American audiences on mainstream TV are odd and seem to laugh when they think they're supposed to, regardless of content. I remember watching a Letterman episode where the actor who plays Kramer in Seinfeld came on to apologise for calling members of his audience the N word. The audience at the show couldn't get around the fact they were not watching comedy and thought they were supposed to laugh and kept doing so until they were literally told to stop. Odd. — Baden
It's totally made up if he means as he seems to we had the entire island and then the British took N. Ireland (our tip). That's not at all what happened. — Baden
What about a possible world where the only thing that was different was that George 1 came from gamete 2 instead of gamete 1, which just happen to be "twin" gametes. Everything else in that world is identical. — Apustimelogist
Don't know why you're tagging me. I'm not going to waste my time on this guy. Maher is boring, conventional, and not too sharp. The comedians I like are mostly dead, unfortunately. — Baden
Well in the the gamete example, it is about a world where that person was not born as opposed to a world where some property of the person has been changed. — Apustimelogist
Here is the individual, this individual has the name Moliere, and this individual with the name Moliere at the time of conception had this set of base pairs, and this set of base pairs was necessary for this individual as stipulated by the use of rigid designation. This person necessarily had such-and-such a base sequence at a particular time -- I can grant that, and don't think our imagined scenarios define what actually happened in the past.
But I'm wondering if it's side-stepping some real point of contention :D -- like causality and genes and personality, and how those combine, or some such. Perhaps we just have different notions of what's plausible here, for instance? — Moliere
No, his main target was the descriptive theory of proper names and reference generally. — Banno
The causal theory of reference was only mentioned briefly towards the end of the book as an alternative, pretty much just to show that there were other possibilities besides descriptions. There are others who have tried to make the idea work. For my part I don't see why there should be only one explanation for how reference works. — Banno
I don't know how to follow that. We can say that schopenhauer might have had different genetics to that which he actually has, and that is a truth about schopenhauer. We might not so clearly say that this person might have had different genetics, depending on considerations of de dicto and de re interpretations. Notice that it is specified here that in some possible world, schopenhauer, that very individual, has different genetics. There is no chance here of schopenhauer being someone else. — Banno
That's pretty loose. No, it's not an essence. The causal theory was more a throw-away alternative explanation, never fully worked out by Kripke. — Banno
No, they don't. That's rather the point. Pick any property you like, you can designate a possible world in which that very individual does not have that property. — Banno
Stop there and you are pretty much right. — Banno
Being rid of essence is somewhat to the point. That's what rigid designation does, avoids the "picking out". — Banno
You seem to be working with some form of counterpart theory, which has it's own set of problems. — Banno
One of the logicians will probably correct this, and doubtless it is formally wrong, but speaking roughly an individual is referred to by an individual constant, {a,b,c...}. A type is a grouping of individuals. The difference between types and sets is that types are hierarchic in such a way that a type cannot be a member of itself, avoiding Russell's paradox. — Banno
So the stuff in this glass - note the demonstrative, picking out an individual - is water - a type. So that individual belongs to the type "water" — Banno
An individual is not defined by being "a combination of substances". — Banno
Water is a kind, not an individual. The logic is a bit different. A closer example would be the Lectern used in Identity and Necessity. There i tis used with the demonstrative: this lectern. Kripke chose not to use that example in Naming and Necessity. But I wonder if the lack of clarity here is what led Kripke to drop the example. — Banno
Water is a bit different from identity because we can speak of a chemical's identity, but I don't think that's an existential identity like I allude to above. But I think I'd say that if water in Bizarro-world was primarily comprised of H3O and still was the stuff we drink when thirsty and more or less did all the same things which water does then I'd say it's the same stuff, even though in Bizarro-world the description differs -- but this wouldn't be on the basis of it caring. I think at a certain level "water" is such a clearly human interest that it's strange to think that this interest must have a corresponding descriptive correlate to it. Rather I think we're really interested in water because it's connected to our being alive, and so we investigate water and see what it is we can see about it. Here our name is much more in a functional space -- it's what it does for us rather than what we've come to describe it as which we're picking out. — Moliere
One puzzling consequence of Kripke semantics is that identities involving rigid designators are necessary. If water is H2O, then water is necessarily H2O. Since the terms 'water' and 'H2O' pick out the same object in every possible world, there is no possible world in which 'water' picks out something different from 'H2O'. Therefore, water is necessarily H2O. It is possible, of course, that we are mistaken about the chemical composition of water, but that does not affect the necessity of identities. What is not being claimed is that water is necessarily H2O, but conditionally, if water is H2O (though we may not know this, it does not change the fact if it is true), then water is necessarily H2O. — Wiki Article
How about saying that you’re against Israel’s concentration camp? — Mikie
Yes, we know that killing THOUSANDS of children and killing DOZENS of children is indeed a difference. — Mikie
If we buy into the nonsense that it’s been the Palestinians refusing peace all these years, would this justify supporting the apartheid state that establishes concentration camps? — Mikie
I don’t think Israel citizens should be killed or punished for having an extreme right wing government— do you agree? If so, we should also agree that the Palestinian people should not be killed or punished for their government’s actions. — Mikie
The UN represents world opinion, you know, the whole world. — Baden
No, you don't get to dismiss the entire world (which have condemned Hamas btw.) because you don't like what they have to say — Baden
Of course it was legitimate. Germany was one of the most powerful militaries in the world and could easily have defeated and subjugated Britain. It's mind boggling that you think you are making any kind of relevant point here. — Baden
What's insane is that you on the one hand claim to be against killing civilians but think my idea that Israel stop killing massive amounts of civilians is insane. — Baden
Also, a tangential but Irish-related question. Strategically, Ireland didn't enter WW2 because they were not fans of Britain and remained somewhat neutral (with some help at various times to Allies). Was that the right decision simply because Ireland's hands were "clean" of being involved in a war? If Britain remained defensive only and did not attack German positions, would they have been the "better" for it?
I'm just trying to get the scope of your notion of legitimacy in conflict. I am also testing to see if you are using various historical scenarios when it suits your argument and then retreating when they don't. It will just be a game of "That was different!" on both sides, you see. — schopenhauer1
What's insane is that you on the one hand claim to be against killing civilians but think my idea that Israel stop killing massive amounts of civilians is insane. The other stuff you wrote is a frankly idiotic strawman. Are the only two choices you can think of here 1) destroy an entire city of 1.5 million people committing multiple war crimes in the process 2) invite your enemy for a handshake and a side eye? Did I any where suggest those were the only two options. Or have you decided to join the kindergartners again? You get one more chance and then you don't get any more of my time., — Baden
But the point won't be illluminated by quibbles over divergences in the tactics of the IRA and Hamas or their ideologies. — Baden
It's the cultural, racial, and geographical closeness of Britain and Ireland and the political sway of Ireland in the U.S. that made it impossible for the British to use massive indiscriminate force and collective punishment against the Irish. That is what dictated they be civilized. Whether, for example, the IRA would have ever stood down is irrelevant to this dynamic. — Baden
So we need to wake up, be honest with ourselves, and recognize that the current level of destruction of the Palestinian population, including civilian life and infrastructure, is an option (for we "civilized" Westerners) not simply due to the nature of Hamas but because the Palestinians are poor and lacking powerful allies and because they diverge from us ethnically and culturally, so they can more easily be dismissed as expendable. Hanover's speech on the superiority of all things Western illustrates this well. Of course, what's really uncivilized is this othering that sets ethical arguments on different planes according to such an artificial, albeit convenient (for us), dichotomy. — Baden
Ireland stayed neutral for political not moral reason. I'm not sure what the moral thing to do was given the information available at the time and Ireland's military weakness. But the mere fact that I'm Irish makes zero difference to how I would analyse it. — Baden
A pretty sure goal when you are the sole nuclear power in the Middle East with likely a working nuclear triad deterrence, a superior armed forces compared even to all neighbors combined. Addition to all that, then you are backed by the sole Superpower that funds your defense spending and will rush to your aid.
Oh, how close it is that Israel would perish! — ssu
Again an argument for the inferiority of Palestinians compared to the 'new comers'?
Jewish culture endured even when there was no Israel around. — ssu
I dunno why am I an Irish American who finds the Hawaiian culture to be the one of the most noble life affirming culture in the modern world? (Hawaiian culture is vastly different than American culture btw) — Vaskane
Sure — saying the Nazis “up and did this” to the Jews is equally misleading and shortsighted, I suppose? — Mikie
Yes, there’s a long sequence of events that led to this monstrosity, which is true for literally everything. To the show up and declare how “shortsighted” it is to believe it’s unlike any other event in the world is…incredible. — Mikie
Modern Zionism started as a method to overcome Judaic tradition which leads to Self-Hate as Lessing details it. — Vaskane
Israel couldn't be a democracy, if they actually accepted the Palestinians in it would mean the Jews would be out numbered and thus Israel would be democratically dismantled. — Vaskane
Invasive force? So the concentration camp we call the Gaza strip — that’s the “invasive force”? — Mikie
What they did instead was to open unpublicized background communication channels with the group and appeal to more moderate elements in the nationalist community to get the IRA to stop. — Baden
In some sense my name rigidly picks me out, and it would be true that the particular me could not, under any circumstances, be made out of ice from the Thames. But that's the name, and not the unique and particular description of my genetic code at the time of my conception. And for that it seems that DNA doesn't behave in a necessary relationship to the name that picks me out: rigid designators aren't ruled by causal patterns, but rather are just how we use names. — Moliere
The temporal parts aren't strictly identical to each other because the history builds over time (thus accounting for your changes over time), but collectively- the entire temporal, causal chain precisely defines the "something".
Identity of indiscernibles applies to each object at time t: all the properties the object has at time t are essential to being that object at time t. It also applies to the entire chain: only one individual can possibly correspond to the set of all those temporal parts. — Relativist
Thanks for the interesting article, but I don't see a direct relation to the notion of individual identity, and it persistence over time. The issues here are not valuation, but how to precisely define what constitutes a persisting identity. I lean toward hyperessentialism and perdurance, and I don't think these conflict with valuations of objects. — Relativist
"Object-oriented thought holds that there are two principal strategies for devaluing the philosophical import of objects.[18] First, one can undermine objects by claiming that they are an effect or manifestation of a deeper, underlying substance or force.[19] Second, one can "overmine" objects by either an idealism which holds that there is nothing beneath what appears in the mind or, as in social constructionism, by positing no independent reality outside of language, discourse or power.[20][21] Object-oriented philosophy fundamentally rejects both undermining and "overmining", since both approaches hand-wave objects away by attributing their existence to other, more fundamental elements of reality.[22]
In a 2013 paper, Graham Harman also discussed the concept of duomining.[23] Borrowing the word from computing science, Harman uses "duomining" to refer to philosophical or ontological approaches that both undermine and overmine objects at the same time. Harman asserts that Quentin Meillassoux's ontology is based on "a classic duomining position", since "he holds that the primary qualities of things are those which can be mathematized and denies that he is a Pythagorean, insisting that numbers do not exhaust the world but simply point to sort of "dead matter" whose exact metaphysical status is never clarified".[24]" — Wiki Article
I just don't think it entails a sufficiently complete concept of identity. — Relativist
That's the thrust of Watts' book, yes. — Wayfarer
Just curious, what do you see as a counterfactual to this view, and why wouldn't it be right? Why couldn't there be simply individuation without the unity that you posit? In a trivial way, we can say by way of empirical studies that the world is fundamentally unified in that it matter and energy particles that came from a singularity right before the big bang. But of course, that is not what you mean either. — schopenhauer1
But again, quite tangential to the OP. — Wayfarer