Curious did you have an answer for this?
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/862434

Sure, but can't we say the same about all the facts in your personal history?

If you went back in time and encountered your younger self, you would consider that youngster a person distinct from yourself. If youngster stubbed his toe, only he would feel immediate pain. I account for the distinction in terms of histories: your history differs from youngster's, even though there's overlap. — Relativist

Sure we can split every nanosecond into its own time slice and call that a different person. Same with any object. Yes, time adds duration and development to that object, but the element of change, doesn't mean each unit of change is a different object. Why is it that you are not a rock or a grain of sand or a computer or another person, a bat, a wolf, an insect, or a molecule floating in the air? It's not because of some temporal aspect of things, except in the point in time it matters, when the two gametes combined. Whatever else happened, that is what started the person to be, which is why I put it as a contender as necessary for someone to be someone, even if not sufficient for full identity.

I will add of course, that those hypothetical questions should not be taken as you could be anything else. That was my original point, there could never be a counterfactual case where you could have been something else (prior to conception)... and hence the case that indeed it is when the gametes meet that is the start of how "you" are you. Development of course can add and does add to this identity.

What exactly are you saying is necessary? Your DNA mutates throughout your life, so if your specific DNA sequence is necessary, you are not the same person your mother gave birth to. — Relativist

The combination of the DNA code from the set of gametes. The fact that this has slight changes over time or whatnot does not invalidate this.

My position is that 100% of your history is essential to being "you" at a point of time. There is a causal relation between the "yous" of each point of time - and "you" are that cross-temporal causal sequence; you have temporal parts. This is perdurance theory of identity. — Relativist

The causal-temporal sequence still works off of certain genetic information. It isn't just any genetic information. There is a start to the sequence. For example, one gamete is not a necessary or sufficient. You need both sets. But it can't be any set of gametes, it has to be that set and not another. Whatever else comes of the causal-temporal sequence of another set, even if that had a roughly similar life as you, that is not you.

I think you're saying that the particular sperm/ovum combination that produced you is essential to being you. That combination is your historical origin, but isn't your subsequent history also essential to being you? This history would distinguish you from your identical twin, if you had one.

Is all your history essential to being you? If not, then how do you non-arbitrarily draw the line? — Relativist

Again, it's necessary, not sufficient because of its role in its unique combination. It's also causal and spatially variant, thus accounting for the difference between twins and clones. Surely, experience plays a role in identity. Even two rocks from the same molten volcano are roughly similar but are separated by a boundary when they cool. One rock may end up being smooth and one crushed up and jagged. Surely, part of the identity of that rock is the substance that the rock is composed of and arrangement of chemical compounds. When identifying if certain objects came from certain areas in archeology, you can use their unique patina "fingerprints" see if they came from the same location originally.

Another fact to reflect on is that every being occurs as 'me' from their first person point of view. Every living being experiences themself as 'me' but it's not until the being becomes attached to a particular set of sensations and memories that it is differentiated as an individual self or soul by the thought 'this is me, I am this, this is mine'. Of course, from the p-o-v of a specific individual, every other being is 'not-me' (cf Kastrup's 'dissociated alters') as within their first-person perspective there is only one 'me', as due to their identification with ego. That's why it's said in the Upanisads that the awakened see themselves in every being and every being in themselves. — Wayfarer

This is another topic, but this kind of parallels our debate for why it matters whether one has achieved some "unity" of this monism (aka Nirvana), or nothingness. What if there were no lifeforms, as was the case prior to 4.5 billion years ago, give or take? Energy and matter on their own don't seem to need liberation from anything. It seems at the least, the problem is biological as much as it is existential, as existential matters not without the biological. And thus, this is contra to the always existing mind of idealism.

Maybe because with the emergence of organisms, there is an exponential increase in possibilities. And that in order to exist as an organism, the very first thing that appears is the boundary between self-and-not-self. After all, death is merely dissolution, isn't it? That the elements comprising a specific individual organism dissolve back into the periodic table. It is the ability of organisms not to simply succumb to chemical entropy that is the hallmark of organic life, isn't it? — Wayfarer

Seems to be.

I think my position can resolve a lot of these nuances if we just phrase it that the gametes components are necessary but not sufficient for identity. I think Janus point earlier is that there is clearly a boundary of organism with non-organism. There is clearly a unit of this person versus that person. Indeed a brain in a vat might complicate things , but the brain itself seems to be the “seat” of mental events, so in a sense there the brain in the vat is still necessary. It is almost trivially true that it is a specific set of gametes with boundaries in space that separate it out in some way that define a person as separate and unique from another.

I am sure philosophers have broad range of beliefs on the issue. I doubt I am the only person drawn toward that kind of view. — Apustimelogist

Cool. What’s your view? Do you really understand mine?

I am not sure what you're saying I dismissed — Apustimelogist

The whole notion of identity and discerning it. I don't even have to look this up, and I would guess there would be hundreds or more papers written on things tangential to this regarding identity, essence, genes, and the like. It just seemed you were a bit too hastily dismissive of any sort of notion related to that. But we don't have to dwell on this odd dismissiveness and hostility to the concept.

It's also a function that you missed a broad portion of the debate on the thread here and then just came in with these ideas focusing mainly on the genetic component aspect of my argument, and not the idea that it is combined with the causal. There is a casual aspect that it encompasses these two things coming together at a place in time that is not repeatable because as I had mentioned earlier with twins and clones example, there is a spatial, causal, as well as genetic component to it. I also mentioned that the genetics aspect is not some blank slate. It does have uniqueness that contributes to various aspects of the self that would be different than if the gametes were another set. It isn't just "any set of gametes" that makes you, you. It has to be those gametes, along with the other factors I mentioned.

Also, the debate started out on what can be counterfactual and what cannot. I made the claim that before your birth, there could be no possibility that YOU could be anything else. There would not have been a you if anything had changed that prevented those set of gametes from combining, even if by a few seconds. If another set of gametes combined, THOSE gametes would NOT be you. And that is an indication that indeed, it is a necessity that the gametes be the ones that combined with causal factors.

Not sure what you're getting at. — Apustimelogist

This seems dismissive of a large topic in philosophy:

Yup, I was just saying that when I think about it more deeply, I just discard identity or self from an objective standpoint entirely. — Apustimelogist

In one sentence you dismiss the work of many philosophical writings in that subject, because you thought about it deeply.

The genes obviously contribute but seems intuitive one might change genetic information or phenotypic traits of a person and retain the identity. Its not clear where the dividing line is. I can even conceive of changing lots of genetic information which otherwise has little effect on the parts of the person crucial for its identity. — Apustimelogist

Still has a causal link tied with it. The start of an object isn’t just the substance so it was more nuanced. Also isn’t there volumes of philosophical literature on identity, essence, and similar issues?

Seems rather dismissive, so I wonder if it’s just you don’t like when I argue it rather than X “legitimate” philosopher in SEP.

But then again when I think about identity or what it means for a counterfactual person to be you, I don't really find sound criteria or meaning anyway. — Apustimelogist

I see it as a necessity but not sufficient as being a biological being and its unique genetic combination that contributes to your identity both biologically and neurochemically.

Before I answer, I’d like to ask you to look at some of my responses in previous lists as I think I could covered this. To summarize, the gametes are not a blank slate and the experiences and contingent biochemistry adds to identity, it combines with that initial blueprint. Experiences aren’t by themselves just free floating. And yes, the causal link to the start of a person matters too. Before the gametes there was no person.

And did Kripke invent causal necessity as well? — Ludwig V

I'm not sure what you are implying here. Is this supposed to be sarcastic or something? I simply stated he invented the term "rigid designator" for the idea that a word attaches to an object in all possible world. In his version, it is through causal necessity.

But, supposing I am the first child of my parents, there would still be a first child. Why wouldn't that be me, but different? — Ludwig V

That's the point I'm refuting (and you seemed to agree with in your last posts?). That is to say, the first child would be different, and therefore that is not the YOU who is reflecting now. That would be that guy who may or may not reflect back on himself as YOU are doing now. And even if he reflects back about his birth, the "definite description" of the "first born son of the union of so and so" would not be you, just as if someone else was president that was not George Washington, that would not be him, even though he does fit the definite description of first President of the United States.

I happen to know that they intended to call their first child Ludwig if it was a boy. I forget what the choice would have been if I had turned out to be a girl. — Ludwig V

And even if it was another George Washington, that was not the George Washington that we know of. And that is very much now making my point that part of the differentiator of identity is not contingencies like the ones you are saying, but the exact set of gametes that was to become that person.

And then, presumably, the name Ludwig would have rigidly designated their first child if it was a boy, or their second if that was a boy and so on. Then gametes would be irrelevant. — Ludwig V

Indeed it would have rigidly designated but now you are making a sort of category error. The person is unique in its designation. There are many Ludwigs and George Washingtons, but that it picks out that one is the point. And this question goes further and asks, "And what makes it that one as opposed to another one?

You say that as if it settled the matter. Is there a universal consensus that Kripke is necessarily right? That would indeed be remarkable. — Ludwig V

No it is not. Someone brought up rigid designators (and thus Kripke).

I pointed to the fact that generally his work on rigid designators (he invented the term I think), involves proper names.

It has also been extended to natural kinds (like H20 necessarily being the term "water").

I remarked that rigid designators can be tied into identity of individual personhood by way of causal necessity (these two gametes meeting at a certain instant of time whether natural or artificially).

I'd also like to add, that perhaps it falls less under his proper names "necessity by way of causality across all possible worlds", and could simply fall under "necessity by way of natural kinds". One has a causal aspect to it (someone dubs an object in a speech act that then becomes the origination of the name tied to that person in a chain of events). The other seems to be essentialist in terms of something akin to "substance" (H20 is water). Interestingly, both can be the case in terms of individual personhood.

In a sense, yes. Which is why I went back to the past before I existed - when there was no me for anything to be in relation to. — Ludwig V

Yes, and I would agree with that characterization. It is exactly that reason that this issue is interesting. There wouldn't even BE a YOU to begin with. It's a non-starter. It's something you can imagine in hindsight, but is not a possibility in actuality.

Well, bits of metaphysics that I can never know do not concern me greatly. I'm funny like that. — Ludwig V

I don't think you're interpreting that right, but @wonderer1 can chime in. I think he is saying that there are some moves that are necessitated as non-possibilities.

If the link is causal, it is empirical. Which means it is not necessary. — Ludwig V

The causality is the necessity. That is similar to Kripke's causal-theory of proper names and use of rigid designators.

How could it be someone else if I don't exist? — Ludwig V

Yes, I guess that's the point I am making too. But when discussing the past, it's always going to be in relation to the YOU existing now.

No, it does not. Because the person who would have been born 5 minutes earlier never existed and never could have existed. There's only person who exists. You can say that there are possible people who would have existed if I had been conceived 5 minutes earlier or 5 minutes later. But you can't say anything about them, not even whether they would have been the same or different - except by arbitrarily stipulating that they would. Where would your evidence be for saying that they were the same as me, or different from me in ways that matter or different from me in ways that don't matter? — Ludwig V

I think your interpretation of what I am saying is 180 degrees off. I am saying what you are saying I think. That is to say, the person born five minutes earlier or later is NOT you. It would have been someone else.

I'm gonna stick my neck out and say that no counterfactual about the past (or the present) is possible. History can be rewritten, but the past is fixed and determined . Only what happened can have happened, and no amount of thought can change it. And of course the future is open just to the extent that there are no facts about it yet. — unenlightened

Sure, I think that's more-or-less Ryle's point. And I'd largely agree. However, I think as Ryle also points out, we are mixing up cause-and-effect with logical necessity. I am moving from the realm of cause-and-effect (which indeed would seem to work along the lines you are describing about past and future), and into the realm of logical necessity. That is to say, there are possibilities that in theory could have happened given various circumstances, but were not actualized. However, there are some things which by necessity were never going to be possibilities even going forward into the future or otherwise.

It is impossible that I moved the bishop and won the game, because I moved another piece and lost. What is being made clear is that it is very easy to get confused between the imagination and the real, and this is because imagination is in use all the time to model and predict the world as it unfolds. If I do this, you will do that, if I say this you will say that, If I go to the shop, I can buy some beer. If I hurry, I can catch the bus. and part of the learning process is to imagine past counterfactuals and 'run them'. If only I had hurried, I could have caught the bus. Next time... — unenlightened

For sure.

The professional gambler has a talent for using the form book to imagine the race being run and pick the winner with better odds than the bookmaker; the amateur just guesses at random. The architect draws imaginary buildings that may sometimes be realised. Philosophers live almost entirely in their imagination, and get annoyed when reality has other ideas. — unenlightened

Indeed. Philosophers play hypotheticals all the time. But I think the broader implication here is interesting in terms of what it means to be in the first place. Your circumstance for living is non-transposable. It is not a repeatable event.

I wish I had thought of that days ago. But I'm not sure it applies. Doesn't Ryle's argument about the future mean that rigid designators cannot be rigid in the future tense? — Ludwig V

Rigid designation is a bit tangential perhaps, but it can be pulled into this debate. As I see it, rigid designators are about invariant necessities involved in something's name. Generally this is "proper names" but can be expanded to scientific kinds and other things as well. So when someone is rigidly designating "Ludwig V", that means this person is Ludwig V in all possible worlds. Ludwig V is causally "linked" through a dubbing process that cannot be invariant across worlds.

In this sense, we can start making connections to this notion of identity, gametes, and temporal-causes. That is to say, the gametes combining in such a way at such and such instant (they usually go together, though in a fantastical conceivable way I can think of a way they might not), that it must be this event (and combination of gametes), invariant across all possible worlds. It is in a way, "rigidly designated" as "you". Across these worlds, you might have different hair colors, different ways in which you interacted with the environment, but what has to be invariant was the gamete combination at that instance of coming together for it to be you, and not someone who is just similar. Just as there is a causal link in Ludwig V with the person Ludwig V. The person Ludwig V is linked "as an individual person" by way of causal instance of gametes combining.

Though in my mind your argument is unequivocal, you touch on some other principles of individuation which may suffice better than DNA because DNA also shows that we are mostly alike. And then we get events like blood transfusions or transplants, or where DNA can become mixed, which confuses the matter. — NOS4A2

Yes I mentioned the Ship of Theseus. But this doesn't discount the causal-temporal nature of those two gametes creating the initial template for which changes occur contingently through life-history of the person, combined with experiences.

You mentioned time, for instance. Times implies space or location. Location suffices to distinguish one system from another, and as such, to distinguish the identity of one system from another. I would say that the DNA of that specific system of that specific time and space, is but further evidence of its individuation. — NOS4A2

Yes, I think it needs to be a factor as it was that particular instance of gametes combining that made you.

This is a stipulation of your own about an imaginary situation that didn't happen because - here we all are. You are free to imagine that happening, and someone else is free to imagine exactly that sperm and egg coming together at any other time they care to stipulate. What you cannot do is declare that your imagination is the only real one, without me at least saying, "yeah, as if..." — unenlightened

So, one of the original points I was making was about counterfactuals that are possible, and ones that are not. There are counterfactuals that may be possible. For example, it may be possible that you could have won a game had you trained better. However, perhaps your capacity for winning was never going to allow you to win the game, no matter how much you practiced. That one was something that could be possible or not possible depending on which factors were involved.

In the case of a counterfactual person, there is no possibility that you could have been anything else had the causal history been different prior to your conception. That is just a non-starter. You can imagine all you want, but that is just hindsight fantasy. So we can distinguish between counterfactuals that are real possibilities versus ones that can never be real possibilities. Being born in different causal circumstances is not a real possibility.

I think arguments similar to the gamete point could possibly be applied to points all along the causal history in different ways but where the consequence for identity would plausibly be different. — Apustimelogist

I am claiming that it is necessary not sufficient, which is harder to say about almost any of the other subsequent things in the causal history. If we took those away, they might or might not contribute to identity, but what is absolutely needed is that initial gamete combination and blueprint.

Do you seriously think that whether you performed the action 5 minutes ago or in 5 minutes time matters. You may realize that there may be some differences - even serious differences, but do they make any difference? I don't think so. The difference is that there's no me to make any difference. (cf. Ryle) — Ludwig V

It makes a difference because indeterminate future is one without you. The five minutes changes the gamete to someone else’s genetics.

it's obviously not impossible that you could have had somewhat different genetics. — Banno

I know you don't want to get in the weeds, but that is exactly what I am contesting. Even if it was a slight second earlier or later, whatever that person becomes, it was/is not you.

As to whether your genetics might have been completely different, that will depend on how you understand the designation. It's a minefield, and intuition is a poor guide. — Banno

Indeed it is a minefield, but now there's a whole thread devoted to it, if you want to take a stab at it. Obviously, with that article you referenced, this opens a tremendous can of worms and encompasses a whole lot of ideas in metaphysics, causality, necessity, identity, and the like.

One of the things that makes this hard to be a definite "rigid designation" is that it is conceivable that there is the ever so distant possibility that the same set of gametes could have been selected in some artificial way that was exactly the same as the ones that comprised the non-artificial version. So, is it conceivable that someone could still come about in a way that was different than the instant of the two gametes coming together? Perhaps. But then this brings up ideas of different causes for the same outcome... In other words, it may refute the claim that everything would have to happen as is prior to conception for you to have existed. However, in 99.99999999 cases, the circumstances would have had to be the same for you to have been conceived. How much does the limit have to reach 100% for it to considered a necessity that everything had to be exactly the same?

Some idea of the complexity involved can be gleaned from The Possibilism-Actualism Debate. I doubt it's a road we would want to go down here. schopenhauer1's new thread shows how convolute that area becomes. — Banno

Yes indeed. My argument seems to parallel Ryle's that the future is more along the lines of "possiblism", and that even looking in the past, there could have been actual counterfactuals that could have happened. However, there are some things which are logically impossible because they require necessity. For example, prior to your conception, if there was any slight change to the gametes meeting, there was no person that was you. Most circumstances would lead to the outcome that if any slight circumstance changed prior to conception, then the current you would not exist to look back upon these counterfactual possibilities.

But claims to necessity are a bit hard for me to accept, at least. — Moliere

I'm not sure why. It is the blueprint for which our bodies function. No one is doubting that it combines with contingent circumstances, but as I stated, circumstances aren't combining on a tabula rasa, but a blueprint from which the genetic combination is comprised of.

Similarly our fingerprints may be unique to us, but if I was born with a different unique finger-print pattern I don't think my personal identity has shifted. The particulars of the finger-print pattern have not been a significant source of identity, even if they are a unique pattern inscribed upon my palm. And this is exactly the sort of thing that comes to mind with DNA for myself: the specific and unique pattern clearly can have effects, but I'm not so certain that those effects are related to personal identity in a necessary relationship. — Moliere

No, fingerprints are not part of your identity, but DNA is. Just because both are physical, doesn't mean they are both either valid or not valid. DNA is more foundational to your uniqueness as it holds various blueprints for your physical and psychological makeup. Again, you are not a complete blank slate.

But it goes beyond that, because there is a causal aspect to it in terms of individuality. It's not just "identity" but it's also "uniqueness". I am going to differentiate that in the idea that each set of gametes hold variations that are unique to it, that when combined are not like other, even similar cells. But it goes beyond that even. As, the timing of when the gametes are meeting actually make a huge difference. One second earlier or later, and it was no longer you, but someone else. So it is almost an instance in time, combined with the unique set of gametes that is part of the uniqueness, along with its role as blueprint for the functions of your physical development and ongoing regulation.

But, I also explained that it's not the end of the story in regards to "identity", because yes, experience and contingency plays a role in how your personality, memories, relationships, beliefs, and sense of self is shaped.

At this level of plausibility, such a counterfactual can function as part of an argument for - swimming lessons in schools, for example. And speaking of schools it a common part of history lessons to "Imagine you were a Roman citizen of the 1st century AD, and describe how you would have lived on a typical day" and similar counterfactual tasks. Counterfactuals can be instructive and interesting in spite of all being false. — unenlightened

Yeah I never made a claim that it's not useful as an imaginative exercise. However there is a type of thinking that seems to naively think that you could have been different than who you are. It's sort of a naive notion that one can keep one's personhood transposed in various scenarios. There is only a very precise avenue for "you" to be "you". And that quote there is illustrative of the fact that if someone had an altered situation, they wouldn't even be the person who is doing the counterfactual thinking.

It actually also demonstrates the preciseness for which the causal origination of your own personhood had to happen. Everything basically had to causally lead up to that point, otherwise, no you look back upon one's life in the first place.

It brings up another point too, that there may be some things that can be counterfactual without completely destroying one's identity. However, up to the point of one's own conception, that certainly cannot be the case.

You are still starting with the same set of conditions. Your development as a physical being relies on the initial template and the development that ensues. Any changes, still are in relation to this individualized code. It’s not just starting from a tabula rasa.

I think "meaning of life" questions become unnecessarily rooted in these historic questions of religion and science. I think when answering this question, just do some self-examination. What is it that you "do" every day? Basically, I think Schopenhauer has characterized it correctly, more-or-less. He basically said that we struggle to just exist. We were born into the world, not of any known prior desire to be born. We then have to deal with this fact. That involves survival in a society, learning the means of gaining enough resources to survive and be a comfortable, and find ways of entertainment. That's about it. Everything else is window dressing. Schopenhauer mentions the idea of Will or "will-to-live". Well, we need not perhaps make it a metaphysical thing. We can keep it at the personal existential level. That is to say, we struggle to fulfill our wants and needs. Boredom or "angst" tells us that we are never generally satisfied or satisfied for very long. The idea of "flourishing" is simply trying to run past the debt that is continually pressing upon us, which is an inherent dissatisfaction of being an animal that is oriented towards fulfilling needs and wants.

One of the things I hate in these debates is when people don’t acknowledge what was already acknowledged. Please look back to my posts above about sci-fi scenarios and the Ship of Theseus.

That being said, while I acknowledge that while DNA goes under contingent changes after conception, it is the initial combination of gametes that sets the stage for these variations. That is why it is necessary but perhaps not sufficient. By and large, the genetic code provided from the two gametes provides the unique variation that provide the initial individualization, and stays constant while the variations in experience and epigenetics can thus further shape the individual. Also note that these experiences aren't parallel, but in combination WITH these initial genetic instructions that makes the individual. It's not just a vanilla tabula rasa that then takes on any experience. They both shape each other.

And again, twins and clones can be offered as some sort of counterpoint, but it's not if you look at the argument. The argument is about necessity, not sufficiency. Another thing to consider is that you can clearly have the same genetics (like a clone), and it is a different person based on experiences and perhaps even genetic variations in coding, etc. They also take up differences in space. That is to say, two genetically identical people taking up two different bodies/minds are still two different people. However, they certainly wouldn't be their identity as them without that initial DNA combination contributing to their genetic blueprint. It is unique not that it is the only one, but that it is part of them and comprises what makes them them.

I think that what differs between these two sentences is the notion that if, at the time I was conceived, a different set of DNA, like the sperm nearby, would have started the process of birth then I'd be a different person. But in the second part you're acknowledging that there are processes after conception that can change twins to explain the initial idea that our gametes are necessary parts of our identity.

What I'm saying is that twin studies suggest that gametes aren't up to the level of necessity. So the scenario you're positing is if in the past when I was conceived I was conceived with different gametes, and you're saying that's absurd and I'm saying "Why?" — Moliere

No, twin studies don't negate necessity, but sufficiency (perhaps). That person would not be that person at some level without the gametes that they were conceived from. They might be another person that had similar experiences, but not that exact person. You can combine it with causality and points of view and experiences, but it is a large part of it. Generally speaking, no one has the EXACT same experiences as someone else. But let us say there was someone adjacent with a different set of DNA but had a very similar upbringing. Clearly, that's not the same person. It is acknowledged, however, that someone's experiences and epigenetics can affect a person's personality, dispositions, and interactions. This may all go into identity of a person, but it's not like that one can just copy and paste these after-birth experiential aspects onto another person and call it "the same person". One can change in the form of the same genetic person, but one cannot transfer over one's identity to another genetic person, barring some science fiction scenarios perhaps.

I think far too much emphasis is put upon DNA when it comes to identity. DNA doesn't relate to who you are in some kind of easily explicable relationship. Just imagine that your own DNA has been mapped, as can be done, and you look at the map: a series of letters consisting of A G T and C. Which part of them causes you to type what you type here? None, of course. But if you cannot establish a relationship between the genetic code of an individual and what they do then I'd say you're mistaken that the genetic code is a necessary identifier. At least existentially what we do is who we are. And unenlightened has already pointed out how identical twins have identical DNA, but not identical identities. (though it's worth noting here that DNA morphs, too -- so just how identical the DNA is is up for dispute -- 99.99% matching between code is very similar, but not identical identical, and biological processes have a way of finding difference)

I think the real reason DNA is highlighted is because it helped courts. Finally, a marker of identity to prove beyond reasonable doubt that this blood was theirs!

But surely we are more than our legal identities, and that those are certainly up for interpretation. — Moliere

So also like @unenlightened you (willfully?) ignored this:

After the above has been agreed upon as a matter of fact, then we can possibly get into arguments of identity after the conception/birth of the person. If the person born was from the same gametes as you, would that person in fact really "be" you with various changes in their upbringing, etc.? You can even at this point, ask about indiscernibles regarding twins or clones because those are about the same genetics, and same gametes. I think for example, the case of maternal twins (twins from the same cell that splits), proves that identity is not necessarily wrapped up in genetic origin, otherwise twins would be considered the same person, which would seem absurd. In order for a person to be identified as a separate "person" or "being", one would have to take into account that they have their own X to some degree (body, and/or mind). And then, that body or mind is subject to changing experiences that could alter the course of their outlook, life, personality, etc. At that point, you can argue identity. But in no way, a person born of different gametes, even given the same set of experiences, would be "you". It would be an approximately similar person, however. So being of the same gametes is necessary but perhaps not sufficient to identity. — schopenhauer1

Especially please pay attention to the necessary but not sufficient part. And yeah I also said this if you want to go down the sci-fi scenarios:

realize one can go on a wacky crusade of exceptions and give me some interesting sci-fi scenarios along the lines of a Ship of Theseus whereby someone's genetic code was replaced from its initial code to a different code, so would that then be a different person? Indeed, how much genetic engineering would the "person" then be a different "person" than the starting point? I could concede that it might be different. I would not know at what point. But certainly, if a different set of gametes were used, even by the same parent in artificial insemination, it would still be a different person. Each sperm cell has a different combination of genetic information that gets reshuffled in meiosis.

But it was said here:
But if people can change in the course of their life, without those changes being so radical that they become a different person, what makes the gametes so important and sensitive that ANY change in them produces a different person. It seems absurd to suppose that if I was conceived 5 minutes earlier or later, the resulting person would not be me.
— Ludwig V

So that's my point. There would be no YOU conceived. That person is someone else. You keep taking the POV of someone who can transpose their current personhood onto a different person. I contend, even if that person was conceived five minutes earlier, and had the same life experiences, that would be a different person. That would not be you, but someone else. — schopenhauer1

However, we have some way to go, and I'm a bit concerned that this issue is clearly off-topic. One of us could start a different thread, and I think that would be a good idea. How about it? — Ludwig V

Oh by the way, what I am discussing versus a specific identity versus a general future event, is not so indirectly related to this passage in Ryle:

But one thing he could not do--
logically and not merely epistemologically could not do. He
could not get the future events themselves for the heroes or
heroines of his story, since while it is still an askable question
whether or not a battle will be fought at Waterloo in 1815, he
cannot use with their normal force the phrase ' the Battle of
Waterloo' or the pronoun 'it'. While it, is still an askable
question whether my parents are going to have a fourth son, he
cannot use as a name the name 'Gilbert Ryle' or use as a pronoun designating their fourth son the pronoun 'he'. Roughly,
statements in the future tense cannot convey singular, but only
general propositions, where statements in the present and past
tense can convey both. More strictly, a statement to the effect
that something will exist or happen is, in so far, a general statement. When I predict the next eclipse of the moon, I have indeed
got the moon to make statements about, but I have not got her
next. eclipse to make statements about.

I do apologize, for breaking rules, with the assurance of admitting to be a slow lerner. On account of a rare but not unusual genetic trait, that neuropsychologists have been trumped by, but compelled to stay the course, and raise the impending necessity of accelerating said such learning.

Such uninspired damage control is quite similar and relative to the level of expected ‘internal’ change. — Bella fekete

Not quite catching what you are saying, but it may have been addressed in my post here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/861568

:up:

In the latter case it would be you in a different body. So to speculate about possible worlds in which you were born to do different parents and so on, would always be to invoke such a theory of the soul, else the speculations be nonsense. — Janus

Yes, I think it's actually quite easy to do to say, "Oh wouldn't be weird if I grew up in this or that place, time, or otherwise." And it can be entertained in hindsight via imagination. But never (in any modern conceivable way) would that actually have been YOU.

I think what you say is right, at least in the sense that we are all unique organisms. If a different sperm had fertilized the ovum that grew to became you then it would not be you but someone else... — Janus

:up:

unless the theory of the soul as self were true. In the latter case it would be you in a different body. — Janus

Indeed. But I suspect people who don't necessarily believe in a theory of a transposable "soul" into different physical bodies, STILL TALK AS IF that is the case because they are not keeping in mind the necessity of genetic origin for a person to have been the same person when providing counterfactual scenarios.