why the juxtaposition? — Banno

Just my two cents but scientific naturalism doesn't allow for something akin to panpsychism.

Its purely relational equivalent of pansemiosis is all pattern and no qualities.

The next problem is that of emergence. Things like downward causation seem like an illegal move, a sui generis.

All emergent properties are known by an observational setting. How the observation itself comes out of emergence seems an odd difference from other kinds of emergence.

The homunculus fallacy allows people to posit hidden dualisms.

Theories of illusion don't even get at the problem itself, just renames it.

Maybe the point to take away then is that we don't need an overarching theory of meaning. If you want to know how language and words work and how information is communicated between brains.. we have psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, anthropology etc. — Apustimelogist

Indeed, and I would go to these subjects to answer questions about how humans developed and use language. I would perhaps philosophize rather on the nature of mind, ethics, and the like. Some hypothesizing is necessary, but at some point, experiments, comparative animal studies, and the like, would get us closer, and thus why Philosophy of Language is kind of a dead end for me. Insofar as it is covertly used to apply to metaphysics or epistemology due to its deflation to various forms of logical constructions (e.g. modal logic somehow getting us any closer to essences, things such as this), I rather just go straight to talking it out in the open. This mid-ground is tedious though. I'm against the propositional project on one hand (i.e. logical construction somehow gets us anywhere other than formalization itself), and I'm against armchair anthropology (i.e. hipster Wittgensteinism).

You don't justify them, you take them for granted, axiomatically. — baker

Philosophy doesn't have to be about what one can prove empirically. It should be thought of as "avenues of looking", synthesis of ideas, or one's "insights".

And it helps to acknowledge that, otherwise we're stuck on a wild goose chase. — baker

Much of modern philosophy is trying to wrangle in previous philosophy from "going too far". Putting limits, whether that be language or the mind or experimental verification.

That's solipsistic. — baker

Right. I'm saying how do you justify social entities like community outside of individual perceptions of what the community is, means, etc. There is a "shared" space. What is this "shared" space. Be careful how you define it though without falling into the trap.

You, too operate with axioms just not necessarily the same ones as other people's. — baker

Hehe. Well that itself is a different axiom than the axiom of hinge propositions... Everyone puts down their flag somewhere I guess.

Perhaps in order to avoid infinite regression it is best to say that the thought IS the content. — RussellA

Yes, I meant it like that. What I was referring to with "belief" was the list you had (Platonism, nominialism, etc.). That is what I meant by he was not referring to "nature of thought" but the content.

Yes, he is describing something that depends on the mind but avoids talking how the mind works. A little bit of science would have helped. — RussellA

My main problem with it..

I look out of the window and see a "tree", but no two trees on Earth are identical. Every tree is different in some way to every other tree.

In one sense "tree" has a single meaning as a concept, yet in another sense has many different meanings, an Oak Tree, a Yew Tree, an old tree, a short tree, a green tree in the summer, etc.

There seems to be an ability of the brain to discover family resemblances in things in the world that are different yet have something in common. It is because of this ability we have concepts.

I can only see this ability as a positive thing. Why would Wittgenstein see it as a negative thing? — RussellA

You are building a theory. Wittgenstein I don't see as doing what you are doing. He is pointing to a way of meaning but not really giving it an explanation except, "Don't you see!". You are explicitly saying, "Brain discovers X.. " He is just saying what he thinks we do. And this seems to be to counter other theories like his ones in Tractatus. By negative, I simply mean he is critiquing, not positing a full blown theory of mind, or theory of meaning. He is demonstrating some things about how language is derived from community and context, but without really explicitly theorizing about it either.

I think when interpreting one of Wittgenstein's' paragraphs we should always look for the simplest, most straightforward and most common sense reading, in other words what Wittgenstein calls the "good philosopher" rather than the "bad" philosopher who creates problems out of nothing. — RussellA

Cool.. Maybe one day there will be a book of schopenhauer1 and people can read it all sorts of things from it. I-Ching is another I hear is good for that. The Bible is another.

No. Hinge propositions are axioms, that's the point. — baker

To me it seems arbitrary one builds their axioms there. Go further.. Dig. If you say that there is a limit, that is one position out of many.. Believe it if you want, but don't expect me to believe it.

But what exactly does this "shared" mean? — baker

Good question but I’m asking it on the strictest metaphysical sense not just what it’s meaning is.

What else do we have to express ourselves but language? And who else can we communicate with if not other people? — baker

Other people is a reification of an idea.

That we do things is not something that Wittgenstein, or for that matter, as far as I know, anyone else attempt to explain. — Fooloso4

Really? So psychology, sociology, and anthropology don’t contribute theories for this?

A community is not made up of individual perceptions but of shared beliefs, practices, and language. A common form of life. — Fooloso4

How do you get out of circularity of what community is? Whence this? How is it “out there”? You have to justify a theory of emergence, not just posit it.

The role of the hypothetical demon is to establish that there is something that cannot be doubted, something we can be certain of even if we are deceived about everything else. Wittgenstein has an interesting response: in order to doubt there must be things that are not doubted. — Fooloso4

I can doubt community exists outside my perception. Hinge propositions can’t just stop theorizing as that hinge needs to be grounded further. And it’s a legit move to do that.

I actually see that confirming what I said:

So if you drank from the coffee cup and said, "I am doing a game", someone might look at you funny. But you tried to justify yourself by saying, "Yes, every time I pick up the coffee cup and put it to my mouth, I call that "game"", someone would just say you are crazy. They would tell, you, "Just say "sip" or "drink"!. In other words, you should be using a different set of family resemblances (to drink, sip, imbibe, ingest, partake in, guzzle, gulp, etc.) than the set we usually employ when we say "game". These have historical precedents in the language community and thus these are the proper words to use. If before you sipped from the coffee mug you looked around suspiciously, then stated, "I am getting myself a drink", then winked at me, I might infer "drink" to mean you spiked your coffee. It is all kind of related in a web of notions because of the community's use. So community "grounds" words (i.e. Form of Life), and as far as I see, context grounds how the words are employed (language games). And by "ground" I don't mean metaphysical, but one can say as a some sort of "error checker" for permitted or non-traditional use of words.

But all this being said, my particular critique is that Witt insufficiently posits his theory because it is very common sensical. Communities form language games and their use in context grounds the meaning. But I believe, any anthropologist could have told you that even by his time, so what else is he saying? And that's where I fail to see anything of interest. There are a ton of questions that can arise from this view (common sensical as is it is). For example, how does Wittgenstein explain how it is that social facts exist outside of some sort of linguistic solipsism? There are beliefs that prima facie are not facts of the world, but interpretations we have. So what is a "community" outside a set of individual points of view interpreting information? So you see, there has to be a greater theory for how something like "community" obtains outside of individual perceptions if one doesn't want to maintain solipsism. How does this get beyond the Cartesian Demon? And if you say we can't, we shouldn't, or we shan't try, okay, then it's not that interesting to me as it is essentially just more explicitly coming up with ways we use language that don't correspond to a direct "truth correspondence theory of logical positivism, which is just tedious to me as someone who never cared for logical positivism to begin with. — schopenhauer1

@RussellA The way I see it is to look at this progression as a history of philosophy problem....

-You have empiricists (Hume, Locke, Berkeley, etc.) and
-you have rationalists (Spinoza, Descartes, Leibniz, etc.).

-You have Kant trying to combine the two, making a sort of new paradigm about internal and external. He wanted to make the analytic-synthetic distinction clear, and then combine the two for certain judgements.

-You have Idealists (mainly German and French like Schopenhauer, Hegel, Fichte, Shelling, etc.), that were captivated by the Thing in Itself notion.
-From the Idealists you get the phenomenologists (still focus on the internal like Brentano, Husserl)
-From the phenomenologists you get the existentialists (still focus on the internal but not structural as much as "being" itself as a subject.. Heidegger, Sartre, Camus.)
**Nietzsche can be considered a perspectivist- a subjectivist.. so a sort of phenomenologist..

-From the empiricist tradition, you have Frege forgoing the internal or "psychologicism" for the empirical and what can be stated accurately in logical puzzles (beginning of logical positivism)
-You have Frege, Russell, early Wittgenstein, Ayer, Carnap, and a bunch of the Vienna Circle, Mach (from a physics perspective who early on cared more about verification than theory behind it ... didn't even believe in "atoms")..
-Logical positivism, the idea that verification is what makes a statement meaningful, was hostile to psychologicism..

So you get people like Freud who split the mind into three parts and pleasure principle etc... This is clearly some sort of rationalist camp... How can you ever prove such a thing? This isn't falsifiable or observable. This is one of the last major holdovers that sort of posited internal a priori notions whilst claiming "science".

So the logical positivists would have scoffed at Freud. Wittgenstein would have too.. However, Later Wittgenstein, could then say, "Is Freud useful to a language community"? He started a Form of Life he called "psychoanalysis", and then people participate in the language community and play his language games. Some of these people find a relief to their issues.. Can one say that Freud was "wrong"? In a pragmatic sense, he was "useful" no? Doesn't that matter?

When you are building a building, you don't care if the slab is real or not. You need to survive, so you "get shit done" (use).

But of course, that is just grounding an "is" with an "ought". That is to say, because we need to "get shit done to survive", thus all our inquiry stops about what grounds reality. But Wittgenstein might turn that around again and say, "There is no problem with inquiry, as long as it is "useful" for the game you want to play called "philosophy"". And I'm afraid that's all you're going to get as far as Wittgenstein and philosophy's value, perhaps.

I don't think it has anything to do with justified true belief.

The question of whether I know that the picture I have of him is a picture of him is odd. When the picture of N suddenly floated before him there was no question that it is a picture of N. It is only subsequently, after the fact, that the question arises. — Fooloso4

This gets to the notions I had here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/842365

Hinge propositions are anti-philosophical. It's simply a way of stopping inquiry. Why does the limit have to be how we use language and not how it is grounded in the world or our minds?

Therefore, the meaning of the word "slab" in the sentence "bring me the slab" cannot be the private belief of either the foreman or the assistant, but can only exist in the language itself, as language is agnostic about the private beliefs of the users of the language . — RussellA

I was thinking that Wittgenstein meant the content of the thought (like your Martian example) more than belief about the nature of the content, but I still liked your list of metaphysical theories that can be believed.

This doesn't mean that language exists as a Platonic Form independently of its users, as the language was created by its users. But it does mean that language is independent of the private beliefs of its users. Language is grounded in the ability of the mind to discover family resemblances in different physical things in the world. These different things can then be given a public name by one or more individuals within the language community. One should note that it is the family resemblance that is being named, which for the Nominalist is a concept in the mind, not any particular physical thing in the world. — RussellA

I would say this is accurate though Witt doesn't seem to discuss "ability of the mind", which makes it as I said mainly about "inside politics of language use" rather than a theory proper. That family resemblances exist, as I see how he is presenting it, is not a positive theory for epistemology, but rather a negative theory of opposing a certain view that words correspond to exactly one kind of meaning. Meaning becomes a sort of emergent phenomenon (he doesn't use that word I don't think), by way of the community's acceptance of the word as being referred to that. So I see it as more about consensus than the individual.

So if you drank from the coffee cup and said, "I am doing a game", someone might look at you funny. But you tried to justify yourself by saying, "Yes, every time I pick up the coffee cup and put it to my mouth, I call that "game"", someone would just say you are crazy. They would tell, you, "Just say "sip" or "drink"!. In other words, you should be using a different set of family resemblances (to drink, sip, imbibe, ingest, partake in, guzzle, gulp, etc.) than the set we usually employ when we say "game". These have historical precedents in the language community and thus these are the proper words to use. If before you sipped from the coffee mug you looked around suspiciously, then stated, "I am getting myself a drink", then winked at me, I might infer "drink" to mean you spiked your coffee. It is all kind of related in a web of notions because of the community's use. So community "grounds" words (i.e. Form of Life), and as far as I see, context grounds how the words are employed (language games). And by "ground" I don't mean metaphysical, but one can say as a some sort of "error checker" for permitted or non-traditional use of words.

But all this being said, my particular critique is that Witt insufficiently posits his theory because it is very common sensical. Communities form language games and their use in context grounds the meaning. But I believe, any anthropologist could have told you that even by his time, so what else is he saying? And that's where I fail to see anything of interest. There are a ton of questions that can arise from this view (common sensical as is it is). For example, how does Wittgenstein explain how it is that social facts exist outside of some sort of linguistic solipsism? There are beliefs that prima facie are not facts of the world, but interpretations we have. So what is a "community" outside a set of individual points of view interpreting information? So you see, there has to be a greater theory for how something like "community" obtains outside of individual perceptions if one doesn't want to maintain solipsism. How does this get beyond the Cartesian Demon? And if you say we can't, we shouldn't, or we shan't try, okay, then it's not that interesting to me as it is essentially just more explicitly coming up with ways we use language that don't correspond to a direct "truth correspondence theory of logical positivism, which is just tedious to me as someone who never cared for logical positivism to begin with.

I was right into Whitehead for a good while. I think process metaphysics is closer to actuality as experienced than substance ontology is. I like speculative metaphysics because it's an exercise of the creative imagination. Whether or not it accords with any absolute reality is unknowable, but I don't think that question matters at all, or is maybe even coherent. Falsification has no provenance when it comes to metaphysics. — Janus

:up:

A correlationist will say that we cannot imagine how objects exist "in themselves". We can imagine that they do exist in themselves, which is something else, obviously. — Janus

Yes indeed. And how it is that objects relate and interact is a big part of that. Did you read the article?

What I like about Whitehead is he has "street cred" as a mathematical logicist (he worked with Russell on Principia Mathematica), but instead of buying into logical positivism he went way out in speculative metaphysics on being, like an odd analytic continental. Anyways, that doesn't prove anything here nor there about his ideas, but it shows that one can plow straight ahead and speculate in imaginary ways on being. Falsification is overrated :smile: .

Just so you know, that last comment was aimed at Witt not your commentary.

Let me know if you want me to help you put the toys back in the pram. — Apustimelogist

?

What I am getting from this post mainly is that things like "forms of life" lack some kind of inflated metaphysical underpinning or something, but concepts like this and games more or less just refer to our behavior in which we use words. There doesn't need to be anything else unless you want to really get into the neurobiological causes of that. I mean, I think Wittgenstein is much closer to jettisoning the idea of reified meaning rather than trying to establish some rigorous explanatory theory. — Apustimelogist

Cool, let me know when the philosophy begins then. Otherwise, I am on the wrong forum.

Think of this as taking an imaginary journey into how objects exist in the world. Correlationism always asks how these things exist in my world. OOO is trying to get to the idea that there are non-animal was of being in the world.

This brings up bigger notions to me. What does it mean for there to be an interaction or a relation between objects? And is it all relation (without an animal to perceive it), or is there something retained in each interaction?

For further reading on this, see this article.

You being "correct" isn't enough to stop the wheels of the universe turning and neuronal messaging being transmitted and societies going on their daily business. — Apustimelogist

Nope, but since humans are deliberative animals (as in, behaviors are often chosen with degrees of freedom), knowing what is more "correct" leads to outcomes that would only be done by instinct, chemical markers, or more associative type learning in other animals.

That's more an aside from my point that you quoted though. My point with Witt particularly is he wants to demolish overarching theory whilst sneaking in an overarching theory (use), while he "gets to do so" because it's merely a case of "What else can it be?" through a series of proclamations rather than justification.

You as the audience get to sit back in satisfied head nodding that this is a legitimate move because he has already set the tone against notions of "certainty". It rings true for amateur pragmatists, and so confirmation bias in favor this deflationary view of theory (whilst still getting to promote a theory, nonetheless).

You can compare this style to his also suspect Tractatus which was all theory but without good explanation such as the nature of objects (the very root of how the "picture theory" hangs!). He has contempt for anything "beyond" language, and it shows in both works. It takes a dull philosophy to say "bUt YU CaNT get BYOND LNgAGe!!"

And what becomes a weakness is the very thing that he's supposed to have as a strength. Because there is no metaphysical underpinnings to his work, it's all him talking "inside politics of language use", there are no overarching theories of what "community" or "forms of life" are. How it subsists other than the obvious. But if it is obvious he should have stopped before he started his work. But I do know that PI was posthumously published.

Perhaps it was really meant as an inside sentiment to send to philosophers like Russell and his former self. So perhaps it is the audience who reads too much into it and expects too much of it. That is on the audience, not him then.

But pretending this was meant to be published at some point, because he is against certainty (the way he defines that word of having a sort of overarching theory of grounding), things like "Forms of Life" are themselves grounded in nothing. I mean that in the metaphysical sense of not having a theory of "what that is" other than our individual perceptions of what we think others think (a sort of linguistic solipsism). Is it "emergent"? What is emergence then? Is it epiphenomenal? What is that then? What does it mean for there to be social facts? Is it loss of pride, resources, status, self-esteem, survival that one knows that one is following them versus other kinds of "facts"? Are all facts really social facts? etc. etc.

Imagine I produce a bunch of what appears to you as random symbols. And I proceed to tell you that this is a language. If you ask, “how do you use these symbols”, and I reply, “I cannot tell you how to use them, but rest assure I know how to use them in similar ways as how you use your language, and thus it is a language.” I believe you can rightfully say that I have no idea what I am trying to say or express. This also goes for these claims of judging private activities within the mind. — Richard B

I don't think this gets past this critique:

Just using Wittgenstein against himself perhaps, what if every person in the community had an idea wrong such that every correction was actually never correct. How would you know any differently than the private sensation case? Diving in further in skepticism, how do you know that every supposedly public correction is not distorted by one’s own view? At some point you can keep drilling downward and you start getting to Decartes Demon again. Using public or practice or community as a way out doesn’t suffice. — schopenhauer1

This outward pain behaviour is visible to not only me but others, and can be given the name "toothache". — RussellA

So far all of this is trivially true..

A child can then learn the word "toothache" by being pointed at the connection between toothache pain behaviour and the name "toothache"

Note that the child cannot learn such a connection from a single example, but only from many examples, where every example is different but all share a family resemblance. — RussellA

Yes trivially true, yes. In this case, I don't need a philosopher to point this out, but I guess if Augustine and others had bad theories, he is pointing this out for those confused individuals.

Therefore any public language within a community must have been founded on the private languages of the individuals within the community.

An individual may be corrected by a public language, but recognising that such a public language has previously been collectively corrected by the individuals who make up the community.

Yes, without the foundation of private languages, a public language cannot be corrected. — RussellA

So just a few things here:

1) I am not representing my own view of language. This is purely a hypothetical view designed to show that Witt's idea of use can be critiqued for not having some sort of foundation to the language.

Rather, if one purport's that the measure is "use", by "what" basis can use able to be founded?

2) If you purport that it's founded on "community" (Form of Life), this is what has to be adequatly accounted for other than "don't you see!" and then scoff at any further explanation. No, demonstration won't just do here. Rather, you need to account for "what" this is, otherwise, it can be critiqued as an assertion.

Here's a real basic analogy. If we had no inclination for theorizing, we might say that common sense says "the sun revolves around the earth". But wait, a man named Aristarchus came up with a heliocentric theory based on less obvious things like the position of the constellations. The common man says, "What! It's "common sense" that the sun revolves around the earth. Don't you see!"

Well, Witt here might be like that common man. Because he is against theorizing about certainty (of things like language), he resorts to a kind of "common sense". Now, he may be right in his idea, but since he is committed to a sort of theory-skepticism, he cannot just resort to an idea (but not a theory!) and then claim that it is just kind of "common sense" or "what else can it be?". That would then have to be explained.

Thus community must have a basis outside of each individual's version of it, otherwise he is back to solipsism. How can he purport that community is anything more (in HIS philosophy) than a "useful fiction"? He can't. Another philosopher might start with the idea of "information" as "real", or justify how it is that social facts are real. But then, isn't this getting into epistemology and metaphysics proper- something he is adamantly opposing?


In summary, what I'm trying to convey is a hypothetical perspective that questions Wittgenstein's notion of language use. I'm not putting forth my own belief about language; rather, I'm presenting this hypothetical scenario to critique Wittgenstein's idea that language use is sufficient as a foundation. The main point is to stress the necessity of a robust foundation for language, especially if we claim it's rooted in community or "Form of Life." Drawing on an analogy involving Aristarchus's heliocentric theory, I aim to highlight the importance of substantiating claims beyond what might seem like "common sense." The argument underscores the need for a clear explanation and justification of the basis for community in language. Simply accepting it as a given or "common sense" doesn't provide this basis, but is just "what else can it be?" or "don't you see??", which rejects elaborate theorizing and absolute certainty. Wittgenstein's critique undermines his basis for a positive claim. He would need a deeper exploration of the philosophical basis of social facts and language to avoid falling into solipsism and to truly understand the essence of communal language use.

Just curious, what’s your take on this?

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/841611

pause.

Though the famous PI 43 does very much sound like a theory:
For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer. — RussellA

Schrodinger’s theory perhaps? It is both a theory and not a theory. It is immune to all categorization. It is above all such attempts. It is special and unique, you can’t contain it in such crass terms. Read that with eye rolling.

Plotinus article on the One:

For Plotinus, the first principle of reality is "the One", an utterly simple, ineffable, unknowable subsistence which is both the creative source of the Universe and the teleological end of all existing things. — Wiki Neoplatonism

Many philosophers have taken ‘I remember the connection right’ to mean ‘I use “S” when and only when I really have S’. They then take Wittgenstein’s argument to be based on scepticism about memory: how can you be sure that you have remembered aright when next you call a sensation ‘S’? …

Critics of Wittgenstein have found the argument, so interpreted, quite unconvincing. Surely, they say, the untrustworthiness of memory presents no more and no less a problem for the user of a private language than for the user of a public one. No, Wittgenstein’s defenders have said, for memory-mistakes about public objects may be corrected, memory-mistakes about private sensations cannot; and where correction is impossible, talk of correctness is out of place. At this point critics of Wittgenstein have either denied that truth demands corrigibility, or have sought to show that checking is possible in the private case too. (Kenny[ 1973] pp. 191–2) — SEP - Private Language

I’d only add that I don’t even get the arbitrary stopping at private. If there’s no foundational criteria, public cases cannot truly be “corrected” either. Or perhaps put differently, correction itself is not an indicator of right/valid/true. The correction can always be wrong etc.

Just using Wittgenstein against himself perhaps, what if every person in the community had an idea wrong such that every correction was actually never correct. How would you know any differently than the private sensation case? Diving in further in skepticism, how do you know that every supposedly public correction is not distorted by one’s own view? At some point you can keep drilling downward and you start getting to Decartes Demon again. Using public or practice or community as a way out doesn’t suffice.

Don’t you know Witt, can’t be categorized silly. His philosophy just is…,

That means language games / forms of life need an overriding theory but perhaps that violates his need for not relying on “certainty” :snicker:

Well, I've answered that. I'll leave you to your private language. — Luke

You cannot prove beyond “my representation” without foundation.

A second ago you were asking about getting outside of one's own representation. Now you are asking about getting outside of everyone's representations. Which is it?

It's our practices, our rules, our games, our language. Calling all of these "our representations" makes them seem like some communal, shared idea, rather than our practices and actions in the world. I don't see the benefit or truth in caliing them all "representations". — Luke

Oh I wasnt meaning to say “our representation” but rather “my representation”, however that applies

If the practice called "following the rule" wasn't outside of one's own representation, then there would be no difference between thinking one was following a rule and following it.

I'm not going to keep going around in circles on this. — Luke

How can one claim one was following it? Verifying by another representation. There’s no getting outside representation.

Practice isn’t a magic word

How is this outside their own representation? What can that mean?

Whence rules etc… outside of one’s representation


You can only go to incredulity (common sense etc)

What do you mean by "external"? I mean public, open to view, available for others to verify, not limited to one person's private experiences. — Luke

Others are verifying…right so no it goes to others verifying. Now, when they verify, is it their own representation of what’s right or wrong, or do they have access to something outside their own representation?

P1: I say yes

P2: I see this and say yes

P3: me too!


Persons 1-3 are an entity unto itself or is each one verifying by judging with their own representation?

Nobody decides this. We are unable to verify anyone else's private, internal beetle, so we can only judge whether another has followed the rule based on their ("external") behaviour. — Luke

How is anything “external”?
As I said:

Individuals may still just think they are confirming some thing, but one can still be a skeptic about all of it. You can’t just say common sense or refer to the other person because that can just be an individuals representation. The beetle is still in the box. — schopenhauer1

What — Luke

Typooooo

I don't. What's internalized (or internal) is the beetle, which drops out of consideration as irrelevant. All that matters to following a rule is "what's being conveyed" or one's words and actions. — Luke

Huh who decides?

It doesn't matter how it is "internalized". That is irrelevant to following the rule. — Luke

Who decides? :chin:

Individual confirmations of what are the rules and cultural ideas are not hidden and private; they are expressed publicly. One's public expression can be demonstrated to be inconsistent with the accepted practice that is called "following the rule". — Luke

But how is this internalized? Publicly ? :chin: How odd. How do you know what’s internalized is what’s being conveyed? Who has these rules? Who doesn’t? Who decides? Is it hom or her or him or you or that guy or that person or that …

Social facts!!!!!!!!!

Searle!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!