Aren't ALL lies (intentional falsehoods) immoral?

So...you're saying fraud and defamation are perfectly fine, because the freedom of speech trumps them.

I had in mind saying a few of the things you discussed , but you said it all.

I brought the issue of fraud and libel to NOS4A2 in another thread, and he never responded to those points. I'm curious in any free-speech absolutist will try and rebut anything you said.

I think I have provided one, but that you're not interested in it, — Wayfarer

You haven't provided an overall metaphysical framework. When I asked, you said: "As to whether I advocate a metaphysics, it’s a notoriously difficult subject."

What is called 'reality' is not merely physical, but always shaped by mind. So, therefore, mind is truly a fundamental constituent of what we understand as reality, but in a transcendental rather than objective sense. — Wayfarer

A word is needed that refers to what actually exists. "Reality" seems the word to use. To claim reality is shaped by the mind, or is a constituent of reality (beyond the beings that have minds) is a rather drastic assumption based on pure conjecture.

Physicalism is not a falsifiable hypothesis. It's a philosophical view of the nature of reality. The central problem with physicalism is, as Schopenhauer says, that it seeks to explain what is the most immediately apparent fact, namely, the fact of one's own conscious experience, in terms of a hypothetical substance namely matter, the real nature of which is conjectural and uncertain. — Wayfarer

To me, it seems absurd to refer to matter as a "hypothetical substance", as if it's worth entertaining that it is unreal. Absurd, because it's unwarranted to believe matter to NOT be an actual substance. It seems a futile attempt to wipe our cognitive slate clean.

Any metaphysical theory - any ontology, will necessarily be "conjectural and uncertain" - it's neither verifiable nor falsifiable. That's a good reason to reserve judgement. But if that's what one is going to do, it's inconsistent to then embrace something wild that is even MORE conjectural and detached from anything we know about the world. MN takes the smallest leaps from the things we know.

As we've discussed, and you acknowledge, physicalism doesn't and probably cannot explain the nature of mind or consciousness, yet when we come to this point, that inconvenient fact is disregarded.

I said this is like trying to explain hurricane behavior using quantum field theory. There's nothing about hurricane behavior that warrants believing there to be some ontologically emergent properties or features that magically appear somewhere in between QFT and meteorology.

That post defends a perspectival form of philosophical idealism, arguing that mind is foundational to reality—not in the sense that the world is “in” the mind, nor that mind is a kind of substance, but that any claim about reality is necessarily shaped by mental processes of judgment, perception, and understanding. — Wayfarer

As I've said, it makes perfect sense to note that our PERCEPTION of reality (our image of the world) is shaped by these mental processes, but it's an unwarranted leap to claim that REALITY ITSELF is shaped in this way.

the world as known arises through the unifying activity of consciousness, which science has yet to fully explain and indeed generally tends to ignore. — Wayfarer

This sounds more reasonable than the claim that "mind is foundational to reality". But the question remains: where does this lead? I have no problem agreeing with what you said here, but how should that influence our efforts to understand the world? Our understanding will NECESSARILY be from our own perspective.

Mind independence is true on an empirical level as a definite matter of fact. But the problem with methodological naturalism, is that it wishes to extend mind independence to reality as a whole, to make a metaphysic out of it. — Wayfarer

You complained about problems with scienticism, which I pointed out is addressed with metaphysical naturalism. Then you choose to dismiss metaphysical naturalism (MN). MN demonstrates that there is no need to propose magic to explain the world. What would be the warrant to propose some UNnatural component (or foundation) of the world?

It tries to make a metaphysical principle out of empirical methodology. — Wayfarer

No, it doesn't. There's nothing empirical about MN. You're conflating scientism with MN.

Of course it does! As you've mentioned John Bell — Wayfarer

Not knowing the context, it sounds like he's referring to strict determinism as being unviable -contrary to Einstein's insistence on determinism. QM is fully deterministic - it conforms exactly according to a Schroedinger equation. The indeterminism arises when interacting with something beyond the quantum system. This is where multiple interpretations of QM step in to explain what is occurring - and these explanations are essentially metaphysical, with the same problems that any metaphysical theory has: unverifiable and unfalsifiable. No interpretation is really inconsistent with MN, unless you choose to treat consciousness as something special and magical to begin with.

As noted in the Nobel Committee's award statement, their findings suggest that "quantum mechanics cannot be replaced by any local hidden-variable theory," implying that the properties of particles are not predetermined but are defined only upon measurement. — Wayfarer

Are you conflating determinism with MN? QM is fundamental science; it is telling us something about the material world, not telling us there's something immaterial or magical.

doesn’t the idea that particles lack definite properties prior to observation strike at the very core of ‘mind-independence’? — Wayfarer

Not in the least. It shows that there are complementary properties, and that this complementarity is fundamental. The recognition that there are complementary properties is a testament to our ability to identify aspects of reality that are inconsistent with our natural prespectives - the perspectives that idealists seem to consider too constraining to grasp reality as it is.

Anyway, you are still asserting that there is intelligility without explaining it. — boundless

Here's where I explained it to Wayfarer:

what we take to be "the external world" is already shaped through our cognitive apparatus.
— Wayfarer

I agree. I've referred to this as innate, basic beliefs that are nonverbal. Arguably, these beliefs are PROPERLY basic: a product of the world as it is. If we are the natural product of the world, then of course it would produce beings with cognitive structures that enable successful interaction - so they would at least be FUNCTIONALLY accurate. The more closely this internal image of the world is to the actual world, the more flexible and adaptable the animal. When we compare ourselves to other animals, that's exactly what we see.

I am borrowing the concept of a PROPERLY basic belief from Alvan Plantinga, who uses the term to argue that theism is rational. He suggests that a God who wants to have beings that know him would instill an innate sensus divinitatus into them, by which they would know him and recognize what is true about him. This innate knowledge of God is basic (not learned), and it is basic "in the proper way" - produced by means that would be expected to produce it. This is not a proof of God (that would be circular reasoning), but rather a defense of the reasonableness of theism - that is contingent on there being such a God. If there is such a God, it means it's perfectly rational to believe in him. If there is not such a God, then belief in God is irrational (the alleged sensus divinitatus doesn't actually exist).

Analagously, if there is a world that produces living beings through natural processes, those beings would require a functionally accurate means of interacting with it - and the MORE accurate the internal picture of that world, the more flexible and adaptable the life forms. Similarly to Plantinga, this is not a proof, but it's a consistent and coherent theory that is rational to believe, even though it might be false.

And if I'm right that this is a basic belief (whether PROPER or not), then it's rational to maintain it unless defeated, and irrational to deny based on the mere possibility that it is false. — Relativist

we can't conceive anything except withing the framework of your experience and the mental faculties that 'make sense' of it. — boundless

This is unarguably true, but it doesn't imply the framework represents a false account. Consistent with evolution, it's plausible that our mental faculties came into being in order to interact with the world that we perceive and "make sense" of. Were these faculties to deceive us, we wouldn't have survived- so it is reasonable to maintain our innate trust in these faculties. Perfectly fine to keep the truism in mind, and adjust our inferences, but extreme skepticism seems unwarranted.

I acknowledge that I'm being speculative about the role of evolution - so (in isolation) this doesn't undercut idealism. But it does support the coherence of realism.

It depends on the 'ontological idealist'. Ontological idealists of this kind, for instance, are generally not solipsists and they would affirm that there is something outside our minds: other minds and their mental contents. So, perhaps, while there is no 'material' world, there is still something external of us and, in fact, there are still other minds with which/whom can interact. — boundless

Sounds like unwarranted skepticism- denying our innate sense of the external world on the basis that it's possibly false. Mere possibility is not a defeater of the innate beliefs the idealist was born with!

Right but this doesn't undermine neither idealism (epistemic or ontological) nor the argument that Bradley makes. There might be some kinds of sentient experience that we can't know but are in principle knowable. — boundless

This still relies on mere possibility. This is like a conspiracy theorist who comes up with some wild claim which he clings to because it can't be proven wrong. Only this is worse because there's no evidence to support the hypothesis.

So, the 'law of non-contradiction' is semantics?

Anyway, I believe that intelligibility also implies meaning ('making sense'). So, that's another reason why I don't understand how to explain (without assuming it from the start and leaving it de fact unexplained) how a purely physical world is intelligible. — boundless

Yes, the law of contradictions is semantics: it applies to propositions, not directly to the actual world.

How can it be that the physical world can produce physical beings that make sense of the world? The survival advantage explains the causal context. Can something physical experience meaning? I can't prove that it can, but it seems plausible to me. If you're inclined to think it cannot, then what would you propose to account for it? The problem you have is that you need to make some wild assumptions about what exists to account for it - and then I'd ask if those assumptions are truly more reasonable than physicalism?

While you distance metaphysical naturalism from scientism, it seems to me that in practice it tends to rely on scientific findings as the principal arbiter of philosophical questions—especially when appealing to parsimony to set aside questions that science cannot easily address — Wayfarer

Science relies on abductive reasoning , which is a general epistemological approach- not exclusive to science. It's explicitly used by historians, and it is the most common form of rational reasoning we engage in every day (the most obvious problem with conspiracy theories is the failure to consider all available data). There's more to abduction than parsimony, but why should it not be a factor?

Any viable metaphysical theory would need to be consistent with all known facts. Science provides a set of facts, so of course it needs to be consistent with these facts - as well as any other facts. Are there non-scientific facts being overlooked? That would certainly be problematic. But 2000 year old philosophical frameworks (e.g. 4-causes; teleology; essentialism...)are not facts, they are alternative theories to be judged against.

you seem prepared to treat the framework as the best available by default. 'Hey, it's a great car! Don't let the fact it doesn't steer bother you! Look at the panel work!' — Wayfarer

I'm open to a better framework. You haven't provided one, and indicated it's outside the scope of your interest. But you exaggerate the problems, it seems to me, because none of the problems truly falsify physicalism. Qualia are a problem, but can be rationalized as illusions. Is there a better, comprehensive explanation that is non-physical? Is there a true defeater- something that unequivocally falsifies physicalism?

That strikes me as an unresolved tension: relying on science to ground metaphysics when it appears fruitful, but retreating to a more minimal philosophical stance when its limits are acknowledged. I think that’s a structural challenge for naturalism.

as a philosophical position. — Wayfarer

I repeat: a complete metaphysics needs to be consistent with all available facts. Consider how absurd it would be to dismiss a well-supported scientific theory on the basis that it's inconsistent with some prior philosophical commitments (have you ever debated a creationist?) Again: what unequivocal facts are inconsistent with, and thus falsify, physicalism? Explanatory challenges are not defeaters, but they could be taken into account in the abductive reasoning.

I would question whether the definition you cite from the Blackwell Dictionary straightforwardly supports metaphysical naturalism per se. Framing metaphysics as “an inquiry by pure reason into a reality beyond perception” seems to align more with rationalist or even idealist traditions than with a naturalism grounded in empirical science — Wayfarer

There's multiple definitions of the term; I just sought a definition consistent with the scope of inquiry I had in mind to describe what I'm interested in, in contrast to your interests.

The point at issue was the supposed mind-independence of the objects of classical physics. — Wayfarer

Of course I believe objects exist independent of minds- and I've discussed that this seems rooted in innate, non-verbal basic beliefs. Do you truly not believe mind-independent objects? If so, why do you believe that?

Furthermore that the laws of physics were understood to be universal and not dependent on the context in which they were applied, operating deterministically in accordance with the mathematical principles discovered by Galileo and Newton (et al). — Wayfarer

I see no reason to think the most fundamental laws of nature are context dependent. When we notice a context dependency in a law of physics, it implies there's deeper law than the physics law. E.g. Newton's law of Gravity is true only within a certain context, whereas General Relativity is the deeper law.

That’s the sense in which I believe quantum theory undermines the assumption of scientific realism—an assumption that, I think, underwrites the metaphysical naturalism you’re defending. — Wayfarer

It doesn't do that, in the least.

the point was, he had to ask! — Wayfarer

I believe he asked because, at the time, the so-called observer problem was being debated.

Werner Heisenberg: "Of course the introduction of the observer must not be misunderstood to imply that some kind of subjective features are to be brought into the description of nature. The observer has, rather, only the function of registering decisions, i.e., processes in space and time, and it does not matter whether the observer is an apparatus or a human being; but the registration, i.e., the transition from the "possible" to the "actual," is absolutely necessary here and cannot be omitted from the interpretation of quantum theory."

John Bell: "Was the wave function waiting to jump for thousands of millions of years until a single-celled living creature appeared? Or did it have to wait a little longer for some highly qualified measurer - with a PhD?"

I disagree with your conclusion. That's because a natural OG, which includes the laws of nature in its structure, would exist necessarily. It's logically impossible for an OG to have been designed.

On your other point: If there is a designer with free will, it could design creatures that lack it, so it seems irrelevant whether not the designer has free will.

don't know. What's an OG? An ontological grounding...?

And wouldn't it be incumbent on those positing an OG to demonstrate the need for one? — Banno

Yes: OG = ontological ground. I don't need to demonstrate there is an OG to someone who already believes there is one.

Why? — Banno

Because he's a Christian, he believes there is an OG. I am arguing that an OG does not entail a God.

Can you show that there is no OG?

if the fundamental laws of nature existed inherently, this would result in a modal collapse, which is usually frowned upon. Therefore, the existence of the fundamental laws of nature are explained by design (type 2), and for a specific purpose. — A Christian Philosophy

Can we agree there's a first cause and an irreducible bottom layer of reality? If we start with that assumption - and call it the "ontolgoical ground" (OG), we can then entertain some possibilities. But first, let's consider whether or not the OG exists contingently or necessarily. (in all cases, I'm referring to metaphysical necessity/contingency, not to confused with conceivability or conceptual modality).

If the actual OG is contingent, then an alternative OG could have existed instead - or perhaps there could have been no OG at all.

Whatever it is, the OG cannot have been caused, because it's a first cause. Can an uncaused thing be contingent? To be contingent, something must account for that contingency - such as its cause (whatever caused it, might have not caused it). But if it exists uncaused then I suggest it must exist necessarily - any OG must exist necessarily.

You believe God is the OG, and probably agree it's existence is necessary, but there's no reason why it couldn't be something natural that includes the fundamental laws of nature in its structure. You alleged this entails "modal collapse", and dismiss this because it's "frowned upon". But how is it any different from a God existing necessarily? The only difference I see, is that a God is infinitely more complex (possessing infinite knowledge that is not the product of learning or experience) than an natural OG - which is a good reason to think it's natural.

Believing that the methods of science can be applied to the questions of philosophy is what is described as ‘scientism’. — Wayfarer

Yes, but I'm not doing that. Metaphysical naturalism (MN) provides a metaphysical context for what we know about the world. Of course, any metaphysical theory should be consistent with what we know, but the strength of naturalism is that it depends the fewest assumptions. The basic assumptions of MN are not derived scientifically (as scientism would require)- they are a product of conceptual analysis - just like any other metaphysical system must do.

My area of focus is philosophy, as I’ve outlined above. The problem with physicalism is that it begins with exclusions and abstractions. — Wayfarer

Indeed, we have different areas of focus. Mine is to seek to understand reality as a whole. I have not suggested your approach is wrong.
Physicalism doesn't exclude anything we know about the world. It "excludes" some past metaphysical assumptions - hypotheses, not established facts, but provides alternative hypotheses.

But physics... brackets out questions of meaning. Its power lies in its ability to isolate variables and describe systems independently of context... excludes is the nature of the observer — Wayfarer

Don't conflate physics with MN, or physicalism. Physics, as a discipline, does not entail the study of biological organisms, much less the way the brain and mind work.

Physicalism can't find any mind in the world it studies, because it begins by excluding it, and then tries to patch it back in as a 'result' or 'consequence' of the mindless interactions which are its subject matter and from which it seeks to explain everything about life and mind.

I would characterize it differently. MN/physicalism provides a metaphysical framework for explaining what we know about the world- the relatively secure knowledge that science provides. It subsequently applies the model to the mind. It succeeds to a degree, but it certainly has some explanatory gaps. The methodology and framework are not suitable for examining the philosophical issues most important to you. Its unsuitability is not a falsification, anymore than does the meteorological study of hurricanes falsify fluid dynamics or quantum field theory.

This exclusion could not be sustained in quantum physics, where the so-called observer problem brought the role of measurement and observation back into focus. Since then, physics has no longer provided the idealized model of mind-independent reality — Wayfarer

That's simply not true. That was a claim some made, based on a basic Copenhagen interpretation. Most today would say that an observation is just one example of an entanglement, and that the entanglement results in a collapse of the wave function (some claim there's no collapse at all, but a world branching - but that's too unparsimonious for me).

As to whether I advocate a metaphysics... — Wayfarer

Fair enough, but bear in mind that I do advocate a metaphysics - defined as "In the rationalist tradition, [in which] metaphysics was seen to be an inquiry conducted by pure reason into the nature of an underlying reality that is beyond perception," (from the Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy article on "metaphysics"). As I've said, I'm not a committed physicalist - in that I do not have faith that everything is necessarily reducible to the physical. But I consider it a default assumption because of its parsimonous ontology. Some of the most appealing aspects are: its denial of essentialism, its dispensing with a "third realm" to account for the supposed existence of abstractions, the account of laws of nature, and truthmaker theory of truth. I am interested in knowing the limits of its explanatory scope (e.g. it doesn't seem possible to explain qualia), and for that reason - I like to explore the various issues with theory of mind.

I say that part of this world-model is 'the self in the world'. We see ourselves as individual subjects in a domain of other subjects, as well as impersonal objects and forces. But that too is a model, indeed the dominant model in scientific-secular culture. But philosophy demands us to look deeper, to understand the way that even such an obvious and common-sense view is itself a construct. — Wayfarer

Agreed: it's a construct and a model. But does the model reflect truth, at least in part? Is its truth not possible? Unlikely? Untrustworthy?
Is there an alternative- with equivalent explanatory power? Most of whay I'm seeing, including the above quote, is providing a reason why it might be false. And I raise my objection again: mere possibility is not a defeater.

what we take to be "the external world" is already shaped through our cognitive apparatus. — Wayfarer

I agree. I've referred to this as innate, basic beliefs that are nonverbal. Arguably, these beliefs are PROPERLY basic: a product of the world as it is. If we are the natural product of the world, then of course it would produce beings with cognitive structures that enable successful interaction - so they would at least be FUNCTIONALLY accurate. The more closely this internal image of the world is to the actual world, the more flexible and adaptable the animal. When we compare ourselves to other animals, that's exactly what we see.

I am borrowing the concept of a PROPERLY basic belief from Alvan Plantinga, who uses the term to argue that theism is rational. He suggests that a God who wants to have beings that know him would instill an innate sensus divinitatus into them, by which they would know him and recognize what is true about him. This innate knowledge of God is basic (not learned), and it is basic "in the proper way" - produced by means that would be expected to produce it. This is not a proof of God (that would be circular reasoning), but rather a defense of the reasonableness of theism - that is contingent on there being such a God. If there is such a God, it means it's perfectly rational to believe in him. If there is not such a God, then belief in God is irrational (the alleged sensus divinitatus doesn't actually exist).

Analagously, if there is a world that produces living beings through natural processes, those beings would require a functionally accurate means of interacting with it - and the MORE accurate the internal picture of that world, the more flexible and adaptable the life forms. Similarly to Plantinga, this is not a proof, but it's a consistent and coherent theory that is rational to believe, even though it might be false.

And if I'm right that this is a basic belief (whether PROPER or not), then it's rational to maintain it unless defeated, and irrational to deny based on the mere possibility that it is false. This is irrespective of physicalism, per se.

One does not need to deny the empirical facts of science (indeed, the originator of this kind of philosophy, Immanuel Kant, did not) . But the philosophical question is about the nature of existence, of reality as lived - not the composition and activities of those impersonal objects and forces which science takes as the ground of its analysis. — Wayfarer

Different starting points: a materialist is seeking to make sense of the world at large, a world that we've mostly learned about through science. You accept that there's an external world, and that science has provided some true information about it; the physicalist metaphysics just proposes a metaphysical framework for this what we know. It seems quite successful at this. However, when extending the model to the minds, there's some problems.

Your starting point seems to be the mind itself. It appears the metaphysics of mind is what you consider of paramount importance. You focus on the deficiencies of physicalism at accounting for the mind, and it seems you therefore dismiss physicalist metaphysics because it inadequately accounts for your area of focus. From my point of view, this is throwing the baby out with the bathwater: you have no general metaphysical framework for accounting for the world at large - despite the fact that you accept the existence of the external world and that science give us some true information about it (in the vein for structural realism). You seem uninterested in such an overall metaphysical framework, whereas that is what I'm most interested in.

I'm not a committed physicalist, but I do think physicalism is the best explanation for the available facts of the world - among metaphysical systems. That doesn't means it can answer every question, but it answer more than others.

But we’re not talking about science. We’re discussing philosophy, which is crucially concerned with the human condition, with questions of meaning. — Wayfarer

YOU aren't talking about science, and it's account of the natural world, but I am. The expanse of human existence is a speck in this vast, old universe.

The human condition is worthwhile and interesting to contemplate, and we probably agree that physicalism is a poor vehicle for doing so. But similarly, from what I've seen of idealism, it seems a poor vehicle for understanding the world at large.

here’s no conflict between idealism and science: the conflict is between idealism and scientific materialism, — Wayfarer

Much of what I've seen written in this thread suggest there IS a conflict between idealism and science - the disconnect between the perceive world and the actual world. I guess there are varying degrees. The title of the thread suggests a high degree of skepticism about the external world.

I say that part of this world-model is 'the self in the world'. We see ourselves as individual subjects in a domain of other subjects, as well as impersonal objects and forces. But that too is a model, indeed the dominant model in scientific-secular culture. But philosophy demands us to look deeper, to understand the way that even such an obvious and common-sense view is itself a construct. — Wayfarer

Agreed: it's a construct and a model. But does the model reflect reality, at least in part? The model formation process does not entail falsehood. If it's a product of natural forces (however one describes this: no necessarily physicalist), I think congruence with reality is likely. If the product of something outside the scope of natural, something with intentionality, why would it produce a false model?


Is there an alternative- with equivalent explanatory power? Most of what I'm seeing, including the above quote, is providing a reason why it might be false. And I raise my objection again: mere possibility is not a defeater.

nothing comes to the human intellect already named...these philosophical pioneers agreed on this major premise: that which is first given to the senses is undetermined. — Mww

I agree language helps shape how we think about the world, I think there's something more basic in us that is pre-verbal. No one has to be taught there's an external world, and that there are individual objects. The words have to become attached to perceptions. Animals learn things without ever attaching words. Gorillas and chimps can learn to attach words (sign language) to types of things.

The appeal to 'brute fact' seems convenient but is ultimately uninformative. — Wayfarer

Appeal? It's an inference. I believe the past is finite, which implies an initial state which exists by brute fact. Likewise, I believe there is a "bottom layer" of reality, not composed of anything simpler. Whatever it may be, it exists by brute fact. I don't see how any comprehensive metaphysics can avoid brute facts (and labeling it "necessary doesn't remove bruteness").

No. He's saying - and he says it very clearly - that the world, objects, and things, ARE ideas. — Wayfarer

That sounds absurd to me. Does he provide some epistemological assumption for this claim?

Look at it from the perspective of cognitive science: cognitive sciences knows that what we instintively understand as the external world is generated by the h.sapiens brain. — Wayfarer

Agreed.

Materialism as a philosophy, fails to take this into account, or ignores it.

\
I disagree. Rather, physicalism's account of mental activity is deficient. Even it if justifies rejecting physicalism, it doesn't justify rejecting our innate basic beliefs that there is an external world that we perceive, and interact with. We naturally belief our perceptions of the world are true. What defeats these beliefs?

Whatever presents itself to our senses 'has passed through the machinery and manufactory of the brain, and has thus come under the forms of space, time and causality, by means of which it is first presented to us as extended in space and...active in time.' Space and time likewise are foundational neurological senses which allow us to orient ourselves and move around. They are real, but they also are built on an ineliminably (can't be eliminated) subjective basis.

I don't see a problem. Making sense of the world is necessarily going to be rooted in our nature. If bats were capable of abstract reasoning, the explanations they would generate would be rooted in their unique nature. These are perspectives, not falsehoods.

Physicalism attributes to the objects of perception an inherent reality which they don't possess.

Set physicalism aside, and focus specifically on what we perceive in the world. We naturally believe what perceive is real, including all the details delivered by our senses (the colors, smells, sounds, shapes, etc). Certainly the qualia are subjective, but they provide true information. A turd's stench is not an objective property of a turd, but it gives the true information that the turd is a turd, not a flower or food.

Hence, Schopenhauer's saying 'materialism is the philosophy of the subject who forgets herself.'

Materialism is an account of the world that is consistent with our perceptions and with science. What is his account of the world? How does its usefulness compare? Criticizing the deficiencies of materialism is not a justification for an alternative. It's useful only if we're seeking a "best explanation", in which case we need a real alternative to compare it to. If it's starting point is extreme skepticism about the external world, I see no utility to it.

Relativist: "Our perceptions entail only a reflection of reality, not reality itself. It is a perspective, but a perspective on what is actually there."
Bradley and Berkeley aside, I will take issue with what you say is 'actually there'. In line with what I've said above, your 'actually there' remains a conceptual construction or a sign. But physicalist philosophy overlooks this by regarding the 'testimony of sense' as indubitable. — Wayfarer

The statement of my you refer to was discussing a physicalist point of view, and acknowledging that perceptions are not identical to reality (what is actually there). My point being that, although I do not buy into idealism, I do not insist we perceive reality as it is.

It's not clear to me what Schopenhauer is addressing here:

"From such an indirectly given object, materialism seeks to explain what is immediately given, the idea (in which alone the object that materialism starts with exists), and finally even the will from which all those fundamental forces, that manifest themselves, under the guidance of causes, and therefore according to law, are in truth to be explained. To the assertion that thought is a modification of matter we may always, with equal right, oppose the contrary assertion that all matter is merely the modification of the knowing subject, as its idea."
He seems to be criticizing physicalism's inadequate account ofthoughts and ideas Is that it?

You might protest that the object is not an idea, but an actuality. But this overlooks, or rather, takes for granted, the fact that any object you refer to is identified as such, named and thereby brought into the domain of name and form, otherwise it would not constitute an object. You and I both know what it is - look, it's a hammer. It's a chair. It's a qasar. It's a neuron - but the point stands. — Wayfarer

My objection is more basic: what is the big picture of reality under this theory? Does it actually account for anything? Does it just assume it's futile to consider a broad metaphysical theory? Physicalism offers an explanation for almost everything. Does idealism explain ANYTHING?

Imagine 'how the world looks like' without any kind of sensations. — boundless

There were no sensations in the universe before life came into being.

:
Feeling, thought, and volition (any groups under which we class psychical phenomena) are all the material of existence, and there is no other material, actual or even possible... — Berkeley

This seems to entail abandoning our innate sense of a world external to ourselves. If one really believed this, why wouldn't one stop interacting with the world we're allegedly imagining? Why eat? Why work?

Try to discover any sense in which you can still continue to speak of it, when all perception and feeling have been removed; or point out any fragment of its matter, any aspect of its being, which is not derived from and is not still relative to this source. When the experiment is made strictly, I can myself conceive of nothing else than the experienced. Anything, in no sense felt or perceived, becomes to me quite unmeaning. — Berkeley

I can infer something reasonable from this: making sense of the world will necessarily be in our own subjective terms. Our perceptions entail only a reflection of reality, not reality itself. It is a perspective, but a perspective on what is actually there. Understanding can only be from our perspective (it's like a non-verbal language - a set of concepts tied directly to our perceptions), but that doesn't mean it's a false understanding. And it has proven to be productive

physicalism seems content to claim that intelligibility (which you assume here) is just a 'brute fact' that doesn't need to be explained. I disagree. So, for me, it isn't enough. — boundless

It is a necessary fact that survival entails successful interaction with the external world. Our species happened to develop abstract reasoning, which provided a "language" for making sense of the world- a useful adaptation. There may very well be aspects of the world that are not intelligible to us. Quantum mechanics is not entirely intelligible -we have to make some mental leaps to accept it. If there's something deeper, it could worse.

do you believe that universals/structure can be considered 'physical' because their 'existence' is immanent in the physical world? — boundless

Exactly. We can consider a universal by employing the way of abstraction: consider multiple objects with a property in common, and mentally subtract the non-common features. This abstraction is a mental "object", not the universal itself.

I do not deny the existence of a 'physical world', independent from our minds (i.e. which is not just mental content), but IMO it isn't ontologically fundamental.

What IS ontologically fundamental? Isn't it a brute fact? Even if it is mathematical, it's a brute fact that it's mathematical, and a brute fact as to the specific mathematical system that happens to exist.

the ontological status of math/logic is actually important in this discussion.

A physicalist perspective is that we abstract mathematical relations which exist immanently. There are logical relations between the pseudo-objects (abstractions) in mathematics, and logic itself is nothing more than semantics.

I don't think you are an anti-realist about universals....do you believe that universals/structure can be considered 'physical' because their 'existence' is immanent in the physical world?

Correct on both points.

only some idealists would claim that the physical world is reduced to perceptions and understandings — boundless

How do they justify believing this?

Physicalism is epistemically grounded in our perceptions of the world - presumably our senses deliver us a reflection of reality (so there is a bit of distinction between perceived reality and actual reality) and the success of science. It's logically possible for these assumptions to be false, but the grounding beliefs are innate - basic beliefs. Possibility alone doesn't justify abandoning them.

This specific type of idealism, however, makes no claim about how the world is 'outside' of experience. — boundless

This seems to entail denying the reality we experience and interact with, denying the basic beliefs we're born with- and isn't it solely based on the possibility these innate beliefs are wrong?

. I said that reductionism cannot explain a structured world because 'structure' is a property (if it even can be considered a 'property') of the whole, not of the parts.
It was something separate from universals. — boundless

Your view is inconsistent with physicalism. Under the physicalist paradigm, reality has a structure, and physical structures have ontological properties, but the structure (i.e. having structure vs being unstructured) is itself not an ontological property.

Particulars have properties and relations to other particulars. Properties and relations exist immanently. Two (or more) particulars can have the same property and/or relation (or sets of these) - these are universals.

Laws of nature are relations between universals; they are universals. Laws of nature entail necessitation, and they account for causation.


This framework reflects, and accounts for, the structure that we see in the world. It's not a causal account, it's a structural account.

do you believe that formal causes exist? — boundless

No. It doesn't fit into a physicalist paradigm, ontologically.

I just don't understand why many physicalists are so sure that using the term 'physical' is appropriate for the 'structure'/'order'. To me it's just equivocating the term. — boundless

"Physical" is just the label attached to the things that exists that is causally connected to everything else. Causally disconnected things are logically possible, but because of an absence of causal connections, their existence is moot and there is no epistemological justification to believe such things exist.

If you still believe there's an equivocation, please describe it.

I don't mean to do away with language - that is scarcely possible - but to be on guard against being lulled to sleep and into error by casual usage. — tim wood

Glad you don't mean to do away with language, but this "casual usage" is pertinent to a very practical (and seemingly successful) means of interacting with the world. Granted, it's a paradigm- but one that is fleshed out pretty thoroughly.

F=ma defines the physical relationship — Banno

Yes, but there is a physical relationship present that exists irrespective of us putting it into intelligible terms.

Yes, it's a definition of force, but it also identifies a physical relationship among force, mass, and acceleration- so it is predictive.

presupposed. And semper presuppositions. Without them we wouldn't get out of bed in the morning, nor into it at night. The problems arising when the presuppositions, and their nature, what they are, is forgot, and what they provide is taken for a real thing. — tim wood

Fair enough - it's presupposition, but it is POSSIBLY true. By contrast, we agree that mere description (equations) is not causitive - that's not even possible.

I claim F=ma is descriptive only and has no power in itself to make anything happen. — tim wood

I agree, but what does the equation describe? It describes some aspect of reality (if it's true).

Personally, I lean toward law realism: there exist laws of nature, which are causal relations between the properties of things. You had said:

As to QM, the language of description - which is after-the-fact and tentative - seems to be implied to have a causative power, and I do not see how that can be. — tim wood

Under the paradigm of law realism, the causative power within a quantum system is intrinsic to the quantum system: it's evolution is both necessary and deterministic.

The OP's question has to do with possible connection, reified into possible existence. Until the terminology nailed down on four corners, unanswerable in any but speculative terms. As to QM, the language of description - which is after-the-fact and tentative - seems to be implied to have a causative power, and I do not see how that can be. — tim wood

I don't understand what you're saying. Reified? That entails a fallacy. Do you mean actualized?

Under QM, a pure state quantum system evolves deterministically- per the wave function, describable by a Schroedinger equation.

Here's what I was thinking.

The things that lack explanations, are brute facts. So we should always seek explanations, but accept that there are instances where we will hit a brute fact.

Example: assume metaphysical foundationalism is true (i.e. there's a "bottom layer" of reality"). That layer is not explainable in any deeper terms.

If only SOME things have explanations, then there's not much impetus to seek one.

Where I wanted to go with this, is to narrow down the sorts of things that have explanations.

I don't think science strictly needs it to be metaphysically true for EVERYTHING to have an explanation. — flannel jesus

So some things have explanations. Seems so weak, it's irrelevant.

If a non deterministic interpretation of qm is true, then the response isn't necessarily to revise the PSR, it might just be to reject it. — flannel jesus

The PSR can be considered the underpinning of science: the pursuit of answers to why something is the way it is. So I think there's something worth salvaging.

How about grounding? A quantum collapse is grounded in the quantum system, and possibly the entity that it becomes entangled with that results in the collapse.

If that's the case, then quantum indeterminacy would seem to imply the PSR is false. However, the PSR seems generally applicable, except for this one exception, so it would then make sense to revise the PSR to allow for probabilistic determination: asserting that the outcome of a quantum collapse is sufficiently determined by a probability distribution.

As I said in my previous post, if one speaks about 'evolution' and 'evolutionary advantage' as an explanation and, indeed, if one thinks that explanation is true, I don't see how one can escape the conclusion that the 'process' considered is intelligible. — boundless

Sure, but you said you agreed that's an innate belief, reasonable to maintain:

I agree with you here. If we also give credence to the basic belief of the intelligibility of the world would imply that we assume that the world has a 'structure' that can be 'mirrored' by our mental categories. — boundless

how we have to understand that 'order'? Is it something 'physical' — boundless

It seems to me that it makes more sense to believe it IS physical, because otherwise we must make some unparsimonious assumptions about what else exists, besides the physical. I just don't get why so many are embracing idealism- it seems to depend on skepticism about the perceived world, and then makes the unsupported assumption that reality is mind-dependent. I see no good justification for believing that. Sure, our perceptions and understandings are mind dependent, but I see no justification to believe that's all there is to reality. The innate, basic belief has not been defeated, and if we merely apply skepticism- we should also be skeptical of the hypothesis of idealism.

IMO you are oscillating between a position that requires some degree of intelligibility (the assumption that there is a physcial reality) and a skeptical position which would require to abandon all attempts to rational understanding of reality.
I would say that the 'order', if we take it seriously, would not be just a 'judgement' but also a property of physcial reality itself. — boundless

No, I'm being consistent with physicalism in terms of what a property is: properties are universals that exist immanently where they are instantiated.

if intelligibility of physical reality is assumed, then, you can't 'conceive' the more elementary parts of physical world independent of anything else. — boundless

In the case of properties (universals) - you can recognize that two or more things have it. It's true that we aren't visualizing redness as a thing- we're visualizing a red surface, but we are intellectually just identifying the sameness that red things have.

But note that this does have implications, after all. If we say, for instance, that logical inference derives from physical causality, we are assuming that physical causality has the same character of 'necessity' that logical inference has. — boundless

I don't agree. Set physicalism aside and just consider the evolutionary advantage of associating effect with "cause" (something preceding) with "effect" - even in nonverbal animals. This mirrors "if....then", the most basic form of inference. This is instinctual and behavioral, and doesn't depend on a law of nature to make it so; it depends on recognizing a pattern. Humans take it a further step because of our ability to think abstractly.

"Why would the 'physical' follow the same 'rules' that make a coherent reasoning 'coherent'?" I think we're just intellectually tracking the observed regularity, and then abstracting.

you are assuming that the world has a structure/order that is amenable to rational description. But here we get the same question that I raised before in the case of causality — boundless

If the world does have structure/order, then it would be amenable to rational description.

Note that Artificial Neural Networks are still, ultimately, our inventions that are programmed by us. So, I am not sure that this can lead us to the conclusion that the world is 'orderly' in the same way as our thoughts are. — boundless

My only point here is that the capability of recognizing patterns is consistent with physicalism, so it doesn't require magic.

if one assumes that the 'order' is an intrinsic property of the world this would mean that reductionism is wrong. Parts can't be understood as 'abstracted' from their context of relations. In fact, parts must be understood as, well, being intrinsically 'parts' and, therefore, wholes are not reducible to them. — boundless

Order is not a property, per se. It is a high-level intellectual judgement. Properties are not parts. "-1 electric charge" is not a part of an electron, it's a property that electrons have. I don't see a problem with identifying an aspect (a property or pseudo-property) that 2 or more distinct objects have and then focusing attention on that aspect. Explain the problem you see.

There is logical inconsistency in both the semantics AND the acceptance of extraordinary claims with no evidence. — Harry Hindu

You're wrong. Consistency is present if a word corresponds to a concept. It's an entirely different matter as to whether or not you (and others) are willing to accept the linguistic shift. But languages evolve all the time.

If gender and sex are separate, then why is changing one's biology an affirmation of one's gender? — Harry Hindu

Physical alteration of one's body is presentation. Is biology being changed? Amputation of a leg isn't a change of biology, nor is cosmetic surgery.

why the need to change the biology and control other's speech?

“The one constant of a vibrant living language is change,” explains Gregory Barlow, President of Merriam-Webster. “We continuously encounter new ways of describing the world around us, and the dictionary is a record of those changes.” (source)

In the present case, it's a matter of having a word to denote a particular concept. If you read the word, it's to your benefit to understand what the word means- there's no control involved. If you get triggered when you see others using the term, that's your problem. If you feel to need to correct others when they use the term in the way you oppose then you are as guilty of trying to control others as anyone.

Why the need to enter female spaces - which are divided by sex, not by gender?

Those are the serious issues! The semantics is trivia. I sense that you lump it all together in your mind.

Don't you think, however, that you are assuming that this 'natural' world is intelligible, though? That is, your model, actually presupposes the validity of inferences, logical explanations and so on? — boundless

We seem to have an innate, basic belief that there's an external world that we're perceiving and interacting with. As we develop from infants, we are making sense of the world. The process continues throughout our lives, and underpins our study of nature. Maintaining a basic belief is perfectly rational, unless there's some undercutting facts. It's of course possible that we're wrong, and it's fare to acknowledge that, but possibility alone is not a rational reason to drop a belief.

If an explanation is incoherent we do not think that it can be true, or convincing. So, you can't ground logic without assuming it in the first place. It's just fundamental. — boundless

As I said, logic is semantics -a formalization, based on assigning sharply defined definitions to terms. You could question the grounding of our semantics, I suppose. But again, the grounding seems to be basic, innate beliefs. Of course we learn a language, but we have a common understanding that depends on our hardwired mechanism for perceiving the world - and similarly, rational to maintain.

IMO one might say that transcendental objects are in some way connected to the regularities of phenomena. But I would assume that it would be somewhat inconvenient for a physicalist to admit that, say, the 'laws of thoughts' are actually an essential aspect of that physical world which is assumed to be totally 'mindless'. — boundless

I've identified the specific way universals are connnected to reality, and how we manage to perceive them. This seems a better account than saying they are "somehow connected".

Regarding "laws of thought": an orderly world producing orderly thoughts, enabling successful interaction with it.

order to even recognize a pattern, you need to assume a basic capacity of recognition of 'sameness' and 'different', which actually means that a capacity of interpretation is assumed. — boundless

It seems a minor step from pattern recognition, which Artificial Neural Networks can do.

Incorrect. You want to discuss the symptom while I want to focus on the cause. If you don't value logical consistency and questioning ALL extraordinary claims that are being made, then what's the use? — Harry Hindu

There is no logical inconsistency in the semantics, if sex is defined as biological and gender is defined as what is presented and (presumably) felt. My sense is that this won't catch on, because many are like you: unwilling to accept the semantics. As I indicated initially, that's the most trivial aspect of the TG issue.

It's not semantics. It's politics. — Harry Hindu

There's a political dispute about semantics. This portion of the dispute is a waste of time- I mentioned some serious issues; this isn't one of them- it's a distraction.

Your post just re-iterates my point - that there is no meaningful distinction between gender and sex. — Harry Hindu

Your assertion is consistent with my view that part of the issue is semantics. Language can drift, and there's no right/wrong to it. So what if we move toward using "sex" in the biological sense, and "gender" to denote some self-described social role?

Accepting such semantics allows us to focus on more serious issues, such as sports (it is unfair to biological women to compete against biological males). A bigger deal would be misrepresentation: if I were young and single, I would not consider having a romantic relationship with a transgender woman (biological male) - so I consider it improper for such a person to present themselves to me in that false way. Other than that, I couldn't care less how they dress, act, or what pronouns they prefer.

A third big issue is the difficult problem parents of transgender have to deal with. Even if (as you said) it's a delusion, it could be a life-long one, and the optimal path forward is not clear.

I was casual friends with a transgender woman a few years ago. My wife and I would hang out with at a wine bar that we frequented. When she committed suicide, we learned that her parents had never accepted her choice and this resulted in some serious emotional problems. I dare say their approach didn't work.

Complexity must evolve from simplicity, Anything else results in a Ponzi scheme — noAxioms

I love this!

Under presentism, yes. But you called all those 'existing', the tense of which implies 'currently existing'. That's what I was commenting on.
Many (most?) presentists don't consider future events to exist since it interferes with their typical assumption of free will. Far be it from me to put words in their mouths; I'm not a presentist. — noAxioms

I agree there's ambiguity in the way I used "exists". Can you suggest a different term? I want to distinguish between the superset of past/present/future existents and hypothetical things that are not in that superset.

For the purpose of taking a piss or shit, yes, people should be separated. — Harry Hindu

Why can't separate stalls, with walls and doors that reach to the floor, suffice? I seen no reason to segregate hand-washing. I've been to bars that have two separate toilet facilities, but a common hand-washing area.

These traditions aren't opposed to observation or analysis, but they don’t assume that science alone defines what is real (especially because science in today's sense wasn't even understood in their day). — Wayfarer

a vision of reality informed by reflection on what it means to live and to know. Similarly, Buddhist thought offers an extraordinarily detailed and multi-layered account of mind and its transformations—yet it does so without treating mind as reducible to brain. — Wayfarer

These approaches may be useful in a psychological way (some might say "spriritual")- a potentially helpful way to approach life or reality. But I don't see that it has a superior shot at objective truth. Do you disagree?