Yes, I also understand all cases of knowing anything as being examples of familiarity. You know your wife your dog, your friends simply insofar as you are familiar with them. This is like knowing in the Biblical sense: " A man shall know his wife.." although obviously carnal knowledge is a special case of the general 'being familiar with'.

Knowing-how is also a sub-category of knowing by familiarity; by practicing we become more and more familiar with a task; for example riding a bike, or playing a musical instrument, until it becomes "second nature". "Knowing-that" consists in being familiar with conventionally accepted facts or ways of thinking about the world. For example knowing that it is raining depends on experience of (familiarity with) the present conditions either directly or by report, and knowing how to conceptualize that experience in conventional terms.

Applying this idea of familiarity to a famous Gettier example which is supposed to be an issue for JBT: say I see what i believe is a sheep in a field and form a consequent extended belief "there is a sheep in that field". But the sheep turns out to be a cardboard cutout, so my belief is mistaken; there is no sheep in that field. According to JBT then my belief does not count as knowledge because it is not a true belief.

But then say there is another hidden sheep in the field; does my belief that there is a sheep in that field then count as knowledge? It is justified by seeing the cardboard cutout, and it is true because there is a sheep in the field, so perhaps I do know there is a sheep in that field.

No, I do not know there is a sheep in that field. I think the answer to such puzzles is pretty simple and obvious; I am only justified in believing that the cutout is a sheep on account of perceiving what I understandably (if it is a very convincing cutout) take to be a sheep. Regardless of whether this is mistaken seeing the cutout cannot serve as a justification for believing there are any other unseen sheep in the field, it can only serve as justification for mistakenly believing that the cutout is a sheep.

I might have mistaken M. for N. Seeing N. and M. or photographs of them I will realize my mistake and might say: "Oh, I meant M." And here we see why my meaning N. or M. does not consist in having a mental picture. — Fooloso4

Yes. Nor need it be comparing images algorithmically in a database. Connectionism provides a much better model for brain activity than does unconscious Bayesian statistics.

I think this could easily be tweaked to be a Gettier problem, which is, imho, much more interesting. — NKBJ

I'm not so keen...

It strikes me as odd that Gettier has such a claim to acclaim, since his famous examples serve only to debunk a theory of knowledge that has been seen as fraught since its birth in the Theaetetus.

@Janus

I also understand all cases of knowing anything as being examples of familiarity. — Janus

Will familiarity do? It seems - and I dread using the word - too subjective.

What is it to say something is familiar? To have a suitable mental image? But see . How do I tell that you are familiar with N.? Only by what you say and do.

So skip familiarity and move on to that one does; to knowing how.

Deleted repeated post.

I understand your concern, but I don't see familiarity as being subjective. I would say I am familiar with something or someone when I interact or deal with it or them, and more so to the extent that I become used to interacting with it or them. I can then be said to know who or what I am dealing with, even if I do not yet know how to interact in contextually specific expert (highly practiced) ways.

In the context of sexuality, for example, I am familiar with others in that particular sense if I interact with them sexually, by being attracted, gazing at them with desire, flirting, making eye contact in certain suggestive ways and so on, and none of that need necessarily be learned, it might come instinctively, in which case nothing could be more familiar. I might not yet know how to make love, that will come with practice, but I must first be familiar with the context in which sexual desire begins to make sense and making love can come to be a spontaneous expression of desire.

So, to return to your "image" example I know an image shows a particular person if I can recognize them there and if the image is indeed of the person in question. It is always possible I could be mistaken, though (although not in the case of a mental image provided I have met the person and am familiar enough with them to be able to remember what she looks like).

I read the post(s?) you cited written by @Fooloso4 and was unable to see the relevance; perhaps you could explain how you think that bears on what I have been saying.

think what Wittgenstein is breaking the connection we may have formed of meaning as consisting of a mental picture. To mean N. does not mean to have a picture of N. in my mind. Having a picture of N. in my mind is not to mean N. The picture may come unbidden. I do not have to mean N. to have that picture. It may come "suddenly". — Fooloso4

So what is it to mean N?

We use the term 'know' in a variety of different ways.

An old song comes on the radio. I say I know that song, but if someone asks me what the words are or how the melody goes I might say I don't know it that well. Later I might remember snatches of the words or a part of the melody that I had forgotten. Do I know it now and not before when I said I knew it? Or do I not know it at all since I still do not know all the words or the bridge?

One person may say she knows what gefilte fish is. She ate it whenever she visited grandma. She might think that it is a species of fish like trout or bass. Does she then not know what gefilte fish is? Another might know how gefilte fish is made but has never tasted it and cannot identify it by taste. Does he know what it is even though he could not tell you what he had just eaten if it was served to him?

I am introduced to someone. I say "Yes, I know Bob we are old friends". Does my knowing Bob mean I know how? I can identify him but doesn't my knowing him have something to do with all the time we spent together, the shared experiences, the talks we had?

So what is it to mean N? — frank

It might be the person I am talking about who says things on a philosophy forum that others cannot make sense of, or the person I am pointing to rather than the person right next to him or he who shall not be named.

So what is it to mean N?
— frank

It might be the person I am talking about who says things on a philosophy forum that others cannot make sense of, or the person I am pointing to rather than the person right next to him or he who shall not be named. — Fooloso4

So to mean N is to hold some fact about N in mind?

So to mean N is to hold some fact about N in mind? — frank

Not necessarily. Pointing to N. does not mean to hold some fact about him in mind. I might mention some fact about N. in order to help identify the person I mean, but that fact might only come to mind at that point to help identify him.

So knowing that 2+2=4 reduces to knowing how to do addition. Knowing that Canberra is the capital of Australia reduces to knowing how to use maps and political notions. Knowing that this is a photo of N. reduces to knowing how to address N, identify him in a group, ask him about his wife and so on. — Banno

That seems like one of those things that amounts to someone saying, "Hey, check out this trick: I can interpret everything, to my satisfaction, so that it amounts to knowledge how-to rather than propositional knowledge or knowledge-by-acquaintance."

And then someone else could say, "Hey, check out this trick: I can interpret everything, to my satisfaction, so that it amounts to propositional knowledge rather than how-to knowledge or knowledge-by acquaintance."

And then of course a third person would say, "Hey, check out this trick: I can interpret everything, to my satisfaction, so that it amounts to knowledge-by-acquaintance rather than how-to-knowledge or propositional knowledge."

And in my experience, we shouldn't doubt that any of those people can do that--interpret things, to their satisfaction, at least, so that everything is x, and nothing will convince them that they can't interpret everything the way they say they can, and nothing will convince them that it isn't a good idea.

But it's basically just an example of their resolve to jump through whatever hoops they'd need to jump through to come up with an interpretation, as promised, that they'd consider good enough to keep the trick going to their personal satisfaction.

For my part, I think we are wrong to think of a distinction between knowing that and knowing how. It seems to me that all examples of knowing that reduce to examples of knowing how.

So knowing that 2+2=4 reduces to knowing how to do addition. Knowing that Canberra is the capital of Australia reduces to knowing how to use maps and political notions. Knowing that this is a photo of N. reduces to knowing how to address N, identify him in a group, ask him about his wife and so on. — Banno

Knowing how to do something is more like applied knowledge. One might know the steps but never performed the steps and gets better with experience. In this case, knowledge comes in the form of degrees of behavioral effeciency. One can know how to add larger numbers faster, or tie their shoes more efficiently, because of experience.

Most people keep using terms like "recognition" and "familiarity" when defining "knowing". Could it be that they are the same thing and that philosophers have insisted on using this word, "knowledge" as if it were something more which has led to the confusion.

Thinking about knowledge as a set of rules for interpreting sensory data allows for knowledge to become obsolete and replaced when new experiences show it is necessary.

So to mean N is to hold some fact about N in mind?
— frank

Not necessarily. Pointing to N. does not mean to hold some fact about him in mind. I might mention some fact about N. in order to help identify the person I mean, but that fact might only come to mind at that point to help identify him. — Fooloso4

Yep. As you mentioned, knowledge isn't the issue here. It's more about reference.

Do you, Sam26, find it curious that so many here remain convinced that one does know that this is a picture of N., and rush to provide the justification that appears to be missing? — Banno

It does seem curious doesn't it? However, I'm finding that beliefs have more to do with psychology than good arguments. The psychology of belief is much more powerful than any argument, and this is true no matter what educational level you're dealing with. One can see this especially when we consider religion and politics. People like to follow their particular group, be it a large group or small group, it's comforting to think that others think like you. What we need are more independent thinkers, those who can think outside the box, those who are non-conformists. The other problem is that sometimes you can get to far outside the box. Why people believe what they do is very complicated.

Do you, Sam26, find it curious that so many here remain convinced that one does know that this is a picture of N., and rush to provide the justification that appears to be missing? — Banno

Although this is not addressed to me I would like to respond.

I think it is the result of bad arguments, something that is only problematic for some who are "doing philosophy". The assumption that justification is needed is a pseudo-problem. The question of whether or how I know that the picture I have in my mind of N. is a picture of N. would strike anyone not suffering from a particular kind of philosophical dis-ease as absurd, and rightly so.

I agree it is also a matter of perspective, but nonetheless I maintain that knowing as familiarity is basic and comes first, and that knowing-how and knowing-that are secondary and derivative. The other point is that thinking about knowing in different ways, in all the ways we can imagine, may open up new insights into our knowing practices and what it means to know.

Indeed. Yet here it is.

If to know is to hold a justified true belief, then what is the justification here? — Banno

I don't think it has anything to do with justified true belief.

The question of whether I know that the picture I have of him is a picture of him is odd. When the picture of N suddenly floated before him there was no question that it is a picture of N. It is only subsequently, after the fact, that the question arises.

I don't think it has anything to do with justified true belief.

The question of whether I know that the picture I have of him is a picture of him is odd. When the picture of N suddenly floated before him there was no question that it is a picture of N. It is only subsequently, after the fact, that the question arises. — Fooloso4

This gets to the notions I had here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/842365

Hinge propositions are anti-philosophical. It's simply a way of stopping inquiry. Why does the limit have to be how we use language and not how it is grounded in the world or our minds?

Hinge propositions are anti-philosophical. — schopenhauer1

Hinges are not anti-philosophical.

It's simply a way of stopping inquiry. — schopenhauer1

It is not a way of stopping inquiry but what inquiry turns on.

Why does the limit have to be how we use language ... — schopenhauer1

Wittgenstein does not claim it does.

... and not how it is grounded in the world or our minds? — schopenhauer1

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/840026

I actually see that confirming what I said:

So if you drank from the coffee cup and said, "I am doing a game", someone might look at you funny. But you tried to justify yourself by saying, "Yes, every time I pick up the coffee cup and put it to my mouth, I call that "game"", someone would just say you are crazy. They would tell, you, "Just say "sip" or "drink"!. In other words, you should be using a different set of family resemblances (to drink, sip, imbibe, ingest, partake in, guzzle, gulp, etc.) than the set we usually employ when we say "game". These have historical precedents in the language community and thus these are the proper words to use. If before you sipped from the coffee mug you looked around suspiciously, then stated, "I am getting myself a drink", then winked at me, I might infer "drink" to mean you spiked your coffee. It is all kind of related in a web of notions because of the community's use. So community "grounds" words (i.e. Form of Life), and as far as I see, context grounds how the words are employed (language games). And by "ground" I don't mean metaphysical, but one can say as a some sort of "error checker" for permitted or non-traditional use of words.

But all this being said, my particular critique is that Witt insufficiently posits his theory because it is very common sensical. Communities form language games and their use in context grounds the meaning. But I believe, any anthropologist could have told you that even by his time, so what else is he saying? And that's where I fail to see anything of interest. There are a ton of questions that can arise from this view (common sensical as is it is). For example, how does Wittgenstein explain how it is that social facts exist outside of some sort of linguistic solipsism? There are beliefs that prima facie are not facts of the world, but interpretations we have. So what is a "community" outside a set of individual points of view interpreting information? So you see, there has to be a greater theory for how something like "community" obtains outside of individual perceptions if one doesn't want to maintain solipsism. How does this get beyond the Cartesian Demon? And if you say we can't, we shouldn't, or we shan't try, okay, then it's not that interesting to me as it is essentially just more explicitly coming up with ways we use language that don't correspond to a direct "truth correspondence theory of logical positivism, which is just tedious to me as someone who never cared for logical positivism to begin with. — schopenhauer1

For example, how does Wittgenstein explain how it is that social facts exist outside of some sort of linguistic solipsism? — schopenhauer1

In OC Wittgenstein quotes Goethe:

In the beginning was the deed.

Language emerges out of pre-linguistic practices. Social facts include things done not just things said. That we do things is not something that Wittgenstein, or for that matter, as far as I know, anyone else attempt to explain.

So you see, there has to be a greater theory for how something like "community" obtains outside of individual perceptions if one doesn't want to maintain solipsism. — schopenhauer1

A community is not made up of individual perceptions but of shared beliefs, practices, and language. A common form of life.

How does this get beyond the Cartesian Demon? — schopenhauer1

The role of the hypothetical demon is to establish that there is something that cannot be doubted, something we can be certain of even if we are deceived about everything else. Wittgenstein has an interesting response: in order to doubt there must be things that are not doubted.

Why does the limit have to be how we use language and not how it is grounded in the world or our minds? — schopenhauer1

What else do we have to express ourselves but language? And who else can we communicate with if not other people?

According to Locke, pictures are also ideas. Ideas are thoughts and memories.

Justification or judgment must be either from intuition or A priori reasoning ability comparing the idea of the perceived picture with the idea of the corresponding past memories.

A computer can identify a picture of you as Banno. It must be matching various criteria against something in its database. That's what I'm doing at some level.
— Hanover

This claim carries all the paraphernalia around the guess that mind involves unconscious algorithmic processing.

I'm not buying that, and hence I am not buying your point here. — Banno

Is this still your view?

If so, suppose "algorithmic" was replaced with "physical" or "biological". Would that make a difference in your plausibility assessment?

A community is not made up of individual perceptions but of shared beliefs, practices, and language. A common form of life. — Fooloso4

But what exactly does this "shared" mean?

Is it an active and deliberate sharing, like when you offer someone an apple if you have two?

Or is it a kind of sharing we're simply born into, which is imposed on us, without having any say in it?

That we do things is not something that Wittgenstein, or for that matter, as far as I know, anyone else attempt to explain. — Fooloso4

Really? So psychology, sociology, and anthropology don’t contribute theories for this?

A community is not made up of individual perceptions but of shared beliefs, practices, and language. A common form of life. — Fooloso4

How do you get out of circularity of what community is? Whence this? How is it “out there”? You have to justify a theory of emergence, not just posit it.

The role of the hypothetical demon is to establish that there is something that cannot be doubted, something we can be certain of even if we are deceived about everything else. Wittgenstein has an interesting response: in order to doubt there must be things that are not doubted. — Fooloso4

I can doubt community exists outside my perception. Hinge propositions can’t just stop theorizing as that hinge needs to be grounded further. And it’s a legit move to do that.

What else do we have to express ourselves but language? And who else can we communicate with if not other people? — baker

Other people is a reification of an idea.

But what exactly does this "shared" mean? — baker

Good question but I’m asking it on the strictest metaphysical sense not just what it’s meaning is.