All the properties of a possible world would have to be non-physical. — AJJ

Sure. So is there a spatial location of your computer in the possible world you mentioned?

Two different things are noted to be similar in some respect. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Similar in some respect isn't entirely different than it, of course. (Although I did miss his "not.")

Ah - I see what you’re saying now. Well that’s fine, I don’t mind being in agreement with anyone on that point. But some nominalists such as Terrapin claim that abstract objects don’t exist in any sense, which I do disagree with.

Well, that's the trick.

I mean they are always entirely different, despite any similarities they might have. No matter how similar I am to the penguin, I am in no way the penguin. The idea similarity overcomes or eliminates entire difference is an illusion.

So is there a spatial location of your computer in the possible world you mentioned? — Terrapin Station

Yes, but only potentially as opposed to actually. It could have a physical instantiation but it doesn’t.

Yes, but only potentially as opposed to actually. — AJJ

So you're claiming that potentials exist as something "independent" basically?

So you're claiming that potentials exist as something "independent" basically? — Terrapin Station

I think possible worlds exist independently of the actual world, yeah.

I think possible worlds exist independently of the actual world, yeah. — AJJ

But you'd say they don't actually exist . . . which seems impenetrably incoherent to me.

They exist potentially, in the way the brownness of a yellow banana exists potentially. It isn’t actual, because the banana is yellow, but it obviously can be.

They exist potentially, in the way the brownness of a yellow banana exists potentially. It isn’t actual, because the banana is yellow, but it obviously can be. — AJJ

The problem is that the brownness of a yellow banana doesn't exist in any manner prior to it being actual, and saying that it does is incoherent.

I disagree. What makes it incoherent?

I disagree. What makes it incoherent? — AJJ

The fact that it makes zero sense. You have to posit more incoherent nonsense a la an "immaterial" realm.

It would be like arguing that it's a fact that brown or yellow bananas are colorless, only not in the actual world, but rather in the "esoteric realm."

It would be like arguing that it's a fact that brown or yellow bananas are colorless, only not in the actual world, but rather in the "esoteric realm." — Terrapin Station

I disagree. The positing of potentials is a way of explaining change - a yellow banana can become brown because it has that potential. The potential can’t be actual, because then the banana would be brown, so rather it has to be potential and exist in a different way to what is actual.

"Explaining" something obvious by making up something incoherent seems perverse.

That things change is obvious, but what allows them to is less so. Parmenides thought change was an illusion, then Aristotle managed to give that explanation above of why it isn’t. You say it’s incoherent, but since you haven’t explained in what way I have nothing to argue against, so I simply reject your objection.

That things change is obvious, but what allows them to is less so. — AJJ

Why in the world would you think that "something allows" things to change, as if not changing would be the default that we need permission to depart from?

as if not changing would be the default that we need permission to depart from? — Terrapin Station

I don’t know what you mean by this.

Not changing isn't a default. We don't need an explanation for what "allows" change, as if it would need to be allowed.

Not changing isn't a default. — Terrapin Station

I agree. Change is the default, so we start by explaining it. You don’t need to explain it if you don’t want to, but it can be and has been explained in at least one way, as described above.

That things change is obvious, but what allows them to is less so. — AJJ

Wouldn't that merely be space?

How would space alone enable change?

it can be and has been explained in at least one way, as described above. — AJJ

But it's not explained by something that's incoherent. An existent non-actual is incoherent.

Why would anything need to allow or "enable" change? That's what you need to explain. Why you'd think that.

Well if there's no space for motion, there's no space for change.

If there is nowhere to go, but where you're standing - you can't change position.
Likewise for all things - if they don't have any space but the occupied space, how would they motion?

Why would anything need to allow or "enable" change? That's what you need to explain. Why you'd think that. — Terrapin Station

Because on the face of things the brownness of a banana doesn’t exist while the banana is yellow. So the change on first consideration seems a case of something (the brownness) appearing out of nothing, which isn’t logically possible so change must be an illusion (Parmenides). But change isn’t an illusion - it’s obvious. So how does it occur? Aristotle seems to have given a very good answer to that.

Well if there's no space for motion, there's no space for change. — Shamshir

Sure, physical change seems always to require spatial movement. But that alone wouldn’t account for change, which seems to require there be potentials becoming actuals.

An existent non-actual is incoherent. — Terrapin Station

Only if you assume a univocal use of the word “existent”. Words can be used analogically, so a potential doesn’t need to be said to have being in precisely the same way something actual does.

That 'becoming' still entails space.

There's the 'actual' frame in play, and then there are the 'potential' frames. Now if all frames were to occupy a single slot, the object would appear static, but if we were to space and layer them - they would motion.

That 'becoming' still entails space. — Shamshir

I agree - but your contention was that it is “merely” space that enables physical change, which is what I disagreed with.

Because on the face of things the brownness of a banana doesn’t exist while the banana is yellow. So the change on first consideration seems a case of something (the brownness) appearing out of nothing, which isn’t logically possible so change must be an illusion (Parmenides). But change isn’t an illusion - it’s obvious. So how does it occur? Aristotle seems to have given a very good answer to that. — AJJ

Aristotle and Parmenides? No wonder you're in such a mess here.

Properties are characteristics of matter and matter's dynamic relations (always-changing structures) with other matter.