You of all people should know that knowledge claims are not based on absolute proof, come on! — Isaac
I'm being sarcastic. There's no way to know that no one has ever had an idea for an alternate measurement standard (again, ignoring that we already know the history of this where it's not the case that there haven't been alternate, sometimes simultaneous measurement standards).
Again, this is rather disingenuous considering your usual attention to detail. — Isaac
You literally wrote, in support of there only being one measurement standard that
no one ever has proposed a different measurement standard.
And actually, something else that you're overlooking is the fact that not all rulers, measuring tapes, etc. use 127/500 of the length of the path travelled by light in a vacuum in 1/299 792 458 of a second for calibration. So it's not at all the case that there's a universal length for an inch anyway. (I'd bet anything that many ruler manufacturers aren't even aware of the official standard that an inch is 127/500 of the length of the path travelled by light in a vacuum in 1/299 792 458 of a second. They probably just use some sort of template they have on hand.)
Again, you're ignoring my argument re moral foundational principles vs moral 'views'. Abstenence from sex before marriage is a moral view with normative weight, but no one (and I mean no one) is simply born, or grows up with a gut feeling that they should abstain from sex before marriage. The position derives from more foundational ones (we should seek to follow the Bible, we should resist carnal temptation as a virtue, we should not cause harm to others - presuming such an act would result in harm, etc...). Even some of those will be based on even more foundational beliefs. — Isaac
I'm not a foundationalist, first off. Not just for ethics, but also for epistemology in general, I more or less buy Quine's "web of beliefs" view. When I talk about foundational view, I'm talking about that in a relative context, where it's something serving as a foundation in a particular instance. That's how I believe we reason. With "moveable 'foundations'" in a complex web of beliefs/stances. ("Moveable 'foundations'" are a bit like "moveable 'do'" in solfege if you're familiar with that.)
No moral stance has to "grow out of" or be based on any other moral stance, especially in a given instance.
The foundational view is another big gaffe that grows out of mathematics fetishism.
So when we discuss normative moral positions we make an assumption about shared foundational beliefs — Isaac
All that it means to discuss normative moral positions is to talk about what we feel should or ought to be the case. It has absolutely nothing to do with sharing anything. Sharing anything has no normative weight. In other words, normatives (shoulds, oughts) don't actually have anything at all to do with statistical norms. Or, another way to say that is that statistical norms (or you could say sharing, including proportionate to how widespread it is) in no way imply, suggest, etc. anything about what should or ought to be the case, or what is correct/incorrect, in the sense of what you ought to or should do.
This is too long already, I've already said most of this stuff, and we're getting nowhere, so I'm leaving it off at that for now. I don't like ignoring parts of posts, but don't drone on and on.