IFF there exists some C, such that C accounts for (X or ~X)

Laws of nature are typically necessitations; if C causes X, then C necessarily causes X. I.e. there are no exceptions*. Quantum mechanics seems to entail a contingent outcome: Q (a quantum collapse) results in X, but there's a suite of other results (a probability distribution) that it might have collapsed to. In this case, X is contingent; the other results that might have happened are non-actual possibilities..

* C may itself be contingent, but the outcome of its instance of caustion is necessary.
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Because nothing accounts for the OG, there are no non-actual possibilities.

You don't have to accept my account of metaphysical contingency/possibility - but this demonstrates that your proof depends on a metaphysical framework that you cannot show to be true. Your proof is thus epistemically contingent on that questionable framework.

Tautologies are necessarily true, and truth means conformance to reality. — A Christian Philosophy

The statement "The morning star is the evening star" is a tautology because both the morning star and the evening star refer to the same object. This is semantics, with no ontological implications about necessary or contingent existence. So substituting tautolgy for necessity is misleading, such as your next error:

outcomes described by the laws of nature also occur in reality, but these laws are not tautologies and so these outcomes do not occur in all possible worlds. — A Christian Philosophy

For there to be a "possible world" in which it is not the case that F=ma, there would have to be some C that accounts for the truth of F=ma, and C could have accounted for ~(F=ma) - some non-actual possibility. Here's a case where I think you're conflating metaphysical possibility with conceptual possibility (i.e. you can conceive of F=ma being untrue).

The solution to the QI vs PSR problem is discussed in this post. There is a long and a short answer. The short answer is that quantum experts themselves claim "I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics", and something that nobody understands cannot be used as a valid argument for or against anything. — A Christian Philosophy

Actually, there are multiple coherent interpretations of QM. Some treat quantum outcomes as contingent (as I described). Others treat it as a necessary outcome. My earlier comments are based on the premise the outcome is contingent. My purpose was to illustrate the concept of contingency, not to insists there is true, metaphysical contingency.

It sounds like you believe in the PSR but allow some exceptions. This is problematic because how do we decide when exceptions are made? — A Christian Philosophy

I consider the metaphysical basis of necessity/contingeny that I described to be the correct principle. The PSR generally conforms to it, but it is more vague.

Such findings resonate with philosophical perspectives that consider time not as an absolute backdrop but as emerging from the interplay between observer and system.’

Agree? — Wayfarer

Yes, but how does this differ from confirmation bia?

Your use of 'something ontological' simply means, you believe that time is real in a sense outside of any cognition of it. Even that usage is questionable. 'Ontology' refers to kind of being, or alternatively, a method for categorising types of substance or systems. What I really think you're saying is 'mind-independent'. I might agree that our perception of time reflects something real, but whatever that real is, it might well be outside of time - which we would have no way of knowing without measurement. — Wayfarer

Correct: I think time is mind-independent. From my point of view, calling it "real" is vague. My best guess would be that it's a relation between events, where events are states of affairs. Relations are ontological - constituents of states of affairs. That's why I labelled it ontological. But I didn't want to be this specific because IMO, there's no definitive view I'm willing to even tentatively commit to. But it seems contradictory to think time is "outside of time".

When it comes to the Universe as a whole, time looses its meaning, for there is nothing else relative to which the universe may be said to change. — Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right for Life, p 271

This is consistent with the Page-Wooters mechanism, which I find fascinating (I recommend reading the abstract at the link).

He's making the point that I'm making, and that Bergson makes, and Kant makes - time exists as an inextricable basis of our cognitive apparatus — Wayfarer

Here's an article Linde wrote. He's speculating about a mysterious connection between time and mind. By contrast, the Page-Wooters experiment I linked you to demonstrates an actual passage of time being experienced by the "clock" within the quantum system while externally there's no passage of time. The internal clock isn't conscious, so the passage of time isn't associated with mind - it's just a matter of being within the system.

Who knows where any of this will lead. Linde suggests it's possible some link to consciousness will be found, but that remains to be seen. I understand why his speculation appeals to you and Kuhn.

A perspective which includes a number of presuppositions, mainly drawn from science (despite your denials) or at least from natural philosophy. Hence why I say 'metaphysical naturalism' is self-contradictory - naturalism has generally defined itself in opposition to metaphysics. — Wayfarer

Yes, of course there's a number of presuppositions - it's a complete metaphysical system. As I keep telling you, the outline of the system (state of affairs ontology, immanent universals, law realism, truthmaker theory) has no dependency on known science - but it's consistent with science, and indeed it accepts scientific facts as true. How is that a problem, other than the tentative nature of scientific knowledge that scientists and philosophers agree is there? You don't have to accept physicalism. I gather it's because you want there to be more. That's fine. I'm not trying to convince you to settle for it. But personally, I don't need anything more. I'm sufficiently open-minded to know there may very well be more. I expect there IS more to reality than the analyzable portion, but the possibilities are endless -and I see no objective means of picking some to embrace. Phsyicalism is minimalist, but also the most secure BECAUSE it minimizes the speculative leaps. That's its appeal to me. You want more, but accept that not everyone feels that way.

That is exactly what it means. His profession of respect for religion is out of civility. But, he says, understand that it is subjective, comforting for those who believe it, but not true — Wayfarer

I think he was being sincere, but you can think whatever you like. If you're interested, here's the full interview. He says a little more about it, but not much.

The underlying belief is that mind is the product of physical causes - and Armstrong says it! - which I'm saying forgets or fails to realise that mind is the pre-condition of an analysis of causes. — Wayfarer

Armstrong's dead. I'm alive, and I do accept that the mind is a pre-condition for analyzing causes. But that does not falsify the theory that the mind is a product of the physical. You have admitted that physicalism is not falsifiable, so why do you keep treating these notions as if they do falsify it?

Bottom line in all of this is there is no time without mind. I — Wayfarer

You've provided no justification for that claim. Here's an unobjectionable alternative: the human perception of time would not exist if there was no mind. It's something of a tautology, but it's unwarranted to claim that our perception of time does not reflect something ontological. Remind me again how youo view the body of knowledge about natural history: the big bang, planet formation, abiogenesis, evolution, etc - the conventional wisdom is that this reflects a past time in which there were no minds. What do you accept, and what do you deny about this? Cast your answer in a way that's consistent with "there is no time without mind".

I wouldn’t say that space and time are “entirely mind-dependent” in the sense of being subjective or personal. I’m not saying they’re imaginary or arbitrary, nor that they vary from person to person. What I’m proposing is in line with the Kantian (and later phenomenological) insight that space and time are conditions of appearance—they are the framework within which any object can appear to us at all, not features of things as they exist independently of experience. That is the sense in which they're not mind-independent. — Wayfarer

I agree that space and times are conditions of appearance, and the framework within which objects appear to us (through our senses), and establishes the cognitive anchor by which we evaluate the object. But that doesn't imply there is no ontology to time or space. I won't make a rash judgement at to what that ontology is, but my sense is that this ontology applies both to ourselves and to the object we're perceiving: we're on the same moving train of time and space that the objects are. Why think otherwise? Why think this has the potential for introducing additional error? And if it does have that potential, how should it affect our analysis?

we never experience space or time themselves apart from the objects and events that are given in them — Wayfarer

We nevertheless can reason abstractly about this - consider the relation of time to whatever we're analyzing. Once again, my issue is that is that, even though agnosticism about this could be warranted, what's the usefulness - unless it suggests some direction for analysis?

Here, I’d say the value isn’t in treating our foundational perceptual and cognitive framework as "tentative" in the same way we treat scientific hypotheses—after all, as you say, we can't "revise" the basic conditions of human cognition. But acknowledging their conditional or constructed nature serves a different philosophical purpose: it helps us see the limits of objectivity, and opens space for deeper inquiry into the nature of reality and experience. — Wayfarer

This seems like the same tentativeness as any other unverifiable/unfalsifiable aspect of philosophy. That's neither condemnation nor praise. But I agree with everything you said about cultivating humility, but not so much here:

What I’m ultimately taking issue with is the pretense of objectivity in philosophy, especially where it has been co-opted by scientific materialism or physicalism. This worldview treats the human being as simply another object among objects, to be analyzed in the same terms as stars, stones, or synapses: — Wayfarer

What you consider the "pretense of objectivity" is, to me, just applying a consistent perspective from which to evaluate the world. We all have one, with varying degrees of commitment to the assumptions. But because no assumption is necessarily true, we shouldn't apply those assumptions dogmatically - we could be wrong. I think this is close to what you're going for with your call for humility.

Regarding Armstrong suggesting that humans are objects. In his ontology, they are. That doesn't mean they're JUST objects. We value other humans, the artistic creations of humans, and we value animals and the environment - these values don't disappear for those of us who believe humans are objects. (Regarding Armstrong: although he was a committed atheist, he respected religion. He said, "I have the greatest respect for it. I think it may be the thing that many people need, and it enshrines many truths about life. But I do not think it is actually true.")

It’s requirement to recover the truth that human beings are not reducible to what objective methods can say about them, because those methods themselves emerge from the activity of human understanding.

Just because our methods emerge from our understandings doesn't mean we aren't reducible, but this shouldn't be a threatening proposition - because it doesn't erase our values or the feelings we have.

Space and time are not imaginary, but nor are they properties of things in themselves. They are forms of intuition—that is, they belong to the structure of experience, not to things independently of experience. They're part of the conditions under which anything at all can appear to us as an object. In that sense, they are functions of cognition—not invented by the mind, but intrinsic to how the mind makes sense of what it receives. — Wayfarer

So...your view is that space and time are entirely mind-dependent. Is this a premise, or can you provide reasoning that entails this? Needless to say, I don't buy it.

How do you account for the past, before any human-like intelligence existed?

Your objection seems to come from a position that assumes we can somehow stand outside both perception and object, as if we could compare “the thing as it is” with “the thing as it appears.” — Wayfarer

My position (which is not what my objection is) is that we are part of the world, that are sensory perceptions deliver a reflection of that world which is interpreted by our cognitive functions in a way that is congruent to reality. From this foundation, our abstract reasoning has enabled us to identify more aspects to reality than our senses deliver (e.g. composition, relations, laws, natural history). We "make sense" of all of this through these cognitive faculties, and this entails casting these derived facts in a fashion congruent to our noetic structure (which is partly innate and partly learned). So we aren't "standing outside" perception, but we can abstractly grasp aspects of reality that are beyond our perceptions.

I would view "the thing as it is" to be the thing's composition, its intrinsic properties, and its relations to other objects. Among those relations is the way it's related to it's material and efficient causes. What I have just outlined is a "state of affairs". Are we missing something? Possibly, but my position is rational to believe unless it's either rationally defeated or an alternative explanation can be shown to be superior.

We never encounter the object “in itself”; we only ever encounter appearances—ideas, — Wayfarer

Indeed, we are encountering appearances - specifically, what our senses deliver to us, and the sense we make of those appearances (e.g. the colors, angles, etc) - but it is the object itself that appears that way to us - so we are indeed encountering the object itself. Why would you, or Schopenhaurer deny that we are actually encountering the actual object? This seems an unwarranted skepticism. My view is that we are PERCEIVING aspects of the actual object, and if this is being denied, I'd like to understand the justification for denying that.

Of course, our perceptions aren't necessarily delivering the object's intrinsic properties, but some of the actual properties are reflected to us in our perceptions. Example: color is not an intrinsic property of an object, it's a quale that gives us the capacity to discriminate, but it's physically accounted for by the wavelengths of light that are reflected from the surface. Through analysis, we are able to identify aspects of the object that do constitute intrinsic properties. Example: we might identify mass as an intrinsic property of an object. Further analysis reveals that mass may not be fully an intrinsic property, but rather - a consequence of interactions with the Higgs field. I only mention this to point out that much of what we know is tentative and subject to revision. But at each stage, we're identifying a best guess at what the object actually is - at least in some respects. A degree of skepticism is appropriate because all scientific "knowledge" (body of accepted facts) is tentative. Feel free to add an element of skepticism on the basis that our foundational starting point (our perceptions and cognitive faculties) is a step removed, but then I ask: what's the value of doing this, other than as an intellectual nod to possibility? Why treat it as tentative, like we do scientific knowledge, when there is zero chance of correcting it?

This insight—that every object is already shaped by the structures of perception and understanding—later became a stepping-off point for phenomenology which built on this by exploring how the world is always "given to" consciousness, and how even our sense of objectivity is conditioned by the intentional structures of experience.

I agree, and this is 100% consistent with everything I said. It would be absurd to ignore the role of our senses and cognitive apparatus.

So this is not just a metaphysical musing—it’s part of a serious and ongoing philosophical effort to understand how experience, meaning, and cognition are bound up with the structure of appearance itself. — Wayfarer

Again, I 100% agree. Did you think I'd disagree? Do you think any of this is inconsistent with state-of-affairs ontology, law realism, immanent universals or truthmaker theory? It's not.

Even an OG needs to fulfill the PSR. — A Christian Philosophy

That's logically impossible. There can be no explanation for an OG. It must exist autonomously - not dependent on anything else. But since the OG is not contingent, it exists necessarily, consistent with some versions of the PSR.

Even an OG needs to fulfill the PSR. This is done by the OG having existence inherently, — A Christian Philosophy

Autonomous is a better descriptor.

This self explanation does not apply to the laws of nature because they are not tautologies — A Christian Philosophy

Category error. Tautologies refers to PROPOSITIONS, not to existents.

Quantum indeterminacy (QI): QI is incompatible with the PSR. — A Christian Philosophy

Since quantum indeterminacy is likely to be real, you have a choice: reject the PSR outright, or accept the probabilistic result of a quantum collapse as adequately explained.

Ok, thanks for the clarification. But note, that, however one can still say that we have been proven wrong in our assumptions many times, even by science itself. It's obvious, for instance, the Sun and the stars revolve around us. — boundless

Of course, but it's rational to maintain a belief before it's disproven, and its irrational to reject something just because it's logically possible that it's false. This latter is my issue with idealism, per my understanding of it.

So, I'm not sure if your argument here is compelling. — boundless

It wasn't an argument to show idealism is false. I was just showing that it is rational to deny idealism. I'm struggling to find a rational reason to deny mind-independent reality exists. The only reasons I've seen so far is because it's possible. That's not a good reason. There's loads of possibilities - many of which conflict with one another. Surely it's at least POSSIBLE that mind-independent reality exists - so what's the reasoning that tips the scale away from that?

But note that, however, pragmatism doesn't imply truthfulness....the existence of an external, partially intelligible physical world is a reasonable belief to be mantained. But I do not claim certainty about this. — boundless

I agree that we can't be absolutely certain. And while I also agree that pragmatism doesn't imply truth, my impression is that idealists interact with the world pragmatically (they eat, sleep, piss, work, raise kids...) - and if so, this seems like cognitive dissonance. Why get out of bed, if they truly believe mind-independent reality doesn't exist? If they aren't walking the walk, it makes me think they're just playing an intellectual game (perhaps casting a middle finger at reality, a reality that places relatively little value on a PhD in Philosophy: "F__k you! You don't even exist! Nya Nya!).

IMO it raises interesting questions also about the nature of the 'physical', even when we assume that it is real. — boundless

The issues raised with perception and the role of our cognitive faculties are definitely worth considering. But how should influence our efforts to understand the world beyond acknowledging the role of those cognitive faculties?

note, that 'meaning' seems something that relates to mind. So, if meaning is something that relates to the physical too (and, in fact, it is something fundamental), it would seem that the 'physical' is not that different from the 'mental'. In other words, we land to a physicalism that seems not to far from a panpsychism (or at least quite open to the 'mental').

Exploring the nature of "meaning" is a worthwhile philosophical endeavor, and it seems to me that it's entirely within the scope of the mind. That's because I see its relation to the external word as a matter for truth-theory: what accounts for "truth"? I'm a fan of truthmaker theory, which is just a formalized correspondence theory: a statement is true if it corresponds to something in reality (what it corresponds to, is the truthmaker).

Now, if you consider any material object - the computer you're looking at now, the desk it's sitting on, the keyboard you're typing on: 'all this is given indirectly and in the highest degree determined, and is therefore merely a relatively present object, for it has passed through the machinery and manufactory of the brain, and has thus come under the forms of space, time and causality, by means of which it is first presented to us as extended in space and...active in time.'

You might explain the sense in which this is mistaken. — Wayfarer

Sure. It seems to conflate the object (the existent that we naturally believe we are perceiving) with the perception of the object. It's perfectly fine to draw attention to the perception process, but I object to blurring the distinction. It's unclear what is meant by coming "under the forms of space, time and causality". Is this just a reference to our cognitive interpretation? Is there some reason to think space, time, causality, and spatial extension are all imaginary?

I don't understand what is being referred to as "relatively present". Is it the perception? Is the actual object? I can't tell if this is nit-picking what "the present" is (the act of perception takes a bit of time).

In general, the whole quote appears to be applying hyperskepticism to perception - which I think entails hyperskepticism about everything. Am I misinterpreting that?

You refer to 'facts of science' in defense of metaphysical naturalism, and specifically to reject anything perceived as inconsistent with modern science (teleology, qualia, formal and final causation, to mention a few.) — Wayfarer

Consider a hypothetical metaphysical theory that was inconsistent with the "facts of science". I feel strongly that such a theory has been falsified by those facts. I use the scare-quotes because all facts of science are tentatitve- because they are falsifiable, but they are nevertheless the best available explanation for the phenomena they concern - and it would be foolish to just assume they're false, in order to embrace the metaphysical theory. A metaphysical theory needs to be consistent with everything we "know" about the world ("know" in the sense that we have a body of well-supported information).

You had claimed Metaphysical Naturalism "tries to make a metaphysical principle out of empirical methodology". Aristotelean 4-causes is not methodology, it's an analytical framework - a paradigm. It's a paradigm that modern science doesn't use - although material and efficient causes are consistent. Modern science uses a different paradigm, and its methodologies are based on this - but the paradigm is not methodology. That's a conflation. Why shouldn't MN start with the modern, successful paradigm? Why assume teleology? Why treat the form of something as a "cause", in a sense similar to an efficient or material cause? Is some fact of the world otherwise left unexplained?

You included qualia in your list. Neither science nor MB denies that qualia are something in need of explanation.

You admit that physicalism doesn't really accomodate or explain the nature of mind. ...

What I've said is that there are aspects of mind that physicalism doesn't now adequately explain. That honest assessment doesn't entail the existence of something nonphysical, and besides - you admitted physicalism wasn't falsified.

But then, when pressed about that, you say, that metaphysical naturalism is not science, even though it apparently relies on scientific ontology. Pardon me for so saying, but it seems a little disengenuous

Scientific ontology? Theoretical physics does discover things that exist, and seeks to account for them in terms of something more fundamental, so it's ontology. It's also part of the uncontroversial facts of the world that any metaphysical theory would need to be consistent with (idealist skepticism notwithstanding).

So yes, MN accepts the conclusions of modern science- but it is flexible enough to accommodate the tentative nature of those conclusions. And MN does use a paradigm fully consistent with science. Do you have a better one? I've asked for this, and you've indicated it's both difficult and out of the scope of your interests.

So I don't get why you'd think I was being disingenuous. The space between science and MN is small, but that's a point in its favor - parsimony. You denigrated the relevance of parsimony, but you offered no alternative means of evaluating a metaphysical theory. You seem to be reacting to the fact that MN dispenses with some traditional metaphysics - but this misses the point. That's a main reason why a comprehensive metaphysical theory was needed - much of metaphysical theory was inconsistent with physicalism. That fact is a feature, not a bug.

any claim about reality is necessarily shaped by mental processes of judgment, perception, and understanding. — Wayfarer

I've never disputed that. You haven't answered my question about this: how should that influence our efforts to understand the world?

Contrary to the dominant assumptions of physicalism and metaphysical naturalism, which treat the physical world as ontologically basic and knowable through objective science, this essay argues that all knowledge of the world is always already structured by the perspective of a subject. This does not mean denying the empirical reality of a world independent of any particular mind, but rather recognizing that mind is the condition of the intelligibility of any objective claim. — Wayfarer

Physicalism does assume the world is physical, top to bottom - so it fits "ontologically basic". Provide some reason to think this is false, beyond the mere possibility that our cognitive processes are delivering a false picture.

Sure, our knowledge of the world is shaped by our perspective. So what? What are the relevant implications? I've explained why I believe perceptions of any organism would provide a functional view of the world - survival requires it. And I proposed that the more congruent the worldview is to actual reality, the more adaptible it is. There's good evidence we have a more accurate view of the world than other animals, in certain respects.

You seem skeptical of our perceptions, but provided no reason for it other than by noting the processing involved and that there's a distinction between our cognitive image of the world, and the actual world. I assume that you nevertheless trust your perceptions as you drive home and select your meals. You haven't identified a problem with my "properly basic beliefs" account. So please explain why anyone should reject their perceptual world-view.

Qualia are a problem, but can be rationalized as illusions.
— Relativist

What is at issue in this rather glib statement? What's hiding behind these words? — Wayfarer

These issues: 1) we have subjective experiences that we label as "qualia". 2) There is no fully satisfactory physical account of them. 3) The absence of a fully satisfactory account of qualia does not falsify physicalism. 4) I have pondered the problem myself, and came up with the idea that qualia (their nature-what they feel like) may simply be mental illusions. Consistent with representationalism, they are still representations of something (e.g. pain represents damage) but the nature of pain- the feeling itself, is otherwise unaccounted for. Their nature seems manufactured by our central nervous system, and manifest as they do in our consciousness. That was my personal hypothesis, and then I later discovered that some physicalist philosophers had developed the same illusionist idea. It's still the best answer I have at present for a physicalist account, and it demonstrates that physicalism is not falsified by qualia. Nevertheless, I doubt any non-physicalist would embrace the theory.

You've now accused me of being "glib" and "disingenuous", both of which are insulting. Please try and be polite.

Why the need for 'interpretations' at all? Why has the problem come up? You can't deny that debates over the meaning of quantum mechanics have been boiling ever since it was discovered. If there was a definitive explanation, then what were the arguments about, and why are they ongoing? Why was this thread created? Why does it ask 'does anyone support mind-independent reality'? Why did Einstein feel obliged to ask the question about the moon existing? You're not addressing any of those questions. — Wayfarer

Do you disagree that explanations are metaphysics and unfalsifiable? An interpretation is needed because the ontological implications of QM conflict with our natural world-view. As I said, the fact that we've been able to grapple with this is a testament to our abilities to consider theory that is inconsistent with our perceptual world-view. I assume asked about the moon to highlight a perceived folly with the notion that consciousness is a factor in measurement. You may not think that notion is folly, but I'm with Einstein on this one - even though I do think "God" throws dice. Why are debates ongoing? because the matter hasn't been settled, and probably can't be - it's a philosophical question, and as you know - philosophers can't settle much of anything. Someone who believes reality is fundamentally mind-dependent can interpret it in a manner consistent with that view (I have no objection to doing this)- but doing so doesn't constitute a reason to believe reality actually IS mind-dependent - it's not a reason to think it likely.

Regarding the question posed by the title of this thread: the question seems to imply that we ought to reject the existence of mind-independent reality. Should we all do that? I certainly don't think so. Should anyone do that? I am still waiting for someone to give a good reason for doing it. You've only identified some reasons for a degree of skepticism, but haven't explained how this is more than mere possibility.

*edit* I overlooked this:

However, if you drill down, the basis of the 'conceptual analysis' turns out to be scientific. If you discarded scientific cosmology, atomic physics, evolutionary theory, and so on, what would be left of 'metaphysical naturalism'? — Wayfarer

State-of-affairs ontology, immanent universals, law realism, truthmaker theory, and the entailments of all these. IOW, it would be 100% intact.

And, for that matter, isn't 'metaphysical naturalism' oxymoronic insofar as naturalism is generally defined in opposition to metaphysics?

I gave you a definition from Blackwell that fits. Other definitions don't fit. If you don't like using the label, we can call it something else, but recognize it stands as a mutually exclusive alternative to theories you would likely label "metaphysics".

Since the laws of nature are not tautologies, they are contingent facts that need an explanation outside of themselves, i.e., a cause. — A Christian Philosophy

Tautologies are statements that are necessarily true. The term doesn't apply to existents, like an OG. The question is whether or not there is an ontological basis for an OG being contingent- meaning that it could have not existed.

If X is caused to exist, then it is contingent on it's cause, if the cause could have failed to produce X. That can't be the case for a first cause, so how else can it be contingent? You can't just assert it, because you are claiming to have a proof.

Additionally, if the OG has necessary existence, it must be the OG in all possible worlds. Thus, if the OG included the laws of nature in its structure, then the same laws of nature would exist in all possible worlds and this would result in a modal collapse. — A Christian Philosophy

Modal collapse pertains to propositions - it means that every true statement is necessarily true. From the perspective of ontology, necessitarianism would entail modal collapse. Necessitarianism means everything that exists, exists necessarily. You seem to think necessitarianism is false. Why? Provide your proof (dismissing it based on the assertion it's "frowned upon" carries no weight).

Regardless, a necessary OG does not entail necessitarianism - other sources of contingency may exist, such as quantum indeterminacy.

what I meant was that the OG is a designer that designs the laws of nature, not that the OG is designed. — A Christian Philosophy

You are claiming to prove there's a designer, so you can't just assume it. A natural OG accounts for laws of nature which exist necessarily. This remains a live possibility (thus defeating your argument) unless you can show this is impossible - or at least, less likely than a being of infinite complexity with magical knowledge (not the product of learning or experience).