(keep it on the down-low, but it was pretty much spam as soon as you started parsing everything I said as question-begging and everything you said as an explanation, despite it being structured just the same)

You said the above in reply to points that weren’t even about properties. — AJJ

Aside from the fact that anything we talk about in any respect, any changes we talk about, is talk about properties, the specific example at hand was a banana changing color.

I'm not a scientist but Newtonian physics applies at the quantum level. If I'm correct that means particles, their position and velocity, are deterministic in behavior. — TheMadFool

So one comment is that "I'm not a scientist" should be emphasized there.

Why are you proposing that quantum mechanics is deterministic, exactly?

I cannot handle these interactions. I am also deleting my social media accounts, discord, etc. it is too distressing psychologically — rlclauer

It seems to me that in essence your arguments take this form:

Premise: You’re wrong.
Conclusion: I’m right. — AJJ

C'mon, be serious, at least.

He wants to make sure he takes all of his toys with him.

OK. But I consider those question-begging statements and so not valid objections to what I’ve been relating. — AJJ

You don't understand what question-begging is, really.

It kind of seems like your view is always slanted towards some very stock religious arguments, really. And you see anything outside the scope of that as question-begging.

I just parse it as having different preferences than you.

Because on the face of things the brownness of a banana doesn’t exist while the banana is yellow. So the change on first consideration seems a case of something (the brownness) appearing out of nothing, which isn’t logically possible so change must be an illusion (Parmenides). But change isn’t an illusion - it’s obvious. So how does it occur? Aristotle seems to have given a very good answer to that. — AJJ

Aristotle and Parmenides? No wonder you're in such a mess here.

Properties are characteristics of matter and matter's dynamic relations (always-changing structures) with other matter.

No. — S

Haha, okay. So how would any ethical stance be incorrect. You simply set a requirement that you then fulfill with your stance.

Only in a relativist sense. — S

You buy that there's a non-relativist sense?

So if the requirement to not ban any speech is fulfilled, is that correct?

Why would anything need to allow or "enable" change? That's what you need to explain. Why you'd think that.

it can be and has been explained in at least one way, as described above. — AJJ

But it's not explained by something that's incoherent. An existent non-actual is incoherent.

Not changing isn't a default. We don't need an explanation for what "allows" change, as if it would need to be allowed.

That things change is obvious, but what allows them to is less so. — AJJ

Why in the world would you think that "something allows" things to change, as if not changing would be the default that we need permission to depart from?

"Explaining" something obvious by making up something incoherent seems perverse.

There is no purpose to reasoning though, it doesnt matter how a person arrives at any ethical/moral position, or even that they make any attempt at all to make sense. If you arent concerned about being consistent with reason, in what way are you not abandoning it? — DingoJones

In other words, I'm just descriptively saying that we reason about things we at least temporarily take to function as foundational moral stances. Which is true. We do that.

I'm not endorsing or prescribing reasoning about foundational moral stances, especially not as a way to arrive at moral stances with "more normative weight" or anything like that.

Re the illusion, the distinction that morality is something different than the way you feel is an illusion in your view right? Im not talking about the feelings themselves as being an illusion. — DingoJones

Yes, but morality is the feelings/dispositions we have. Again, ceding moral talk to people who want to assert that morality is something "more" than that isn't something I'd go along with.

I disagree. What makes it incoherent? — AJJ

The fact that it makes zero sense. You have to posit more incoherent nonsense a la an "immaterial" realm.

It would be like arguing that it's a fact that brown or yellow bananas are colorless, only not in the actual world, but rather in the "esoteric realm."

Can he sing?

It's not a category error because there is something to get correct or incorrect, namely the issue under discussion. I'm correct and you're incorrect. — S

What would getting a moral stance correct amount to?

They exist potentially, in the way the brownness of a yellow banana exists potentially. It isn’t actual, because the banana is yellow, but it obviously can be. — AJJ

The problem is that the brownness of a yellow banana doesn't exist in any manner prior to it being actual, and saying that it does is incoherent.

So do you abandon all reason and sense when ethics are involved? — DingoJones

I didn't address that again because I'd say the same thing I said earlier ("People will reason from stances that they take to be foundational in a given instance (what people treat that way can change on different occasions)_._._._plus the three later paragraphs from that same post). So it's not that you abandon reason, but there can't be a stance that's wrong (alethically)/incorrect/mistaken etc. via reason.

Ethics isn't an illusion because it's really a way that we feel/think about things. It's just like saying that our emotions in general aren't an illusion.

I think possible worlds exist independently of the actual world, yeah. — AJJ

But you'd say they don't actually exist . . . which seems impenetrably incoherent to me.

Yes, but only potentially as opposed to actually. — AJJ

So you're claiming that potentials exist as something "independent" basically?

So you don't actually believe that morality/ethics is subjective. Probably because you don't actually believe that reason/rationality is subjective. Maybe you'd say you would call them that, but you can't be using the terms in the same way I'm using them.

It's not a category error. I'm arguing that it's correct to disallow it, meaning I think that it should be disallowed. — S

It's a category error because there is nothing to get correct or incorrect.

Two different things are noted to be similar in some respect. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Similar in some respect isn't entirely different than it, of course. (Although I did miss his "not.")

All the properties of a possible world would have to be non-physical. — AJJ

Sure. So is there a spatial location of your computer in the possible world you mentioned?

My view is potentials have being, but in a sense analogical to the sense in which actuals have being: not in the same way, but not in an entirely different way. — AJJ

An analogy that's entirely different than what we're analogizing?

You asked what properties non-material existents can have. On my view possible worlds are non-material existents and have properties in the way I described. — AJJ

Ah, okay, so in a possible world sans the blue mug, is there a spatial location of your computer, for example? So that you'd be saying that spatial location is a nonphysical property?

You think someone thats not making any sense at all is still valid in their moral views?? — DingoJones

Logically, yes. Traditionally, in logic, any argument with contradictory premises is valid. That's because the logical definition of validity is that validity obtains just in case it's impossible that the premises are true and/or the conclusion false. That's the whole idea behind "everything follows from a contradiction" (aka the "principle of explosion").

Re not changing the language, etc., the belief that there's anything other than feelings to morality is what's mistaken and what's a misunderstanding what we're saying when we "do morality." Abandoning the language would be surrendering to an "objectivist co-opting" of the language. I think it's better to understand what's really going on when we make moral utterances.

Right, your self is not identical through time--nothing is.

I have no idea what that's supposed to have to do with our last two posts.

Ya, that's the common view, viz, that consciousness is a function of the brain. — Sam26

Right, and that's my view, too. It was refreshing to see it just assumed on a show like that, because it gets so much opposition here.

Who is this 'I', then? that that sentence applies to? All 'you' see is what you see now. Someone else would be seeing parts of that set of everything...
or? — Coben

Yeah, your self is dynamic, too.

would it be fair to say you see the hoop of leather as equivalent to the Heraclitian river? — Coben

I see everything as equivalent to the Herclitian river, really. ;-)

"Just" = "only" = "it's not something else than"

In other words, it's not really the same thing. That's only an abstraction. It's a way we think about it, by way of performing an abstraction.

It starts with trying to make sense of the notion of any nonmaterial existent. No one who posits nonmaterial existents will even posit any positive properties that they're supposed to have. ("Positive property" refers to saying properties they're supposed to have rather than listing properties they do not have, that is, rather than defining them via negation of physical properties.)