This is a far more serious problem. What resolves it for me, is undoubtedly not Schopenhauerian. A simple answer is best for now. The question may be posed as what makes the projections not just an extension of what is real? The answer is in their structure/nature(?). While the Universe is formed of matter and energy, as are all of the organisms including their brain functions, Mind emerged as something other; it is structured by Representations that now move in accordance with their own laws and mechanics (as opposed to the rest of "us" bound by the laws of nature).

I won't get into the how and wherefore of it. But for me, this epiphenomenom has an affect on our will, our natural selves, to the point of superimposing an "I" upon it. And yet, it is not Real. — ENOAH

This all sounds like an attempt to square the circle here. Something I also struggle with in Schopenhauer. That is, how is the multiplicity the same as the unity. It just starts sounding more absurd.. I proposed a Higher Will (will denied), and Lower Will (will manifested), but this makes no sense if all is One Will.

Then it also starts looking like early forms of trinitarian justifications.. same substance different modes, or whathaveyou. This also will not do.

Rather, the only way I can interpret it is that Will literally IS the illusions. It is NOT primary/originary/more REAL than the illusions. Rather, illusions simply IS WILL as it is carried out.

However, I still don't know where Denial of Will comes into play. "What" that is, is beyond me. But it's the same problem as Buddhism's desire for no desire. And I am sure there are plenty of clever ways to get around it..

Is it possible to conceive of the projections (phenomena/mind/becoming) as epiphenomenal, ultimately not "real;" and so, there is ultimately only one, but the projections are nevertheless

1) existent (though fleeting and empty, like shadow paintings)
2) effective against the real. Like a Fictional story can cause one to really cry. It effects reality while maintaining its status as Fictional
3) avoidable, or at least, tune-out-able by a process of attuning to the Will (drive for survival) without attention to the projections (desire and suffering)
? — ENOAH

That is indeed a way to look at it, but I have problems with it...

Whence the illusion? If you say that it is secondary, and not somehow, ONE AND THE SAME, then you are trying to say that there is some sort of temporal and causal succession (first there was Will, and then there was Idea/Representation). That doesn't seem to make sense.

It also makes no sense to say that Will CAUSED Representation, as causation is purely in the phenomenal world of Representation, but cannot be said of Will itself.

I mean to say, for me the two categories summarized as X and Y are ontologically(?) separate. The one being, "Being", the other being a modified "reality" mediated or projected solely by the emergence of human minds. If I am mistaken, and for all of these philosophies, X and Y are indivisible (I.e. suffering cannot be isolated to Mind or resolved in being, independent of mind), then why are they consistently spoken of as if one is the ground of being and the other projections of Mind? — ENOAH

I think that is a great point, and I think it valid. I think the question is a legitimate one that stands.. And goes right back to a conversation I had with Wayferer in a previous thread... I'd have to look to find it, but it was the one I sent you a little while ago.

It does seem like if Schopenhauer is offering a dual-aspected world, that indeed, Will is not the "true" or "primary" but simply the "flip-side", but he keeps discussing the Representation as "Illusion", as if it is NOT double-aspected but rather epiphenomenal, that is to say somehow "emergent from". However, this second interpretation would seem to be false under his own pretenses regarding the co-occurrence of both. There can be no prior or "originary", only BOTH being one and the same.

This can perhaps recovered in a couple ways, but these attempts are more just hypothesis...And it may answer my previous question about "denial" to @Wayfarer just above...

First off, no ONE manifestation/representation can ever be "Will itself", as Will is the WHOLE superstructure.. All that exists.

However, perhaps as a manifestation of Will, one can become a sort of Will-less individual. Don't ask me what or how that looks.. It seems impossible, bit would be something like an individuated aspect of Will knowing its own nature first-hand, without the mediation. Again, I have no idea what that really means.

So "denying" the will is "more weighted" of the noumenal understanding rather than the phenomenal presentation. It isn't "becoming one with Will" per se, because that is an impossibility.. It is the manifestation, understanding its own nature as much as a manifestation can.. I guess. And if that sounds really woo woo.. it is to me as well.. I'm just trying my best to work with what a I got in terms of Will and "denial of Will" ... and what that means.

Ok, if that's the case, then definitely he places suffering in the category of the real being, and unlike Buddhism, not in the category of Maya/Samsara/Karma. That is, suffering for S. is not restricted to the "illusions" but also Buddha Nature (if that and S's "will" are similarly the ground of real being). — ENOAH

Not exactly, look at our conversation right above:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/904945

I do rather like SEP's phrasing here:

For if Will is only one of an untold number of the universe’s dimensions, there would be no reason to expect that the individuating effects of the principle of sufficient reason would generate a world that feasts on itself in the manner that Schopenhauer describes. — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schopenhauer/#7

It sounds like something I'd say :smile: as a criticism.

But it brings up a good point. And again, the question remains- "what" is this "denial of Will" that can be employed that would "not Will" if "all is Will"? Is there a Will above Will? Is there Will+? This now looks like gnosticism. That is to say, Will is the demiurge, but there is "higher Will" which is more foundational. But then when one is "denying the Will", is one employing "higher Will" to deny the "lower Will"? And then this starts to unravel... And then you get to bring in those fun Sanskrit and Pali terms to placate it.

In Urs App's book Schopenhauer's Compass, there's a whole chapter on what Schopenhauer describes as 'better consciousness' (apparently what we would call higher consciousness) — Wayfarer

So what do you think of this one?

But how is it you suppose, one can "deny" if one IS will. What is this "other" of "denial" which would not be part of "Will" itself, thus self-refuting the effort from the start? — schopenhauer1

Goal of Liberation: Schopenhauer and Buddhism both propose that liberation from suffering involves overcoming the driving force of desire. For Schopenhauer, this is through the negation of the will, while in Buddhism, it is through the elimination of craving and the attainment of nirvāṇa.
Differences: — Wayfarer

This is getting very esoteric, but can it be argued that Schopenhauer's famous "denial of Will", is actually a sort of existence of unmediated existence?

But how is it you suppose, one can "deny" if one IS will. What is this "other" of "denial" which would not be part of "Will" itself, thus self-refuting the effort from the start?

While there are seemingly significant qualifiers differentiating each beyond nuances, is it not true that the following can be "extracted" from the "root" of each (i.e. before the differences emerge)?

Y is the "ground" where difference, therefore, meaning, therefore, desire, therefore, suffering is "constructed." This ground is mediated reality.

X is the "ground" where there is only the will to survive. No difference, etc., therefore no constructing suffering. This ground is direct reality.

And if X and Y are indivisible, inseparable, and not "two" distinct "grounds," why does this line of philosophical history separate them?


*is it "Body-->Mind"/"Living--knowing" which is "problematic"? — ENOAH

1) Yes this is a more-or-less good summarization of the main premise of his theory.

2) As to why his line of philosophical history separates them, I would have to understand what you mean exactly. If you mean, where does this line of thinking come from, then that would be Kant's noumena/phenomena. If you mean, how is it split in history, as a metaphysical construct, it has no historical beginning- the world is both noumenal Will AND mediated Representation. They co-occur, not one after the other.

3) Body-mind is simply the apparatus, subject/object, knower/known. The problematic part is that Will IS this construct constantly playing out, over, and over, and over. An aimless unity viewed as individuated by its hapless subject-object creating, "illusory" manifestations (the representations that are but the manifestations of Will).

So what is this non-proper ethics that apparently applies to states? — Tzeentch

It's not based on individuals but actors on behalf of states. These individuals can be liable for acting poorly on the state, but war itself is considered a legitimate form of conflict (however ironic that sounds), between state actors. Hence it isn't war that is the basis for the target of individuals but war crimes, which are specific actions taken by individual leaders during war.

Irrelevant. What other people do is no argument for any type of moral decision. — Benkei

That seems unethical. You are not allowed to defend yourself now if someone does you harm? I think that is a universally accepted notion... And again, the issue then becomes about collateral damage, not waging a war against an aggressor who wants to see your people, state, or both destroyed, and are actively and repeatedly doing this. Should FDR have declared war against Japan? Perhaps he should have waited for other Pearl Harbors...

Why don't you try to make a coherent moral argument why a close family member's life is more valuable than another's. Maybe my mother in law is a real bitch, maybe my dad a rapist. Filial connections are morally irrelevant. — Benkei

Noticed I said "close family member" and not just named a family member. So yeah, that already was not my argument, and thus a straw man..

But the main argument one might make is that the state is obligated to its own citizens more than protecting other citizens. This doesn't mean they are COMPLETELY devoid of considering other country's citizens. The author stated as such. Rather, that the balance is weighted more for one's own citizens in the state's obligations above other countries when weighing decisions of life and death.

In the case of Israel, presumably the state is a platform for which the people are to survive. Like family and friends help each other for survival and day-to-day living, one's own state presumably would be akin to a political family that is closer to helping in one's own survival, and thus if the political family is mutually supporting each other, there are bonds and obligations to help each other, above and beyond the obligations to other political actors that are not necessarily in the mutual interest, or in fact, are completely opposed to the mutual interest of the political family. This would seem even more so in such a small nation-state where people have much more in common. It is arguable the bigger a state, the more impersonal that family is, like a large extended family that is estranged. Anyways, that part is farther afield from the main point which yes, there are special obligations to friends and family that would be violated if they were not considered.

I guess it depends how much we're willing to stretch the concept of "Hillelite?" How does one qualify as a Hillelite anyway? — BitconnectCarlos

Yeah, not a fan of this dismissive, condescending way of asking this seemingly innocuous question, but in GOOD FAITH I'll answer it:

Jesus emphasis on "Do unto others.." and "Hear O Israel.." seems to be in line with Hillel when asked the most important aspects of the Law..

Jesus' more lenient interpretation of Law, for example Jesus's disciples being in danger or starving during the Sabbath.

Hillel was more open to outsiders as was Jesus

The way Jesus criticized OTHER pharisees, was the way perhaps, a Hillelite might criticize a Shammaite.. I see the sentiment that God gave Sabbath for man.. as sort of saying that the Law isn't there simply as a routine thing one must memorize, but because it has symbolic significance and the intent of one does it matters, not just that one is doing it to look good, for the sake of scrupulousness, etc.

Interestingly, his ideas of divorce are more Shammaite (divorce should be rare), so he had his own takes on things, but I am saying he had more of a lenient approach to the Law.

My overall point isn't that he was a Hillelite, that is speculation. Rather, it is that Pharisees often had HEATED and SERIOUS debates amongst EACH OTHER.

Maybe. I don't deny as Essenic influence. But on purity Jesus seems different: "It is not what goes into a man's mouth that defiles him, but what issues from it." — BitconnectCarlos

Sure, but one of two things here:
1) The Essenic movement could have evolved or split since the Dead Sea Scrolls were mainly written 100-200 years earlier.

2) John and Jesus may not have been mainstream Essenic adherents, but an outwardly version of it (Elijah inspired, or whathaveyou).

Either way, there are too strong a parallels in form and content of the End Times, Son of Man, use of baptism, and shared communal living to just throw up one's hands and say, "Yeah they are not connected but look similar". That seems too incredulous to me.

But as to your specific quote, again, it's an emphasis of intent versus ritual. Does the text say exactly the context? Probably not. But if it is giving a "gist" of what Jesus' ideas were, it was that main take away.

Look at parallels with Isaiah:

Stop bringing meaningless offerings!
Your incense is detestable to me.
New Moons, Sabbaths and convocations—
I cannot bear your worthless assemblies.
14 Your New Moon feasts and your appointed festivals
I hate with all my being.
They have become a burden to me;
I am weary of bearing them.
15 When you spread out your hands in prayer,
I hide my eyes from you;
even when you offer many prayers,
I am not listening.

Your hands are full of blood!

16 Wash and make yourselves clean.
Take your evil deeds out of my sight;
stop doing wrong.
17 Learn to do right; seek justice.
Defend the oppressed.[a]
Take up the cause of the fatherless;
plead the case of the widow. — Isaiah 1:11-17

This is a theme amongst prophets.. that ethical behavior is what is of utmost importance. This doesn't negate the rituals, but if one does rituals whilst discounting the poor or neglected of society, one is doing an injustice. Thus, as I said, he models himself after the prophets here. It's a critique he is trying to model himself. If he sees himself as the harbinger of the Son of Man (angelic figure who comes at the End Times.. right hand angel of God or whathaveyou), then this is his paramount message to repent to prepare for this End Times scenario.

Possibly. IMO his saying "blessed be the poor" and "blessed be the poor in spirit" are part of a larger inversion of Jewish (and practical) wisdom. Doesn't money help us build a better world? Or give more to charity? But Jesus is decidedly unpractical. Ridiculously impractical. It is how one deals with this blatant impracticality that determines one's view of Jesus. — BitconnectCarlos

If you think the End Times are near, and you take the Prophets like Isaiah seriously, impracticality is perspective, isn't it? Look at the Dead Sea Scrolls themselves. If I recall, some did not even go to the bathroom on the Sabbath because the latrines were too far. That can be construed as impractical... Taking it too far.. Perhaps this is taking the social element too far. Either way, your evaluation of what he said isn't the matter here.

Also, I notice with you that you need Jesus to be "Othered" so that you can keep some sense of the modern Jewish view of things as CONTRA the character of Jesus. Or it seems from here. Rather, I see Jesus as part of the Jewish debates, and eschatology that was very much en vogue of his time. Again, not sui generis, but a variation of a rather commonplace theme in Second Temple, 1st century, Judea amongst the diversity of the Jewish ideas of that time, and the interplay of politics of Roman rule, Jewish Dissent, how to interpret the Law, what is the best lifestyle for a Jew, how to view the Temple in Jerusalem (corrupted or not.. legitimate or not at this point in time with Roman rule?)..

Instead of things being given to sensibility, it is representations that are so given, which leaves the gaping explanatory hole in the form of…..how the HELL can a mere representation be of physical substance???????? How does a sensation follow from a representation, in the same manner as a sensation follows from a real physical object’s affect on the sensory apparatuses? — Mww

So you have to remember that Schopenhauer believes that the world is Will AND Representation. It is NOT one or the other, but both. Thus Will is nothing without Representation as its double-aspect. Thus, sensation is simply how Will manifests itself on the "flipside" to a subject when certain interactions happen (of external stimuli with sense perceptions). The physical causations have the double-aspect of the internal feelings. And this interaction he calls "Representation". The feelings are immediate, but they are still a "presentation" of subject/object mediated in the PSR phenomenal world.

And if S’s representations are conditioned by space and time in order to make them appear real for our senses, as Kant’s things appear to us, then it remains questionable how the will can be a source of such conditions insofar as will is the origin of them. And if will doesn’t originate space and time, in that they still belong to the subject as pure a priori intuitions of transcendental deduction….S hasn’t done anything Kant didn’t already do. — Mww

I am not quite sure what you are contending here. Schopenhauer thinks that BOTH subject and object are manifestations of the Will that is the noumenal aspect of the whole apparatus. I think of Will as a sort of aimless Logos "principle" behind the phenomenal world. Will is simply "striving", and the apparatus is striving "playing out" in its individuated ways. Its the expression of how Will strives. Of course "why" it takes this form and not another is a bit of a "just so" answer, but that is another objection that doesn't affect this one.

Kant took Plato’s forms from the external instances of universals and made them internal a priori content of the mind; S took Kant’s internal representations as content of faculties of mind and made them external objects of will. Turn-about is fair play? If he can do it so can I, kinda thing? Dunno, but maybe…. — Mww

I think Schop would even agree with this. His idea of art and aesthetics "bringing out" the external Forms in their sublime universal form, and this being some sort of stop-gap of the Will, pretty much shows this.

This isn't often explicitly discussed, but there is a fundamental difference between an individual acting out of self-defense, and a state (an abstract idea) "acting" out of self-defense.

In my opinion, what constitutes genuine self-defense from a moral angle, is when the individual in question has no alternatives. — Tzeentch

That indeed does seem to be an outlier view of war. When a country gets attacked, like a sneak attack, (think something like Pearl Harbor), then generally the sovereignty attacked generally has a right to declare war against the attacking entity.

Debunking the idea of a "war of self-defense" from a more practical angle: morality must be analyzed on the appropriate level - that of the moral agent, which is to say the level of the individual.

So even in war, determining the moral nature of actions must happen for each individual and each action seperately. Just because many individuals are involved does not mean we get to use special shortcuts by which a war can be labeled as just as a whole. — Tzeentch

So this is a fringe theory whereby state institutions have no right to do anything on behalf of the people they represent because they are not individuals. Thus, providing aid, working out trade deals, protecting commerce, and other international procedures of state go out the window. And all of these things can be said to have an ethical component insomuch as policies enacted by states can have ethical intent or outcomes.

Now, on an ethical basis, when talking about ethics-proper, I agree with you that the individual is the locus of ethics. However, this is why I've always separated government and ethics. I do NOT think that ethics can in a 1:1 way ramped up to large social levels. That is because this a discontinuity at some point when actions can no longer be controlled at individual levels.

What you are advocating is a sort of anarchism perhaps, or anarcho-capitalism. While an interesting theory, this would pretty much negate any political dialogue as we know it. So there is really no where to go from there regarding this debate as now we are getting into much more theoretical territory about whether states are legitimate.

I think this has a lot of influence for Schopenhauer, especially here in your chat:

Intellectual Reception of Forms: According to Aquinas, when the intellect knows an object, it receives the form of that object. However, unlike sense perception, which apprehends particular, individualized forms, intellectual knowledge apprehends universal forms. This means that the intellect abstracts the essence from the particular instances and grasps it in its universality.

Some of my own notes here:

1) In Schopenhauer the Universal Ideas/Forms are directly manifestations of the Will, but so is the "knower". The "knower" is the subject mediating via space/time/causality to garner the "Idea" which is the mediated version of external forms with subjective-space/time (the phenomenal world).

My question then is how does time function for Aquinas? For Schopenhauer, it seems to be a sort of instrument for becoming. Or that's how I take it. In order to strive for something, you need objects and duration, and displacement, etc. All the dimensionality needed to make the myriad of the world-framework.

2) In Schopenhauer, unlike Aquinas' knowledge through the religious-mystic, seems to have it through negation. Denial of one's will. Also, for Schopenhauer, a lesser form of denial, is the ability to see the "sublime" of objects-qua-objects in art and object-qua-their-inner nature (Will) via music.

hence the motif of divine union, merging with the divine, etc. There's a theme I'm exploring in medieval philosophy, 'the union of knower and known'. Too large a digression for this thread. — Wayfarer

Interesting! Thread?

If only one side plays by those rules, they will be the ones to suffer because the other party will use it to their own advantage. — Sir2u

That's a whole other consideration. What if we have two sides (A) and (B).

A plays by international laws at the beginning but B does not, making A think that they cannot win unless they use B's tactics.. At the least B is as bad as A, not worse.

However, this isn't the situation as I see it. Rather, Israel is still following a type of framework to minimize mass casualties, but with the caveat that their own side will not be drawn into undue harm either. That changes the calculation.

There is an argument perhaps, that this calculation is the immoral part. I am emphasizing the case being made that this is not immoral. But for reasonable interlocutors (unlike certain forum participants who like to ad hom and poison the well), who may see that calculation as illegitimate, this could be considered irrelevant in any calculation of war. Thus, to these folks, if it takes your army taking on massive casualties to get the bad guys in the attempt to minimize the enemies casualties, this is still the correct thing to do. But I think you see the author's point that, there is a case that this calculation should be added- that one's own citizens are weighted more if their deaths can be prevented.

Only interesting if you're not interested in morality. The moral case is clear, "we are all people" and those lives are all equal. That's why the just war tradition sets out to find objective criteria and random squiggly lines on a map ain't it. — Benkei

Hamas doesn't think like that. They want to cause harm. The point of a self-defense war like this is to take out the people doing the repeated harm to your citizens. And my point then still stands:

What seems to be the sentiment here of some is that war can only take place in hypothetical spaces where troops can fight it out. Of course, Hamas doesn't allow for that. It has built a large infrastructure to hid within under civilians. So the empasse of whether to get the targets amongst the civilians or to send groundtroops to try to pinpoint them..

This brings up issues of protecting one's own brethren/family/people versus anothers when in a war of self-defense (preventing a group from repeatedly harming your country)..

There are several ethical frameworks here..

Social-contract theory provides a justification that states have obligations to its own citizens to protect them. One presumably can extend this even in times of war that, while international law considerations apply, one still must uphold one's obligations to one's own citizens above and beyond others when protecting lives.

Basic filial piety ethical considerations like the "lifeboat scenario" are relevant here. If a ship was sinking and all things being equal, you had to save your own family members versus strangers, what do you do? Obviously, discounting one's own brethren as having some moral weight would seem off in some ethical sense. People are people are people, but to pretend one doesn't have obligations for one's own relations is to dishonor what it even means to have relations.. or so one might argue.

Not to mention this is just psychological.. One's brethren/countrymen presumably are part of one's own survival, so by extension, one's own family/brethren/countymen would be a self-preservational response to a threat. This can be considered a natural phenomenon of ethical concern.

So I am not saying these are proof that there is now justification, but that these considerations along with merely "We are all people" when in a conflict of an enemy that wants to see you harmed or destroyed, is something to consider. — schopenhauer1

No doubt you would let your close family member drowned to save the stranger it seems. Some people disagree there.

Thanks for replying to my actual point. I invite you to comment here as well:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/904669

The part I am most interested in what the author said here:

Walzer’s approach is well-intentioned but misguided. It repeats the same error made by many contemporary ethicists: prioritizing individual human rights to override other values. In this particular example, Walzer errs in two critical ways: 1) neglecting the obligation to protect one’s own citizens, combatants and noncombatants alike, from attacks on them; and 2) neglecting the associative duties that a country owes to its own brethren, including its own soldiers. To understand the point, let’s focus again on the common dilemma Walzer and Margalit reference:

Violating international law, Hamas launches mortars from the neighborhood toward a town in Israel. The IDF commander has two options: seek aerial support to bombard suspicious houses in the neighborhood, or order his subordinates to take the neighborhood house by house.

The advantage of the first option, using aerial support, is that it provides not only greater soldier safety, i.e., protection from risk of capture, injury, or death, but also velocity. Israel should stop the mortar attacks as soon as possible; otherwise, its civilians will continue to suffer. By failing to immediately halt these attacks with aerial fire, Israel would be prioritizing enemy citizens over its own citizens.

Israel’s citizenry, moreover, might not tolerate high “body-bag counts” from house-to-house combat and demand to end it prematurely. Indeed, over the past few decades, heads of leading democracies like Britain, France, and the United States have changed their military plans because of waning popular support following troop casualties. Morale among soldiers, moreover, regularly decreases when the troops feel their lives are being overly jeopardized. As one Israeli soldier lamented, “We’re like pizza delivery boys who have to come right to the door of the terrorists’ houses.” This is clearly a problem.

The decision to place soldiers at greater risk might also endanger the efficacy of the entire defensive mission. For this reason, countries like Australia, Canada, and New Zealand signed the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention (AP/1) treaty while insisting that “force protection,” i.e., actions taken toward protecting troops, must be taken into account when weighing the proportionality of a given action. (The U.S. and Israel never signed AP/1, in part because of these concerns.)

NATO, in fact, relied primarily on aerial strikes during its intervention in Yugoslavia while flying its planes at higher altitudes to avoid anti-aircraft fire. This protected the lives of soldiers and gained popular support at home, but it probably increased collateral damage, including incidents like the one in Korisa described earlier. The decision to “fly high” received much condemnation from philosophers, but citizens and soldiers lauded it.

The IDF’s decision in 2008 to send soldiers to fight house-to-house, moreover, fails to consider that those soldiers are also citizens. They are “civilians in uniform” sent on behalf of the state. Yes, we send them to fight to protect their fellow citizens. This makes them liable to attack by the enemy, but that does not mean that the state that sent them can neglect their security. On the contrary, the state that sent them to fight must constantly justify why it is endangering them. The state bears special duties toward its citizens and agents alike. Force protection, in other words, is a deep moral obligation. There is no compelling reason why the state should jeopardize soldiers’ lives to save the terrorist’s neighbor.

The lead author of the IDF’s first code of ethics, Professor Asa Kasher, and the former head of the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate, General Amos Yadlin, have repeatedly emphasized this point, including in a pointed exchange with Walzer and Margalit. Israeli forces, they argued, should try to separate enemy noncombatants from fighters. After that, “not only is the state no longer obligated to endanger the lives of its own soldiers to attempt to further such a separation, it is forbidden from doing so.”

They further argued, compellingly but with great controversy, that the IDF Code of Ethics demanded only that soldiers do “all that they can” to avoid harming noncombatants. This does not include risking their lives and those of their comrades. A very distinguished group of Israeli philosophers lined up to disagree. Yet Kasher correctly held his ground. When push comes to shove, brother trumps other.

This doesn’t mean that we allow the army to protect its soldiers by carpet bombing the enemy nation and indiscriminately killing. That strategy may (or may not) stop the mortar fire, but it would treat the enemy civilians as disposable means to achieving the end of protecting our own. Moreover, it would negate our attempt to balance the values of communal defense and loyalty with respecting the inherent dignity of all humans.

Yet at some point, these values can conflict. Choices must be made. At this stage, we should prioritize the safety of our brethren at the expense of increased enemy collateral damage. Not because we appreciate the divine image of all human beings any less, but because we value our filial responsibilities even more.

Whatever people's views of this conflict are, THIS seems to be the main justification for the bombardments in Gaza. Where is the balance between protecting one's own troops through killing from "afar", versus sending in troops door-by-door, guaranteeing the killing of one's own citizens.

What seems to be the sentiment here of some is that war can only take place in hypothetical spaces where troops can fight it out. Of course, Hamas doesn't allow for that. It has built a large infrastructure to hid within under civilians. So the empasse of whether to get the targets amongst the civilians or to send groundtroops to try to pinpoint them..

This brings up issues of protecting one's own brethren/family/people versus anothers when in a war of self-defense (preventing a group from repeatedly harming your country)..

There are several ethical frameworks here..

Social-contract theory provides a justification that states have obligations to its own citizens to protect them. One presumably can extend this even in times of war that, while international law considerations apply, one still must uphold one's obligations to one's own citizens above and beyond others when protecting lives.

Basic filial piety ethical considerations like the "lifeboat scenario" are relevant here. If a ship was sinking and all things being equal, you had to save your own family members versus strangers, what do you do? Obviously, discounting one's own brethren as having some moral weight would seem off in some ethical sense. People are people are people, but to pretend one doesn't have obligations for one's own relations is to dishonor what it even means to have relations.. or so one might argue.

Not to mention this is just psychological.. One's brethren/countrymen presumably are part of one's own survival, so by extension, one's own family/brethren/countymen would be a self-preservational response to a threat. This can be considered a natural phenomenon of ethical concern.

So I am not saying these are proof that there is now justification, but that these considerations along with merely "We are all people" when in a conflict of an enemy that wants to see you harmed or destroyed, is something to consider.

There's a glaringly obvious philosophical point which I made and you chose to ignore. — Benkei

If you're referring to the war of conquest thing, then that's not really a philosophical point as a chance to rehash the whole conflict which we have done many times here.

Schopenhauer was not blessed with Husserl, Heidegger, and then all of the stuff that followed from existentialism to functionalism, structuralism, linguistics, postmodernism, psychoanalysis (and these are the blessings my limited narrative can enumerate), and he was barely exposed to Buddhism, the way, he would have been today. How can we disregard those limitations when honestly extrapolating? Extrapolating not to conclude with truth, but to clear the forest for a proper sense of what is worthy of interpolation. — ENOAH

But you realize that these folks were blessed with Schopenhauer's insights FIRST. And just because they came later, doesn't mean, as an axiom, they improved upon it.

So he intuits this autonomous thing, the will, and you tell me it's one and the same as the self, and Rationality, and those (among other things) constitute a unified, whole and real human being. — ENOAH

Eh, that seems not quite right. Will is not one-and-the-same as Self and Rationality. Rather, Will is identified as the noumena of Kant- the Thing-in-Itself. It is what underlies reality, and cannot be known as one knows a simple idea, as it is beyond time/space/causality and the interconnectedness of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (that there is a reason or cause of various events and knowledge).

Or, is it, will is (in a Spinoza/panpsychism/Vedanta way) survival, the being of everything? In which case, what are these attributes or dualities? — ENOAH

Yes this is more akin to what he meant. Survival of individuated/individual beings are a direct manifestation of the underlying Will.

1. He was expressing qualities as dualities. Either forcing them into a monism to suit his narrative, or recognizing that only a single of the "dualities" like, will*, is real, the rest are projections. *though I observe he mis-defined "will" if by it he meant the insatiable etc; he mis-alotted some things to will etc.. — ENOAH

This is loaded language, and I wouldn't quite use the word "qualities", unless you qualify where in the text. But he is saying that whilst Will is the Noumena, the Thing-in-Itself.. this insatiable blind, aimless, striving "force" or principle, co-commitant/co-existing with it is Representation, which is another aspect of Will. If Will is blind and its main principle is "striving", then how can it strive without having "becoming" in some sense? And so Will's expression via Representation is to have a subject that perceives, experiences, and knows objects (which also have a subjective side to them.. even basic forces and vegetation it seems in his philosophy).

And the subject, as Kant proposed, is mediated by a priori categories such as time/space/causality, such that when it looks upon the object, it manifests the idea of the object in space/time/causality and the PSR (the world of phenomenon).

Now here is where it gets tricky, and kind of questionable for me.. The objects for Schopenhauer, are akin to some kind of Platonic Forms. These Forms are the direct manifestation of Will unmediated by a subject. So if we were to have a nested relationship it would be Will > Subject-Object > World as an Idea to a knower (Mediated world of time/space/causality).

My commentary:

Since Schopenhauer is hugely complex, it's hard to distill all of it without having questions left over. One of mine is WHY is it that Will has the double aspect? And I guess, that if it's main principle is that of striving, striving needs to have ends to strive towards and thus this system of subject-objects that present itself beings who are becoming (for something). But it can never reach a "real ends" because Will is always and ever present, and if it is ever present, it cannot stop but doing what it does, which is striving (creating subjects-for-objects) so that it can express/manifest itself.

So what does that mean for us? It means that we are but grist for the mill (Will). That is to say, Will cares not for its individuated expressions that are its manifestations. We end up suffering as being taken along for its ride as beings who strive constantly, being expressions of Will.

Schopenhauer's main answer to the question, "What then is to be done?" is to participate in artistic reflection (as that will give our willing nature a brief glimpse at the sublime of objects without desire). It is purely experiencing the Will without willing, if you will.. Also deep acts of self-sacrificing compassion can get us to briefly pause our willing nature, and finally, ascetic repose. If we deny-the-will to the point of getting beyond our own subject-object nature, we can perhaps escape.

It's not a war of self defence. It's conquest and has been for decades. — Benkei

So clearly we are not getting beyond this point.

As to weighing one group of civilian lives above others or even your own soldiers, this goes against everything any universal morality would stand for. So, I don't find it interesting at all. Just glaringly an argument for the sake of opportunity. — Benkei

I think whatever your own Benkei ideas on it to suit your own argument, it is THE argument at hand and would like an actual philosophical answer rather than a treatise on everything you know related to Just War theory or dismissive frothing at the mouth ad homs and poo poos. You see, I am not an international agency, nor am I anything to you except someone on a philosophy forum.. Your invective towards interlocutors is not warranted.

As a result all military action is tainted by the unjust cause and there cannot be just military action to begin with. — Benkei

It’s a war of self-defense. They were attacked brutally and are responding to the group that did it. The question becomes how to handle collateral damage. The article I provided was answering it a certain way. The part I was interested in was when considering collateral damage, how much do you weigh your own citizens versus the civilians on the other side. There are a lot of nuances there for example Citizens, soldiers, and things such as this, but you would actually have to read the premises there and then evaluate.

Before I answer I’ll let someone else try here. I’ll let this breathe. @Wayfarer any comments?

If you read my profile you will see I disagree with just about every sentiment you expressed, including the "pessimism bad because its sad.. nom nom nom"

I was referring to the article I was quoting that relates ti the ethics of war. Clearly the debate is about collateral damage and the article gets to the heart of the current conflict and perhaps gives insights into some thinking on the matter. It is more nuanced way to answer the OP.

I can see why Kastrup might endorse Schopenhauer's analytical Idealism, and why you could appreciate his notion of a Mind Created World. But I have never been able to get on board with his Debbie Downer*1 "wanh, wanh, wah" Pessimism and Roseanne Rosannadana "it's always something" Cynicism. Hence, I've never attempted to actually read any of his "succinct" prose. All I know of his work is limited to his aphorisms. One of which inspired my latest contrarian blog entry*2. — Gnomon

This is extremely uncharitable... This is dismissive, trivializing, mocking, etc. all with admittedly not reading much of his ideas. This is a transparent smear campaign!

But, unlike the Stoics, he didn't advise that we create the best possible life from an imperfect world. — Gnomon

As if this is a given that it MUST be the case that this is possible or a moral imperative. I question your assumptions.

I suggest you read some of my previous posts on here to discuss some of his ideas rather than just smear him from a distance.

The writer does not understand the nature of international law. — Tzeentch

I'm not sure the writer is completely commenting on law as much as ethics, which could be the basis of the laws or perhaps ways of applying them. It's a bit of both.

The real question is whether the rest of the world finds that interpretation plausible, and in the case of Israel that is overwhelmingly not the case. — Tzeentch

Granted, but this is a philosophy forum and he's making claims on what seems to be more ethical matters, as much as (international) lawful ones.

This isn't addressing the author's position on duty to one's own citizens versus duty to the enemy's citizens, so I find this comment irrelevant.

I thought this the most salient passage because I think it the crux of the debate on the whole current conflict.

Walzer’s approach is well-intentioned but misguided. It repeats the same error made by many contemporary ethicists: prioritizing individual human rights to override other values. In this particular example, Walzer errs in two critical ways: 1) neglecting the obligation to protect one’s own citizens, combatants and noncombatants alike, from attacks on them; and 2) neglecting the associative duties that a country owes to its own brethren, including its own soldiers. To understand the point, let’s focus again on the common dilemma Walzer and Margalit reference:

Violating international law, Hamas launches mortars from the neighborhood toward a town in Israel. The IDF commander has two options: seek aerial support to bombard suspicious houses in the neighborhood, or order his subordinates to take the neighborhood house by house.

The advantage of the first option, using aerial support, is that it provides not only greater soldier safety, i.e., protection from risk of capture, injury, or death, but also velocity. Israel should stop the mortar attacks as soon as possible; otherwise, its civilians will continue to suffer. By failing to immediately halt these attacks with aerial fire, Israel would be prioritizing enemy citizens over its own citizens.

Israel’s citizenry, moreover, might not tolerate high “body-bag counts” from house-to-house combat and demand to end it prematurely. Indeed, over the past few decades, heads of leading democracies like Britain, France, and the United States have changed their military plans because of waning popular support following troop casualties. Morale among soldiers, moreover, regularly decreases when the troops feel their lives are being overly jeopardized. As one Israeli soldier lamented, “We’re like pizza delivery boys who have to come right to the door of the terrorists’ houses.” This is clearly a problem.

The decision to place soldiers at greater risk might also endanger the efficacy of the entire defensive mission. For this reason, countries like Australia, Canada, and New Zealand signed the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention (AP/1) treaty while insisting that “force protection,” i.e., actions taken toward protecting troops, must be taken into account when weighing the proportionality of a given action. (The U.S. and Israel never signed AP/1, in part because of these concerns.)

NATO, in fact, relied primarily on aerial strikes during its intervention in Yugoslavia while flying its planes at higher altitudes to avoid anti-aircraft fire. This protected the lives of soldiers and gained popular support at home, but it probably increased collateral damage, including incidents like the one in Korisa described earlier. The decision to “fly high” received much condemnation from philosophers, but citizens and soldiers lauded it.

The IDF’s decision in 2008 to send soldiers to fight house-to-house, moreover, fails to consider that those soldiers are also citizens. They are “civilians in uniform” sent on behalf of the state. Yes, we send them to fight to protect their fellow citizens. This makes them liable to attack by the enemy, but that does not mean that the state that sent them can neglect their security. On the contrary, the state that sent them to fight must constantly justify why it is endangering them. The state bears special duties toward its citizens and agents alike. Force protection, in other words, is a deep moral obligation. There is no compelling reason why the state should jeopardize soldiers’ lives to save the terrorist’s neighbor.

The lead author of the IDF’s first code of ethics, Professor Asa Kasher, and the former head of the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate, General Amos Yadlin, have repeatedly emphasized this point, including in a pointed exchange with Walzer and Margalit. Israeli forces, they argued, should try to separate enemy noncombatants from fighters. After that, “not only is the state no longer obligated to endanger the lives of its own soldiers to attempt to further such a separation, it is forbidden from doing so.”

They further argued, compellingly but with great controversy, that the IDF Code of Ethics demanded only that soldiers do “all that they can” to avoid harming noncombatants. This does not include risking their lives and those of their comrades. A very distinguished group of Israeli philosophers lined up to disagree. Yet Kasher correctly held his ground. When push comes to shove, brother trumps other.

This doesn’t mean that we allow the army to protect its soldiers by carpet bombing the enemy nation and indiscriminately killing. That strategy may (or may not) stop the mortar fire, but it would treat the enemy civilians as disposable means to achieving the end of protecting our own. Moreover, it would negate our attempt to balance the values of communal defense and loyalty with respecting the inherent dignity of all humans.

Yet at some point, these values can conflict. Choices must be made. At this stage, we should prioritize the safety of our brethren at the expense of increased enemy collateral damage. Not because we appreciate the divine image of all human beings any less, but because we value our filial responsibilities even more.

sorry to impose, friend. But do you have a link to sources for Schopenhauer primary? I have no reason to expect you would. But it's very frustrating just googling your way through reddit, wiki, etc. — ENOAH

I found this...
https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/author/3648

Might want to start with this essays, but his magnum opus that explains his whole philosophy and its basis in Kant is The World as Will and Representation.

@RogueAI @Tzeentch @Sir2u @BitconnectCarlos @Vera Mont

I think the points raised in this article might help ground this debate in some more concrete ethical viewpoints during wartime. One might disagree with this author, I can see many points for debate, but I wanted to present it as a good starting place to help bring up important points about war.

Here is the article:
https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2024/03/92928/

This, I state rhetorically because I can anticipate the "orthodox" answer. Such desperation, coupled with a plan that involves at its essence, urging us to "deny" our "Truth" (given our condition is, as you and Schopenhauer and, presumably, Zapffe, conclude real and not "taking place/driving us" as a process of "fictions.") seems surprising, even cowardly. Perhaps it is the dissonance of that which drives me to prefer a model where we are exhorted to deny it, because it is not our essence nor our truth. — ENOAH

No no, he is not saying this is what we should do. It's not prescriptive, but descriptive. These are some ways we prevent ourselves from thinking about it too much without going into some depression or madness, or some such. It is a way of keeping negative thoughts about our existential situation at bay. He's not recommending it.

Oh. Are you suggesting that because we are radically instrumental in nature, and also are self-reflective, Will is. I.e. will is self being instrumental. (?) — ENOAH

It is the self-recognition (unlike other animals) of how everything is ultimately instrumental. The peace created by roughly those 6 categories are temporary stop-gaps. You labor to survive to survive, etc. etc. You buy shoes that "fit just right" because it will be the best option to make it you feel more comfortable, but this is instrumental. You hunt and gather to use the meat and skins and organs and bones to keep the village going. You plant the seeds and irrigate the crops to be able to harvest to eat. But whatever endless form it takes, it's these needs and wants and basically WILL playing out in space and time. And Boredom (purposely using capital letter here), is but the "feeling" of the instrumental, even if one is not intellectualizing it, though certainly with people like Schopenhauer, the ancient Wisdom literature, etc. it can be put into words as well.

And again, to reiterate, we find mechanisms to try to get around this feeling/knowledge and I think Zapffe's model lays it out well (distract, ignore, anchor in some value or reason, and sublimate).

I could rest there. But I'm compelled to add, and what is the source/nature/structure of that chatter? If a god created us did it have this chatter in mind? If we are organic beings formed by the evolution of cells, is the chatter a formation of cells? Is there a time when our ancestors, the species homo sapiens roamed about without the chatter? — ENOAH

No because "inner speech" or "self-talk" has evolved WITH being a homo sapien. You cannot extricate that which is inbuilt into our evolutionary cognitive framework. It's not just that language is something socialized- our brains are primed for language, and eventually at some development a sense of "self" usually enters the picture along with planning, social interactions, problem-solving, memory and learning, and providing various counterfactual scenarios in our mind that this allows for, which helped us survive. I am not denying this is part of why humans also suffer more greatly, but I would not agree that it is something that can be turned off. Neural structures like long-term potentiation, episodic memory, language centers are there because that is how we evolved.

Books like this might help envision what I mean:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Language_Instinct

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Symbolic_Species

That is what one would imagine pure being to be while that one is trapped in becoming. But being is nature, pure and simple. Why wouldn't it be unless the "one" deciding has a vested interest in elevating other. There is no other. It is made up of images projected from reality to reality. But in that loop, is boredom and suffering. — ENOAH

But again, I am having trouble what you envision this "being nature, pure and simple" is. And I am also perplexed how it is you think humans can ever get to it, overriding our innate linguistic-based/signifier capacities:

but rather built-in to "our running narrative of reasons and explanations and goals and emotional responses, etc. etc. that come from having a linguistic-based mind, and the dynamics of our brain" those autonomous movements of signifiers, "culture" if that's palatable — ENOAH

That is part of what it is to be a human being.

To reiterate the point you said:

Before humans developed language at lets say a level that included a basic grammar and a bunch of words, were we therefore different? — ENOAH

But it is precisely because humans "developed" language (along with other cognitive mechanisms related and intertwined with it), that is our way of being as human in the world. That is part of the human ways of living and survival.

For us reality is necessarily mediated through the projections firing off autonomously in the brain, not what the senses immediately see. And this only for humans. How just an organic evolution. It is very "other". — ENOAH

So I agree that humans have a running narrative of reasons and explanations and goals and emotional responses, etc. etc. that come from having a linguistic-based mind, and the dynamics of our brain. This indeed does make us distinct from other animals. However, I don't see how it could ever be different for the human animal. This is how we survive and live in the world. There is no secret knowledge that then "drops" the pretense of a linguistic mind that evaluates, reasons, explains, etc. It is how humans function and is part of the socialization process, which cannot be bypassed. The human creates a self and places the self in relation to the world, and judges itself accordingly.

What Schopenhauer was saying about Boredom, is beyond merely having nothing to do and tedium. Rather, it is a sense of non-fulfillment in our being. You see, it could NEVER be any other way because our very impetus for doing anything is driven by this angst. The angst drives the kaleidoscope of actions we take, for whatever goals, survival or otherwise. What he is implying is that, if existence was fully satisfying unto itself, we wouldn't need goals. We would simply exist. But we don't. We are becoming...

If we were to think about it in neoplatonic or medieval, or gnostic terms, we can say that a "perfected" state, one of purely "being" (not becoming) would be one where we would wont for nothing. There would be no need for need. That isn't our state. It is precisely the dis-satisfaction that drives us to do anything at all. And it could not be any other way, otherwise, we would not exist. And all of a sudden, Schopenhauer's idea of the extinguishing of the Subject-Object comes into form, as that is somehow the opposite, some sort of state of being and not becoming. Now, is that obtainable? Different question.

So I guess my contention is that in no possible world is there a state of satisfaction. It is all becoming from the dissatisfaction. Boredom in this sense is not just the "emotional state of x, y, z" but rather, the very test for which when we run out of end goals and actions, we are looking at our very becoming/willing nature at work itself, without any content. It's the engine's fumes as it keeps working but nothing to do. You can try to ignore it, anchor yourself, distract it, or otherwise.

Yes both are real; and for both (Suffering and Boredom) their cause and effect is the real body. But these projections as projections have strangely, unique only to humans,* taken the helm of the body's real consciousness, its aware-ing of its drives and actions in nature, and has displaced them with stories. Unique among all creatures, we don't attune to reality, we attune to the projections as projections. The Reality remains. It's just attuned to the "television." Reality, so attuned, becomes the character "I" and emotes "boredom" instead of being Reality, and feeling restless.

It is that just described, which is the why of suffering, and why attuning to one's aware-ing might help (though I agree, might be "psychologically" impossible; but not becausevthat reality is the projections as projections; it is not). Call it psychological if that makes it palatable; say that the projections I insist upon as evolving an autonomy and displacing our organism, is pure psychology; either way, I cannot but settle here for now. — ENOAH

What is "Reality" here? What is this "real" Real of the Body you mean? This again, just sounds like there is a "something" we can get back to with the right frame-of-mind. I mean, I have heard of something akin to ego-death, but that brings up some other notions. True, our psyche is constructed and mediated through language and learning mechanisms, and is largely a socially-derived phenomenon, but how could it be different, for the human? We evolved thus.

Do you know of other Jewish thinkers in that period who liken soil to a mind in their parables? Or who emphasize the role of the child as something to strive towards? Or who specifically seeks out the sinful person? I guess we could consider Jesus as maybe doing an early form of baal teshuva outreach. There's just many seemingly unique elements of his thought that interest me. — BitconnectCarlos

There are probably parallels I can pull out of the Talmud, but I am not saying Jesus can never en toto NOT have his own sayings. I am simply pointing out that his approach to the Law and his emphasis on eschatological matters is not necessarily sui generis- there are other groups around that time. If Rabbi Akiva has a saying that no other rabbi has, does that mean Rabbi Akiva is totally other and apart from the Rabbis of his time because there were unique sayings attributed to specifically him? Of course not.

Jesus certainly seemed to model himself after the prophets of the Ketuvim (Isaiah, Jeremiah, Zechariah, Micah, etc.). Was this renewal program itself, something that John started with his call in the Wilderness? Perhaps. Hillelites were also more lenient in their views. The Zealot party which formed towards the 50s-60s CE, were associate with the Shammaites. There was even violence between the Shammaites and Hillelites at some points. Can Jesus represent a Hillelite with a more outward stance? Perhaps. An outward reaching Hillelite/Essene. Just conjecture, but if Jesus came from the poorer classes, would this not be something he would sympathize deeply with? So we see all the elements of his purported biography making sense.. His peasant/tekton background, his Hillelite stance towards the Law, and his Essenic stance (via John), towards the End Times and Kingdom of God. He was a synthesizer for sure.

Originally (unwittingly) derived therefrom. The difference (which is essential) being that it is exactly not in mindfulness (at least not in mindfulness as theory) that "one" attains "relief" from the "predicament" which Schopenhauer (correctly) observed. There is nothing "spiritual", nor "idealist[ic]" in it. It is exactly in "realism". That is the Body is already "relieved" from both boredom (yes, the body can be restless, a presumed evolved mechanism for survival; but boredom is the "projected" "version" displacing restlessness** ) and the "resulting/associated" suffering/dissatisfaction/desire.
I submit animals "suffer" pain and struggle; but it is our "words" alone which construct "suffering" for us. And relief from suffering is not in the four noble truths, the eightfold path, jnana, bhakti, karma, or katha yogis: it is not in any form of practicing ascetism. The relief is already there in the living being's natural and real nature, as a being, undisturbed by becoming. — ENOAH

But I see this idea of "already there" a kind of version of "mindfulness". "I am not this.." "My evaluation of the pain is not the pain".. Etc. etc. The thing itself, is not the thing I interpret. And so you convince yourself through a sort of repeated mantra that the pain you think you are feeling is not what is real.

I don't think you have to be a realist or idealist to hold the efficacy of this therapeutic technique.

But, we did discuss this previously about the chasm between the animal-being and the human-being. Humans, due to the "projections" (using your terms), cannot help but be who they are- self-reflective beings. There is no "going back to Eden". Self-reflection is baked into the human condition.

Also, I think you slightly misconstrue Boredom here as a secondary trait, when BECAUSE of its foundation in the HUMAN condition, it is inescapable. And so, CONTRA "mindfulness" (or the equivalent you seem to be indicating above), there is no escaping boredom by deflating it as some response to the restlessness. Rather it is restlessness par excellance as it is to be in the human condition.. It cannot be separated as flotsam and jetsam riding the waves of more foundational feeling. It is the foundational feeling. It is restlessness. The ways we go about it we have discussed, which are akin to something like Zapffe's four psychological techniques:

Isolation is "a fully arbitrary dismissal from consciousness of all disturbing and destructive thought and feeling".[5]
Anchoring is the "fixation of points within, or construction of walls around, the liquid fray of consciousness".[5] The anchoring mechanism provides individuals with a value or an ideal to consistently focus their attention on. Zapffe also applied the anchoring principle to society and stated that "God, the Church, the State, morality, fate, the laws of life, the people, the future"[5] are all examples of collective primary anchoring firmaments.
Distraction is when "one limits attention to the critical bounds by constantly enthralling it with impressions".[5] Distraction focuses all of one's energy on a task or idea to prevent the mind from turning in on itself.
Sublimation is the refocusing of energy away from negative outlets, toward positive ones. The individuals distance themselves and look at their existence from an aesthetic point of view (e.g., writers, poets, painters). Zapffe himself pointed out that his produced works were the product of sublimation. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Wessel_Zapffe

Besides which, as I explained in a previous quote, you cannot separate the projections (the subjective/the inner mental construct) from "reality", as they are always intricately, and inextricably, intertwined.