The world...my world, is in my mind and is made up of pictures of reality. — 013zen

For a guy who supposedly didn't like the fight between idealists and realists, he's really making an indirect realist case here.. @RussellA would smile :blush: :wink:

and it is derived concomitantly from his resistance to the "True" locus of "bliss," the Organic Being undisturbed by Mind; untempted by its striving and attachments. — ENOAH

t is saying living without clinging to the activity of boredom and its cessation (impossible), but rather attuning to the do-ings of [your] nature, body hungry/body eat-ing; body tired/body rest-ing etc., is already bliss. — ENOAH

This sounds like the fadd-ish distillation of Buddhist practices of "mindfulness". Would this be the sort of thing you are addressing? If so, that (along with certain "realist" views) is what I was targeting when I claimed that you cannot extricate the subjective from the "is". It is mind, mind-ing, it is not mind, extricating itself from any secondary projections of what actually is. It is projections all the way down, even if one feels during meditation or "mindfulness" exercises that one is getting to some "reality" that is non-signifying/projecting/whatever.. Call me a skeptic of the "mindfulness" idea...Which is ascetic-lite.. Schopenhauer did go full-in I think..but it was so far in that he himself would never be able to achieve it, leaving it to those with enlightened "characters" that have the capacity to completely deny their will-to-live in a sort of Moksha. However, I am skeptical of that too :smile:.

Is philosophy self-deception? Is it merely to shield our greater sensibilities from how things are or, more likely, regardless of what they are for the selfish endeavors of our own pragmatic benefit? To ignore blissfully the egoist reasons we hold to the philosophies we do? — substantivalism

Philosophy raises the strictly pragmatic to that of aesthetic reflection... Even the philosophy of Pragmatism itself is an aesthetic view of things. It is to not walk in the world from one task to another, but to look at the whole, and see it upon reflection, whether that be metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, and values. These are things that take a secondary-reflection and not meant necessarily as to obtain some practical end. In this way, philosophy acts as therapy from the mundanity of everydayness, the feeling of being instrumental, and of only survival, and filling up one's free time with proscribed activities of society.

Why people choose particular philosophies, is a different matter. That is too complicated to answer in one mere post. However, I will say that certain philosophies often appeal to people's aesthetic sensibilities. It is when one can be critical of one's own dearly held philosophies, that one can be open to the synthesis of one's own efforts with others, participating in a sort of dialectic, that will form a novel understanding based on the other, previous ones, even if just small tweaks.

By the way, Outlander, I just wanted to say that was a really good reply to the OP. I didn't want that to go unnoticed.

But we have shown that all this is given indirectly and in the highest degree determined, and is therefore merely a relatively present object, for it has passed through the machinery and manufactory of the brain, and has thus come under the forms of space, time and causality, by means of which it is first presented to us as extended in space and ever active in time. — WWR page 35

Great quote from Schop!.. .This parallels what I was saying in the other thread:

This actually goes back to Schopenhauer's notion that subject and object are always intertwined. Your thought of a dead, lifeless universe, is still a thought. And even if it is a representation of some "reality", that reality will never be YOUR reality, which is NOT simply "lifeless universe" but a psychologically embodied being THINKING of the lifeless universe, and projecting it, Signifying it, as you might say.

And I read through your comments, the ineluctable Subject, the Body/Mind unity, etc. And I won't continue to burden you with my "take". — ENOAH

Not a burden.. we are here to discuss!

But I think Schopenhauer philosophy can follow into a "salvation " derived from "knowing" and accepting the inevitability of suffering rooted in boredom and "seek" ethical and constructive ways to ride it out. Could that be squeezed into at least a reasonable position issuing from Schopenhauer? — ENOAH

Schopenhauer wrote a whole essay on compassion being the basis for morality. It unfolds from his metaphysics.. If we are but illusory Will, trapped in subject-object, then the saintly person is able to be moved beyond this to see all as universally the same Will and thus helping with another's suffering and easing their burden is to them a delight as it is helping themselves. It is as if there was no separation..

Mind you, Schopenhauer can be construed as an innatist, and perhaps even an elitist. Why? Because he didn't think everyone had this kind of agapic/philial love capacity. He thought most people operated out of some reward, even if it is to pat one's self on the back. He thought to a large extent, people's rootedness or "character" as he called it was fixed, and thus there were simply some (a very small minority of) people endowed with the capacity to truly be moved to alleviate suffering with little to no regard for one's own suffering. This is a sort of saintly, idealized suffering.

As for my own opinion...

I think we discussed this a while ago.. But human consciousness with the secondary aspect of Signifying/linguistic and self-reflective capacities complicate our place in the world. Everything is instrumental.. all the way down. One can say, everything is radically instrumental. Thus, Schopenhauer resonates because Will is ultimately the idea of this radical instrumental nature to existing as a self-reflective animal in this world. Except we get the um, "joy", of knowing it. Seeing it first hand and close up.

As long as you have a body to maintain, and the trappings of the tools and objects you need to maintain your lifestyle in whatever setting, you will always contend with instrumentality. Most people put several categories as "intrinsic"..

1) Physical pleasure
2) Human or animal connections- friendships, romance, meetings, group activities, significant others, bonding, nurturing, etc.
3) Flow states- getting "caught up" in something challenging
4) Aesthetic pleasures- reading, painting, nature watching, music, etc.
5) Learning a new concept or skill, participating in a hobby
6) Achievement

There's probably more, but they seem to more-or-less fit into one or more of these categories. Do I think that begetting more people and the usual dissatisfaction that these things try to placate is worth it? I think you know my evaluation of that...

I think that we must confront Schopenhauer to get passed any of this, and many are not willing to do that as it disturbs their peace. When people are living out those (roughly) six things to some extent, and going about their daily instrumental existence surrounding those things (just to achieve them in the first place!), they don't want to be disturbed with the idea of if it is worth it. They don't want to lose the gains they have made by second-guessing. For those rare people who can always think of this, even if they have the gains (perhaps depressive realists of sorts), or for those perhaps who have lost a bit of something in those six above, these ideas might become more apparent.

I think the Stoics to a point, have it right in the mindset that one has to put forward the "worst" version of events.. But not for the sake of virtue, as the Stoics would have it, but because it is therapeutic to the soul to confront one's Willing and suffering nature.

As an interesting tie-in, look at what Josephus says about James (with the caveat that the label, "the Christ" was probably a later Church interpolation),..

1. AND now Caesar, upon hearing the death of Festus, sent Albinus into Judea, as procurator. But the king deprived Joseph of the high priesthood, and bestowed the succession to that dignity on the son of Ananus, who was also himself called Ananus. Now the report goes that this eldest Ananus proved a most fortunate man; for he had five sons who had all performed the office of a high priest to God, and who had himself enjoyed that dignity a long time formerly, which had never happened to any other of our high priests. But this younger Ananus, who, as we have told you already, took the high priesthood, was a bold man in his temper, and very insolent; he was also of the sect of the Sadducees,[23] who are very rigid in judging offenders, above all the rest of the Jews, as we have already observed; when, therefore, Ananus was of this disposition, he thought he had now a proper opportunity [to exercise his authority]. Festus was now dead, and Albinus was but upon the road; so he assembled the sanhedrim of judges, and brought before them the brother of Jesus, who was called Christ, whose name was James, and some others, [or, some of his companions]; and when he had formed an accusation against them as breakers of the law, he delivered them to be stoned: but as for those who seemed the most equitable of the citizens, and such as were the most uneasy at the breach of the laws, they disliked what was done; they also sent to the king [Agrippa], desiring him to send to Ananus that he should act so no more, for that what he had already done was not to be justified; nay, some of them went also to meet Albinus, as he was upon his journey from Alexandria, and informed him that it was not lawful for Ananus to assemble a sanhedrim without his consent.[24] Whereupon Albinus complied with what they said, and wrote in anger to Ananus, and threatened that he would bring him to punishment for what he had done; on which king Agrippa took the high priesthood from him, when he had ruled but three months, and made Jesus, the son of Damneus, high priest.

2. Now as soon as Albinus was come to the city of Jerusalem, he used all his endeavors and care that the country might be kept in peace, and this by destroying many of the Sicarii. But as for the high priest, Ananias[25] he increased in glory every day, and this to a great degree, and had obtained the favor and esteem of the citizens in a signal manner; for he was a great hoarder up of money: he therefore cultivated the friendship of Albinus, and of the high priest [Jesus], by making them presents; he also had servants who were very wicked, who joined themselves to the boldest sort of the people, and went to the thrashing-floors, and took away the tithes that belonged to the priests by violence, and did not refrain from beating such as would not give these tithes to them. So the other high priests acted in the like manner, as did those his servants, without any one being able to prohibit them; so that [some of the] priests, that of old were wont to be supported with those tithes, died for want of food.

3. But now the Sicarii went into the city by night, just before the festival, which was now at hand, and took the scribe belonging to the governor of the temple, whose name was Eleazar, who was the son of Ananus [Ananias] the high priest, and bound him, and carried him away with them; after which they sent to Ananias, and said that they would send the scribe to him, if he would persuade Albinus to release ten of those prisoners which he had caught of their party; so Ananias was plainly forced to persuade Albinus, and gained his request of him. This was the beginning of greater calamities; for the robbers perpetually contrived to catch some of Ananias's servants; and when they had taken them alive, they would not let them go, till they thereby recovered some of their own Sicarii. And as they were again become no small number, they grew bold, and were a great affliction to the whole country. — The Antiquities of the Jews- Chapter 9

A little background... Ananus ben Ananus was the brother-in-law of Caiaphas... I find it MORE than a coincidence that this relative of Caiaphas, who had tremendous influence being of the reigning priestly family, and who had a vendetta against the dissidents of their family (groups like the Sicarii, the Jesus Movement/Ebionites etc..) JUST LIKE his brother-in-law, Caiaphas, carried out a similar mock-trial (with Sadducees.. again priestly elites) to prosecute his brother James and kill him in a similar manner. Notice also, the majority of the crowd was against this action. This flies in face of Matthew, John, etc.

Actually this is the original video. The other one had some dude giving his interpretation of Tabor.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HLQ97erL1gc&t=686s

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_5cNroueffQ

Nazarenes ? — 180 Proof

If Nazarenes and Ebionites are the same, then yes. If they are slightly different, then more like the Ebionites.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ebionites

I'm not sure what to make of this, but I can provide you a comment I made:

People pretend as if you can extricate the objective existence from one's evaluation of it, but you cannot. It is always you situated in the world, not just the world. Believing that the world "is", and you are just there putting your spin on it, matters not, as you will never extricate the two. — schopenhauer1

So just "knowing" that your evaluations are "not the world itself", doesn't even matter, because you as a subjective being will always be in the equation, as you say, "making the projections". And yes, boredom does seem like the psychological state that brings us to more drive to get away from the restless nature of dissatisfaction.

There is a term I rather like that we know well- "the human condition". One can expand it to "the animal condition", but what is this "condition"? That is the condition of being psychologically, enculturated beings. You cannot extricate the "world as it is" or "the body" from the psyche here. This actually goes back to Schopenhauer's notion that subject and object are always intertwined. Your thought of a dead, lifeless universe, is still a thought. And even if it is a representation of some "reality", that reality will never be YOUR reality, which is NOT simply "lifeless universe" but a psychologically embodied being THINKING of the lifeless universe, and projecting it, Signifying it, as you might say.

As for "salvation", Schopenhauer does hold out some sort of salvific state for certain characters who have this innate ability. He thought aesthetic contemplation brought us temporarily out of the will. The observer gets a small dose of this looking at an object or landscape painting (or more strongly with certain music, and even architecture, and other arts...) as to Schop, we are observing a sort of Form of the thing, rather than striving for it as an end. He also thought compassion and saintly goodness towards others was a way of trying to overcome one's own ego. But his highest recommendation was to become a complete ascetic in the denial of one's very will-to-live. Similar to a Nirvana-like state (he admired Buddhism and Hinduism very much), he thought this was reaching some sort of noumenal state of Will that transcends subject-object, and is ineffable, and only described in the negative sense. I am not saying I necessarily go along with this soteriology, interesting as it is, but I think you wanted to know if there was some sort of salvation there.

I'm curious, what do you see as the main differences between the original sect headed by Jesus and Paul's take on things? I see Paul as making certain inferences and elaborating/expanding on Jesus's ideas in his own ways. There's the Jesus layer and then the Paul layer. — BitconnectCarlos

Yes agree on the Jesus layer and the Paul layer. I laid out my view earlier that Jesus seems to be a mix of Pharisaic (specifically Hillelite) and Essenic Jewish thought. From what I gather, he was from a laboring background in Galilee (tektons), a part of the Galilean peasant class. These classes were pretty impoverished by Roman taxation, hence the emphasis on tax collectors in the NT. Fisherman especially around the Galilee were heavily taxed so that they could only eek out a subsistence rather than build capital in any modern sense of the word. My guess is Jesus found himself a student of the Pharisees, despite being from lower class background. Perhaps he was precocious, who knows. Maybe there were connections.. Whatever it was, he learned a kind of Pharisaic way of interpreting Mosaic law. It is evident in his view of fellow Pharisees (see the Talmud regarding the 7 kinds of Pharisees to see parallels, and also the infighting between Hillel and Shammai at that time before School of Hillel definitively won out. See also his debate tactics in defending his interpretation of Mosaic law, especially using later prophets as considered valid evidence. Also, there are references to following the commandments that only make sense in light of an oral tradition, not just the written Torah. However, this is partly overlaid with his propensity for eschatology, the End Times, the Son of Man, and the Kingdom of God, and the call of repentance, and communal living, that seems very much from Essenic teachings. No doubt, if his main mentor was John the Baptist in his later years, then this helped kicked off his itinerant preaching in the countryside amongst mainly the am ha-aretz (peasant/laboring classes), usually avoiding the bigger cities (Sepphoris was right next door to Nazareth and Tiberius was not far either, yet he avoided those cities), and then later he went to Jerusalem, a much bigger and more dangerous theater, where he developed enough of a name, that his actions at the Temple got him arrested and indicted by the High Priest and Pilate.

It does seem far more likely that Paul "created" his Christology and its context than what is depicted in the Acts. — ENOAH

Acts is propaganda apologetics for Paul.. trying to make it seem like his synthesis fit neatly into the original group. Galatians overrides Acts in terms of the irrevocable tension between this new ideology of Paul, and the original represented by James. I don't think they actually mended that rift. Rather, Pauline version simply overcame it hundreds of years later when these communities gained traction in the Hellenistic world, and then Constantine. The truth though is that the original sect was never going to spread like that anyways, being confined to basically the synagogues and at most the "god-fearers".

Either way, there'd be no Xtianity as we know it, without that "notorious" event on the road to Damascus. — ENOAH

That is true. I would not call the original sect prior to Paul, "Christianity". Paul put the Christ in Christianity :smile:.

Now, given that the maladies of human beings is not only boredom; but, rather stuff like depression and anxiety and hopelessness, then what would one be able to say about the human condition according to Schopenhauer, in the present? — Shawn

Yes his general evaluation was correct, even if one does not agree with the architectonics of his Kantian, neo-neoplatonist metaphysics. As I said in another thread:

He makes an interesting distinction between positive and negative properties. He argues that what we call "happiness" is a negative property, as it is really the pursuit of a desire for a change of state. Happiness is not what is intrinsic, but rather dissatisfaction is. What follows is a desire for change, which temporarily puts "relief" on the dissatisfaction, only for the ever-gushing willing nature of our existence to go back to another desire for a change of state. Boredom is seen as the ultimate revealer of a ground-state of dissatisfaction as he argues this to be the "proof" that we are not simply satisfied existing, but always rather dissatisfied. We are always struggling and looking for ways out of our dissatisfaction. We chase flow states, hedonistic ends, entertainment, chit-chatting, and all of it as a result of the dissatisfaction.

Much of life is maintenance, the upkeep of one's lifestyle, not even getting to the game of satisfaction-fulfilling.. Just maintaining the lifestyle to get there.

Then there are contingent externalities that puts people in a deficit. People with various diseases, or unfortunate situations happen to them, might put them at a perpetual deficit in their baseline of what they must contend with while overcoming the dissatisfaction.

Birth puts us on this dissatisfaction trajectory.

Ok, right, and by original group, you may have meant gnostic, but that's my suggestion regarding Essenes, not a direct relationship to the "author(s)" of Th. But a relationship nonetheless. Unless, you're telling me the Essenes are established gnostic. But yes, I too am fascinated by First-second C gnostics, for ghe same reasons as those you referenced. When it is not offensive to orthodoxy, I like considering such an influence (even if a homeopathic trace) on the historical Jesus. — ENOAH

Not quite sure what you indicating here but to break it down...

I see gnostics as a tangent, not a descendent of the original Jesus movement.

I see the Essenes in some ways as a direct predecessor of the group via the historical figure of John the Baptist, and his probable influence on Jesus himself.

The Essenes do NOT equal the gnostics. There may be superficial similarities in terms of emphasis on the "mystical" and the "End of Times", but that doesn't mean they are the same. The Essenes were likely an extremist Priestly group, that wanted to purify before what they saw was an imminent fight with the forces of evil (basically Rome plus supernatural stuff). That is, if they are related to the Dead Sea Scroll Sect, which I think they were. John I don't see as being a part of the Dead Sea Scroll sect by the time Jesus came along, but certainly, whatever "milieu" of apocalyptic Judaism that the DSS represented, John, was "drawing from the same well" so-to-speak. The idea of a demiurge, secret esoteric knowledge that has to do with a spark of God, or in the Pauline case ("gnostic-lite), that the messiah's death and resurrection abrogates the original "Law", is nowhere in DSS/Essenic ideology. Quite the opposite, they were very committed to "The Law", but interpreted differently, and with a bent towards eschatology, and possibly notions of the the Son of Man, being an important figure, though this starts complicating the matter, as people jump right to "Son of God" which is also not really what that is (other than the usual figurative senses it meant since King David was called the Son of God).

Anyways,

Ok, you're sparking my memory now. You're saying Magdelene and James had gnostic ties, right. There are influences on the historical Jesus then. Not sure if you're saying not so for Th., that Th. is of the later gnostic, the ones that represented the various (two?) Heresies, Arianism(?) and I forget tge other guy, Marcion? — ENOAH

No no, I am not saying that Mary Magdalene had gnostic ties.. though perhaps later on she did(?), but rather that the historical figures of Mary Magdalene and James the Just were more prominent in some gnostic literature (like the Gospel of Thomas), and that THIS is probably an echo of something more historical. That doesn't mean that Mary and James were gnostics... just that they are discussed and emphasized as important, is all that I mean which is historical. All the other stuff about them, is probably vessels to sell their (interesting) philosophy.

Yes! Without a doubt. Otherwise where the heck did he come from? He was supposedly a Pharisee, so not Hellenic philosophy, right? Yet his Christology gives goosebumps, even from a historical-critical read. Radically emancipating to the level of mystical. He makes Jesus's world functional "love even your enemies," mystical, like Moksha. But I fantasize a bit,
I know his eschatology was pretty much Biblical. Right? — ENOAH

Well I think we might agree here. You are seeing here that claims to be a Pharisee, but this might be doubtful. He definitely seemed to have worked for the High Priest, as a sort of lacky, that is more probable. Was he disenchanted and found the group fascinating? Perhaps... What does seem to be the case is he came from Asia Minor. There as a huge mystery-cult there based on Mithra. The idea of a god dying and resurrecting and symbolically rejuvenating and cleansing the adherent to the mystery school seems to be in line with what Paul's idea of Jesus death and resurrection was doing. Could he have smuggled the already existing ideas into the new Jewish movement with a dead charismatic leader? Ockham's Razor would point to most likely. So I see Paul as combining the mystery school elements of a dead and resurrecting god and the gnostic notion of a "higher truth", and making his own synthesis that became Pauline Christianity (aka Christianity). The original group, headed originally by Jesus' brother James after Jesus' death, slowly died out over time and had little resemblance to the Pauline churches his adherents formed around the Mediterranean.

Oh, OK. That might explain the "radical"? Or are you saying Paul was "presented" by the Church as a tangent from Peter/James for e.g.? Imagine genuine Epistles of Paul buried somewhere because it reflects accord with the Judaisers. — ENOAH

No, I mean Paul was creating his own synthesis, and claiming Christ spoke to him. I think it was tangential to the original group headed by James, and that followed Jesus synthesis of Pharisaic/Essenic Judaism.

Excellent, makes me even more confident in the Gospel of Thomas (regardless, I am an admirer) historically. As opposed to it being some post synoptics neoplatonist/gnostic set up. Or, if there are updates there too that you know of? I guess we're discussing how Christinity (as an institution) may have "erred" not on the side of good. — ENOAH

There may be historical elements. The parts that align with Q are probably more corroborated. However, it is pretty standard to regard the Gospel of Thomas' main thrust as gnostic, which in my view is a tangent, rather than a descendent of the original group.

Don't get me wrong though, I think the gnostic philosophy is fascinating, and see many parallels with it and Eastern philosophy, Neoplatonism (even though Plotinus disliked the gnostics), as well as Schopenhauer. I just don't think the philosophy represented Jesus and his movement in Judea proper, per se. More likely, it is what happens when Platonic and Near Eastern mysticism get intricately overlaid on top of a historical character in history. This doesn't mean that there might be some stories in there that preserved some truths of the original sect, such as Mary Magdalene's intricate connection, and the importance of James the Just, Jesus' brother.

Interestingly enough, I see Paul as a sort of "gnostic-lite". He wasn't fully gnostic (with a demiurge), but certainly the notion of "the Law" being overtaken by the "higher truth of Christ", has gnostic overtones. And I see Paul too as a tangent (quite deliberately so), from the original Jesus group as well.

Fascinating. I have not kept up with New Testament scholarship for years. I can recall the pharasaic influence, plus some hint regarding the Essenes. I'm asking because it was still controversial last I looked. Is there a strong consensus that J the B was an Essene? — ENOAH

It's not that controversial. At this point it might even be the norm to assume that. He just falls most naturally in that group. The emphasis on the Kingdom, Son of Man, use of baptism, End of Times, and asceticism point to a strong link to the group. James Tabor would be a good place to start in seeing the connections. Robert Eisenman also pointed to numerous connections. Geza Vermes also wrote books on the connection.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pp8rpLMoS1Y

Again, what you imply is also correct. By then it was Rome. Makes you even wonder if the Sanhedrin was even as active in opposing Jesus as the gospels suggest, or if that too was "exaggerated" for political/identity reasons. — ENOAH

Many historians make the important distinction between Pilate's "Gerousia" and the Sanhedrin. The Sanhedrin at this point was most likely stripped of real political authority. Rather, the High Priest, along with Pilate's advisors, most likely made the real decisions regarding dissidents. It was the conflating of Pilate's Gerousia with the Sanhedrin, that was another sleight of hand. It is interesting that the story had to have him tried "twice" and some not at all, but only at Caiaphas' chambers. Also, what seems evident is that the accusations against Jesus were more about "raising the Temple to the ground", an affront to the High Priest, and the stability of Jerusalem, whether symbolic or not. So we have a rebellious Jew at the time of Passover, threatening destruction of the Temple, causing a disturbance, and the High Priest, in collusion with the actual authority (not the Sanhedrin), the Roman governor, known for ruthlessly killing Jews who had the slightest impulse to rebel (crucified thousands as accounted by Josephus and Philo of Alexandria); all of that tracks. The only part that seems shoe-horned is this notion that there was a first trial of the Sanhedrin.. The other sleight of hand is to believe Jesus wasn't at some point at least a student of the Pharisees, which he seemed to be, before being heavily influenced by John the Baptist and his Essenic form of Judaism. Mix that together, you get Jesus' most likely ideological underpinnings.

I've been enriched. I know it sounds cheesy, but I can't but express my gratitude. — ENOAH

:up:

Notice from the SEP entry on Schopenhauer:

When the ascetic transcends human nature, the ascetic resolves the problem of evil: by removing the individuated and individuating human consciousness from the scene, the entire spatio-temporal situation within which daily violence occurs is removed.

In a way, then, the ascetic consciousness can be said symbolically to return Adam and Eve to Paradise, for it is the very quest for knowledge (i.e., the will to apply the principle of individuation to experience) that the ascetic overcomes. This amounts to a self-overcoming at the universal level, where not only physical desires are overcome, but where humanly-inherent epistemological dispositions are overcome as well.

So. important to register that while Schopenhauer recognises 'to live is to suffer', he also sees 'the end to suffering', albeit perhaps 'through a glass, darkly'. — Wayfarer

Yes, and of course, this will open up the conversation we had previously about what Schopenhauer meant in the idea that the ascetic "overcomes" and the notion of Will as noumena.

That we strive in the first place, is where I like to start. The hope of redemption is the part that is speculation.

I meant more generally. My exposure, as I said, were from those Histories (like Bertrand Russell, et. al) and Anthologies. My sense comes from those, and likely I'm reading in those "presentations" preamble, Histories, biographies, etc., an extremely subtle skepticism toward his interest in Eastern Religions (theirs, not mine) And its left a trace in my Schopenhauer file. Its not that reliable. — ENOAH

Yeah so basically the idealism aspect... whether Eastern or not, is pretty denounced by the materialism/naturalism of analytics like Russel et al. Also Schopenhauer was a system builder, and this is generally disliked in modern philosophy where problems are solved on a discrete basis.

True, but, (though I may be misreading) for me, it's not so blue. I would uses as "hopeless" a hue, as Schopenhauer, if that was Schopenhauer, not me misreading a subtle melancholy into "because we cannot just be". Because that afterall is tge fact I accept. — ENOAH

Yes, Schopenhauer was considered a "philosophical pessimist" because of his emphasis on suffering.

One, I can work with that, I do anyway. Why fight it. Loosen the first person Narrator's grip on the endless pursuit; receive satisfaction (though fleeting) rather than pursuing it, And it will ease the tension of the dissatisfaction. And then, just carry on with management of boredom-->desire (Schopenhauer's implicit definition of the human condition, right?). — ENOAH

I think Schopenhauer would answer that you cannot help but pursue it; it's not a choice.

And Two, I'm alive (as in that's what I really am). And that by definition is the only "satisfaction" required. Satisfaction in being. — ENOAH

Again, his "test" is that you cannot simply "be". Survival alone negates that point. But beyond that, your own inability to sit still in an empty room. No one is faulting you for that. In fact, it is quite impossible for fully functioning animals, to do so. The human animal must have its ends, or literally, nothing would get done. We are habituated for anticipation for what we must do next.

It's all instrumental. What is valuable becomes consumed and is in the end a temporary gap in the gushing forth of one's will.

People pretend as if you can extricate the objective existence from one's evaluation of it, but you cannot. It is always you situated in the world, not just the world. Believing that the world "is", and you are just there putting your spin on it, matters not, as you will never extricate the two.

I sense there is a (subtle) propaganda campaign against him? — ENOAH

Do you want to explain what you mean? Hereabouts in this forum, most people probably don't like his metaphysics (idealism, and in my opinion, a sort of neoplatonism whereby reality arises from Will being "objectified" into Forms which then get mediated by time, space, and causality). @Wayfarer tends to have more interest in his philosophy on this forum. If you want a good thread on his metaphysics, try following this thread:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/830498

Right, it negates (or settles) dissatisfaction the built in mechanism driving the desire! I like this. (Extremely sorry if I'm taking any liberties in my (potentially mis)interpretation of your text. But i sure hope Im not. Im grateful!) — ENOAH

That's about it. He thought that our will-to-live (manifestations of Will) as this "force" that simply desires but has no aim, and is sort of trapped in its own representation of itself, with the appearance of objects. In this template of time, space, and the illusion of objectification, Will tries to find satisfaction, but generally does not realize that it cannot, because its whole essence is dissatisfaction.

This is my attempt to distill the philosophy:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/830493

Yes! I really liked his description of boredom. A fresh lesson for me. And impactful. Thank you. I know I am out of bounds not having read Schopenhauer remotely enough to make assertions. But he's involving Boredom, not as a metaphysical state etc, but because the fact of its epidemic manifestation in human experience "reveals" the "real" "metaphysicsl" thing of it, the built in mechanism of dissatisfaction-->desire. Very insightful. I "believe" that. — ENOAH

Yes.. Boredom is an important marker as to what is the case. He elevates it from a passing emotion to THE emotion par excellance.. As it reveals the vanity of existence.. That in the end, we are not satisfied being. It is an endless onrush of satisfaction-fulfillment because we cannot just be.

@Wayfarer
I think Schopenhauer best encapsulates the inherent nature of suffering with this quote:

Human life must be some kind of mistake. The truth of this will be sufficiently obvious if we only remember that man is a compound of needs and necessities hard to satisfy; and that even when they are satisfied, all he obtains is a state of painlessness, where nothing remains to him but abandonment to ​boredom. This is direct proof that existence has no real value in itself; for what is boredom but the feeling of the emptiness of life? If life—the craving for which is the very essence of our being—were possessed of any positive intrinsic value, there would be no such thing as boredom at all: mere existence would satisfy us in itself, and we should want for nothing. But as it is, we take no delight in existence except when we are struggling for something; and then distance and difficulties to be overcome make our goal look as though it would satisfy us—an illusion which vanishes when we reach it; or else when we are occupied with some purely intellectual interest—when in reality we have stepped forth from life to look upon it from the outside, much after the manner of spectators at a play. And even sensual pleasure itself means nothing but a struggle and aspiration, ceasing the moment its aim is attained — Schopenhauer

He makes an interesting distinction between positive and negative properties. He argues that what we call "happiness" is a negative property, as it is really the pursuit of a desire for a change of state. Happiness is not what is intrinsic, but rather dissatisfaction is. What follows is a desire for change, which temporarily puts "relief" on the dissatisfaction, only for the ever-gushing willing nature of our existence to go back to another desire for a change of state. Boredom is seen as the ultimate revealer of a ground-state of dissatisfaction as he argues this to be the "proof" that we are not simply satisfied existing, but always rather dissatisfied. We are always struggling and looking for ways out of our dissatisfaction. We chase flow states, hedonistic ends, entertainment, chit-chatting, and all of it as a result of the dissatisfaction.

Much of life is maintenance, the upkeep of one's lifestyle, not even getting to the game of satisfaction-fulfilling.. Just maintaining the lifestyle to get there.

Then there are contingent externalities that puts people in a deficit. People with various diseases, or unfortunate situations happen to them, might put them at a perpetual deficit in their baseline of what they must contend with while overcoming the dissatisfaction.

Birth puts us on this dissatisfaction trajectory.

Okay, and your philosophical question is ... — 180 Proof

Commentary and open up for discussion. If it doesn’t elicit a discussion point, you can ignore it.

He is expressing his ideas, and as it turns out is reading and commenting on the ideas of others is philosophy. — 013zen

As are we...

Remember, objects may be the “substance of the world”, but “the world” exists in logical space (1.13).

There is a distinction being made between reality and the world. The world is made up of pictures in our mind; reality is not made up of pictures and certainly not pictures in our mind. Nowhere in the text does Wittgenstein say that objects form the substance of reality...its only ever tied to the world. — 013zen

This is even more perplexing then. Whence objects? Why propose them other than the circular reasoning that it is needed to support a theory of objects. It just belies further explanation. If Schopenhauer had a few sentences about "The world is will and my representation".. I would indeed say that he also had an anemic metaphysics. However, he wrote four volumes elaborating on it. Perhaps he put too much stock in presuming the noumena of Kant (being Will), but I can point to where he might have gone wrong rather than wring it out from sparse text.

Here is ChatGPT on the world being relations rather than objects in the style of Tractatus:

The world is not a collection of objects, but rather a dance of processes.
1.1 To understand reality, one must grasp the ceaseless flow of events.

1.11 A process is not a thing, but an unfolding narrative of change.

Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must process.
2.01 The limits of my language are the boundaries of my processing.

2.011 What we cannot process, we must dance around in uncertainty.

The meaning of life is not found in static truths, but in the dynamic interplay of processes.
3.01 Life is not a puzzle to be solved, but a dance to be experienced.

3.1 To live is to engage with the ongoing performance of existence.

3.141 Procession is all there is; to step outside it is to step into the void.

The process of understanding is not to arrive at final conclusions, but to embrace the continual unfolding of insights.
4.01 Language is not a tool to capture reality, but a medium to navigate the currents of experience.

4.1 To speak is not to assert, but to participate in the ongoing dialogue of existence.

4.2 The meaning of a sentence lies not in its structure, but in the rhythm of its processing.

What can be processed at all, can be processed humorously.
5.6 To laugh is not to mock, but to celebrate the absurdity of our existence.

Whereof one cannot dance, thereof one must laugh.
6.42 The process of philosophy is not to solemnly ponder, but to playfully engage with the cosmic comedy.

The process of writing philosophy is not to construct impenetrable tomes, but to craft invitations to join in the dance of understanding.
7.001 My propositions serve as signposts, not as stone tablets of truth.

7.0011 To read between the lines is to catch the rhythm of the universe.

7.5 To conclude is not to end, but to pause before the next movement begins.

7.51 The silence between words is pregnant with possibility, awaiting the next burst of meaning.

Now talk amongst yourselves for decades about this.

I don't think this is quite right. Remember, Wittgenstein gave clear examples of atomic sentences; they have to do with the underlying logic of propositions. Proposition are about something...an atomic fact is merely the underlying logical form of that "about" relation, as stated by the proposition. A Wittgensteinian object is a logical object, or rather, the manner in which its discussed is meant to show what he has in mind as his focus. — 013zen

But then why even bring up "Substance of the world" in relation to objects? This puts it in the metaphysical camp, not simply "logical object". Which is it? You seem to mix form (the relation of objects to predicates.. how they "hang together"), and the objects themselves. And perhaps Wittgenstein is doing the same.

Objects form the substance of the world. Therefore they cannot
be compound.
2.0211If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had
sense would depend on whether another proposition was true.
2.0212 It would then be impossible to form a picture of the world (true
or false).
2.022 It is clear that however dierent from the real one an imagined
world may be, it must have somethinga formin common
with the real world.
2.023 This xed form consists of the objects.
2.0231 The substance of the world can only determine a form and not
any material properties. For these are rst presented by the
propositionsrst formed by the conguration of the objects.
2.0232 Roughly speaking: objects are colourless. — Tractatus

To me that is a very anemic, yet present metaphysics in what he is conveying. Objects are the "real", so-to-speak, and he provides his "reason" for it (2.0211-2.0212). He also says they are "simple". Again, another metaphysical claim.

As for resolving Russell's paradox by regrouping them, cool. I think of this as clever mathematical parsing- computer programming or mathematical proofs. Perhaps there are some interesting philosophical applications, but I haven't encountered where yet. When I do, I will thank Wittgenstein for providing a context for answering it I guess.

I'm sorry, none of this makes much sense and the only way to make sense of it is to "reach beyond what Wittgenstein provides" (to borrow your phrasing of objects :wink:). What you do state I feel can better be described by other metaphysical/epistemological systems more clearly...ironically.

From what I can gather, what you state coincides with my interpretation more-or-less.. That is to say, Wittgenstein views objects of the "aboutness" of the atomic facts. That is to say, the atomic facts has to be about something (the substance of the world), and so he proposes an anemic metaphysics (objects), which is scarcely explained, but is considered sort of fundamental and brute and simple.

One can say that he doesn't have to explain it because he didn't care about it. Or, one can say that his whole point was to not explain things that could not be analyzed any further, and thus he left it brief and moved forward with propositions being built of atomic facts that represent states of affairs of the world. Perhaps trying to explain objects further would be going beyond what he thinks is legitimate for language to describe.

As just an audience and someone who also likes to think about the world, this picture he is providing just doesn't give me much to hang my hat on. Maybe it's just me and my reaction to it. I don't see much "there" there. It seems like an interesting attempt at something, but a mere outline based on some form of logical analysis of objects and their attributes (predicates), but I am really not seeing its greater significance. One problem is that since it is not situated in a framework of what it sets out to disprove (i.e. other theories that are competing with it), I am not really sure what he is trying to prove. He can say something like, "The world is facts" etc. but without explanation of what this is set against, it is rather lost on me why it should be important or interesting. If he went on about how previous to him, or other philosophers think x, y, and z, I could more clearly see what he is trying to set his view against.

Sure, we the audience can try to do that for him, but then, you can say that about anyone. I can write an obscure or obtuse paragraph and say that you should just read up on a bunch of other stuff to really "get me", and I think that is not fair to the interlocutor or audience and is possibly even writing out of bad faith towards one's audience to make them do the job you are supposed to be doing. If I make something just obscure enough, I can always claim you don't "really" get me, or some such.

What's the point of "objects" for Wittgenstein, if he already has "atomic facts" as the primary constituents of his language?

"Objects" indicates a metaphysics beyond the linguistic. Since there is a distinction between objects and atomic facts, there must be a reason why it is important to note. And if it is important, why is more not said about objects (entities, things, as he "clarifies")? It seems like a metaphysics shoe-horned into something that is intended to be completely about how language describes the world...

And if we want to go around the merry-go-round again we can discuss how objects don't have to be physical. Right.. but then later he distinguishes between concepts proper (things of the world), and formal objects (their signs in formal language), and pseudo-objects, (abstracted objects that are neither true or false).

So Bishop Berkeley is ridiculed for his appeal to God to support the temporal continuity of existence, but this appeal is derived from sound principles, whereas Hume is able to remove God, but he does so by using false premises. — Metaphysician Undercover

:clap:

I will try again. You said; — Fooloso4

You tried?

Simple objects do. — Fooloso4

Which are....???

An object is not a function. The possibility of and ways in which simple objects combine is determined by those objects themselves. — Fooloso4

Why would that be the case being that we don't have any idea what objects are other then they are "simples"? Why would it be the objects themselves that determine it and not some other factor of relations? But here further investigation, commentary, etc. is needed. Not opaque statements..."Thus spake Zarathustra!".

An object is not a way of organizing data. Objects are self-organizing in that the possibilities of combining are build into the objects. — Fooloso4

Why? How? What views is this set against?

Objects are not in memory. They subsist independently of what is the case. — Fooloso4

How do we know? What are some reasons for at least, strongly believing this?

None of this is a matter of what I say being right or wrong. It can all be supported and has been supported in this thread by reference to the text. — Fooloso4

But is it supportable, whether or not Wittgenstein believed it or not?

These claims are without explanation as far as I see. Now, I believe strongly in comparing styles and content to show if and where there is an insufficient account of explanation for one's exposition on one's worldview. Well, where is the explanation for any of this other than supposition and possibly because "The rest of my beliefs won't work if these initial claims don't hold"? Having your theory not be coherent if it isn't the case, is not a case in itself for somethings soundness, though certainly validity. This is why I said that it is very much like a programmer writing a language setting out how the language will operate so that it doesn't run into errors.

How is it that objects are the building blocks for atomic facts? Why should there even be atomic facts? Why is objects the building blocks and not processes? This is all strange to simply "Thus claim...".

You can say to me, "Because it has to stop somewhere". Sure, but imagine if any other thinker said that he doesn't have to explain themselves any further.. It just seems like a strange thing to NOT demand from a thinker trying to give you such a comprehensive take on the world. And I would suspect that any modern, living thinker would be grilled to death with more questions to answer for, and the work would NOT just stand on its own to have fanboys be gatekeepers for the deep mysteries of the great Witty.

Now let's compare this to a radically different thinker (from the same time period), Alfred North Whitehead:

4] With the purpose of obtaining a one-substance cosmology, 'prehensions'
are a generalization from Descartes' mental 'cogitations,' and from
Locke's 'ideas,' to express the most concrete mode of analysis applicable
to every grade of individual actuality. Descartes and Locke maintained a
two-substance ontology-Descartes explicitly, Locke by implication. Descartes, the mathematical physicist, emphasized his account of corporeal
substance; and Locke, the physician and the sociologist, confined himself
to an account of mental substance. The philosophy of organism, in its
scheme for one type of actual entities, adopts the view that Locke's account of mental substance embodies, in a very special form, a more penetrating philosophic description than does Descartes' account of corporeal
substance. Nevertheless, Descartes' account must find its place in the
philosophic scheme. On the whole, this is the moral to be drawn from
the Monadologyt of Leibniz. His monads are best conceived as generalizations of contemporary notions of mentality. The contemporary notions
of physical bodies only enter into his philosophy subordinately and derivatively. The philosophy of organism endeavours to hold the balance more
evenly. But it does start with a generalization of Locke's account of mental
operations. — Process and Reality- A.N. Whitehead

Notice the author explains, detail, what his terms mean, provides some context, etc. Or here:



Or just look at Kant:

Of time we cannot have any external intuition, any more than we can have an internal intuition of space. What then are time and space? Are they real existences? Or, are they merely relations or determinations of things, such, however, as would equally belong to these things in themselves, though they should never become objects of intuition; or, are they such as belong only to the form of intuition, and consequently to the subjective constitution of the mind, without which these predicates of time and space could not be attached to any object? In order to become informed on these points, we shall first give an exposition of the conception of space. By exposition, I mean the clear, though not detailed, representation of that which belongs to a conception; and an exposition is metaphysical when it contains that which represents the conception as given à priori.

1. Space is not a conception which has been derived from outward experiences. For, in order that certain sensations may relate to something without me (that is, to something which occupies a different part of space from that in which I am); in like manner, in order that I may represent them not merely as without, of, and near to each other, but also in separate places, the representation of space must already exist as a foundation. Consequently, the representation of space cannot be borrowed from the relations of external phenomena through experience; but, on the contrary, this external experience is itself only possible through the said antecedent representation. — Kant- Critique of Pure Reason

Notice here Kant EXPLAINS his reasoning. Even if you disagree with his premise, he gives why he thinks what he thinks.

The world is everything that is the case.*
1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the
facts.
1.12 For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and
also all that is not the case.
1.13 The facts in logical space are the world.
1.2 The world divides into facts.
1.21 Any one can either be the case or not be the case, and everything
else remain the same.
2 What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts.
2.01 An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things).
2.011 It is essential to a thing that it can be a constituent part of an
atomic fact.
2.012 In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in an atomic
fact the possibility of that atomic fact must already be prejudged
in the thing.
2.0121 It would, so to speak, appear as an accident, when to a thing
that could exist alone on its own account, subsequently a state
of aairs could be made to t.
If things can occur in atomic facts, this possibility must already lie in them. — Tractatus

No exposition. No context. No justification. We just accept that these statements must be true without why, how, what for, etc. It builds from there, but from what epistemic foundation other than fiat of the author? "Entities and things" are also extremely vague, yet even this can be somewhat forgiven if it's explained. But its vagueness is not explained ("This is purposely left vague by me, the author, because...??""")

Of course he could! But you being wrong about him is still wrong. — Fooloso4

Ah yes the old, YOU DONT UNDERSTAND HIM game. I could also write some stuff and then say that you just don’t understand it and continually do it so that I am always at an advantage whereby whatever I wrote is correct and whatever your interpretation of it is incorrect. And somebody who I just like his interpretation of what I wrote will be correct while yours will always be incorrect. it’s a bullshit game. quit it.

Wittenstein wasn’t writing unambiguous shit. It’s clearly ambiguous to the point that even people who knew him best, including Russell didn’t quite understand it he thought.

Go fanboy yourself.

He is not explaining epistemology. He is saying that logic is a transcendental condition for epistemology. — Fooloso4

Wittenstein is not a god to me he could be wrong. Schopenhauer could be wrong can could be wrong. All of them could be wrong. He’s trying to say that certain things cannot be stated clearly in language. He’s using the methods of a programmer to do this in my opinion. This isn’t Explaining anything. It is just limiting language using language, parsing, syntax errors and such. It is making claims on EPISTEMOLOGY without EXPLAINING IT.

Is Aristotle correct on the definition of a human because he wrote a passage in a book on it and that book is studied in philosophy?

We do not simply see things as they are but according to the way we represent or picture them. — Fooloso4

How would this be different thank Kant or Plato for that matter?

One main difference is he’s using language parsing to explain epistemology. That’s like me saying that you got a coding error because you didn’t follow the correct syntax from the Programming language I created. I could’ve created a different language with a different syntax where that error didn’t occur, but according to the Tractatus and Wittenstein’s view, these errors occur. Notice, this isn’t how necessarily reality works just how his programming language (I.e. his Tractatus claims) works, which he uses to somehow describe the limits of reality. I just don’t buy it.

Not following a certain limited programming, syntax isn’t how epistemology works. Kant was explaining how various epistemological reasoning occurred. Cognitive science does the same. Anthropological evolutionary science does the same. None of them need rely on syntax errors of language parsing. Writing bad code is not an epistemology. Acting as if epistemology is writing code that is not in the correct syntax is not an epistemology. And yes, I believe that Tractaus is the rules for basically writing some programming language (pretending to be some key to the limits of what we can say about reality).

And what about scientific ideas like "evolution" that require clues from nature, and are not "states of affairs" of the world, but a combining of phenomena into a concept of how not "what" is happening? To me, Early Witt would just say that this kind of explanatory evidence is not suitable for logical analysis so has to be considered a pseudo-concept. But that seems at odds with how science works, which is by not just observing "states of affairs", but creating explanations from the "states of affairs" of various experiments.

At the end of the day, it seems like Tractatus gives us an interesting computer coding framework. What you can do with his ideas is create a neat coding language from it. I can probably map out Tractatus claims to "constants" and "variables" and "boolean", syntax errors, undefined variables, and such from his propositions of linguistic analysis- and as it works for that purpose, it is fine and dandy.

However, as it is trying to actually picture the "world" and "reality" (not just be an internal guide for parsing out terms in a language), it falls short. And I am not saying that Kant is RIGHT or has captured THE TRUTH. But rather, I see Kant as actually doing epistemology while Witt is doing proto-programming. That is to say Witt might be coherent within the system he defines thusly, but it's explanatory power for how his claims map onto the world is anemic. That is to say, there is nothing really doing this corresponding. There is nothing putting the claims to the world as to how this occurs. It doesn't have to be Kantian, but it does have to be explanatory as far as how the epistemology operates and works. This is not done, so there is no "picture theory". Objects are ill-explained. How the mind creates objects, observes objects, observes cause and effect, are given short shrift, etc. It is coherentism looking to be correspondence theory.

Objects such as blue, unicorn and hat and concepts such as processes and evolution are not referred to in the Tractatus as they are concepts proper in ordinary language and the Tractatus is not dealing with ordinary language.

Another reason that concepts such as process and evolution are not referred to in the Tractatus is that they are abstract concepts, such as angst and beauty, which can neither be described nor shown. Only concrete concepts such as blue, unicorn and hat that can be either described or shown. — RussellA

Again, these distinctions between "concept", "formal concept", and "pseudo-concept", I know come from the broader analytic hay-making of only looking at language, and not the psychology behind the language. This is why I think Kant is much more interesting, as he actually not only covers these various issues with great rigor (especially his analytic-synthetic distinction), he goes on to explain how it is that both of these understandings of reality come about. He is widening the field of explanation, not limiting it. And thus I find this early 20th century positivist-analytic anti-metaphysics/epistemology distasteful and cloyingly more arrogant than the usual philosopher's arrogant schtick (they killed you Socrates for asking too many questions...and possibly siding with Sparta...!!).

We have psychology, neuroscience, anthropology, biology, and a whole host of other scientific and humanistic disciples that can explain how language might possibly work, the psychology behind concept formation, etc. Many "theories" (like evolution), are groupings of phenomenon for explanatory power, yet they are real. I don't see Wittgenstein's "state of affairs" as even encompassing these kind of meta-understandings of the world. "Evolution is the mechanism of biological change in species". That statement according to Witt, would probably be some kind of "pseudo-concept". Ridiculous.

I agree that explaining how the mind can learn the meaning of the world "ngoe" from just five pictures is beyond my pay grade. All I know is that it works, and is in principle very simple.

The Tractatus only begins after I have learnt the word "ngoe", and only then, does the word "ngoe" in language mirror the "ngoe" in the world. — RussellA

Sure, but then, why make a theory that limits language thus in such a way with how he treats language, objects, concepts, propositions, etc.? Don't these types of explanatory things that go "beyond" mere showing refute his claims on the limits of language?

On the one hand the propositional variable "x is a number" signifies a formal concept and on the other hand the variable x signifies a pseudo-concept object. Therefore, a formal concept cannot be a pseudo-concept. — RussellA

Even this on the face of it seems odd to call a "pseudo-concept". Why can't it just be a concept that represents possibilities of states of affairs? And what about "Blue unicorns where hats on Tuesdays"? That is a pseudo-concept / proposition?

And even if it is, so what? This is similar to the problem of Russell, "The present King of France is Bald".

By empirical means, this sentence is about an imaginary or made-up class of characters. That is still a class of things, a kind of concept. Does Wittgenstein allow for that, if he is "object-agnostic" (he doesn't elaborate on what an object is in any significant metaphysical description)?

And what about "concepts" like "processes"? It's arguable that "processes" like "evolution" don't really "exist" but are groupings of how we identify the world as to what happens to objects. "Evolution" itself may not be a "thing" in the world per se, but a descriptor of a series of phenomena that is grouped together by humans for explanatory power.

What do you think "ngoe" means, now you have been "shown" the picture? — RussellA

So is this illustration supposed to be showing a potential "theory" of cognition for words associated with objects? If so this itself would be an illustration of a "psychological theory" that goes beyond simply "acquaintance" (showing) the object, thus refuting that "acquaintance" or "showing" is where it must stop. Actually, it can go further into explanatory theory- whether that be Hume's constant conjunctions, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, or modern cognitive neuroscientific theories!

IE, I agree that Kant's Critique of Pure Reason makes more sense than Wittgenstein's Tracatus, although the Tractarian idea of modal worlds is very important in philosophy. — RussellA

Curious your thoughts on this part:

Both can be communicated using symbols. One tells us about the state of affairs of the world, whether the case is true or false (synthetic-contingent, and experiential-empirical), and the other is necessary for language itself to function. Certainly, this could lead to a regress (definitions of definitions of definitions), and surely, at some point, it is simply just a matter of "knowing" the object is the object without any further explanation, but then we are getting into psychology, and NOT the "limits" of language. Surely I can point to these processes that account for object formation in the mind, and how we attach meaning to objects. And then, I have a "state of affairs" about how the mind KNOWS objects, and is not an infinite regress of definitions of the concept, but a theory of meaning that accounts for the concept-formation, and thus where language ends definitionally, I can continue on explanatorily with the psychology of concept-formation. — schopenhauer1

I am basically challenging Wittgenstein's project in Tractatus as the limits of language being actually "limits" the way he defines them (at some point you cannot say but show only).