I realize one can go on a wacky crusade of exceptions and give me some interesting sci-fi scenarios along the lines of a Ship of Theseus whereby someone's genetic code was replaced from its initial code to a different code, so would that then be a different person? Indeed, how much genetic engineering would the "person" then be a different "person" than the starting point? I could concede that it might be different. I would not know at what point. But certainly, if a different set of gametes were used, even by the same parent in artificial insemination, it would still be a different person. Each sperm cell has a different combination of genetic information that gets reshuffled in meiosis.

But it was said here:

But if people can change in the course of their life, without those changes being so radical that they become a different person, what makes the gametes so important and sensitive that ANY change in them produces a different person. It seems absurd to suppose that if I was conceived 5 minutes earlier or later, the resulting person would not be me. — Ludwig V

So that's my point. There would be no YOU conceived. That person is someone else. You keep taking the POV of someone who can transpose their current personhood onto a different person. I contend, even if that person was conceived five minutes earlier, and had the same life experiences, that would be a different person. That would not be you, but someone else.

I read it, but i decided it would be a cold day in hell before your nonsense achieved much agreement. So I decided not to wait. — unenlightened

Why say it's nonsense? Why can't what I say achieve agreement? This is perplexing. And why the overall vitriolic response? This is poisoning the well, no?

So all of this is not addressing my point which is that genetic identity (same sperm and egg made you who you are) is NECESSARY even if NOT sufficient...

I'd think you can only imagine being yourself with such supeficial changes, but what about less obvious, but more profound differences? Suppose the genes this 'alternate you' got resulted in a person with an IQ 40 points lower than yours? Suppose the genes alternate you got resulted in schizophrenia? Would
you think the alternate you to be you in that case? — wonderer1

You don't even need to speculate about that. Psychosomatic diseases can already impair someone this way so that at one point they are lucid and at another, they cannot access their thoughts as clearly...

I would suggest that this is a gross misunderstanding of personal identity. Identical twins are not the same person, and if someone undergoes gene therapy they do not become someone else, in the sense that a sober person is likewise the same person when drunk or that the same person can be happy at one time and sad at another, or young at one time and old at another. Wrt. social identity, we can stipulate a genetic absolute in this sort of way, but in such case I am identifiable by my genetic code or equally by my fingerprints, but not as them. — unenlightened

So, I see you didn't pay close attention to some of my OP. I said here:

After the above has been agreed upon as a matter of fact, then we can possibly get into arguments of identity after the conception/birth of the person. If the person born was from the same gametes as you, would that person in fact really "be" you with various changes in their upbringing, etc.? You can even at this point, ask about indiscernibles regarding twins or clones because those are about the same genetics, and same gametes. I think for example, the case of maternal twins (twins from the same cell that splits), proves that identity is not necessarily wrapped up in genetic origin, otherwise twins would be considered the same person, which would seem absurd. In order for a person to be identified as a separate "person" or "being", one would have to take into account that they have their own X to some degree (body, and/or mind). And then, that body or mind is subject to changing experiences that could alter the course of their outlook, life, personality, etc. At that point, you can argue identity. But in no way, a person born of different gametes, even given the same set of experiences, would be "you". It would be an approximately similar person, however. So being of the same gametes is necessary but perhaps not sufficient to identity. — schopenhauer1

I'm just waiting for @Ludwig V to have some sort of counter to this seemingly factual understanding of how identity works.

Sorry the above reply in haste was mis written. It should read, that the absolute certainty of proofs to that effect are , even if , a shade below expectations, may make a huge difference , in a retrospective effort to change the way things may have turned out. — Bella fekete

Not quite sure what you are saying but if you are asking why this discounts a lot of counterfactuals about things like, "What if I was born a...".. The reason is, that any circumstance that led to a different circumstance of conception between a specific sperm and egg would have led to a different person, one that was not the sperm and egg that was to gestate and develop into YOU.

@Ludwig V here's your separate thread on the topic of identity and conception.

That can't be true. A clone of me (such as a possible identical twin) would not be me, either. And if you look carefully at what is written about DNA, there is a possibiity (several million to one) that someone else might be born with the same DNA as me.
I admit that DNA is treated as a unique identifier for me. But this is an empirical relationship, like the supposed unique pattern of my fingerprints (or, I understand, my palm-print or ear-print). I mean that the uniqueness of DNA was established on the basis of our understanding of personal identity. So it doesn't establish any logical relationship. — Ludwig V

It looks like you didn't read this part here:

After we establish this agreement (which I think you would be), then we can possibly get into arguments of identity after the conception/birth of the person. If the person born was from the same gametes as you, would that person in fact really "be" you with various changes in their upbringing, etc.. You can even at this point, ask about indiscernibles regarding twins or clones because those are about the same genetics, and same gametes. I think for example, the case of maternal twins (twins from the same cell that splits), proves that identity is not necessarily wrapped up in genetic origin, otherwise twins would be considered the same person, which would seem absurd. In order for a person to be identified as a separate "person" or "being", one would have to take into account that they have their own X to some degree (body, and/or mind). And then, that body or mind is subject to changing experiences that could alter the course of their outlook, life, personality, etc. At that point, you can argue identity. But in no way, a person born of different gametes, even given the same set of experiences, would be "you". It would be an approximately similar person, however. So being of the same gametes is necessary but perhaps not sufficient to identity. — schopenhauer1

But yeah, I'll start a new thread then.

You have two criteria there. Suppose I had been born in different circumstances (but the same parents) and the same DNA. For example suppose I was born as a second child, not the first. Would I be the same person? I say, yes. What would you say? — Ludwig V

Well, you are slightly moving the goal post. All I am establishing is that if the gametes are different than the one that was your set of gametes, whatever the case may be (whether they are similar to you or not), THAT person who was conceived a second before or after with different gametes is not you. I really want to establish THIS point, at the least. That THIS point is not a matter of debate or interpretation, but just a fact that that person born from a different set of gametes is not you.

The reason this is important, is that it then establishes some other more interpretive things. That is to say, you cannot in reality have a person born under different circumstances because those would almost certainly have been a different set of gametes, and hence a different person. If a matter of seconds matters to whether it being a different person, then all the other circumstances that led to the conception would also be different and almost certainly would be a different person. So you can only IMAGINE after the fact that you could be different, but not ever in fact be different.

After we establish this agreement (which I think you would be), then we can possibly get into arguments of identity after the conception/birth of the person. If the person born was from the same gametes as you, would that person in fact really "be" you with various changes in their upbringing, etc.. You can even at this point, ask about indiscernibles regarding twins or clones because those are about the same genetics, and same gametes. I think for example, the case of maternal twins (twins from the same cell that splits), proves that identity is not necessarily wrapped up in genetic origin, otherwise twins would be considered the same person, which would seem absurd. In order for a person to be identified as a separate "person" or "being", one would have to take into account that they have their own X to some degree (body, and/or mind). And then, that body or mind is subject to changing experiences that could alter the course of their outlook, life, personality, etc. At that point, you can argue identity. But in no way, a person born of different gametes, even given the same set of experiences, would be "you". It would be an approximately similar person, however. So being of the same gametes is necessary but perhaps not sufficient to identity.

That being said, a TON of counterfactual ideas about "being you" are discounted if you at least admit that prior to conception, there is no way any other set of circumstances would have been the YOU who is reflecting back on their counterfactual history because any slight change in the antecedent causes would have affected the set of gametes that would have been conceived, if they were to even be conceived at all.

There you go again. I agree that you can call that a different person, but I claim that I can decide on a case-by-case basis whether the difference warrants a change of identity or not. In addition, I claim that a fertilized egg is not a person - yet. — Ludwig V

Sure, if you’re getting caught on conception versus birth, we can say, is going to be a different person once born. That isn’t the substantive issue at hand. It’s just agreeing that when that person is born it won’t be you, and that this is a matter of fact and not interpretation. And thus, you cannot say “I could have been born in x, y, x different scenarios” because the initial conditions of that conception (and then birth) of that person would not be you. The reason I bring up conception is not because I think that’s when someone becomes a person (personhood debate). I’m not trying to debate the abortion issue. I’m literally trying to explain how it is that this person who would be born would not be you (conceived in different conditions whereby the set of gametes was different than the ones that comprise you). So no, you could not have been born in a different scenario.

And so we go back and forth. To no purpose. What do you think is needed to break the cycle? From my point of view, it seems that I present examples to you that seem to me to be incompatible with what you say, but you ignore them, without explaining what is wrong with them. What do you think? — Ludwig V

Because you haven't seemed to grasp the main point of my argument which is that if a set of parents, even your own, had two gametes that were different than the ones that created you, that is indeed a different person. This isn't even controversial. If 10 seconds later, the there was another sperm, that is no longer you. That was someone else. We'd have to establish we agree here.

I could have fair hair and still be me. I could be six inches shorter than I am and still be me. I could have musical talent as opposed to competence and still be me. Minor changes don't matter. The issue is what features of me matter - and not all of them matter. You can decide as you wish, but others will decide as they wish.

By the way, almost all of my features are the result of a combination of genes and environment. — Ludwig V

How do your examples address what you just quoted?

I guess you are not impressed by Ryle's arguments. It would be interesting to know why. — Ludwig V

I actually think I'm in agreement.

Your formulation is a bit confusing, since your use of "anyone" suggests that we are talking about people, but your use of "what I am" suggests that you are talking about things. Since, at conception, I am not (yet) a person, you are not asking the interesting question, which is "WHO I am". The difference between those two questions needs a bit of sorting out before we could begin answering either question.

Most people take birth as the moment when a person's life begins, though they also accept that there's a long way before one becomes an adult, fully-grown person. The question of identity in the case of human beings is complicated for that reason.

Another reason why it is more complicated than you seem to allow that I can, and do, make decisions about my own identity, and, although one might say that those choices should be respected, other people also make decisions. Conflicts are, in some cases, very difficult to resolve.

That would be an interesting thread, but for this thread, the interesting and relevant question is why you are not impressed with Ryle's arguments against fatalism. — Ludwig V

So, I think you are again misconstruing what this claim is saying.

Can you explain exactly where the breakdown is?

Do you agree, a different set of gametes would be a different person? How can a differently conceived person, a person who is from a different set of gametes, ever be YOU? That would not be YOU. It's like you are taking the naive view that your "soul" or something like this is transposed into a different body. Is that what you are proposing? I don't think so, but I don't see any other way you can misconstrue this idea that a differently conceived person would not be you.

One of them is the definition of identity. You seem to have what I think of a strict definition of identity. Any change is a change of identity. This follows from a strict application of the Identity of Indiscernibles and it seems to follow that the identity of anything consists only of a series of time-slices of what is represented as a single enduring object in "common sense". I don't share that view but recognize that the other view is, in some sense, possible, because I don't think that there is a conclusive refutation of it.

On the other hand, there is the fact that people, unlike beings and objects that are not self-aware, are capable of making choices about what changes in themselves make a difference to their identity and what changes do not. Their choices may not be the same as the choices of other people, and this may create problems. The decision that some change does not imply a change of identity, I characterize as deciding that change is "minor".

You identity the other issue by your comparison with Ryle's argument about Waterloo, which I think is correct, when you think about the problem before conception. But your strict view of identity seems to suggest that, once I am conceived, everything is inevitable and there are no possibilities - and no uncertainties - in my life. In other words, a fatalist view of my life. — Ludwig V

I don't think you're quite getting my argument. I am saying that it is a sort of contradiction (as implied by Ryle as well I think), to talk about YOU as anyone other than what YOU are (currently). In other words, you could NEVER have been anyone but what you are now when discussing your initial conception and birth. If a different sperm fertilized the egg, that would be someone else. Not you. If there was any other circumstance that changed the arrangement of the exact moment you were conceived, that would not have been YOU.

You can entertain the notion in your imagination of what it might have been like to grown up this way or that way, but that could never have actually been a reality. Because in reality, that would no longer be YOU, that would be some other person.

I agree with what you say, particularly about the discovery that one's parents are not the people who are bringing you up. But I also think that minor variations do not make a difference. Are you seriously trying to tell me that if I had been born five minutes earlier, or five hours earlier, it would not have been me that was born? I concede that someone might decide to take it that way, but, under otherwise normal circumstances, most people, I am sure, would not. — Ludwig V

How do minor variations not make a difference? Certainly if the event of your parents conceiving 5 minutes earlier or later happened, a different set of gametes would be there, so "you" wouldn't be "you" any more. That would be another person. One that might not be on a philosophy forum to be so indignant about this. As far as being "born" five minutes earlier or later, I'm not even suggesting that kind of thing. Rather, I am simply suggesting that if you were conceived (not born) under any other circumstances, it's no longer "you" we are talking about. Now, after conception, we may start discussing ideas about identity.. In that case, indeed, we might have a "you" that was different from various contingent circumstances of place and happenstance. Perhaps a "you" that lived in India is different than a "you" somewhere else in some sense because you would have had a different course of events happen, even though much of your brain chemistry might react similarly to such events. But in that case. But I am not even going down that route. I'm simply saying, that there is no way you "could have" been any other person than "you".

Actually, now that I think of it, I am even saying that "you" couldn't even BE anything but what was conceived. If you had a different circumstances that necessarily entails you were conceived different, so.. forget the part about being born even in different circumstances. It's a non-starter! In that sense, this seems to align with Ryle's understanding of Waterloo after the fact versus before the fact. The event was necessarily entailed in its happening, otherwise it's a general possibility not tied to any identical entity in the world! You can't say something like, "What if Waterloo took place in America", because then that would not be all the things that made Waterloo Waterloo to begin with! That would be something else!

I agree in the sense that it is a very difficult issue to give a clear answer to.

But what circumstances are sufficiently different to make a problem? For example, I might, quite easily, have been born five days before, or five days after, my actual birthday. That might well not be important. But suppose I discover that I was born a year later than I thought. Whether that matters or not (i.e. is sufficiently different to make a difference) is moot. The issue is further complicated by the fact that my parents, friends, society might decide differently from me.

Then there's the meaning of entertaining, never mind imagining, the possibility. I suggest that one could deduce some factual differences. If I had been born in India, I would be living in a very different climate and a very different society. The part that I cannot imagine, or even seriously entertain, is what difference that would make to "me". And here I remember Berkeley's "master argument", which points out that when imagining those circumstances, I will be imagining myself in those circumstances, not imagining the person I would (might) have been. (Berkeley uses this point for his own ends, but I think the point applies here, as well.)

When I said that the bewilderment is not necessary, I didn't mean that answers would be easy to come by, but that it is possible to reflect that it is, in one sense, up to me to decide what matters. — Ludwig V

So my point is that "you" would not be "you" in any altered history of causation leading to "who" you are. You mentioned being born in a different country, different parents, etc. Do you see the contradiction here? If there was a set of people who were not your parents, or had children at a different time, whatever that person is, it would not be YOU! Even if you were conceived a few seconds later, it would NOT be YOU. Causally speaking, the argument is absurd that you could be anyone but YOU, if there were other circumstances. That isn't an identity issue, it's a causality issue. In that sense, this ties into Ryle's idea that Waterloo wouldn't EVEN be Waterloo if it was a different set of circumstances. You can only retrospectively imagine what someone who is NOW you, would have been like under different circumstances. But in a sense of actual personhood, that person who you are imagining could not have been the person who is doing the retrospective imagining!

On that, the identity of people has an additional complication, that they can decide what criteria of their own identity are important (to them) and those criteria may not be the same as the criteria used by everyone else. I think that many people must have the slightly dizzying experience of contemplating the possibility that their actual parents could have married - or whatever - someone else. I understand their bewilderment, though I don't think it is necessary. — Ludwig V

I think it’s a huge issue and opens a can of worms but, I don’t see how you can defend a claim that if you were born in different “circumstances”, then you would still be “you”; it’s is not even something you can entertain in any real sense beyond imagining after the fact.

No problem, did you see my post on lecture 2 above?

Why on earth would that be true? What is a "rejection understanding"? All that is at stake is a philosophical theory, a way of thinking about things. — Ludwig V

Should be rejection OF understanding...

If someone explains to you about rainbows, are they denying the existence of rainbows? There are, or used to be, people who said that rainbows had been explained "away". Is that true? There are others who said that the scientific explanation "reduced" rainbows (to raindrops and light) and took away their magic. I maintain that nothing is "taken away". I'm even prepared to say that if you want magic, the process that produces rainbows should be magic enough for anyone. — Ludwig V

The way I interpret his "Cartesian" rejection, is that he is rejecting that subjective experiences as something that can be considered in the realm of science. Certainly if he means "Cartesian substance dualism" almost everyone can agree that can be jettisoned. I don't think people are going to say mental states are some sort of "substance" like an ectoplasm or some such. If he means in the broader sense, some sort of subjective experiential mental states altogether, then one is simply eliminating what is to be explained. Perhaps I misread it. He seems to reduce it to behavior. Behavior is something you can ascribe to processes like atoms, neurons and the like. What is behavior in terms of the actual experience of "red" or "red car", or all the perceptual things that one can have? Dennett takes it a step further I believe, and discusses optical illusions, and how the brain edits events. But that simply answers the wrong question (the hard problem). It's actually a category error of how the brain operates for why there is this illusory sense of the world or what this "is" other than a synonym for "illusion".

Well perhaps so. But this has nothing to do with Ryle - or Wittgenstein, either. Ryle does wish to eliminate Cartesian consciousness, but that's a different story because it's about a conception of consciousness, not consciousness. BTW I have very little time for Dennett's idea that consciousness is an illusion; he should have read Austin before developing that illusory idea.

But this is a side-issue. We're moving on. — Ludwig V

:lol: Yes, agreed with Dennett. I don't think it's totally disconnected from Ryle (perhaps in these lectures more so). Rather, if Ryle is against Cartesian consciousness, that usually implies a sort of rejection understanding of basic sensory things such as "red" and "sound", let alone more abstract things like "imagination". I'm sorry, you can't put that in the category of what, "behavioral disposition??"

I think they both do, but will focus on the second lecture. — Fooloso4

@Ludwig V

Ryle's idea of logical consequences and practical inescapability reminds me of other distinctions made in determining principles of sufficient reason. Schopenhauer especially comes to mind. He made the distinction between the grounds of "knowing" and the grounds of "becoming". Knowing is basically about the realm of propositional reasoning and becoming is the realm of cause and effect of objects.

I liken Ryle's idea of a "contradiction" of an event that already occurred (e.g. Waterloo, your own birth, etc.), as similar to one I've raised on this forum before in a bit different way... Here is what I basically said:

We often think in counterfactual notions like, "What happened if I was born a different person?". But that is false (in the spirit of Ryle, "incorrect" or an "error" :smile:) to even think in those terms. Your identity is tied up in "you", so if another person was born, it would certainly not be "you". Could "you" have been born in other circumstances? It probably would not be you, if that was the case, is the point.

Why do some of these philosophers have a hard time with the idea of imaginary concepts?

A bald king of France drives them crazy. There does not exist a category of kings of France. Therefore any person of that category cannot exist. Any person said to be if that category, does not exist. It’s like logicians would have a heart attack parsing out thousands of words to describe a fictional work. Gandalf would take up reams of ridiculous existential quantifiers! :sweat:

But I don't think that Ryle plays that card in this book. I could be wrong. — Ludwig V

Ryle influenced Dennett who is a part of the "eliminativist materialism" notion.

According to IEP:

Eliminativism holds that there is no hard problem of consciousness because there is no consciousness to worry about in the first place. Eliminativism is most clearly defended by Rey 1997, but see also Dennett 1978, 1988, Wilkes 1984, and Ryle 1949. On the face of it, this response sounds absurd: how can one deny that conscious experience exists? Consciousness might be the one thing that is certain in our epistemology. But eliminativist views resist the idea that what we call experience is equivalent to consciousness, at least in the phenomenal, “what it’s like” sense. They hold that consciousness so-conceived is a philosopher’s construction, one that can be rejected without absurdity. If it is definitional of consciousness that it is nonfunctional, then holding that the mind is fully functional amounts to a denial of consciousness. Alternately, if qualia are construed as nonrelational, intrinsic qualities of experience, then one might deny that qualia exist (Dennett 1988). And if qualia are essential to consciousness, this, too, amounts to an eliminativism about consciousness.

What might justify consciousness eliminativism? First, the very notion of consciousness, upon close examination, may not have well-defined conditions of application—there may be no single phenomenon that the term picks out (Wilkes 1984). Or the term may serve no use at all in any scientific theory, and so may drop out of a scientifically-fixed ontology (Rey 1997). If science tells us what there is (as some naturalists hold), and science has no place for nonfunctional intrinsic qualities, then there is no consciousness, so defined. Finally, it might be that the term ‘consciousness’ gets its meaning as part of a falsifiable theory, our folk psychology. The entities posited by a theory stand or fall with the success of the theory. If the theory is falsified, then the entities it posits do not exist (compare P.M. Churchland 1981). And there is no guarantee that folk psychology will not be supplanted by a better theory of the mind, perhaps a neuroscientific or even quantum mechanical theory, at some point. Thus, consciousness might be eliminated from our ontology. If that occurs, obviously there is no hard problem to worry about. No consciousness, no problem!

But eliminativism seems much too strong a reaction to the hard problem, one that throws the baby out with the bathwater. First, it is highly counterintuitive to deny that consciousness exists. It seems extremely basic to our conception of minds and persons. A more desirable view would avoid this move. Second, it is not clear why we must accept that consciousness, by definition, is nonfunctional or intrinsic. Definitional, “analytic” claims are highly controversial at best, particularly with difficult terms like ‘consciousness’ (compare Quine 1951, Wittgenstein 1953). A better solution would hold that consciousness still exists, but it is functional and relational in nature. This is the strong reductionist approach. — Hard Problem of Consciousness

So I guess, if you can't explain it, eliminate it. That thing you think you experience as "red" is not that. But then you get the problem of "illusion" which has to be explained. And the hidden dualism and homunculus continues! The illusion exists, and has to be explained qua the illusion. That is the THING to be explained. It is always somehow assumed in the premise, even by way of "it is learned" what "red" is. Well, what is it that this "learning" is DOING by causing "red" in its discriminatory fashion (red is not not-red, red is not green, red is not blue, etc.etc.)?

Yes, military capabilities surely matter. But those conquered lands that the Mongol Empire briefly held united, didn't start then worshipping Tengri. The follow-up states took up Islam or in the case of China, the melted into the Chinese culture. — ssu

That's my point! Paganism would have allowed for any number of pluralistic beliefs to flourish, just as the Germanic kingdoms of what became France, Spain, Germany, England, etc. (though probably something else if history was altered), could have cultural exchange with the Greco-Roman world of ideas, and it may have flourished, without needing churches or monasteries.

Usually the barbarians were not so barbaric as Romans and Greek thought them of being. I think they were already. It's just that we see the Roman Empire as this light surrounded by darkness, but I don't think it was so black and white. I — ssu

No, many Germanic tribes were already co-opted by Rome and were "Romanized" accordingly. That is again my point, that Christianity was not needed as some vessel to carry the values of Greece/Rome. In fact, if anything, it impeded earlier development of these ideas. The theory might go that Christianity made the "warring" Germanic tribes less "pillaging" and hence the formation of feudalism came about from the "ethics" that Christianity provided through the "values" of ethical monotheism. Christianity held the documents and the translations, and the universities and monasteries that continued these ideas in altered or suppressed fashion. But a flourishing of Greco-Roman ideas, and the switch from warring tribes to more sedentary feudalism with warring nobles under a king, could have happened anyways, simply by the settlements of Germans into more fertile land, and thus the yeoman village farmer, simply came under the control of various warrior-allies that then became dukes, knights, and other vassals that were loyal to the king. Or it may have taken a very different course, without the feudalism. Maybe it would have been confederations, proto-democracies, you name it.. The Middle Ages would have been something else. Maybe not so "middle" and simply more a continuation of Greco-Roman in a Germanic framework, straight up without the need for Church concordia and thought, retrofitted unto and hampering the natural development of Greco-Roman philosophy and sans the doctrine of the Christ and the orthodoxy and heresiology doctrines and debates that sidetracked it for a millennium.

The idea that mental activity is somehow behavioral dispositions seems incoherent to me.

And somehow trying to save this view by pointing to how qualia comes from development is committing its own “category mistake”. We “learn” discrimination of red and not red or some such they’ll say. That doesn’t mean the qualia of red doesn’t exist.

Emergentism and “integration” weasily conceits that always try to save the day as a spoon stirring dissolves the powder into the liquid as if magic. You can’t emerge or integrate your way out of the hard problem. Homunculus Fallacies are pesky and near intractable.

Look all you need to do is hold the view that sounds most common sensical, make a few quips showing your indignation at the silliness that doesn’t represent the common sense view, and then walk way. Duh.

Well s’righty then. The common sense view as sun revolves around the Earth. There are only 3 dimensions. Stars are just points of light in the sky. Direct realism is true. Right right. Carry on!

Sorry, but that happened. Paganism is quite rare today in Europe and in the World. Animism etc. isn't so much related with higher cultures. As the documentary of the Mari people showed, this is not a religion that has those zealots that you have in the Abrahamic religions. And I think it's quite clear why this happens: if I have my Gods and you have yours and I'm Ok with that, it's hard for me to be a religious zealot. But if my Bible says in Matthew 28:19 "Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit", I guess I have a different attitude toward the religions of others. — ssu

So it does bring up an interesting point. I think "higher cultures", meaning, "advanced technology, philosophical inquiry, etc." can indeed go with paganism, as it was practiced in the ancient Mediterranean. Indeed, all the flourishing of the diversity of thought and cultural exchange during the Greco-Roman period, attests to this. In the Greco-Roman world, only the very elite were probably "atheistic" in the way that the gods were mere superstitions to them, whilst philosophy could offer a "way of life" (like the Stoics, or Epicureans). And even those had various theistic ideas of Natural Reason, and a creator god. The majority however, held a variety of beliefs. The local farmer might only worship the localized deities and household deities. The merchants might have had those on top of the more civic-minded deities of the city-state (Athena in Athens, etc. Every city had their patron god). If you joined the army, you might need to pledge loyalty to Mars, or whatever it might be. Various mystery-cults which were like the "New Age" religion of its time, were somewhat more universal as they were not tied to localized patron gods, so were "portable". Thus Mithras and Dionysus cults became popular amongst the military.

So, I am not sure how much Abrahamic religions or even monotheism had to go hand-in-hand with so-called "higher culture". Even in the Abrahamic religion, the Yawhist religion of the ancient Jews, really was a development from the ancient Canaanite pantheon. El was the Northern Israelite version of the chief-god. Yahweh was a chariot-riding warrior god associated more with the South (perhaps even Midianite in origin?). At some point during the United Monarchy of David, there was probably a syncretism. And even then, other gods like Baal and Ashtereh and consorts of the gods were still being worshipped up until the end of the First Temple in Jerusalem. This henotheistic hodgepodge was only redacted later during the Babylonian Exile when scribes wanted history to look as if the original religion was monotheistic and then the Israelites "strayed" at various moments, causing "God's wrath". Really, you can say that the "Yahweh only!" crowd didn't form until about the 700s BCE around the time of King Hezekiah, when contingents soothsayers (prophets), gained prominence and had varying levels of influence. But even then, it was only centered around Jerusalem in the king's counsel. It was only after the destruction of the First Temple in Jerusalem, that the "Yahweh only!" crowd became THE main keepers of the ancient traditions of Israel/Judah, writing down what would become the Hebrew Scriptures (the JEPD theory, though now quite modified amongst biblical scholars). Also it was during the Age of Prophets (700s-400s BCE) and later scribes (400s BCE-200 BCE) in Jewish/Israelite history that you really had the emphasis on ethics being infused in various commandments and not just rituals performed for good harvests, etc. In the olden days of historiography, this rise of the importance of ethical writing in both the East and West (in Greece, India, China, and Israel, respectively), was called the Axial Age (500 BCE - 300 BCE give or take). Except for Israel, the others were basically pagan/polytheistic/animistic, or at the least non-monotheistic. They certainly weren't Abrahamic.

ANYWAYS, my point is you may be overemphasizing what happened as some sort of determined feature of history. Contra the examples of Christianity and Islam, you can have a fully functioning pagan society whilst still carrying forth principles of philosophy (like the Greco-Roman). In fact, Christianity, towards the 400s CE, was systematically closing down and retrofitting pagan temples and philosophical schools to become churches and monasteries. Not only did the Christian clergy physically take over these buildings, they took over the documents inside of them. Sometimes they were burned, misplaced, lost, and this might have mattered little being they were often contrary to the Church doctrine being formulated by the Church Fathers from the 200s-500s CE. Some philosophers were more emphasized and respected. Plato and Aristotle were retrofitted as "good" pagan philosophers that could be built off of using logic and reason, but it was absolutely incumbent about these churchmen to make it "concordia" with the Church. In other words, you could not study the philosophy alone without tying it to Church doctrine of the Christ.

To the credit of the scholastics and the universities, disputations and student-teacher questioning could take place which kept a tradition of free exchange. However, they could not stray too far from previous concordia, otherwise they would be branded as heretical. Either way, just the notion of "heretical" would not have been there without Christian concordia.

And then there's the question how paganism of Antiquity would have evolved. But it is likely that with Roman Gods in Rome, Odin worshippers in Skandinavia, "Ukko"-god worshippers here in Finland, there isn't an Europe as we now know it, because there isn't that Christendom, with Pope in the West and the Byzantine emperor in the East. We simply cannot know how things would have evolved.

And then there's the question of what if some other preacher of monotheism would have been successful later than a Jewish carpenter from the Levant? Let's say this had been a Celtic druid from Gaul that 'had seen the light' in the Middle Ages. Would our heritage that we are so fond of be then "Celtic-(add new religion's name here)" heritage? Yes, if it would have been successful. If then later colonialism happens, then that Celitic-X religion would have spread around the World. And we would have all those kind of small perks of Celtic religion in our monotheistic religion X. And the French would be even more proud about their heritage than now. — ssu

Perhaps, or perhaps not. Rome grew its empire not through ideological conversion of various kings, but by direct military conquering of cities across a vast region. They didn't much care for religious conformism. Thus, even a Celtic takeover from Gallia (modern France) could have went any number of ways whereby the Odin-worshipers, and the "Ukko"-worshippers, and the Slavic-religion could have kept their practices, but paid homage and taxes to their Celtic overlords. I mean, you don't even have to go that far back. Look at the Mongolian Empire. Many people have the misconception that the Mongol leadership was Buddhist. That was not so. They did rule over a large contingent of Buddhists in Asia, but they were actually animists. They didn't much care if the populations under their rule worshipped Tengri, Umay, Oz, or the ancestors of the Mongolian plain...

Christianity in the end didn't pacify Europeans. Talk about pacification through Christianity is simply nonsense. What finally 'pacified' us Europeans was WW1 and WW2, and still we have wars like in Ukraine just now going on, even if both Ukrainians and Russians are basically Orthodox. And we are just rearming now after the Cold War.

There was enough of that unruliness around that one Pope came out with the idea of the Crusades, which were so popular. — ssu

So by "pacify" here, I just mean to imagine the Germanic tribal societies being akin to the later Viking ones. Vikings Norse had subsistence village farms as you well described that existed even to the 20th century. Largely, this would have been Germanic tribes as well during the Migration Period. That is to say, they had to be portable enough a society to be on the move. And they weren't averse to pillaging and gaining resources from neighbors (like Roman, Celtic, or other Germanic tribes). Supposedly, the Christianization of this society where warriors were at a premium, (the king and his band of knights), they were open to a wider society (the Greco-Roman one retrofitted to the Church). However, Christianity need not have been the "vector" for this expansion of knowledge to the Germanic warlord societies.

If Christianity never existed, I could theorize that perhaps the Germanic warlords would have been exposed to Greco-Roman ideas through the natural discourse of cultural diffusion, trade, and intermarriage. It is often proposed the Christianity had to be there to "save" the Roman Empire from having its intellectual achievements from being destroyed by these Germanic tribesman. I don't think that necessarily would have been the case. Rather, by the time the Germans were really hitting Rome, it was simply that the "churchmen" had a MONOPOLY over the intellectual achievements. It could be the case that various pagan authorities, philosophers, and civic-minded people would have preserved the writings in their own way if the Church did not takeover starting with Constantine.

Europe would have been easier pickings for Islam. If it wouldn't have been Abd al-Rahman ibn Abd Allah al-Ghafiqi of the Umayyad Caliphate that would have beaten Charles Martel at Tours in 732 and made France part of Islam like Spain, then it would likely have been the Ottomans that had picked of every Pagan bastion once at a time starting with Vienna. Nope, Christianity as 'Christendom' had it's place, especially back then.

It's even very doubtful that there would have been an Empire of Charlemagne without Christianity. And how tech savvy would have been these pagan kingdoms compared to the Ummah at it's best and strongest?

Paganist Northern Europe would have been far too dispersed: Odin worshippers had not much to do with the Celtic druids and so on. There wouldn't have been that 'Christendom' that put up a defense to the Muslim conquerers. And yes, the Umayyads or the Ottomans would have pushed all the way to the remotest places of Europe had they not been stopped. The Polish wouldn't have come to save the asses of the Austrians in Vienna (as they did now).

So what would have happened to the Greco-Roman heritage? Well, the Ottoman ruler that conquered Constantinople declared himself to be the Roman Emperor and it was the Muslims that kept the knowledge of Antiquity, hence it wouldn't have dissappeared. Only (Judeo)Christian heritage would likely have been there with the Zoroastrians of today. — ssu

Eh, you did answer the question, but I think this is a slight cop-out. Arguably, Islam's mishmash of pagan Arabic culture fused with the Judeo-Christian traditions would not have formed in the person of Mohammed if history was altered in that Byzantine period. So, let us say the Arabic invasion of the Middle East never took place in the 600s either.

You seem to be coy to discuss pre-Christian Europe and then seem eager to replace one lustfully expansionist Abrahamic/monotheistic religion like Christianity with another, similar lustfully expansionist Abrahamic/monotheistic religion (Islam), as if any pagan society is just waiting for an overpowering theological ideology to dominate it and keep it in line. Are you somehow embarrassed of a pre-Christian pagan Europe? Is it unseemly for a mosaic of European pagan-tribal religions to have existed and persisted? That seems pretty regressive and buying into the 19th century notion of the West as necessarily needing to be Christian overlaid on top of a Greco-Roman substrate.

You were almost getting at it when discussing the Odin worshipers and the Celtic religion, etc. Why can't they function relatively intact but with Greco-Roman philosophy? Would it not in fact, look like various syncretic (pluralistic/open) ethno-religions? Did Germanic tribal culture (and others) need some sort of belief system that inoculated them from their former ways? Would pagan Greco-Roman philosophy not have taken root without the vector of Christianity? Is a monotheistic ravenously totalistic theological framework necessary for it to be passed to these warrior societies? Surely, it developed and took root in pluralistic/syncretic/pagan Mediterranean society. It couldn't find its way north through diffusion? Were monasteries the only hope for the Greco-Roman ways to be preserved?

So you really didn't answer again, the main questions at hand, and I would like to know your 10 cents worth on it here:

Then, what would you think if Christianity never took over the Roman Empire? Was it Christianity or was it the philosophy of the Greco-Romans that would cause the influence? Was Christianity necessary to "pacify" the Germanic tribal way of life into more sedentary feudal lords or was Christianity superfluous to this movement in history? — schopenhauer1

Did Christianity add anything to the Westernization of the West through its pacification of the Germanic tribal way of life? — schopenhauer1

You seem to be indicating, "Yes, an expansionist monotheistic religion needed to do this to 'pacify' the warlord pre-Christian Germanic/Slavic/Celtic societies". But perhaps you might have a different answer.

Not actually everywhere: for example in Sweden (which Finland was also a part of) the peasants remained quite independent and the aristocracy wasn't at all so powerful. In fact the last time the Swedes revolted against the authorities, it was against a Danish king in the 16th Century and the revolt was lead by Gustav Vasa, the founder of the Swedish monarchy. And no peasant revolts after that! Also Switzerland was quite different too. — ssu

True, but then you are ignoring that I acknowledged the basic independence and "late to the game" aspect of Viking society. By that time, feudalism did not reach their society, and largely bypassed it which shows that you did not need to go through feudalism per se to get to "Westernization" in Europe. It adds another interesting element if we were to put the idea of "Christianity" "Greco-Pagan philosophy", and "Feudalism" as broad categorizes contributing to the West. Which one is more to do with its "essentialness", which one is accidental? I would say the Greco-Roman pagan philosophy was the core, that was carried through and indirectly influenced both feudalism and Christianity (to the extent of a unifying structure for feudalism and rhetoric and the foundation of inquiry for Christian theological philosophizing). However, some might argue that you needed Christianity and feudalism to contribute to pacifying the Germanic roving tribes into a different organization and with the literate influences of the Greco-Romans via Christianity and the sedentary nature of feudalism.

In a way perhaps we shouldn't focus on the awesomeness of the West, but the failures of the East. Religion's tight grasp hindered the Muslim countries whereas China suddenly chose itself to close itself after making it's dash for Exploration. Hence in the end you have these huge WTF moments for some civilizations like Japan when an Western armoured battleship enters their harbor and they have nothing to defend from it. As previously you simple were so ignorant about the technological and military capabilities of other cultures (as many times people weren't aware of them). — ssu

And yes, though I do largely agree with this assessment of the East, I am still focusing on the West, and so I will ask the questions in the last post again:

So stepping back a bit more, what do you think Europe would be like, if the Christianization did not take place to the extent it did in Europe? Let's say it remained only around the Mediterranean but did not move up north? What would a Europe that remained largely pagan look like in regions like France, England, Germany, Scandinavia, Baltic states and Eastern Europe?

Then, what would you think if Christianity never took over the Roman Empire? Was it Christianity or was it the philosophy of the Greco-Romans that would cause the influence? Was Christianity necessary to "pacify" the Germanic tribal way of life into more sedentary feudal lords or was Christianity superfluous to this movement in history? — schopenhauer1

Keeping that in mind, could the West have still retained something of the Greco-Roman spirit of inquiry without Christianity's religion which both shut down academies that competed with its own theology, yet still practiced a theologically-approved version of it, as well as keeping the writings somewhat safe in monasteries (after also burning down large libraries like in Alexandria of course so again, hugely mixed bag). Did Christianity add anything to the Westernization of the West through its pacification of the Germanic tribal way of life? — schopenhauer1

The Roman Empire and Rome had something that didn't exist later in the Middle Ages: globalization. — ssu

True, so this would more apply to the regions inside the Roman Empire like Italia, Hispaniola, Illyricum, Graecia, Byzantium, etc. As you stated well here after 410 CE (give or take) in the West, and the East conquered by the Arabs in 630s CE, and was a former shell of itself by its take over in 1453 as you mainly go over here...

Rome having one million inhabitants in Antiquity is only possible due to globalized network of agricultural products being transferred from North Africa. All roads went to Rome. With Constantinople it was similar, then the grain came from Egypt. Once Rome lost Northern Africa to the Vandals and East-Rome to the Muslims, that was game over. For a very long time.

(My favorite graph explaining Antiquity. Although it should be 'Constantinople', not Istanbul)

Similarly you can see this well in the case of the Byzantinian Roman Army. It simply had to adapt to the changing environment and basically feudalism was the answer here. The East-Roman example is telling, as this was the famous Roman Army, it did even gain foothold back in Italy (under the general Belisaurius) and it did fall then to be a small tiny city in the 15th Century where you would have even fields inside the famous city walls where once a bustling megacity had once been. Yes, it lost some huge battles, but the it's downfall came with the downfall of the whole empire: slowly in many Centuries. — ssu

Indeed, with the invasion of the Germanic tribes into the Roman regions, it disrupted various already collapsing cultural features such as large metropolitans and the largescale agricultural Roman estates. The Franks probably did best in trying to adopt some of these Roman practices, and it was this synthesis of Charlemagne's emphasis on seeing himself as a continuation of the Roman Empire (with his Holy Roman Empire), that became the template for later Medieval development in Western Europe. That is to say, that the Church provides salvation of the soul and intellectual developments with the ideal of a strong king who provided his army friends with vast tracts of land as Dukes, and then lesser vassals under them that gets smaller tracts. The subsistence agricultural village farmers became subsumed by greater forces confining them into basically collective peasant lifestyles that worked for their lords, whilst keeping a small plot for their own family.

So what is not discussed as much is how this early feudal system (let's say starting in the 700s), started making Germanic tribal populations more tied to a region and not just a people. It no longer mattered who was your tribal king, or that you were an Angle versus a Saxon versus a Vandal versus an Ostrogoth, but who was your lord. It was just a matter of course that you were more related because people in the same region tended to be from the same roving bands of tribes (the Germanic migration period that took place earlier and helped in the downfall of the Roman Empire).

Hence when Renaissance comes around, you also have the growth again in international trade, more stronger nations. And when Islamic 'Renaissance' fails, even if one Caliph is all for science and similar issues, the religious sector wins and dominates Islam until...today, I guess. This perhaps happened because Islam is far more tightly knit to the government in Muslim states, let's not forget that the first leader of the Muslim state was Muhammad himself. — ssu

Yep, I'd agree there on why the Islamic Golden Age did not lead to widespread tendency towards scientific revolution as in Europe or secularism in general.

Yet the success of the monotheistic religions in the World is quite notable. So there's something with one God, one book and one set of guides on how to behave. It does create larger communities, be it Christendom or the Ummah. Yes, if we would be pagans, there would be many things that would be similar.

However, notice just how crucial these issues are for Western culture.

Max Weber is one of my champions, a truly smart person. His findings are very important. Just notice how crucial that 'Protestant ethic' is to capitalism: where greed is one of the seven deadly sins, once you make it that working hard makes you a good Christian and hence wealth simply shows that you have worked hard, then you get easily to the American mentality towards money and wealth. Also asking interest on debt was not tolerated at first in Christianity and isn't tolerated in Islam (although it now can be circumvented as "fees"). — ssu

I think this might be too much a "just so" theory if we are relying solely on the Protestant Work Ethic as a reason for the Western society we have now. I think indeed, it contributed to a particular form of capitalism perhaps, but not the whole thing. But even if we were to give it a huge portion of the West's development, that work ethic ethic was a contingent outgrowth, not a defining feature of the West's overall trajectory. Rather, my question was whether Christianity "pacified" the warrior-culture tendencies of the Germanic warlords (kings) that banded about in the late Roman and early Middle Ages? Some people want to think so. In fact, when missionaries went to various regions in the era of colonialism, they seemed to spread "the West" as packaged with Christianity first, and then Christianity conferred with it the technology that came along with working with the West.. AS IF Christianity itself was the arbiter of the technology and trade networks that created that technology. But obviously that wasn't the case. The clergy are by and large not productive in a technological sense.. That would be those pesky inventors and entrepreneurs and intrepid scientific types.. The only thing the missionaries are doing are selling their beliefs attached to a higher standard of living.. There is sometimes a case made that the Germanic tribes (Northern/Central/Eastern Europe) were basically converted in a similar way. Charlemagne himself and his ancestors (like Pepin), that benefitted from contact with Rome and Christianization because he now had access to a wide network of intellectual and material culture that might have been closed off if he was just a roving warlord in the hinterlands.

So stepping back a bit more, what do you think Europe would be like, if the Christianization did not take place to the extent it did in Europe? Let's say it remained only around the Mediterranean but did not move up north? What would a Europe that remained largely pagan look like in regions like France, England, Germany, Scandinavia, Baltic states and Eastern Europe?

Then, what would you think if Christianity never took over the Roman Empire? Was it Christianity or was it the philosophy of the Greco-Romans that would cause the influence? Was Christianity necessary to "pacify" the Germanic tribal way of life into more sedentary feudal lords or was Christianity superfluous to this movement in history?

In the end, it's "the economy, stupid". It makes one culture to seem to be dominant from others. And things that make an economy great, the institutions, the trade, the education and the military abilities etc. all make it seem so. — ssu

Keeping that in mind, could the West have still retained something of the Greco-Roman spirit of inquiry without Christianity's religion which both shut down academies that competed with its own theology, yet still practiced a theologically-approved version of it, as well as keeping the writings somewhat safe in monasteries (after also burning down large libraries like in Alexandria of course so again, hugely mixed bag). Did Christianity add anything to the Westernization of the West through its pacification of the Germanic tribal way of life?

Added a bit more.

The 'Westernization' of European, or the continent to become 'European' as we now know, surely is the interesting process here. Hence even if there is the Greco-Roman heritage and the Judeo-Christian heritage, a lot more happened that molded what is now called Western. Lithuania indeed might be the last kingdom to become Christian, but it's interesting that history doesn't paint pagans and their Christian neighbors being actually so much different. — ssu

Legitimate historical question that is quite complicated...
When studying Germanic tribes during the late Roman Empire and early Middle Ages, the characterization is mainly of pastoral and village-based agriculture. That is to say, the main subsistence was raising livestock, not so much farming. How did the Germanic tribal social order with roving bands of warriors, with a king turn into a more sedentary society, that became the hierarchical feudal order of the high and late Middle Ages?

Wiki has a small paragraph here, for example:

Generally speaking, Roman legal codes eventually provided the model for many Germanic laws and they were fixed in writing along with Germanic legal customs.[45] Traditional Germanic society was gradually replaced by the system of estates and feudalism characteristic of the High Middle Ages in both the Holy Roman Empire and Anglo-Norman England in the 11th to 12th centuries, to some extent under the influence of Roman law as an indirect result of Christianisation, but also because political structures had grown too large for the flat hierarchy of a tribal society.[citation needed] The same effect of political centralization took hold in Scandinavia slightly later, in the 12th to 13th century (Age of the Sturlungs, Consolidation of Sweden, Civil war era in Norway), by the end of the 14th century culminating in the giant Kalmar Union. — Early Germanic Culture

The overlay of Christianity did create a framework for shared ideology in Europe that was beyond the tribal. It also created an eschatological framework, where history was moving to an End of Times (that was often seen to be immanent).

However, I just wanted to bring home that Christianity is often seen as some determined thing in Europe. It did not have to go that way. Imagine if rather than the theological meme of Christianity was spread to the Germans, Slavs, Finns, etc., it was straight up Greco-Roman philosophy through cultural diffusion to the Germanic tribes, or some other counterfactual history. People could retain their tribal customs and beliefs and still get the benefits of the inquiry and rhetoric of Greek philosophy. People argue here that the Christianity had to infuse with the "pagan" Greco-Roman philosophy for what eventually became the Renaissance and Enlightenment. But of course, we only seen it through hindsight. Imagine if there was no Christianity, but there was still a strong philosophical tradition, with flourishing Greek-style academies (likened to the Lyceum or Academy). Even so, it is sad that the Old Ways were lost and are simply trivialized as "Christmas trees" and Easter bunnies (Easter was a goddess of fertility in Anglo-Saxon paganism). With modern scholarship of course, we can also see the very roots of Christianity in Near Eastern paganism was also abundant. The dying-resurrecting Son of God that dies for humanity and is a sacrifice, and where one partakes in a sacrament of the god, etc. is all Mystery-Cult style tradition, appropriated by Paul of Tarsus for his new synthetic religion. So, Christianity was syncretic from the start. First it was pretty deliberately done and then just the course of how Christianity learned to adapt to the Germanic, Slavic, Celtic traditions.

I guess there is also a strong tradition that Christianity offered (by way of Jewish ethical monotheism), a way of adopting less violent means of living that tempered the more violent Germanic ways of life of the "warrior". What do you think of this theory, that Christianity was needed to be infused with the Greco-Roman pagan writings, otherwise, it would not have had the ethical component to "quell" the pagan warrior society?

For example, with the Vikings, who converted "late in the game", they are often portrayed as brutally killing their victims to inflict terror. This practice became "quelled" when their leaders became Christians, and instead of being Vikings, they now became pacified Swedes, Norwegians, Danish, and Finns. But is that the full story? Was it really Christianity, or the kind of networks that come along with being in such a widespread network of rulers, kingdoms, trade networks, and power structures?

One of the largest distinctions in law is the difference between the US system and 'British' which the colonies took on. Canada's law system is closer to England than is the US. Likewise with Australia, New Zealand and many other 'British' countries. The mere existence in the US of Federal and State law sets it aside in a rather extreme way.

It seems to me this was purposeful. While i'm not an historian of Law, i do understand that the War of Independence probably influenced the US legal system and bases as much, if not more, than the pre-loaded British mechanisms of law which were necessarily, at least initially, mimicked. — AmadeusD

For a brief period right after the American Revolution, there was an even more extreme "states rights" federal document called the Articles of Confederation. This gave supremacy and powers almost solely to the states, and had almost no executive branch (being they just fought to get away from a king). However, this proved difficult to coordinate trade agreements and put down rebellions, etc. so that's when they called for a Constitutional Convention in 1787 in Philadelphia. This is of course well known American history, but just giving you how it went from extreme states independence to a more federal version of government with three branches of clearly defined powers, bicameral congress, etc. For a time, the senators were voted on only by proxy of state legislators, not the people directly as in the House of Representatives. This changed with the 17th Amendment when the citizens directly could vote for senators. But, anyways, in order for the Constitution to be ratified, they needed 9 of the 13 states approval in separate ratification conventions, which they almost were not going to get. The "Anti-Federalists" were strongly against any form of government above and beyond the individuals states.

Articles of Confederation
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Articles_of_Confederation

The Federalist Papers
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Federalist_Papers
https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/full-text

The Constitutional Convention
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitutional_Convention_(United_States)

No response here? Or was it pretty comprehensive? :smile:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/858550

Do you think a human falling apart in mind, spirit, and/or body can itself be a valid social goal, in the sense that it is a force of thought directed against the overwhelming wave of subsistence as a goal? Or more generally, is mere existence enough from an objective point of view? — kudos

Antinatalism largely answers this dilemma of putting people into a world where they must subsist, often against what would be the conditions and range of choices they otherwise would have chosen.

As to Yankees, whose sovereignity lies more in international corporations and Israel, not in Vespucci's America, even if its law code is descendend from England (which is and has been a far cry from general European culture), it does not make it alike the English law. — Lionino

Well yeah, I didn't make a claim it is exactly the same as English, just that they are derived from the same set of ideas. Clearly, the USA is more deliberately developed from written Constitutional principles (aka the US Constitution), and undergirded in philosophy by writings such as the Federalist Papers to understand the "Founders" intent. But all of these deliberations were part-and-parcel of the broader Enlightenment taking place in the "Western" (European and North American) milieu. English law and custom, though somewhat deriving from deliberation (1689 Bill of Rights for example and various acts of parliament), many of the customs were based on tradition (the idea of common law itself using precedence to decide former cases, Parliament itself was more organically formed from the Medieval period, the executive branch technically comprises a monarchy, there are still titles of nobility and a House of Lords, etc.).

That question reads a bit convoluted to me. Can you rephrase the question?

I am tempted to say that any notion of conceptual scheme would claim that putting empirical evidence prior to determining the scheme is the wrong way about: in the strong version the scheme determines evidence, in the weak version the scheme is part-and-parcel to the evidence. At the very least there are beliefs around empirical evidence which can be questioned from a non-evidential standpoint -- there's a certain sense in which we have to delimit what evidence even is. — Moliere

So I see "conceptual schemes" in Philosophy of Language, as applying Kuhn's theory meant for paradigms in the history of sciences (and science in general) to that of individual schemes for understanding the world and language communities in general. So that's what I meant by language "itself", if that helps.

I’m sorry but you haven’t established why the basis of the American political system is not specifically connected to English and broadly European history, especially as it relates to the Enlightenment, the scientific revolution, the Protestant reformation, and the colonial economic system of the 1600s and 1700s.

I'd also like to mention there is perhaps an inner tension already from analytic philosophy from the start, especially with "logical positivism". The logical part wants to retain its a priori status and the positivism part is committed to empirical observational studies. But language poses the problem that traditionally it is viewed as a priori, like a playground of various things you can manipulate into theories of this and that. However, anthropology, psychology, and neuroscience might disagree that language is properly just there to be a priori arranged to various interesting theories of its use, function, origin, and acquisition.

So you have fields that discuss a languages phenomes and syntax and pragmatics, etc. and this starts looking more like the "logical" part. And then you have fields like anthropology, neuroscience, etc. and this starts looking like the "positivist" part. You can say they are coming at it two different ways, for sure. One is describing its formal aspect, one its functional, how it originated biologically, etc.

Contra the super positivism of people like Skinner, you had Chomsky with a super formalist approach. And then as I keep mentioning, you may have people more in the middle who understand the formalism, but put it in the context of the positivist setting of biology and anthropology. That would probably be the way to go I would think if we want to get a proper meta-theory of language, its origins, functions, etc. and how it related more generally to human cognition and cultural development.