I would speak instead for a realism of nature - an ecological level of personal equilibration. It feels right that if society as a whole were founded on sustainable principles, then everyone would live much more happily as a result.

And yes, having any personal influence on society in this fashion feels like an impossible task. It is a Romantic vision as things stand. Which is why my response is to take the analysis a further step and consider how the current consumerist/neoliberal settings of the world are entirely natural as a response to a cosmic desire to burn off an unnaturally large store of buried fossil fuels.

From this perspective, things really are shit for humans. We have a biopsychology (a biology that includes all our general social organisation settings) that was adapted to a hunter/gatherer lifestyle, but it is a biopsychology that is quite poorly adapted to the entropic explosion that is the modern industrial era. — apokrisis

Yeah. And it is this egocentric one-noteism that I say is so tedious and overwrought.

To talk about a feeling existing in this fashion simply ignores all metaphysical sophistication about the very question of the nature of "existence".

Does suffering "exist" really? I know my suffering is part of my experience. But to then elevate that to the level of a cosmological fact - a fundamental feature of reality that is solipsistically present, and so supposedly could have been absent - is just a wild exaggeration.

It is hard to take seriously for a minute any argument that begins with such a bum ontological basis. — apokrisis

I'd say suffering is more "immanent" to the human condition than sustainability. This is not to say that sustainability is not important for a society to exist in perpetuity; I am not denying that keeping our society going without severe depletion of resources/critical survival needs would be a priority of our modern industrial community. What I am saying is that even if we figured out sustainability- using perfectly recycled fuels and slowing the general entropy of our local system, we would still suffer. So, is suffering a part of the human condition? I think so. Unwanted pain, and what I call "instrumentality"- the Will-for-nothing (striving-for-nothing) would still remain.

Also, you seem to assume the trope by intellectual-types that humans need to exist for the X-reason of discovery and novel technology. Why we live for a principle such as discovery is not really explained other than sci-fi aesthetics of sorts where the "discovery" moment provides some sort of species-existential epiphany.

I'm reminded of 2001: A Space Odyssey. One can read many things into that movie. The name of the ship was Discovery.. And David Bowman- the intrepid human, does encounter the "alien" Monolith and whatever created its technology. In this encounter, Bowman experiences the dimensions of time, moving through his life and is transformed into the Space Baby. Perhaps a new dawn for humans, or perhaps just a big farce- a big thing signifying nothing. I think it might be the latter. We are simply instrumental beings striving for nothing.

But yes, personally I find the constant harping of the pessimist on these kinds of boards very annoying. Such whining is only possible from a point of material privilege. — apokrisis

I see, philosophizing about pragmatic logic of metaphysics and ethics isn't though...That takes true poverty.

You have less reason than anyone to go out and use that advantage to really achieve as an individual. — apokrisis

This is hollow, as "what it means to achieve" is cultural and also determined by the very culture (possibly of privilege) one belongs to. That is a loaded word filled with biased group/individual opinions on what achievement is or should be. I stated earlier that I don't like to be complicit with the inherent suffering by accepting it. But I know that is the one and only way to "achieve" equanimity (take that with sarcasm).. You know, the way of the warrior-Sage who "prevents" suffering with his awesome mind? Yeah that guy.. Free togas, Buddhist robes, and stern/earnest faces come with package too.

Therefore your comment - "we can devise ways to achieve equanimity despite the suffering" - seems wrongly focused in trying to ignore what we can't control, rather than instead seeking to adjust in ways our feelings are meant to indicate that change is needed. — apokrisis

I think darthbarracuda was trying to explain that the FACT that suffering EXISTS to be figured out is a tragedy in itself. One that is deserving of bitching about and not just pragmatic drill sergeanting "pick-yourself-by-the-bootstrap-you-yella-bellied-SOB" reactions.

Philosophy shouldn't be used to prove the way you are is the way you ought to be because that is the way reality really is. Philosophy should be a tool that might get you out of such a hole rather than a tool to dig it even deeper. — apokrisis

I don't see it necessarily as either. Also, who is to say that this cannot be applied to yourself or anyone doing philosophy at a particular moment in time? Rarely are people touting points of views they don't agree with except when asked to entertain the notion for academic reasons, or purely to be devil's advocate. Sometimes they do it to shake out their own philosophy and see if they can find flaws in it, but many ambiguous arguments can be justified in some manner or other, so even this won't necessarily change anyone's mind.


You're just preaching to the choir. NO ONE except me on these forums is going to say it is ok to bitch at suffering. And NO ONE (including me) is going to say that you should not try to get at the root cause of a particular problem if it is continuing to be harmful. As OglopTop was indicating, it is that suffering is there to begin with. This says something about the conditions of life. ALSO, the instrumentality of life is very much a part of this understanding. As I've stated before, I use the word instrumentality because that captures the idea that there is some sort of emptiness/incompleteness at the end of all endeavors. We are doing to do to do to do.

discipline — John

I see. The warrior again.

How we ever to make progress in such an environment? — TheWillowOfDarkness

There is no making progress. As I said earlier:

At this point, I might even question some of the philosophies themselves. The Tao.. the Way.. the flow of the universe.. do not resist.. The Logos.. the natural reason of the universe.. the Buddhist ideas of letting go.. Perhaps even that is being complicit. If you can't beat 'em, join 'em. It is romanticizing a mystical stillness behind the suffering that one can tap into. Again, one can cause certain mental states for limited period of time, that is it. — schopenhauer1

How is it that you feel qualified to speak for "all"? — John

Being completely detached from suffering? Yep.

Sustainable by whom? You? Or others? — John

All, baby!

Prevention, however, is different. In moments where suffering doesn't exist in the first place, there is no problem. I am arguing Stoicism creates these moments. Not false "coping" with suffering, where we try to tell ourselves our suffering isn't a lie, but an absence of these moments, where some of our worst anxieties over not getting what we want are eliminated. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yeeah I don't believe it, unless a serious mental/physical handicap/disability befalls us.

If someone becomes a Stoic and changes from a person who flies off the handle at every disappointment, to someone who's disappoint passes or never becomes life consuming, states of suffering have been prevented. There's no illusion to on longer feeling constantly upset of anxious about what they world did not give you-- it's a real absence of a suffering. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I agree this can happen some of the time. I don't disagree some cognitive-behavior self-modifications can work. I just don't think suffering ends and not all situations apply. So I guess I am disputing its efficacy and totality of such self-modifications, not that it can never be employed in the first place.

Your pessimism is still caught under the illusion of "coping." It treats suffering like is something which could be resolved, as if it were a matter of "coping." As a result, you read instances where suffering is prevented as "coping." The Stoic's victory (prevention) over suffering (prevention of anxiety and disappointment) is misread as their philosophical falsehood (that one can "cope" with suffering). Unless, we undo suffering we are supposedly "just coping." That's not how it works. Suffering is never undo. Life hurts a lot of the time. Victory (i.e. prevention) of suffering doesn't change this, it merely gives us some wonderful moments where we are not burned with a suffering.

Your position is not pessimistic enough, for it still treats suffering as something to resolve, and ignorant of prevention, as it treats undoing suffering as the standard for preventing suffering. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Not really, because I do not think we can prevent suffering once alive. Again, I am challenging the efficacy but not that it cannot work in any circumstance or for some people. We are not a Jedis andwe cannot see through the matrix.. We are just poor schlubs caught in life's instrumental moving forward.

Buddhism sees suffering as distinct from pain. We cannot, as long as we are embodied, avoid pain, but we may choose, by releasing our attachment, not to suffer it. The Stoics too, were onto this idea. — John

Yeah, I'm well aware. I just do not think it's really sustainable. Shoot me.

I also have this feeling that maybe stories of sages and buddhahood, while they may contain some truth, may also be overly romanticized. Over time, some sort of supra-human ideal 'teacher' has been projected to a person who is probably not too unlike many of us; who time and time again experience pain, stress, and boredom. The difference is that, they have a positive outlook even after realizing this. Maybe history and politics played a role, the unsavory aspects of their being are filtered out and their internal struggles a mystery -- what is palatable gets retained and the remainder gets forgotten. — OglopTo

That is a good analysis of how the "supra-human" ideal teacher remains as the reality is forgotten.

It's an interesting realization how having a negative outlook doesn't get the same attention as having a positive one. There are no Buddhas or Stoic sages who profess a negative outlook in life who gets the same degree of admiration. Majority of us don't have a clue what this all means and yet pessimism is, most of the time, automatically met with apprehension and pre-judged to be an incorrect way of seeing things. Makes you wonder what kinds of works do pessimists of Buddha's and Jesus' time were then available but is now forever lost in history. — OglopTo

I completely agree. Negative outlooks are dismissed. It might be a problem of life in analog and digital. In analog, it is lived out in all its grittiness. However, when asked to formulate a cogent philosophy, Pollyanna outlooks ensue and the past, future, and "meaning" of things gets either a rosy gloss or an escape-hatch regimen (i.e. the warrior-Sage, etc.). I get the ideal of being calm and indifferent in the face of flux and pain. It is just not achievable. The fact that suffering exists in the first place should give us pause.

At this point, I might even question some of the philosophies themselves. The Tao.. the Way.. the flow of the universe.. do not resist.. The Logos.. the natural reason of the universe.. the Buddhist ideas of letting go.. Perhaps even that is being complicit. If you can't beat 'em, join 'em. It is romanticizing a mystical stillness behind the suffering that one can tap into. Again, one can cause certain mental states for limited period of time, that is it.

You disagree with me? Never. I can agree that they attempt attempts to avoid pain. I just don't think it happens to the extent of creating Sages or Buddhahood. In other words they may attempt avoidance but all they get is coping.

I think realizing this is a feat in itself and it sure is unpleasant to have to have this view for the rest of one's life. But is there really no way out? — OglopTo

Nope. I don't believe Buddha achieved some ego-death/Nirvana. I don't believe any Sage achieved some eternal equanimity. Pain sucks for everyone. The pressures of cultro-survival sucks for everyone. The instrumentality of our restless nature goes on for everyone. I do think that some psychological techniques (cognitive-behavioral therapy for example) might work for some people for limited applications. That's making do. Everyone thinks themselves a warrior- of mysticism, of physicality, etc. The warrior-monk will go in there and tear some stuff up with their asceticism. The warrior-athlete will tear stuff up with their physical prowess. No matter what, instrumentality is the law, unwanted pain exists, and we all deal with our culturo-survival demands.

So I wanted to draw that point out, because I think that the point of 'philosophical pessimism' has to include some sense of there being a solution to it, or a way of transcending it.

Othewise it can only ever be — Wayfarer

I'm not much for pipe dreams. Sisyphus is like the instrumentality of existence. We do to do to do. Our restless nature- keeping ourselves going. The outside motivating us through our culturo-survival needs and through presenting our being with unwanted pain. The inside motivating us through our restless nature turning restless dissatisfaction to pleasure and goal-seeking. That is our lives.

Does the above look like a valid summation to you? — anonymous66

Yes for the potential future suffering. Of course it does not address the suffering of now (i.e. the instrumentality of existence, unwanted pain, goals that are never satisfied, flux and never stasis).

I'm not sure what you mean here. Isn't it obvious that suffering does exist? Anything we do in regards to suffering is "after the fact", isn't it? — anonymous66

Right, suffering exists period. That is the problem. What we try to do about it is one thing. But Pessimists keep in mind that it exists and that the need to overcome it itself is a burden that we make do with if we want to keep living in a world with suffering.

How does Pessimism propose we deal with suffering in a way that is "not after the fact." ? Does "not dealing with suffering in a way that is after the fact" also = making sure less humans exist in the future (anti-natalism)? — anonymous66

Since suffering will always exist in some way. It's best to bitch about it and see everyone else as in the same boat (as fellow-sufferers). Alleviate other's suffering as much as possible and ones own through whatever coping mechanism (Stoicism is fine if you like that), but just recognize that we ARE suffering in the first place.

Preventing it is not coping, it is stopping it from ever happening (antinatalism) for a potential future person. As for bitching at it and resenting it, this is not seeking to work with it but the opposite. It sees suffering for what it is.

So, does suppressing = wanting to rid the world of it?
Does admitting it exists and trying to prevent it in the future mean that one is "working with it"?, and if so, isn't that bad (because you're then being complicit)? — anonymous66

Preventing it is not coping, it is stopping it from ever happening (antinatalism). As for bitching at it and resenting it, this is not seeking to work with it but the opposite. It sees suffering for what it is.

And of course your assertion is that "not being complicit" = making sure there are less humans in the future (anti-natalism).

Preventing it is not coping, it is stopping it from ever happening (antinatalism).

I want to understand the point of the thread.

It's comparing Stoicism to Philosophical Pessimism and making the claim that Philosophical Pessimism is better because if Pessimism hand in hand with anti-natalism, then less humans to suffer in the future.

And you're saying that no philosophy ever has dealt with human suffering? or just that Stoicism hasn't dealt with human suffering?

Or are you claiming that only Philosophical Pessimism addresses the fact of human suffering? — anonymous66

This thread was started to be originally an open forum regarding the major questions on the OP. It came about through people providing the stock answer of "Stoicism" anytime suffering was debated. It then turned into a pretty intense argument over Stoicism and Pessimism. Anyways, what I am saying currently in reply to your idea that it is a solution to human suffering is that Stoicism may be one way to try to ameliorate suffering. It is an interesting coping mechanism that might be effective for some. However, it is a coping mechanism- always after the fact. It does not address the fact that suffering exists in the first place (to be overcome with so-and-so coping mechanism). I am positing that this sort of coping is complicit in the suffering BECAUSE it accepts it as something to be coped with rather than something to rebel against. As I put it earlier

The Pessimist knows and deals with this fact face on without resorting to suppressing it. Rather accepting it means that one cannot avoid it. It is ok to resent it, bitch at it, commiserate about it. That is part of the rebellion. Seeking to work with it is being complicit. — schopenhauer1

I think it could be argued that Stoicism, like all the ancient philosophies, was developed as a response to an obvious issue. Life can be difficult. Philosophies are therapeutic. Stoicism is one proposed solution to the reality of human suffering (it does promise to be a path to Eudaimonia).

If not difficulties, then not philosophy (as a solution.) — anonymous66

I don't see how this addresses the point of the FACT of human suffering.

I believe I did cover it very well. All of philosophy exists as a solution to suffering. — anonymous66

That was not meant for you but for Stoicism :).

The problem is, I don't see Stoics going and and trying to convert anyone. Perhaps the next best world would be one in which there are many Stoic sages, and they would be living in harmony with everyone else, who have found their own path to Eudaimonia. This seems like a possibility, because there is no agreement on how to reach Eudaimonia (or even if that is a good goal). — anonymous66

I guess any group can believe this, right? Christianity, Epicureanism, Buddhism, etc. If everyone just becomes the exemplary of whatever belief-system we would all be in harmony and on the path to X-blissful/exalted stated. The problem is that a) some things cannot be solved with these philosophies and b) there is still suffering in the meantime until everyone becomes the wise Sage. c) Some people are naturally more resistant to being "Sages" than others due to a variety of factors. d) The FACT that there is suffering to overcome is not addressed. The Pessimist is similar to the Stoic, in many ways except that, in my opinion, the Pessimist does not evaluate the suffering as simply something to overcome (which it may or may not be depending on what kind of suffering, the personality dealing with suffering, and many other non-linear factors), but they are rebellious against the situation in the first place. No life is not a paradise, there is no excuse for it otherwise. Accepting this is de facto anyone who does not commit suicide. Trying to live your life so that it does not affect you, in fact makes it affect you quite greatly in your efforts to ameliorate it in the first place. You can never escape it. The Pessimist knows and deals with this fact face on without resorting to suppressing it. Rather accepting it means that one cannot avoid it. It is ok to resent it, bitch at it, commiserate about it. That is part of the rebellion. Seeking to work with it is being complicit.

That Stoics deny suffering and/or problems in general, seems to be a common misconception. From what I can tell, Stoics acknowledge there is a problem, and then look for a rational solution. Sometimes the solution is to reframe the problem in terms of "what judgments am I making?" But, sometimes the solution is to realize that there is a problem and and that we can do something about it. The Stoics have been accused of being fatalistic. I guess I just don't see it. — anonymous66

One of the reasons for the thread was that Stoicism could be used to deny that we have to "deal" with suffering in the first place by being born at all. Stoicism seemed to be a sort of stock answer, like a salve that could be used to justify the fact that we suffer. "Look, we can all act as Stoics, and the problems of life are solved". Maybe it is not put in such Pollyanna terms, but that was/is basically the gist. My point was to to point out that there are problems which Stoicism does not solve as well as the fact that suffering, by existing in the first place, bypasses the "Stoicism" as answer-to-suffering response.

You must distinguish between "wanting" to have a diversity of thought and "allowing" for a diversity of thought. I'm all for the latter, but not the former. — Thorongil

Yes, allowing may be a good word there. Providing for a climate where diverse points of view are protected from government censorship would be getting more at the sense of it I think.

This is too vague. — Thorongil

Once a person "takes to heart" a fundamentalist religious doctrine, it becomes incumbent upon that person to also follow the restrictions of the thought that is part of this doctrine. If TRUTH is instilled through some divine revelation and/or divine interpretation, and one believes this to be true, then anything that is contradictory to this truth can never be even in the realm of consideration. As stated earlier, it really does not become an issue until it is coerced.

But this is impossible, There will always be some beliefs that dominate others, such as the belief that society is healthier with a diversity of beliefs without one dominating the other. — Thorongil

It is a very weak dominance and allows for the widest number of views to be taken. The tyranny of wanting to keep a society with a diversity of thought, just doesn't seem very stifling.

That was basically what I was asking. I don't have an answer to it, but it's a good question I think. — Thorongil

Yes, it is a good question.

This and what you say before it is all granted, but I feel like adding some qualification here. Heresy was a state crime at the time. The inquisitors would hand over those accused to the state and the state would then determine the punishment; and the vast majority of those accused of heresy were not killed or tortured. Second, Galileo and Bruno did have demonstrably heretical and heterodox views, so it would make even less sense for the Church not to investigate them, considering they identified as Catholic. Lastly, the crusades were originally conceived as a defense of Christendom from Muslim invasion, not bloodthirsty imperialist and colonialist expeditions. — Thorongil

By the time of Christendom's reign in the Dark Ages, lower classes of Germanic/Slavic/Celtic tribes followed their kings' shift to the religion, or were forced converted by losing in battle or not following his lead. The ability to allow for local syncretism often helped transition native pagan beliefs to Christian doctrine. Trials as far as I know it, was amplified and institutionalized when the Church was more established around the high/late Middle Ages.

"Thorongil;15506"]If he voluntarily found the Christian system true, then he was not "strait-jacketed" into anything. Or would you rather him view things through the prism of doctrines and beliefs he thought to be false? —

If a change in language matters here, I am willing to say he "took to the teachings and beliefs of a brand of Christianity as he saw it and thus philosophized about the world in those terms" rather than "strait-jacketing" his views to one system which puts a negative spin on it. I only want emphasize that the difference with religious belief and any old philosophical belief is the expectation that one can only view other philosophies in relation to a core belief system rather than one amongst many.

Fully agreed. Nonetheless, I would be hesitant to praise diversity for its own sake. In modern cultures that do so, there is always a diversity of the false and the bad, which makes the truth harder to find and pursue. Could it also be that "enforcing" a certain set of beliefs produces a healthier, more harmonious, and culturally richer society? — Thorongil

Plato might agree with this as per The Republic. I don't think so though. A society is healthier with a diversity of beliefs without one dominating the other. It depends on what goals you want to promote though. If there is some sort of prosperity or benefit that ensues from sameness in beliefs, does this outweigh the possibility for general freedom to entertain any belief?

Does it really impede the truly critical and original thinkers out there that much? I am reminded of the long history of the method of esoteric writing and a particular line about Meister Eckhart from Schopenhauer:

Yes it does. They were still tied to a core belief system with no possibility of disclaiming it. I am sympathetic to some Medieval ideas as they are often acutely aware of suffering and the disatisfaction of the physical world. There are definitely overlaps with Eastern/Schopenhauerean ideas here. However, this does not mean that I'd rather everyone drink from the "sweet bliss of Enlightened thinking" by forcing feality to it. Imagine if it was Schopenhauer's beliefs instead of Christianity. Instead of being freely enjoyed, his ideas would become a sort tool for thought-police. "Once you have shown your fealty to ideas about the Will's existence, how it is the flip side of Representation, and accept that we are all suffering through our constant deprivation, you may be free to entertain any notion you want!" Again, there was a time before this in Western history where one did not have to vow fealty to a system of thought. After this time period, it would return again.

What is this supposed to imply? That one not ever commit oneself to what one finds to be true? That one must remain skeptical, even in the face of evidence to the contrary? Critical thinking doesn't, or needn't, cease when one commits oneself to a philosophical or religious system. — Thorongil

Again, I am willing to change my terminology. If people are willing to take on a belief system of their own accord, I am fine with this. Critical thinking does not cease, but if there is a climate and power structure that does not allow for one to even exit this belief system, this completely destroys the basis for truly critical thinking.

Well, it depends on the belief system. Christian Europe was far less destructive in this regard than the Muslim Middle East and North Africa, if only for the simple reason that the former produced all those things you seem to be indirectly praising, namely, freedom of speech and religion, democracy, modern science and philosophy, etc - whereas the latter actively fought against them. — Thorongil

No doubt, Muslims did the same thing. Muslims had the advantage that many of the former Byzantine writings and teachers ended up under their control which gave them access to Aristotle, mathematics, medicine, astronomy, and science that was largely cut off from Europe until about the 1100s. The Muslim Golden Age ran from about 700-1200 CE.

However, I still have the same complaint that their philosophical achievements had to be in employment of religion. Unfortunately for this region, free-thought took a reversal when the two-fold factors of Genghis Khan's destruction of the Baghdad library in 1258 and (primarily) the spread and institutional enforcement of conservative beliefs of philosophers like al-Ghazali. It would be interesting if this somehow went the other way.

I'm not too sure about Christiandem being the driver of democracy. Under the system of a unified Church, it was quite hierarchical. Democracy came about in Europe through both an evolutionary means and a deliberate philosophizing in the Enlightenment era. Republics like the ones in Italy and then the Netherlands, were ones based on mercantile-elite rule. England's parliamentarian system gradually evolved from an assemblage of nobles advising and limiting the king to a larger institution where a House of Commons became dominant by the 1600s. More systematic approaches to democracy and freedom were often due to the Renaissance/Enlightenment practice of people trying to abandon Medieval traditions and looking back to a time of more freedom of thought (and not bound to Christian doctrine) such as the Greco-Roman period. It took outside philosophers like Spinoza and Hobbes to get points of view out that were skeptical and critical of religion.

I largely agree with your assessment that due to Christianity's early ability to separate itself from political power and be a third rail rather than a direct ruler, allowed for there to be a less strict stranglehold over differing points of view. It also helped that Europe was not unified under one regime as the Muslim world was. The Church's power was at the whims of local monarchs and aristocracy. Thus Luther, subsequent Protestants, and later a-religious thinkers could be somewhat insulated from persecution. However, one should not overlook the Church's concerted effort to keep its grip (trials of Galileo and Bruno, Protestant persecution, the Inquisition, Crusades, trials and persecution of the Cathars, numerous individual trials on heresy, etc.).

But why narrow? You are assuming in advance that Christianity is untrue, so that if someone like Augustine formally turns away from Neoplatonism and toward it, he is ipso facto making the wrong decision. — Thorongil

Being a belief-system that focuses on proper belief, taking on the Christian system strait-jacketed his thought to then only view things in the prism of the core doctrines/beliefs of this belief system. The irony is, that a culture of "right" and "wrong" belief became dominant because of apologetics and polemics that he helped create and thus, others under Christendom were compelled to have these beliefs as well. Thus future people who were under the much more forceful watch of Christendom could not enjoy the relative freedom to explore other systems of ideas the way he was able to do in the relative diversity of ideas in late Antiquity. Granted there was the cult of the Emperor which was tacitly put in place to establish dominance (and was in great part the reason for the Jewish Revolt of 70 CE). Granted there were isolated incidents before Rome, where Greeks were overzealous to Hellenize (again involving Jews in ancient Judea who resisted the more Hellenistic faction and revolt against Antiochus IV's Zeus-worshipping policies of c. 160 BCE). However, for the most part, right doctrine or right religious beliefs or right philosophical leanings were not a part of the Greco-Roman power structure. Certainly brute force, slavery, and intimidation was a part of it and the sheer desire for land and economic gain, but the desire to completely limit people's beliefs to one belief-system was not usually on their agenda.

Yes, because he and others like him thought Christianity was true. A lemonade stand is likely to sell lemonade. — Thorongil

Thus his (core) beliefs became everyone's beliefs with limited options and variety. This was very different than the diversity of Greco-Roman times.

And prior to then, people converted to Christianity freely and in the teeth of brutal Roman persecution. Enough of them did so to constitute a majority of the population, which then carried over into the Middle Ages. Naturally, Christian rulers then persecuted others into conversion, but this was not the primary means of how the Roman world became Christian to begin with. — Thorongil

Perhaps not to begin with and I guess I have no problem if people choose to strait-jacket themselves into a belief system. It is when that one belief system becomes the dominant power in a region and systematically creates a climate and structure that disallows other points of view. It edged out all othe philosophies- ones that could have survived the barbarian invasions. This indeed happened as stated earlier, when Theodosius came to power. It morphed into the Pope/ Bishops become power players after the downfall of the Western Roman Empire. No doubt, you can argue that Christianity "saved" some of the pagan ideas through monasteries and libraries, but at the cost of suppressing diversity and creating the Medieval system of concordia (making philosophy in accordance with Christian belief).

I cannot say what would have happened if monasteries and other Christian institutions did not exist as preservers. You may have an indirect argument that religious suppression came with it philosophical preservation. However, this was more of a consequence, and not the goal as far as I see it. Perhaps Roman academics could have found other ways to preserve ideas and writings. There were schools of thought, like the Classical Academy in Athens that were shutdown so, there could be no room for competition of this academic sort at least.

Here again you're simply parroting Russell's patronizing treatment of these philosophers. Has it ever occurred to you that perhaps, in following where the argument leads, they thought it lead to Christianity? — Thorongil

That's interesting because when Christiandem stopped being the power structure and lost its grip on academic institutions, other points of view started to make its way to the fore.

Correct. The Church had quite a bit of power, but it also encouraged philosophy, learning, etc. Like all large institutions it has a mixed history. — Thorongil

Granted, as stated before philosophy was somewhat permissible in the scope of the parameters set down by Church Fathers and theologians. There was some allowance of debate, I'll grant that. Even this became political if one group came to power that did not like the other's point of view. Certainly, one had to show fealty to a belief-system first before ought else was speculated upon or debated.

You appear to be talking about Augustine. I would say that your criticism is quite unfounded. He did identify with pagan philosophies as a young man. He was a Neoplatonist and a Manichean before becoming a Christian, and if you want to know why he became the latter, you can read the Confessions. Secondly, I don't think anyone could honestly accuse Augustine of not having fully acquainted himself with Neoplatonism and other Greco-Roman schools of thought. He was probably the most learned and often sympathetic authority on these schools you could find in the entire Roman world at the time. Finally, trying to pin on Augustine all the alleged oppression perpetrated by Christianity is nothing more than a fallacious attempt to impute guilt by association. — Thorongil

Yes, Augustine and his guilt..I never claimed he did not know or initially participate in other views of thought. In fact, I acknowledge that, and hence why it is a tragedy that he chose, at the end, a narrow focus on Christianity and then participated on apologetics and trying to define an orthodox Christianity as against other sects which were deemed wayward and possibly dangerous. His interpretations would by and large would become orthodoxy during the Middle Ages (though his more interesting Neoplatonic spin would be challenged later on).

As far as pinning on him the oppression perpetrated by Christianity- he was not the sole bearer but certainly a mover and a shaker in the field. Cyril, Irenaeus, Clement, Origen, Jerome, Athenasius, and the like started this kind of philosophy-in-employment-of-orthodoxy; later debates over doctrine were ongoing throughout the Middle Ages in a sort of echo chamber. So he indirectly (in a link with other apologists) influenced the idea that philosophy is only in employment of Christian theology and as far as I know, explicitly supported coercion during a time of Christian consolidation and power. Every once in a while new writings came through and provoked new ways of thinking of old problems (i.e. Aristotle in the 1100s), it was always in the confines of a) Christian-theological speculation and b) what the authorities of the time deemed was orthodoxy or heretical.

I don't know, the demise of diverse thinking could have been due to the weakness and corruption of the later Western Roman emperors, the barbarian invasions, the cultural deterioration of Rome, and so on. — Thorongil

I acknowledged this as you acknowledged.

And? Most of the Roman world had converted to Christianity by the time it evaporated in the West, so I don't know what you expect. — Thorongil

With the alignment of the Church being fused with the State in 380 CE (under Theodosius), persecution and coercion were the norm. Augustine, tacitly and then explicitly agreed with these policies. By the 500s, the last pagan schools of Classical philosophy was closed down (purposefully). Church Fathers- master theologians and apologists influenced the Councils and Edicts that would be pronounced via the Church infrastructure which eventually become consolidated under the Pope. This institution would become the de facto third rail of power in Europe. Germanic/Slavic/Celtic kings would convert (and often force convert) their respective tribesman (especially the warriors which would then filter down), and thus be given the pomp and legitimacy that a (for that time) international institution could bestow (with ancient ties to the Roman Empire).

I'm glad you clarified here, but I don't like your insinuation in the last part. I find most of the medieval philosophers to be genuine searchers after truth, not cynical opportunists making due under an oppressive church. The oppression thesis is simply too patronizing to these often profound thinkers. And remember that the seeds of the scientific, political, and philosophical revolutions of the early modern era were laid during the medieval period by these thinkers. — Thorongil

The educated class- those who would eventually become monks/priests/bishops/clergy did several things that made Medieval philosophy sclerotic:
1) Christian texts would be the only texts that mattered most for copying and recopying in monasteries and libraries. Pagan philosophical texts were secondary if at all being deemed as inferior. It would not be until the libraries from the Muslim world were making their way into Europe via Spain and Sicily that there was a slow movement towards studying things outside of the confines of theology. Even then, Aristotle's inaccurate version of cosmology and movement would be used to justify Church theology- making empirico-mathematical science especially hard to overthrow in the Renaissance.

2) Philosophy could not be free-form but only used in its employment of theology. Thus, the educated class, instead of following the dialectic to wherever it led, were instead following it wherever it led as long as it had the tinge of Christian belief.

3) The various inquisitions (the major ones being in the 14-1600s), crusades, and especially via Papal edict and Church Councils, were enforced via courts and kings who made alliances and thus indeed did keep a tight grip of Church order in this time period. It became an established and enmeshed part of politics in a period when there was little other avenues for inter-regional politics.

They were free to think within the confines of Scripture. Like Whitehead said: Christianity is a religion looking for a metaphysics (...while Buddhism is a metaphysics looking for a religion). — darthbarracuda

Astute summary.

I'm not sure if that is sarcastic which, if so, is kind of funny. But what I meant is he could have put his theological tendencies energies into Neoplatonism proper or traditional Greco-Roman schools of though but instead he became the mouthpiece of what would become orthodox Christian thinking which became an oppressive system as it became one of the only allowable points of view. Being heavily involved in what is considered right interpretation of Christian metaphysics/ethics and what is heretic- he along with other Church Fathers was a main architect of the demise of diverse thinking, heterodoxy, and the relative free thought of the upper classes enjoyed in Greco Riman times. The Christian point of view being the "only" point of view carried over into the Middle Ages with scant alternative. Granted, contingencies of Germanic tribal culture, the collapse of the Roman economy, and the general decline of knowledge didn't help- the archetype of only viewing philosophy in service of bolstering Christian belief was established.

It's too bad he didn't use his intellect to pursue more "pagan" philosophies.

@andrewk
The capacity to break the world down into conceptual units might be considered a radical break from other animals. The generative capacity that language engenders creates an enormous amount of information that can be stored in memory capacities that only exist with language. It also provides for a generally generalist-type brain which is decoupled from the usual instinctual response to environmental stimuli.

Thus language capacity provides for more survival strategy options. Instead of just associative learning, imitation, reflexes, and fixed-pattern responses, an "inner mental theater" whereby thought can arrange and rearrange the world in this "theater of the mind" is employed as a more generalist approach. This theater of the mind helps us survive by using a vast number of generalist methods such as learning complex tasks, synthesizing conceptual knowledge, sharing complex memes of information, allowances for imagination and novel concept generation, self-talk (which leads to more novel survival strategies) etc. In other words, the immediacy of the world is removed (less if then) and replaced with a complex imagination generating world of mental abstraction.

Further, the abstraction capacity which creates with it a sense of relation of self to others also creates with it deliberate (aka volitional) acts. We choose to do something among a variety of options. We may deliberate in the best way to get it, or what we even really want, but there is at least the sense that we can choose various goals, figure out how to pursue them, debate whether or not we will actually go through pursuing something, etc. In other words we at least feel we know why we are doing something and can plan it out.

So I have to criticize Zapffe a bit when he says that consciousness is "not-natural". On the contrary, everything in the universe is natural (nature doesn't exist exist in the first place, it's an empty word). It's natural that people can feel unnatural. Kind of disturbing, like an instance of cosmic self-hate. — darthbarracuda

I agree that "natural" here may be the feeling rather than an actual metaphysical position. It is more of a poetic idiom. The closest we may get to "feeling" natural may be in a communal social setting. Knowing we came from a close-knit hunting/gathering way of life, and knowing that our species is one of "meme" sharing (concept-sharing) my guess is that humans are most in their "element" when socializing. This may be universal social interactions like sharing stories, laughing, teaching others, sharing creative achievements, customs, etc. The problem is that at any given time we may feel a "broken-tool" moment when the surfaces of our everyday "flow" of things gives way to existential dread. We are no longer in a flow. We become aware of our own restless nature. At this point of self-awareness we are always chasing after "flow" again. We must get our attention caught up in the moment again so as not to think of existence itself.

With the contingency of the human switch to industrial/post-industrial society comes more broken-tool moments. Rather than the "given" flow that living in a tribal or agricultural society affords, a post-industrial society must create ever more nuanced ways to achieve flow so as to avoid existential restlessness. So this is why we have self-help, exercise, technological distractions, extra hours spent at jobs (or finding "meaningful" jobs), hobbies, games, philosophizing, performing math/logic problems, reading, studying, poetry, writing, studying science, analyzing and discussing literature, inventing things, etc. etc. etc.

Drawing from his metaphysics, could it not be argued that human consciousness (or consciousness in general) is just one of infinite manifestations of the Substance (or perhaps the Will if we're to follow Schopenhauer)? An uncaring Will would create, create, create, and we happen to just be one of the unlucky creations that isn't self-sufficient and "happy". Consciousness is just one of the fluke Modes in an infinity of Modes, completely unknowable by us. Some of these other Modes also have an "experience" of inadequacy and alienation, albeit in a different way that consciousness does. Or perhaps all Modes do. — darthbarracuda

This goes back to my idea of instrumentality- especially when you describe "create, create, create". We do, we do, we do... But for no other reason than motives that ultimately come down to survival and boredom. To elaborate - there is Other (world)- imposed constraints of survival/culturo-survival needs. There is also the Other-imposed constraints of dealing with unwanted pain. Conversely, there are also self-imposed constraints of our own inner restlessness (angst/boredom/restlessness) which help sustain this situation of instrumentality (we are surviving, avoiding unwanted pain, and trying to convert our restless nature into pleasure-seeking and goal-seeking in genera ad infinitum). Ultimately a principle of a Will-for-nothing ensues (pace Schopenhauer).

It's interesting how survival manifests in a plethora of ways. When I use the word "survival" or "culturo-survival", what I mean is something as subtle as an office-worker taking upon themselves the yoke of "hard-worker". This ideal may come from a deep-seated enculturated idea that working hard at your job is just and right. Society in turn, would approve of this ethic as it sustains production for survival etc. [This example is just to prove that not all survival is directly related to the survival itself, but the culture and complex contingent/environmental factors surrounding it.]

To add a bit further here about our "unique" situation- humans have the unique "language-brain" caused by multiple environmental factors in our evolutionary development. This language-brain itself creates a unique framework to see the world, that may be a major layer in how we are "stuck" in consciousness which seems remote from the rest of nature. By being stuck in consciousness, are stuck in time, both projecting backwards and forwards. We try to make modern mantras of "living in the present", but our restless natures are part and parcel of the human condition. The fact that we even have to go on a "journey" to calm the Will (not that I think this happens really in any Buddhist/Ascetic fashion aka pipe dream), is enough to make this situation undesirable.

The sparrow emerges from the capacity of information to organise a dissipative flow of matter into an anticipated, purpose-serving, structure. It's negentropy and entropy, constraints and freedom - the usual systems story. — apokrisis

Not to take this away from this universals topic, but I just wanted to see your reply to the idea that semiotics has an already-baked-in observer which still has to be accounted for in the problem of philosophy of mind. The interpretant is essentially the already-baked-in observer here. Whence interpretation? My prediction is you will say that we cannot go any further than this semiotic ground and thus just a brute fact. If that is the answer, I would then reply that this is still leaving the observer/awareness aspect unsolved and just taking it as a brute fact, thus begging the question.

Contrary to the established belief that metaphysics is first philosophy, I think that it is ethics that is first philosophy (pace Levinas), or an ethics-based metaphysics. You have to be alive in order to do anything else, and so we have to ask ourselves how we ought to live, or if we should live in the first place. — darthbarracuda

Pace Schopenhauer (and the later existentialists)- our wills force us to have make choices about actions. Choices about actions are traditionally considered in the realm of value theory and ethics so this makes sense in a certain way. Doing metaphysical philosophizing is making the choice to get a better understanding of what really is. Similarly, doing political philosophizing is making the choice to get to the understanding of how to distribute power. Perhaps you can rank it in terms of what life forces upon humans:

1) Dealing with choices (ethics)
2) Dealing with society (roughly politics/social science)
3) Dealing with what is or is not the case (metaphysics and epistemology)

It can be said that this is the order in which humans must contend with the world. To a varying degree, Marx could be right that in order to get a more philosophical (that is to say more systematic) approach to any of these things, an economic superstructure must be in place as well, but one does not even need a Marxist view to understand that personal choices and community choices come before the luxury of being able to look more deeply into existence itself. Even if there was not forethought (in the systematic-philosophical sense) of ethics and society in ancient societies which had no economic superstructure to be so rigorous- they still had to contend with choices and society in the resources available at the time and thus the hierarchy holds up even for ancient time periods that may have had less systematic thinking on dealing with choices and society.

I'll admit, this still seems a bit awkward, as if there had to be a better way. I align myself largely with the thought of Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas thought Ethics was First Philosophy, and that this was the case because our immediate phenomenological experience is that of the Same and the Other. The Other forces upon us duties to it - Levinas called our ethical duties a kind of "persecution". Whether we want to or not, we feel compelled to serve the Other. — darthbarracuda

By mere fact that we are conceived, raised, and survive through social means- how it can it be otherwise that we do not take into account the other?

Pain is pressing. It requires our attention, immediately. It engulfs our entire awareness and focuses our attention to it. It is difficult to control our reactions to pain. — darthbarracuda

Happiness can occur during pain, but it is through a prism of pain, and thus it can be said that a painless form of happiness is preferred to a happiness but through the prism of pain.

That vocabulary is really unintuitive to me. I suppose there may be a connection, but I shall have to take your word for it for now. Have you read any of Process and Reality and if so would you recommend that I do at some point? — Thorongil

I think there are a lot of neologisms in that work, so it is best to read it with secondary literature. However, you may find that it provides insights that you might not otherwise think about. His use of actual occasions as a basis for his metaphysics could be a good mechanism for Will. It may help overcome some of the paradoxes of Schopenhauer's Will "objectifying" itself.

As a follow up, your question also reminds me that for some time I've had the thought that Aristotle may prove useful in further clarifying and possibly widening Schopenhauer's metaphysics. I wrote some brief notes to myself on it a while ago and can share them with you if you want. — Thorongil

Yes, I'd like to see that. Sometimes one philosopher makes you think about another one differently. For example, Whitehead's actual occasions are not really at odds with Schopenhauer's ideas and can in fact provide a generalized mechanism for Schopenhauer's dual-aspect theory. Schopenhauer was a sort of dual-aspect theorist. Actual occasions are a process/event.

The mental and the physical are not two causally linked realms, but two aspects of the same nature, where one cannot be reduced to or explained by the other. — Schopenhauer, Arthur from IEP

The double knowledge which each of us has of the nature and
activity of his own body, and which is given in two completely different ways, has now been clearly brought out. We shall accordingly make further use of it as a key to the nature of every phenomenon in nature, and shall judge of all objects which are not our own bodies, and are consequently not given to our consciousness in a double way but only as ideas, according to the analogy of our own bodies, and shall therefore assume that as in one aspect they are idea, just like our bodies, and in this respect are analogous to them, so in another aspect, what remains of objects when we set aside their existence as idea of the subject, must in its inner nature be the same as that in us which we
call will. — Schopenhauer WWR Book II

Now compare a summary of process philosophy from IEP:

The most counter-intuitive doctrine of process philosophy is its sharp break from the Aristotelian metaphysics of substance, that actuality is not made up of inert substances that are extended in space and time and only externally related to each other. Process thought instead states that actuality is made up of atomic or momentary events. These events, called actual entities or actual occasions, are “the final real things of which the world is made up,” (Whitehead, Process and Reality, 18). They occur very briefly and are characterized by the power of self-determination and subjective immediacy (though not necessarily conscious experience). In many ways, actual occasions are similar to Leibniz’s monads [link], except that occasions are internally related to each other.

The enduring objects one perceives with the senses (for example, rocks, trees, persons, etc.) are made up of serially ordered “societies,” or strings of momentary actual occasions, each flowing into the next and giving the illusion of an object that is continuously extended in time, much like the rapid succession of individual frames in a film that appear as a continuous picture. Contemporary commentators on process thought suggest that individual actual occasions vary in spatio-temporal “size” and can correspond to the phenomena of sub-atomic particles, atoms, molecules, cells, and human persons (that is, souls). Likewise, these individuals may aggregate together to form larger societies (for example, rocks, trees, animal bodies). According to this model, a single electron would be a series of momentary electron-occasions. Likewise, the human subject would be a series of single occasions that coordinates and organizes many of the billions of other actual occasions that make up the subject’s “physical” body. — Process Philosophy from IEP

It isn't hard to make the leap from acts of Will and actual occasions. They can be conflated to be, for all intents and purposes, the same metaphysical idea. Actual occasions are the vehicle for which Will constructs reality- interacting, configuring, etc. To bring in the element of "suffering" (Schopenhauer's perennial theme) I actually inadvertantly ran across this blog that brought to light another possible connection between process philosophy and Schopenhauer's Will/Pessimism.

Third, Whitehead retains the notion of final causation in the becoming of actual occasions, arguing that occasions are pursuing “satisfaction” or completion that they accomplish through the integration of prehensions in a novel and aesthetically pleasing unity. Consequently, it is the final cause that accounts for the becoming of an actual occasion in Whitehead. Where Whitehead attributes becoming to final causes, I attribute it to difference or disequilibrium. Objectiles become because they contain disequilibrium within themselves and disequilibriums are introduced into their being through interactions with other actual entities. Becoming is the resolution of these tensions or disequilibriums producing new properties or qualities in the objectile, but this resolution of tensions is not governed by final causality but rather by the mechanics underlying the internal organization of the objectile. The resolution of disequilibriums marks the death or completion of an objectile, though the dead entity can still function in the becoming of other objectiles through being prehended by these objectiles. — https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2009/03/07/objectiles-and-actual-occasions/

This blog author's idea of disequilibriums sounds similar to the dissatisfaction/deprivation of Will's primum mobile. Constant disequalibriums are causing configurations, etc. Though this is at somewhat odds with Whitehead's other notions (as noted in the article), combining this disequalibrium idea with Whitehead's idea of eternal objects which keep the configurations as similarities (universals) you have a parallel with Schopenhauer's use of Ideas. Personally, I am not sure about the need for the Platonic backing of universals- but you can see that even this, would at least seem right at home in Schopenhauer's philosophy.

Have you looked into Whitehead? His metaphysics seems like a good vehicle to concretize Schopenhauer's Will.

The presence of consciousness or otherwise is not important. Objectivity, for me, is any actual occasion, any state of the world (and so of subjectivity too), whether it "interacts" (appears in? causes?) experiences or not — TheWillowOfDarkness

Well I think Whitehead would say, any material is a process (actual experience) that aggregates with other occasions (either democratically in non-organism structures) or monarchically (in organism-like structures). Thus, the point you seem to make about objects not being in causal/experiential interaction with a particular subject is moot, as everything is deemed to be experiential, and thus interacting with something at all instances.

I disagree with your summation of substance dualism as "there are souls," because that suggests it's a theological position. It strikes me that you've jettisoned the classical Cartesian position so that you could move on to the more modern views. My thought is that substance dualism and it's newer offspring property dualism largely collapse into the same thing under analysis and no real headway has been made by Chalmers or Searle in their new classification system. They've just rearranged the furniture. — Hanover

Here, here! This is a theme I was trying to convey in the other philosophy forums.

When I say the subjective is objective, I’m collapsing the subjective/objective split which drives the starry-eyed staring at the mysterious noumenon. Not only cannot we not know noumenon, but there is nothing to know in the noumenon. All knowledge of the world is of our experiences. The only objective knowledge is of the subjective. When we have experiences, we don’t just “only know our experiences,” we know the world (subjectivities) as they are. Our experiences are the means of knowledge rather than always being an inadequate attempt to grasp what is forever beyond us. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I get this idea. Do you agree then with Whitehead's speculative theory of actual occasions? All matter/energy is actually the cumulative process of actual occaisions whereby what "seems" to be a non-subjective object (electron, let's say), is actually an actual occasion subjectively interacting with other actual occasions? Objectivity then is simply an (society of) actual occasions interacting with other actual occasions of experience. These actual occasions could be split into two categories:
1.) aggregate occasions- organisms which have a centrally coordinated series of occasions (and may contribute to having what we call "consciousness")
2.) corpuscular occasions which are non-organisms and have no centralized coordination of occasions (and hence do not seem to possess what we call "consciousness").