what the being sees is always an experience of the being, so even though the being may encounter the phenomenon of "just a tree", — leo

I agree with that, because I believe that we're beings with bodies situated in a world, in relationships with things that are not us, where our perception works via our senses in particular ways, etc.

Again, this is different than the experience qua the experience, which can be of just a tree. The above is a theoretical account of what's going on.

Hence asking a question about experiences qua experiences versus theoretical accounts of what's going on with those experiences.

(And I already explained this to you above.)

Knowledge is awareness of present intelligibility. Intelligibility is grasping. Grasping is being aware. So Knowledge is awareness of present awareness basically. Or we could say grasping of presenting grasping.

That's gobbledygook.

I'd like to have a conversation with you, but if you're just going to keep falling back on word salad/gobbledygook it's pointless.

Also, why would you be conflating knowledge with experience or perception anyway? Are you using "knowledge" strictly in the "acquaintance" sense?

To be grasped — Dfpolis

Grasped in what sense? "Intelligible" conventionally refers to understanding. How are you conflating understanding with experience or perception?

Understanding makes sense in semantic contexts, and it makes sense in the sense of, say, being curious about how something works and then discovering/being aware of that information. How would you apply it to experience or perception in general?

The content of an experience is the intelligibility actualized in it. — Dfpolis

What in the world is that supposed to refer to? It seems extremely gobbledygooky to me, probably because it's resting on theoretical views that I don't at all buy.

One thing that's going to make this confusing, by the way, is that a lot of people are going to read comments from a Kantian perspective, when not everyone buys or is speaking from that perspective.

For example, as Michael is quoted above, he says, "objects of perception – known as 'phenomena'" a la Kantianism. But that's not the only way to use the term "phenomena." Synonyms for common senses of "phenomena" (or the singular "phenomenon") include "occurrence, event, happening, fact, situation, circumstance, case, incident, episode, appearance, thing"

Personally, I don't buy any sort of phenomena/noumena distinction, no appearance/reality distinction. Appearances are what things are really like from some reference point, and there's always some reference point.

The content of an experience can be just a tree, but an experience is more than its content. — Dfpolis

What is that supposed to mean? It seems kind of nonsensical to me. What's the difference between "content of an experience" and "an experience"?

I guess Terrapin would disagree with that, he says he encounters mostly phenomena of direct things, for instance the phenomenon of "just a tree", not the phenomenon of "light traveling from a tree towards our eyes", so how does a realist conclude that everything he sees is light reaching his eyes? — leo

I'm not sure what post that was from (I just saw it because Harry Hindu was responding to it).

The question I was asking Dfpolis was about phenomena or phenomenal experience per se (though again, "experience" has a lot of baggage I was trying to avoid). The reason I was asking him that was that the first post of this thread seemed to be from the old idealist/representationalist/at-least-agnostic-on-realism standpoint, where he seemed to be saying that we can only know experience as mental events that we have. That's not what phenomena are at all limited to for me. I often have zero notion of something mental going on.

That's not saying anything about whether we perceive trees via light traveling to our eyes. But that's an issue of "what's really going on." The phenomenon, qua the phenomenon, isn't of light traveling from the tree to your eyes. That's rather theoretical.

. Of course the realist view sees it as a mental disorder ("there is only one reality — leo

Remember that I'm a realist, but a relativist/"perspectivalist." There is only one reality, but it's not identical at any two different reference points.

Realism also doesn't imply anything about "always sticking to the same beliefs." I'm not even sure where you'd be getting that notion from.

The tree as an independent existent being is ontologically prior, — Dfpolis

I don't know why this is so hard, but I'm not asking you anything about that.

The phenomenological encounters always involve a subject. — Dfpolis

This is what I'm asking you about. So your answer to "Isn't there (for you) sometimes just a tree phenomenally" is actually "No," it's not "Yes."

For me, phenomenally, sometimes there's just a tree. There's no subject.

To have a phenomenon, an appearance, there has to be a subject to which something appears. — Dfpolis

There's not always a subject for me phenomenally. In fact, quite often that's the case.

So then the issue is why our phenomenal experience is so different. I can't imagine having a phenomenal sense of a subject 100% of the time. And it seems that you can't imagine sometimes NOT having the phenomenal sense of a subject.

This sounds more like an "I'm really high conundrum."

Just like the conundrum, the answer to it would depend on what fantasy scenario you want to make up. Again, being really high often helps for this sort of thing.

Put forth a duration. — creativesoul

The changes/motion that are happening, versus the changes/motion that happened already or the changes/motion that have yet to happen, from the reference frame in question.

Remember that time is simply changes/motion. Time measurements are simply an issue of comparing one (set of) changes/motion to another. The present is the changes/motion that are happening, versus those that happened or those that have yet to happen.

The tree in the first instance does not simply exist, it exists in relation to me. — Dfpolis

But this is the very question I'm asking you. Isn't it ever just that there's the tree, and not the phenomenon of "the tree in relation to me." If I'm asking you if it's ever that there's JUST the tree, you can't say "Yes, that's sometimes the case" but add "it's always in relation to me"--because that latter part isn't JUST the tree, it's something else, too.

I'd say that sometimes there's just the tree (well, and just the stuff around it, too--the grass, etc.)

You were saying that moving away from realism requires theoretical explanations, but so does sticking to realism as soon as you invoke false beliefs or hallucinations. — leo

I never said otherwise. Idealists pretend it's not the case and that idealism is clearly the default however.

What's important to realize is that we have to make theoretical moves in our philosophy of perception, our basic stance on realism/idealism, whatever our stance is. Once you realize that, we can deal with the reasons why we'd choose one construct over another.

You were guessing that I was arguing that one choice didn't involve invoking theory at all, while the other did. That's not at all what I was doing. I'm trying to get "your side" to admit that you're making choices based on theoretical options. It's worth exploring how you're arriving at the theoretical options you're arriving at, what those theoretical options imply, why you'd choose them over other options, etc.

so it could be interpreted as saying "X is proven to be true" — leo

Again, anyone with a decent science or philosophy of science education is going to know that empirical claims aren't provable, and we're no longer doing science if a claim isn't at least hypothetically open to revision.

So, dreaming does not count as perception, but imagination? — Janus

A common connotation of "perception" is that it's referring information obtained via one's senses--via your eyes, ears, nose, mouth, or via touch.

Don't fall for that crap. If one cannot step into the same river twice then s/he cannot step into it even once. — creativesoul

How would that follow, exactly?

true beauty is that which satisfies every aspect of our being-ness, — BrianW

Now there's a phrase that'll make one's eyes roll back in one's head.

I'm not missing that point because in that post I put on the realist shoes, so to speak. Remove the "out there" if you want, the point still stands, in realism encountering the phenomena of a ghost or of a god or of water means that they refer to real things. — leo

That would have nothing to do with anything I was talking about, but it doesn't follow. Realists don't believe that we can't have false beliefs, that we can't experience hallucinations, etc.

First, you're missing the point that if you're positing an "out there" (versus an "in here") you're a realist.

I just don't get why you wrote that anyways. — schopenhauer1

The context was a discussion about values and whether they're changeable via argumentation. For some reason you wanted to agree on what philosophy was first. So I thought, "Ohhhkay" and I agreed, but I pointed out that I hadn't said anything about what philosophy was in general, and just in case you were thinking that philosophy in general tended to imply something about normative values (otherwise why were you bringing up a characterization of philosophy in general?), I was stressing that MOST of philosophy isn't about values, period, and SOME of the philosophy that's about values isn't taking a normative approach. (Also not all philosophy about values is ethics, by the way.)

To convince me of this, we'd need an argument for it, and because of what it's claiming, the argument would have to appeal to empirical evidence as well.

"Examples" wouldn't cut it.

It's a notion that I believe is seriously in error. Beauty is a subjective assessment that individuals make about things. It has no objective correlate.

My point was that while the form of these is different, their matter is the same. — Dfpolis

This makes no sense to me. The first is just a tree. That's all it is phenomenally. The second is phenomenally the tree plus phenomenally the notion of a self, an I, the notion of a perception (or if you want to say a judgment).

Just a tree doesn't have a notion of self, of perception, etc.

So how are they the same?

One of the most important things to learn when doing philosophy (or anything, really), is that something isn't correct just because someone (including someone important/famous/respected/etc.) said it.

No problem.

Does it make sense to you that "(Just a) tree" is different than "I am perceiving a tree"?

So the experience (again, I was trying to avoid that word--we could just say the phenomena) of:

<<(just a) tree>>

would be different than the experience (phenomena of):

<<I am perceiving a tree>>

Does that make sense to you?

You're arguing that normative ethics is most of philosophy?

This is a good illustration that you're not reading others' comments very closely.

I said that MOST of philosophy is not about the normative sense of values. That's different than saying that NO philosophy is about the normative sense of values.

And then I said that SOME philosophy that deals with values is only about values descriptively. This doesn't imply that I'm claiming that ALL philosophy that deals with values in only about values descriptively.

That was a lot to type that shows nothing at all as to whether you now understand what I was asking you.

All I'm interested in is whether my post made it any clearer to you what I'm asking you. Because I want to ask you what I did (ask you), I want you to answer it, and I want to move on with that as a starting point. Otherwise I can't get at what I'm trying to get at with you.

Again, what showed that you didn't understand what I was asking you was this comment: "I think it is naming, not theorizing. In what way does 'this is something I'm perceiving' go beyond our experience?" That question doesn't make sense in the context of the question I asked and your initial response to it.

Just to make it clear, I asked, "The first thing I'd wonder is if that's really the way all phenomena are to you. For example, it's never for you just that there's a tree, say. It's always that you have something like 'I'm a conscious entity, aware of a tree' present? For me, there's often just a tree (or whatever)."

And you said, "Yes, trees are often just present."

So "In what way does 'this is something I'm perceiving' go beyond our experience?" doesn't make sense in the context of the question I asked and your initial answer to it. "Just a tree" is not the same thing as "This is something I'm perceiving."

That suggests that maybe you didn't really understand the question.

Please, normative ethics such as Kant's deontology, Mill's utilitarianism, and virtue theory are debated constantly, as are their applications, and applied ethics in general. — schopenhauer1

What would you say this has to do with the comment of mine you're quoting? You seem to be presenting it as if you're disagreeing with something I wrote. Do you believe you're disagreeing with anything you just quoted from me?

But I'm not sure that's a useful distinction. — leo

Well, the "if I know something I don't believe it" sense of "believe" is just stupid, yeah. So I don't think it's very useful, either, aside from understanding some stupid stuff that some people say. I'm not endorsing the distinction. I'm pointing out that some people make it, and you appeared to be using it.

Empirical claims are not provable, by the way. Anyone who took Science Methodology 101 should know this. This doesn't imply that we don't know anything, or that we can't know things with conviction, etc.

Before I do that, are we going to agree that philosophy is basically based on argument and dialectics? — schopenhauer1

Sure. I hadn't said anything about that, by the way. I just said that you can't change someone's values via argumentation. Most of philosophy isn't about the normative sense of values. And some philosophy that deals with values is only about values descriptively (so it's not the normative sense).

Are you asking, has anyone who has held one set of values been convinced through argument to hold another set of values? — schopenhauer1

Yes I'm asking for an actual world example of that if that's the part of my post that you're disagreeing with.

Note that I'm not saying that folks' values can't change. I've just never seen them change via arguing with them.

Um, in philosophy, debates and arguments are pretty much its foundation. It's essentially built on dialectics, starting with Socrates. So your characterization is wrong there. — schopenhauer1

If you're just disagreeing with the notion that you can't argue someone to different values, show me an actual world example of doing so.

How do you define belief then, if not by "acceptance that something is true"? — leo

The issue isn't that. The issue is that the common Internet religion discussion sense of belief (at least as promoted by some atheists) is that belief necessarily is faith-oriented.

The common epistemological sense of belief is NOT that belief is necessarily faith-oriented. Belief is often empirical evidence, logic, etc. oriented.

The dichotomy here doesn't allow that something can be BOTH empirical evidence-based and faith-based.

The common Interneet religion debate sense of belief has it that faith only pertains when there is NO empirical evidence or logic to back something up.

I can only try to convince you that prior to birth, preventing harm for a future person is all that matters and I have presented a lot of arguments for this idea. — schopenhauer1

Mattering is subjective though. No fact can imply that anything matters or doesn't matter. It's an issue of what an individual values. The things they value matter to them. You can't "argue someone to different values."

And belief is also separated from empirical evidence and logic to some extent, — leo

Not in epistemology when we're talking about knowledge in terms of justified true belief for example.

So it turns out that you are using the sense of belief that I suggested. But that's not the sense that I'd use or that Moliere was using.

In the common epistemic sense, it's incoherent for anyone to assert something like, "2 + 2 = 4 is true" while also asserting, "I do not believe that 2 + 2 = 4." In the common Internet religion debate sense, you'll often run into atheists who'll say "2 + 2 = 4 is true, but I don't believe that 2 + 2 = 4, I know that 2 + 2 = 4," where among other things, they're obviously ignorant of the jtb characterization of knowledge.

No one is talking law though, j — schopenhauer1

The reason I brought it up is that if one is curious, one might read " I certainly wouldn't use 'creating the possibility of harm' as a moral hinge," and then wonder what my stance would be on legislating against potentials, since that's a popular track that many people are in favor of, and that might lead to wondering what my view would be on negligence laws. I gave the info so folks wouldn't have to ask.

What I think you are really trying to convey is you have problems with basing decisions on only considerations of harm and not the potential for good experiences as well. — schopenhauer1

I wasn't trying to say that. I very literally did say that.

Any other "hinge" consideration would be selfish and of no moral worth. — schopenhauer1

"Of no moral worth" is not true, because that solely depends on what an individual assigns moral value to. Anyone can assign any moral value, positive or negative, to anything. And they can't be wrong in that, because there are no (normative) moral value facts. There's no valuation to get wrong.

You don't really believe that moral valuations are subjective, because you write things such as, "Creating people to manipulate and exploit them for an agenda is just wrong."

I don't see a fundamental difference between belief and faith — leo

As I just wrote " faith (where that's being separated from empirical evidence, logic, etc.), "

But that's not what he said. He said "X" is true because there is evidence that supports it: — leo

I'm guessing you're reading "belief" in a sense that it often appears in Internet religion debates, where you'll run into atheists who want to say that they don't believe anything, because they're taking belief to only refer to faith (where that's being separated from empirical evidence, logic, etc.), and they want to claim to not buy anything on faith.

That's not how belief is used in epistemology when we talk about knowledge being justified true belief.

I think it is naming, not theorizing. In what way does "this is something I'm perceiving" go beyond our experience? — Dfpolis

So something wasn't understood about the question I'm asking.

First, just to clarify, I was referring to phenomena that are present in general. Whether those phenomena are "experience" qua experience or not needs to be left unanalyzed for the question I'm asking. (The point here is merely that the term "experience" can come with a lot of connotational baggage that I'm trying to avoid, because otherwise one won't understand the question I'm asking.)

And then the question was whether sometimes the phenomena that are present aren't simply things like trees, rivers, etc.

This is to say that the phenomenon present sometimes is not "I am perceiving this tree," but simply a tree. In other words, there's no conscious notion, awareness, etc. of perceiving something per se (or of conceiving, etc.) There's just a tree.

If it's the case that the phenomenon present can sometimes just be the tree, then the phenomenon present on that occasion will not be "I am perceiving a tree." So, for those occasions, "I am perceiving a tree" is doing something theoretical (as I'm using that term) that isn't present in the phenomenon it's about.

Exactly. I say that plenty of things are true because there is supporting evidence, but I wouldn't say that any empirical claim is provable.

Yes. I guess a better question than where is how individuality happens. I think that was the subtext. — Noah Te Stroete

So, if we have two arbitrary things, the only way for them to not be individual(s) is for them to somehow literally be the same thing in some respect. But it's difficult to grasp how that could be the case. So the "how" is kind of "they can't help but be individual(s), because being the same thing would be incoherent." Basically it's a brute ontological fact.