I wasn't going to get involved in this thread, because of the many ways modality is misconstrued.. Why would a kind be different than an individual in terms of substance that it is identified with? — schopenhauer1
One of the logicians will probably correct this, and doubtless it is formally wrong, but speaking roughly an individual is referred to by an individual constant, {a,b,c...}. A type is a grouping of individuals. The difference between types and sets is that types are hierarchic in such a way that a type cannot be a member of itself, avoiding Russell's paradox. — Banno
So the stuff in this glass - note the demonstrative, picking out an individual - is water - a type. So that individual belongs to the type "water" — Banno
An individual is not defined by being "a combination of substances". — Banno
Stop there and you are pretty much right.Just any old thing that is designated so... — schopenhauer1
The upshot in Identity and Necessity seems to be that while this person could not have had a different genetics, schopenhauer1 might have. — Banno
Stop there and you are pretty much right. — Banno
Being rid of essence is somewhat to the point. That's what rigid designation does, avoids the "picking out". — Banno
You seem to be working with some form of counterpart theory, which has it's own set of problems. — Banno
That causal dubbing IS the "essence". — schopenhauer1
No, they don't. That's rather the point. Pick any property you like, you can designate a possible world in which that very individual does not have that property....even individuals have an essential "property" — schopenhauer1
That's pretty loose. No, it's not an essence. The causal theory was more a throw-away alternative explanation, never fully worked out by Kripke. — Banno
No, they don't. That's rather the point. Pick any property you like, you can designate a possible world in which that very individual does not have that property. — Banno
I can agree with even this, yet still insist that a well-known necessary aspect of what makes a person THIS person (and not something else) is the causal-temporal point at which the two gamete components combined. — schopenhauer1
The upshot in Identity and Necessity seems to be that while this person could not have had a different genetics, schopenhauer1 might have. — Banno
But that's my point about the gametes. That is the point where that very individual cannot be that very individual anymore. Then it is back to being open to simply "a possibility of some individual". — schopenhauer1
No, his main target was the descriptive theory of proper names and reference generally. The causal theory of reference was only mentioned briefly towards the end of the book as an alternative, pretty much just to show that there were other possibilities besides descriptions. There are others who have tried to make the idea work. For my part I don't see why there should be only one explanation for how reference works....not a part of his theory? — schopenhauer1
I don't know how to follow that. We can say that schopenhauer might have had different genetics to that which he actually has, and that is a truth about schopenhauer. We might not so clearly say that this person might have had different genetics, depending on considerations of de dicto and de re interpretations. Notice that it is specified here that in some possible world, schopenhauer, that very individual, has different genetics. There is no chance here of schopenhauer being someone else.But that's my point about the gametes. That is the point where that very individual cannot be that very individual anymore. Then it is back to being open to simply "a possibility of some individual". — schopenhauer1
Yes. But you inadvertently run into the oddity about the Identity of Indiscernibles. If you know you have two objects in front of you, you know they are not identical in all respects. The only way this problem could arise would be if you knew about two different appearances of the same object, which may not be both in front of you at the same time. We know how to cope with that in practice, but I'm not sure that logic does. — Ludwig V
No, his main target was the descriptive theory of proper names and reference generally. — Banno
The causal theory of reference was only mentioned briefly towards the end of the book as an alternative, pretty much just to show that there were other possibilities besides descriptions. There are others who have tried to make the idea work. For my part I don't see why there should be only one explanation for how reference works. — Banno
I don't know how to follow that. We can say that schopenhauer might have had different genetics to that which he actually has, and that is a truth about schopenhauer. We might not so clearly say that this person might have had different genetics, depending on considerations of de dicto and de re interpretations. Notice that it is specified here that in some possible world, schopenhauer, that very individual, has different genetics. There is no chance here of schopenhauer being someone else. — Banno
Here is the individual, this individual has the name Moliere, and this individual with the name Moliere at the time of conception had this set of base pairs, and this set of base pairs was necessary for this individual as stipulated by the use of rigid designation. This person necessarily had such-and-such a base sequence at a particular time -- I can grant that, and don't think our imagined scenarios define what actually happened in the past.
But I'm wondering if it's side-stepping some real point of contention :D -- like causality and genes and personality, and how those combine, or some such. Perhaps we just have different notions of what's plausible here, for instance? — Moliere
Well in the the gamete example, it is about a world where that person was not born as opposed to a world where some property of the person has been changed. — Apustimelogist
Well, I don't see why we need to rule that out as impossible. It may be very unlikely, but unlikely things do happen. And we'll never check enough leaves to establish an empirical possibility.the two leaves are identical in all respects except in regard to occupying the same space. — Janus
I wouldn't bet against you. But that's not the point.I would be prepared to wager that there never have been any cases — Janus
It would be one thing to establish this identity at some specific moment in the life of an individual. In one way, I don't mind what you pick, although I think you'll have difficulty identifying a plausible threshold in the long process of growing up and maturing; birth is not a bad alternative.Here is the individual, this individual has the name Moliere, — Moliere
It is a relief to hear that the causal theory was an afterthought. That first sentence suggests that it hasn't worked, which fits with my prejudice. Now you mention it, I don't see any reason to object to the idea that there may be different kinds (categories) of reference.There are others who have tried to make the idea work. For my part I don't see why there should be only one explanation for how reference works. — Banno
But let me point out again that the expected individual does not exist at the moment of conception; all that exists is a fertilized egg, which is an individual egg, if you like, but is not yet an individual person. (Unless you are following the unusual idea that is sometimes propounded in the context of the abortion argument. I don't think it has any currency or point outside that argument.) — Ludwig V
What about a possible world where the only thing that was different was that George 1 came from gamete 2 instead of gamete 1, which just happen to be "twin" gametes. Everything else in that world is identical. — Apustimelogist
Moliere didn't exist until I made an account on The Philosophy Forum, which was far after all of these events. ...... The only thing that happened to give me this name is dubbing myself as Moliere on The Philosophy Forum rather than the physical facts of my body. — Moliere
I notice that it was possible that you might not have made the account, though I get the point that it is no longer possible. — Ludwig V
As to the second, for me, what is important is not so much the dubbing ceremony as the consequences, which are that other people use the name and you respond to it. That's at least part of what your identity qua person consists in. That obviously isn't true of names for objects. — Ludwig V
That is the point where that very individual cannot be that very individual anymore. — schopenhauer1
Well, I don't see why we need to rule that out as impossible. It may be very unlikely, but unlikely things do happen. And we'll never check enough leaves to establish an empirical possibility. — Ludwig V
The difference between a kind and an individual is logical, or if you prefer grammatical, and not to do with substance. — Banno
between a=a and what makes schopenhauer1 who he is. — Banno
I haven't ruled out its being possible, nor do I rule out its being impossible: we just don't know, which is what I've being trying to get across. — Janus
Well, what matters most to me is that, so far as I can see, there's nothing to rule out the possibility and no positive evidence to establish impossibility. There is a common belief, dear to all of us, that each individual person is unique and irreplaceable - and the discovery of DNA seemed to give a physical basis for that belief. But that it seems to me to be an article of faith, though there is the identity of indiscernibles to fall back on. — Ludwig V
I would want to say that what makes schopenhauer1 who he is is partly determined by who he thinks he is and even who he chooses to be — Ludwig V
To be clear as to the issue here, one would need to very carefully differential between modal identity and personal identity, between a=a and what makes schopenhauer1 who he is. — Banno
And here the conjecture falls off the rails, because of course modally we can specify a possible world in which your genetics is different, and yet you are physically and psychologically the same. — Banno
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