Having no good reason to doubt something. — Andrew4Handel

Then why wouldn't you accept that for some people, there's no good reason to doubt the nature of consciousness, whether Gods exist, whether there's an afterlife, etc.?

Who exactly is the something or someone capable of granting consent in the bomb example? — khaled

The person in the location where the bomb goes off. That would be a person who exists who is normally capable of granting or withholding consent.

They're not "a person who doesn't exist yet."

Alright. Explain this one then. Why did you say planting a bomb to explode later in a public park is wrong? — khaled

I didn't say that. You didn't understand that comment. That was an example of a consent issue that's not a direct action upon someone, but rather an indirect yet causally-peggable action that would be a consent issue once the bomb goes off and someone is significantly harmed by it.

In other words, the idea is that consent issues only arise with actions on or with other parties--we're ruling out observation, awareness, etc. as requiring consent. One's consent is not required for someone to wear sagging pants, for example, even though one might see the sagging pants and not at all like them. Or for another example, one's consent is moot for whether homosexual relationships are allowed, even though one might observe or be aware of them and think they're an abomination against God or whatever. We have to be talking about an action performed upon or with another person.

But it doesn't have to be a direct action--it doesn't have to be something where your body is literally touching their body. It can be indirect, however much the parties might be temporally and spatially separated. So, for example, you're not touching someone else when you shoot them. There's some temporal and spatial separation. The same thing goes for poisoning a water supply, planting a bomb, etc. But someone needs to actually be hurt for there to be a consent issue there AND there needs to be a causally-peggable chain back to your actions AND we need to be talking about entities normally capable of granting or withholding consent.

So I wasn't saying there was something wrong with merely planting a bomb. I wasn't saying anything about risks or potentials or anything like that. I was covering the base where someone isn't literally touching another person's body, but where there's an agent capable of consenting to things done to their body where there's a causally-demonstrable chain back to someone else.

And matter is the extension of interaction. — Possibility

I have no idea what that would amount to. It sounds incoherent to me, but maybe you could explain it so that I wouldn't think that.

The point is about risking harm on behalf if others. ALL harm can be prevented if no one is born AND no actual person is deprived by not being born. — schopenhauer1

That has nothing to do with anything I was talking about, but sure, there are no risks for anyone if no one exists. So if you were only concerned with preventing risks for some reason, that would be something you'd focus on.

It's relevant when discussing nonexistent or potential people. — schopenhauer1

If anyone is making or in any way implying the claim you're addressing. Otherwise it's "Hey, here's a chance to do my telemarketing script mantra again."

But your points feed right into mine, so to not demonstrate how your logic about non-existing things not having certain things apply to them (seemingly pro-natalist if one focuses on consent) actually implies antinatalist conclusions (if one focuses on the fact that no actual person loses from not being born). It is not a tenuous connection either, but at the very heart of the logic whereby your objection is being used. So what you think shuts down one argument actually facilitates a much stronger argument that is in favor of antinatalism. — schopenhauer1

That would only be relevant if someone were saying something about depriving nonexistent persons of something.

I already said the point I'm getting at.. but I can walk you through it slowly, and in your case, in a circular holding pattern kind of way, where you will not see the forest for the trees of the argument, but here we go, baby-steps.

1) You think consent does not apply to a non-existent person, correct? It would be a category mistake or something of that sort, correct? — schopenhauer1

Yes, and I said nothing even remotely approaching the notion of nonexistent people being deprived of anything. So bringing that up in response to my posts means you're ignoring the content of my posts to start repeating the same prepared talking points for the thousandth time. You're using my post as an excuse to ODCishly launch into your telemarketing script that we could all repeat verbatim.

I don't want to enable your OCD nonsense. Comment on the content of my posts.

As I just added above: If you want to repeat the same garbage over and over don't use my posts to shit-post in response like that. How about commenting on the actual content of my posts instead. Don't waste my time with the same old crap that has nothing to do with anything I was talking about.

Knock knock..hello..Because with your SAME LOGIC of NON-EXISTENT people, we can say that there is no harm to any actual person who is NOT born, but there may be CONSIDERABLE harm to those who ARE born... I'm using your very argument about NON-EXISTENT people to make an antinatalist claim, ala Benatar's asymmetry argument. — schopenhauer1

That has nothing whatsoever to do with anything I'm typing. I'm not saying anything even remotely resembling the notion of nonexistent people being deprived of anything. If you want to repeat the same garbage over and over don't use my posts to shit post in response like that. How about commenting on the actual content of my posts instead. Don't waste my time with the same old crap that has nothing to do with anything I was talking about.

And what the fuck does that have to do with talking about nonexistent kids being deprived of anything?

Either you are being purposely evasive of what I have brought up as a consequence of your own argument, or you are really not understanding how much this has to do with it. Either way, I'm not sure how to help you more than the very simple way I just explained it. — schopenhauer1

Knock knock--hello? What did I type that you think has anything to do with this? An intelligent response would quote something I typed that you believe has anything to do with the issue of potential kids being deprived of anything.

Ok, well I can also say, "People do not exist, prior to birth, to be deprived of the "goods" of life". — schopenhauer1

Right. And what does that idea have to do with anything I've typed? I'm asking you twice now. I didn't say anything at all resembling potential kids being deprived of anything. Read my posts instead of checking off your prepared talking points.

The problem of consent arises after someone is born because they did not consent to anything. — Andrew4Handel

Consent is an issue when:

(a) we're talking about a particular action that one is an actor in--either via performing actions on another or having actions performed upon by another

And

(b) we're dealing with an entity normally capable of granting or withholding consent for particular actions.

So what particular actions are you referring to?

I don't see how this follows. You can be certain about where you parked you car. You don't know of your car has been stolen but that is statistically unlikely. You can know where you parked your car without knowing if it is still there. — Andrew4Handel

So what definition of certainty are you using?

Because your little supposed paradox cuts both ways. No one exists to be deprived of anything either. — schopenhauer1

Where did I mention anything like that?

You're going through a talking points script that doesn't have anything to do with what I was saying.

Even if I was to distill this argument down to collateral damage- by having someone who did not want to go through life in the first place, you created a lifetime of collateral damage. This is not a minor type of collateral damage we are talking here, but a whole lifetime of existence. If no one is born, no actual person is deprived of anything, either. There is no person in a locked room going, "Let me in!". — schopenhauer1

What does that have to do with whether being conceived or born is a consent issue?

If being is willed by God, then "neither" isn't the answer. The answer would be God willed it so. But then God could have willed being so that it's other than it is, right?

Thus leaving no independent 'space' that is additional beside the span of the relations. — PoeticUniverse

Correct. It doesn't exist as "something in itself."

I think if you know something then it has to be certain. — Andrew4Handel

Then we wouldn't be able to make any empirical claim, including things as simple as "I know where I parked my car," "I know the title of Black Sabbasth's second album," "I know who holds the RBI record for the Yankees," etc.

You'd have to say "I don't know where I parked my car." etc. People who are depending on you for a ride might find that annoying.

Matter isn't comprised of something that's not matter. It's comprised of elementary particles, in particular dynamic relationships with each other.

Energy is matter in motion.

Motion or change is also what time is. However, with energy, we're concerned more with the relative strength of motion--"the ability to do work," whereas with time we're concerned with relative motion--and in particular, seemingly regular relative motion.

Space is the extension of matter and the extensional relations of matter.

Also I can't pretend as if I know. Some people try and argue with you such as saying gods are really implausible or there is no afterlife etc. I don't think you can entirely prove something by argument but only evidence resolves things. (I think this is why philosophy struggles because arguments don't trump evidence or aren't as compelling) — Andrew4Handel

Knowing something doesn't imply that you know it with certainty or that it's provable.

Certainty and provability are simply about whether something necessarily follows in the particular axiomatic system that we've chosen to operate under, anyway.

I... Don't understand what you're saying at all. — khaled

So, you wrote:

"Also for the concert hall example, you CHOSE to go to the concert hall. If the guy forced you into the concert hall and it blew up it IS his fault"

You wrote that in the context of an analogy with having kids.

It doesn't work to point out that the person chose to go to the concert hall, because being born isn't a consent issue. Why not? Because for consent to be an issue, it requires someone normally capable of granting or withholding consent. That requirement is not met when we're talking about conception/birth, so consent isn't an issue there.

So giving someone HIV and them dying of a seperate disease is completely acceptable for you? — khaled

Re that, I already explained my view on it, in some detail, a couple times above.

What matters is:

(a) whether there was intent to give the person HIV,

or alternately

(b) whether there was negligence in giving the person HIV (because the person either knew or would be reasonably expected to have known that they had HIV--a specific health issue, where there's a significant chance of transmitting the specific health issue in question)

and

(c) they do wind up having health problems where that's causally-peggable to HIV

and

(d) we're talking about doing something to a person normally capable of granting or withholding consent.

Either (a) or (b) need to be met, and then in conjunction with either, both (c) and (d) must also be the case.

So re those three statements, are they the case because God willed it so, or are they prior to God so that God has no choice in them, either?

I... Don't understand what you're saying at all — khaled

Holy moley. Okay, when I get back. I'm late for what i need to do.

Having children enables certain kinds of pain but doesn't cause them directly. — khaled

Where did I say anything that suggested I'd have a moral problem with "enabling" anything ? Someone capable of granting or withholding consent is required, and even then, we need to be able to show a causal chain, which I said would be very difficult to do in the HIV example.

Also for the concert hall example, you CHOSE to go to the concert hall. If the guy forced you into the concert hall and it blew up it IS his fault — khaled

As within 15 minutes you completely forget that someone normally capable of granting or withholding consent is REQUIRED for consent to be an issue.

If you intentionally/knowingly gave them HIV and we can causally show that HIV made you acquire the other disease (which would be very difficult to show causally).

Again, If a bomb goes off in a concert hall, the guy who let you in to the concert hall didn't do anything to you.

Having a child is not the action that harmed you.

No, it has to be a direct action that you took.

If a bomb goes off in a concert hall, the guy who let you in to the concert hall didn't do anything to you.

I never said that. I said it RISKS physically harming them. Per bomb explosion for example. (I also need to go soon so maybe later) — khaled

I wasn't saying anything about risks. The bomb example has to do with if the bomb goes off. You don't have to be directly touching someone to do physical harm to them against their consent. There can instead be a causally-peggable chain to you, but someone still has to be physically harmed.

(Also I need to do something at the moment, so if you don't want to have to wait for a response you need to be quick about it)

Before we even get to that, I was going to bring this up: you're saying that conceiving children is physically harming them, right? (Re the bomb analogy) What exactly is the physical harm being done in that case?

" consent where (a) someone normally capable of granting or withholding consent is required, "

If I write that that's required, it doesn't imply that it's optional or that we can just ignore it.

Also, why bring up suffering? I just wrote is "One thing I definitely do not do in my own ethical views is base anything on ideas of 'suffering.'"

So all that morality is is one's personal dispositions (of approval and disapproval) regarding interpersonal behavior that one considers to be more significant than etiquette. When I note that it's one's personal dispositions I'm not saying that those are not influenced by others, but influence is neither identity nor determination.

One's personal dispositions can be principle-oriented or not. It just depends on the individual. And if principle-oriented, it can be based on misconceptions, mistaken beliefs, etc. of course. These can include that there's a plausible way to quantitatively compare suffering and the like, whereupon one employs a principle-based approach based on a suffering calculus.

Personally, I'm not a fan of principle-based approaches. However, one idea I often return to in my own personal dispositions is consent, but consent where (a) someone normally capable of granting or withholding consent is required, and (b) we're talking about either (i) actions directly performed with or on someone, or (ii) actions performed that have a physical affect on someone through a material, causally-peggable chain--for example, putting toxins in a water supply, rigging a bomb to explode, etc. The basic idea here is that I'm excluding things like "observational consent"--it's not a consent issue if one doesn't like how other people are dressing, what other people's beliefs and behavior with other consenting parties is, etc.

Also, I only consider consent an issue, especially for legal purposes, when we're talking about significant physical effects. Physical effects that macro-detectably linger for, say, at least a few days. Thus if someone nonconsensually bumps into you, taps you on the shoulder, or even flicks you or something like that, it wouldn't be a legal or moral issue unless the physical effects detectably linger for more than a few days.

One thing I definitely do not do in my own ethical views is base anything on ideas of "suffering."

So with the psychopath, I don't at all look at relative suffering or anything like that. I see it simply as an issue of whether the "torturee" is consenting.

Re antinatalism, it's not an issue of consent, because when we're talking about nonexistent people we're not talking about someone normally capable of granting or withholding consent. We need an existent person for that.

Well, for example, you said that "Logic is as it is because, to be salve veritate (truth preserving), it has to reflect the nature of being." So you think that there's some way that the nature of being is--the nature of being has such and such set of characteristics, and not this and such set of characteristics, that are reflected by logic, right?

Ok. And I am saying that no one here including you would employ a quantification that makes it so that a parent's pain due to not having children is so great that it is greater than all of the child's suffering do you agree? — khaled

I wouldn't say either way. I don't think there's any plausible way to quantitatively compare two different persons' suffering.

You can't really confirm this is true. Idk if you mean experience as in job experience or some subjective experience. If it's subjective you can't confirm if it's job you can confirm with working hours — khaled

Right. So the point was that with that sort of claim, we need a quantification for each in order to make a comparison. Whereas with the other statement it's simply logically true as long as Frank has any experience. We don't need anything quantified for the second sentence other than that.