@Banno
Why do we need to read Wittgenstein's "On Certainty" to get back to conclusions which Kant already implied with his ideas of "synthetic a priori truths"?

If joint attention theory is correct, “hinge propositions” are simply those that must be formed when working with another in a common ground. The very act of and ability to coordinate attention forms these “hinge propositions” where a world exists, others have minds, etc.

Cognitive science and human language development are outside the scope of the propositions themselves, yet they explain a brain that can create propositional statements about the world.

Even causal and simple logical relationships are probably part of these basic beliefs. So, the basic beliefs that are formed before linguistics play an important role in the more sophisticated linguistic beliefs (such as what it means to know) that come later. — Sam26

As with everything 20th century tried to do away with by turning epistemology to language debates, it goes back to Kant :wink:

But what is wrong with inflicting suffering? Why is it wrong to torture babies to death and make more babies to torture them?

You need an ethics to argue torturing babies is wrong. It’s not obvious. Otherwise, like an orca teaching its young, torturing babies to death is just another motion in space, like any other, neither good nor bad. — Fire Ologist

I base the deontology as rooted in the idea that people have inherent dignity and should not be used as a means to an ends. I agree, if you don't agree with this basis for morality, that either people do not have inherent dignity and thus they should not be used, then none of this would matter. Some people think instrumentally, for example. I think that basis is wrong, precisely because it denies the individual worth of the individual. I also think that this entails that preventing things like suffering and non-consent are more important than whatever machinations you had in mind for a person that would violate those basic principles. Thus I say, your positive ethics doesn't override someone's negative ethics, if it need not be the case (you can prevent versus putting someone in mitigation mode where they must have some suffering but now trade greater for lesser, etc.).

And what is the good of this act?? What is the good of the rule? In the end, what is the reason there were humans once but are no longer any humans? The reason would be because of the ethics we created. Not any other reason. — Fire Ologist

Notice you said "any other reason". Well yeah, there would be a "reason" nonetheless. Some "reasons" are ethical and some are not. That's the debate here. It just so happens, the ethical ones ends in no human being procreated. Again, I see no problem with that. Your argument seems to be something akin to credulity but with no force behind it. You are essentially saying, "But look at this outcome! But look!"

So the ethics itself, the principle itself, for the ANist, is the higher goal than some condition or state in the ethical human being. — Fire Ologist

If you mean by this that ANs generally don't prioritize positive projects over negative ethics, then yes. For example, a positive project from a philosopher might say they want to see, "The flourishing of a virtuous person" (which may or may not be the outcome, but even that point is irrelevant here, though can be the basis for weaker arguments like the "gambling with other lives" arguments, which are also valid). A less philosophically inclined person might just say they want "A person they can raise and do family stuff with". It's all positive projects though, whatever it is.

We create a problem (inflicting suffering without consent) to create a solution (not procreating) for sake of….
…upholding the principle, NOT for sake of any person. All things people are, to the ANist, something that SHOULD NOT persist, should not have come to be.

So AN upholds ethics to defeat ethics. It is literally for the sake of nothing. — Fire Ologist

You are phrasing it so that it comes out this way. Rather, a violation of a person will take place, you are preventing that violation of a person. It doesn't matter if someone is not benefiting from this, rather a PERSON will not suffer and be non-consented. It is for the sake of the person not suffering and being non-consented, that WILL BE SO AFFECTED.

1 There is a null state (no person), and
2 there is a state with some bad
3 and some good.


2 is the only one that has moral relevance here.
That there is a null state is not morally wrong...
That some good happens (3) is not morally relevant.

All that matters is 2 does not occur, as THAT is the morally relevant/bad/wrong state of affairs.

In that case, it is legitimate to ask Why be ethical at all? — Fire Ologist

Sure, don't make someone else unnecessarily suffer if you can.

Instead of killing off the human race, we could all choose to kill off ethics. We could fight our instinct towards compassion (fight the pangs that arise when suffering is inflicted on another) instead of fighting our instinct to procreate? — Fire Ologist

You could. We can do a bunch of things.

Why must our response to compassion be the creation of ethics? If the answer involves humans (an individual, a community, possible future humans…) than antinatalist ethics make no sense as its goal is “no more humans is a good.” — Fire Ologist

See, you are caught up in the "no more humans". It is precisely this thinking that I question. Why is this project important to you other than incredulity or appeal to tradition? And you are going to say a whole bunch of statements about civilization, the wonder of a sunset, love, and all this, and all the "goods" of life, but if you go back to 1, 2, and 3. Why are we forcing suffering unto others so that X, Y, Z happens? Why does X, Y, Z matter? That people need to experience "goods of life", seems oddly messianic, and aggressively paternalistic. What makes you believe that these projects of "good life" or "positive experience" mean you get the right to make people suffer? Indeed, this would be using people's suffering for your messianic/paternalistic notion of what "MUST happen FOR them" or simply "What MUST HAPPEN" in general. If suffering isn't the paramount thing, then there is something that is not ethics going on here.. Perhaps ego? Perhaps forcing one's vision of "the good" on others? Perhaps, misplaced messianism (YOU know what's good, and YOU must be the one to carry that out). But as I've stated more eloquently here:

This has a lot of unjustified assumptions.. such as, why should virtuous men matter? If you say that because the know how to live a "good life", AN always knows that starting a life for someone else means you have a project for them to follow. But here belies an actual UNVIRTUOUS thing- the forcing of someone else into the burdens of life to live out the project of X (the virtuous man!.. cue marble statue staring into the horizon clutching robe!!). It reeks of an aggressive paternalism and assumption (for someone else), that their negative rights should be violated (and that is indeed part of the debate, is it a violation), because you think "someone living out a virtuous life" is okay to go head and be aggressively paternalistic to allow for a deontological violation to take place.

The Lord of the Rings, obviously, an author and work who would be against my philosophy or antinatalism, however, does have themes that I am getting at. The Ring itself can represent the controlling nature of humans- the ability to want to control people, destiny, the world. Wanting to see X thing from another person, even if it means burdening them is perhaps one of these unconscious factors that we hold. The Ring seems to be a good idea.. it seems to have the answers, but in fact, it is simply the human desire to control things, to see their projects carried out by way of using other people, even their sufferings to make this happen. '

You will claim "NO! LOTR was talking about unrestrained control- like Sauron wanting to enslave everyone!". But there is indeed where the debate lies. "Does procreation represent an aggressive paternalism.. does this too go too far in how we want to control people, even violate ethical principles, to see our project carried out?". And I get the impulse to defend it.. It's the very basis for which our whole society has operated. But perhaps it isn't as unassailable as you might think. And for millennium, as long as there has been societies that had the abilities to reason beyond the tribal unit, there have been lifestyles of ascetics who eschewed the worldly projects. I am not necessarily advocating that, however, but just showing that this difference in notions of established familial traditions exist.

Far be it from me to begrudge anyone laughter. But as I indicated with the Lord of the Rings analogy above, there is a bit of a weird aggressive paternalism in the notion that you need to teach someone, and see your project carried out... I have wants and desires, but do I have the right to unnecessarily and non-consentingly burden you with them? Well, no I don't have that right. But somehow a blind eye is seen in the case of procreation because of the romantic notions of learning and virtue of the philosophies you describe here. Don't get me wrong, go have fun.. don't be a dour asshole to your children, but my point is perhaps we may even question the impetus for control and wanting to see projects carried out from others, rather than assume that this is what is right. The doting grandfather laughing at his grandchildren in merriment as they work through the small problems of life gradually being raised to become productive members of society, etc. But what of this? I question this project, its motives, and what we are wanting from other people.

And the concept of "no consent" and the concept of "inflicted suffering on another" and the concepts of "good" and "ethics" are reified concepts. Not actual humans. No difference. — Fire Ologist

No, you are misconstruing my argument. The "no consent" and "inflicting suffering", if violated, WILL affect the person involved. "No humanity/civilization" would be inflicting suffering/non-consent doing something FOR a reified concept.

You can't discard my reference to "the possibility of future ethical agents" as a mere reified concept, and then say ethics is incumbent on current people "in regards to future ethical agents."

This is the problem with the logic. You need certain things be in place as premises and principals, in order to demonstrate a world where none of these premises or principals need exist. — Fire Ologist

All that's needed is actual people with a perspective that exist to know that a future person would be so affected if they violated these principles.

You need human civilization to exist for any human preference to exist at all. The ANist is using a preference to base a conclusion that preferences should not exist. If preferences should not exist, why prefer not to inflict harm? Unless you uphold the principal over the person. — Fire Ologist

Again, this seems like muddled thinking. The "preference" is based on following a principle of non-harm/non-consent. That principle exists because humans exist. Once humans no longer exist, no need for preferences. I am not sure why this is so hard.

There is more to ethics than principles. Ethical principles are calls to action, prescriptions for behavior impacting other ethical agents - they are guides for physical, actual behavior in a society. AN ethical behavior based on principals (do not cause harm; procreation causes harm without consent) is for the sake and goal of eliminating all ethical action by eliminating all ethical actors. On principle, the ANist doesn't want any creatures that would have or construct principals to exist at all. On principle, principles should not drive action. That makes no sense.

So I ask, why would we use ethical principles (don't inflict harm) to make the world better if that better world doesn't need or have any ethical principals in it (because no ethical agents)? Why would I think it is good to follow any ethical principal that had the goal of building a society that had no need or place for ethics? — Fire Ologist

This question makes no ethical matter. In a way, you are undermining your own accusations of me. It seems you have a hidden agenda in your ethical principles (i.e. that they need to have some sort of "goal" that is above and beyond not inflicting suffering/not violating consent to an individual). No one is talking about "building a society" here. That is not this ethic, which is negative (nothing about building). In fact, as I've explained previously, no positive ethic in this case, where there is no tradeoff to an existing person, would matter when it violates a negative ethic. Your right to "build X, Y, Z" shouldn't override unnecessarily harming/violating consent, especially as there is no person who "loses out" on you doing so (i.e. preventative vs. mitigation ethics).

What drives the notion "ethics is incumbent"? Why would you say that? We choose our ethics just as we choose our actions according to our ethics. If choosing and choosing ethically are so good they are "incumbent", why would we destroy the presence of these goods by building a world that had no ethical agents in it? Choosing must therefore be bad. — Fire Ologist

The "presence of these goods".. This sounds like people are instruments for "goods" to take place, precisely the thinking that I think is UNETHICAL... people should not be used (caused to be harm) so that your vision of a positive project is carried out ("these goods of life"). At some point, it is up to the individual to "choose" what they think is ethical. I am presenting the case that unnecessarily harming people (causing to suffer for no reason), is unethical- it doesn't matter if you had a positive vision in mind in doing so (when there is no need to have actually caused the harm in the first place).

AN is constructing ethics to construct a world without humans, as if the ethics of "not inflicting harm" was more important than the human that constructed this ethic. And all with the outcome of world where no creature could reconstruct this ethic and recognize how good all of those humans who did not procreate were back when they were living, ethical agents. — Fire Ologist

Why does this matter that there would be no one to "recognize" that good was done or to "reconstruct this ethic" (whatever that means)?

But AN is the ethical system that places the ethics above the humans. — Fire Ologist

I'm not sure how you get this. Placing ethics before humans would be the opposite. For example, some forms of utilitarianism would have it that you should violate people's basic rights if it helps the greater community. One example might be, having a set of people secretly tested for scientific experiments without consent (this did happen to a group of Tuskegee Airmen in the American South, for example) .. But there are many many examples of this kind of thinking.

For the ANist, the ethical principal is a higher good than the agent, because the ANist is willing to destroy the possibility of all future ethical agents for sake of upholding its ethical principal. — Fire Ologist

So this fails to be an example of "placing ethics above the human", as "the possibility of all future ethical agents" is not an actual human, but a reified concept (the possibility of a human). Quite the opposite, whereas creating suffering because we prefer to keep "Humanity and civilization going" would be using real people for an ethical principle (i.e. some positive project such as "humanity and civilization"), AN is actually ABOUT preventing suffering and non-consent of an ethical agent who will so be affected by that.

I exist, then ethics exists. If the ethics exists because of me, but this ethics tells me I should not exist, then the ethics should not exist either. So what is “wrong” about inflicting suffering without consent again? I was wrong to exist then so is my ethics wrong to exist. So why do a fabricate this whole ethical dilemma? Why not let the Forrest fire burn, the earthquake crumble, the storm drown, and the human procreate? Why not, if our ethics is nothing and for nothing? — Fire Ologist

Your conclusion does not follow at all from the premise. The ethics isn't "You should not exist". Rather, the ethic is, "Do not cause unnecessary harm". All else you are saying is thus misguided and confused. Once you exist, it is incumbent to not cause unnecessary harm. The purest form of this is in the procreational decision which can prevent ALL harm with no cost to an actual person, and thus, to follow this ethic, at least in its purest action, would be to not procreate.

The AN position upholds ethics above the ethical agent, in order to eliminate the agent and so eliminate the ethics. — Fire Ologist

Your first part is wrong as I've explained above. The ethics is not "above the agent". Rather, the ethics is incumbent on humans that already exist to follow in regards to future ethical agents (by preventing a future person's birth). The principle is all about how we are NOT to treat a (possible) ethical agent from the perspective of one who already exists.

There is nothing good about being ethical in a world that should not have ethics in it because it should not have humans in it. — Fire Ologist

This actually makes no sense. If humans exist, ethics towards other agents exist. If humans don't exist, this ethic is no longer needed. No humans = no ethics. If there are humans, then the ethic (of not procreating) remains.

I realized I went from 3rd person to first person in that OP :lol:

Thank you much appreciated..oldie but goodie:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/10842/willy-wonkas-forced-game/p1

Here's a thought experiment..

Let's say I am Willy Wonka..
I have created this world and will force others to enter it... My only rule is people have the options of either working at various occupations which I have lovingly created many varieties of, free-riding (which can only be done by a few and has to be done selectively lest one get caught, it is also considered no good in this world), or living day-to-day homelessly. The last option is a suicide pill if people don't like the arrangement. Is Willy Wonka moral? I mean he is giving many options for work, and even allowing you to test your luck at homelessness and free riding. Also, hey if you don't want to be in his arrangement, you can always kill yourself! See how beneficial and good I am to all my contestants?

There are lots of ways to feel strife and anxiety in my world.. There is generalized boredom, there are pressures from coworkers, there is pressure of joblessness, there are pressures of disease, disasters, mental illness, annoyances, malicious acts, accidents, and so much more that I have built into the world..

I have also created many people who will encourage everyone to also find my world loving so as to not have too many dropouts. — schopenhauer1

Seems like closeted do-gooding to me. Why do you care about natalist solutions? Why not be a part of the problem instead? One must come to terms with the real lack of meaningful difference in order to ascribe to either. It’s a classic strategy: vacillate endlessly between complete cynicism and complete do-gooding in an effort to negate any real choice. It always ends up with a lazy survivalism as a cheap imitation of neutrality. This just-so-conveniently places the individual in a suspended irresponsibility. — kudos

Well, it seems to be that you believe that man is born for some reason (meaningful labor is a large part of that apparently homo economicus or whatnot). But I am questioning that assumption I guess. Meaningful labor is not ALL that life offers, and I can imagine a scenario where someone doesn't find any "labor" (at least in the survival sense) meaningful. And that itself pushes back against this essentialist notion of "homo economicus". It might even be the case that there are considerations of ethical proportions that override any of this scheme to create a society of "meaningful labor".

I agree we are broken. I agree suffering is unavoidable and ubiquitous. And I agree compasssion is essential to ethics, a good, a virtue to be cultivated. And I agree it is “good” not to inflict suffering without consent. But I don’t see anything reasonable about eliminating the infliction of suffering by eliminating the ethics and compassion (along with the human species) that show us suffering is something to be compassionate about in the first place. It makes ethics itself potentially unethical, or non-sensical. It is either suicidal or nihilistic, not simply “good” anymore as “good” is no longer good.

When we end human procreation, we end the existence of compassion in the same universe that led us to be “ethical” and not procreate in the first place.

It’s like this: we all get together write a rule down and all sign it with full consent and the rule is “all of those who make rules must not procreate.” There need be no “good” in the rule or “reason” why the rule is written, because all “good” and “reason” will cease to provide account of anything at all where all those who make rules do not procreate. — Fire Ologist

Again, this doesn't make sense to me, as we discussed in earlier discussions. Ethics only exist because humans exist. Once there are no more humans, ethics need not exist. We don't exist SO THAT ethics can persist, but rather ethics exists because humans exist.

Probably, 'deontological' was the wrong word. I believe, however, that ethics itself is intrinsically social. Ethical agency doens't seem to me to make sense without a community. In other words, if, say, 'I act in order to bring the good to myself and to others', then I cannot 'ignore' the presently existent human beings and the human community in general. If one accepts that seeking the 'good' is also a social 'enterprise', then trying to preserve society seems, after all, a 'good' act. If one believes that, clearly there is a contrast with AN. — boundless

No, "society" doesn't suffer, individuals with POVs do. I make a distinction between mitigation ethics and preventative ethics. Once born, we are in mitigation ethics mode where indeed, we may have to trade greater harms for lesser harms. Uniquely for the procreational decision, we can be in preventative ethics, where absolutely/purely we can make a decision to prevent ALL harm to a future person whereby no drawback (lesser harm) is had for that person. No ONE is deprived. And ANs generally all agree that (unlike your definition of ethics), positive ethics (other people's projects.. like continuing humanity, wanting to take care of a new person, etc.), should not override individuals' negative ethics (rights not to be harmed, non-consented).

Edit: Notice also the pyramid scheme aspect to this. By society existing, it becomes self-perpetuating as you can throw another person in the fray, burden them, cause them to eventually deal with life/suffering, and you can always justify it by saying, "If we don't sacrifice the rights of individuals not to suffer, our society will collapse!". And this to me, is just a justification for doing harm, not an actual answer to the problem that exists.

Suffering can't be avoided so one can't be criticised for not even trying. — apokrisis

Systems of laws arise out of the need to organise successful human communities and not the other way around. If you think there is a problem, changing the system is what you should strive for.

But systems of laws recognise rights and responsibilities. They are based on a pragmatic balance between individual wants and communal needs. Burdens will be imposed. All that is asked is that they are reasonable. — apokrisis

It might be this assumed stance that I most vehemently reject as being moral. It is circular reasoning. Why should burdens be imposed? You will use your systems theory to justify it. However, being that we are counterfactual-acting creatures, we could always choose not to burden someone, so the system itself can produce people that can choose the counterfactual than what you claim the "system" wants to have happen. Yet, hypothetically, all people could choose to not procreate. What you are tacitly suggesting is that there is some instinct or logos, or necessary aspect to procreation. But with deliberative creatures, there is no necessity to procreation. Thus, saying that "Burdens WILL be imposed" is just wrong. Burdens NEED NOT BE imposed.

Pain isn't suffering? This is ad hoc, and it brings with it more problems:

It certainly opens the can of worms as to which sorts of suffering need to be prevented and which sorts don't, and that is a can of worms that antinatalists take many precautions to keep closed. — Leontiskos

Pain vs. Suffering certainly does bring on debate. Does a pinprick followed by no other suffering (necessary or contingent) count as suffering? Well, interestingly, one can argue that the pinprick being the ONLY version of suffering, as the mark-for-what-suffering-is revolves solely on that, might be considered the worst thing ever because it literally is in that world. So, perhaps from the perspective of Pinprick World, this threshold itself would be suffering, and thus indefensible to enact upon on another.

Of course I can cut all this short and just go with my #2 response which is that people should not be unnecessarily harmed and non-consented under any circumstance. Nothing wrong with that. And you can make a whole incredulous response to this, but then you never really addressed how it is that non-existence hurts anyone.

But, even if that sort of response seems off to you because it is so rigid, all you need is as I said, that the "Threshold never reaches the level of pinprick world". And you may say that a future point would lead there, but then you are using people in the meantime to get there- and indeed, it would be generations to get there. Notice, you can say two pinpricks, three... and increase it, but even if you were to increase it by a factor of 100s but still less suffering than our world, that isn't currently our world, and using people to get there would nullify it.

The point can be rephrased in any number of ways. "The woman learns that any children she has will inherit her extremely painful disease. Should she bear children?" "The antinatalist learns that any child she has will experience a pinprick of pain. Is this sufficient to exclude children?" To be blunt, the idea here is that your argument is stupid because it justifies stupid decisions. It makes no sense to say, "Ah well the advice does justify stupid decisions, but it is still good and reasonable advice." — Leontiskos

No you are assuming some baseline "common sense" sensibility beyond the violation. This just Kant-objections redux. There's a reason why 1st degree murder and 2nd degree and 3rd degree murder is considered murder yet have different blameworthiness/punishment aspects to them. There's a difference between murder and manslaughter as well. So is pinprick world akin to manslaughter as opposed to murder? Perhaps, the situation might be "wrong" in some very abstract sense, but there can be allowed degrees of it. In your world, which is a ridiculous reduction. For example, in your world there is no gambling with lives aspect, whereby there can be varying amounts of pains and pleasures. It's all the same amount of pain and all the same outcomes. That drastically changes how that world operates compared to ours. Yet you claim that it's a "reductio" rather than being so irrevocably different that they count as different kinds, not just degrees. I am pushing back on that. At some point, for example, murder is no longer murder, though someone might have died, and someone was involved.

...and paternalistic gaslighting is the icing on the cake. "Humans think life is good even in spite of the pain, but they're wrong so we're going to exterminate the race through lack of births." What is the difference between this and genocidal insanity? — Leontiskos

Yeah this is certainly strawmanning the argument to a laughable level. "We are going to exterminate the through lack of births..." sounds like the goal of AN is to exterminate the race rather than prevent a violation of suffering/non-consent.

I can think of my own thought experiments for you here:

I have a game that I think is worthwhile for other people to play. I enter you into the game without your consent. In the game, you may have good moments, but there are also some tragic ones, harmful ones, and throughout the game, you are put through a lots of negative experiences. In order to escape the game, the person can only kill themselves. They are in it permanently. Are you justified to put someone through that game because you think it is good for them?

Not as impactful as the longer clip but you get the point ha:

I don't know how I'd feel if it were for real, but it gives me enormous peace of mind to imagine all people gone and only me to potter about in an empty world. — Tom Storm

Not in this case:

You can't escape the role economy plays in being and becoming by turning becoming into a finite separateness from being. This is the mistake of reductive existential ethos, for which I have low esteem. — kudos

But yet we have a deliberate choice to create more people, and so existential ethics DO come into play. And we can force more people who need to labor into existence, or we can choose not to. By labor, not only do I mean economically, but the burdens in life in general. You can choose to prevent others from being forced to do anything at all. It may be that forcing others into the game of life, is itself misguided/wrong. If you don't like tyranny, then tyrannical measures, like controlling that someone must be burdened with the pains/sufferings of life because you deem it worthwhile for them, is about as aggressively paternalistic as you can get. Of course, this may fit perfectly in such systems as communism, so I can see why you might not mind it.

Amadeus rightly notes that any position which assumes antinatalism before considering the balance between suffering and other considerations "would be stupid": — Leontiskos

But then thinking that nothing in this actual world does or ever will meet that threshold, effectively makes this a nonissue.

The deontological antinatalist is committed to the former, which Amadeus disagrees with. — Leontiskos

I am fine with that. But I gave my thoughts on pinprick world. It’s either not suffering as we normally define it, or indeed, since no one is obligated to bring happiness only prevent suffering in this instance, it can be defended. Why would it matter if no one existed in the first place? The problem is using Benatar as if he’s purely doing hedonic calculus and not explaining the difference of good and bad in respect to non-existence. Not existing hurts no actual person, only existing does.

Either way, Benatar goes out of the way tgat even if you don’t bite the bullet in pinprick scenario, THIS world is not that world hence he has a litany of follow-up empirical evidence of how we are often mistaken psychologically and empirically just how bad it is in regards to present pain and pain reflected or projected.

Can I do anything I want to you based on percentages, or do you have a right to not be so callously violated, disregarding your autonomy and the principle of non-harm? That's also why I bring in the idea of "unnecessary suffering." There was no mitigation—if you're going to spin it in some political aggregate way, that government force X, or parents force X. In this decision, no mitigation was needed because it was completely unnecessary to cause the harm in the first place. And obviously, even if you try to give me parenting/government examples, I can just give you slippery slope arguments about causing harm that statistically has positive outcomes but violates individual non-harm and autonomy principles.

Nah. Note, for example, that the reductio objection that we have been considering recently simply has no force at all against Amadeus' position. Amadeus' position does not support the conclusion (3) as Benatar's does. — Leontiskos

What are you talking about? It’s either effectively the same (a threshold needs to be met, but empirically, this seems to never be the case..and this always wrong de facto) or its premises are wrong (that the threshold is met or can at some point be met).

Also your non sequitur tying 3 has no support. If the threshold is never met, 3 effectively always stands (it’s good no one suffers..as the threshold represents “suffers” here or “pain”). True it’s not as digital as deontology, but the aggregate amount of “too much pain that this life holds” seems to be his definition of suffering.

The charade is that “it’s good for you!” And the implication is to jump off a cliff if you question the assumptions (more aggressive paternalism for what is good for people- what other people must do). All the same paternalistic impulse to promote one’s positive projects (virtue/character building, civilization, science, whatever excuse/project you want) over other people’s negative ethics.

But isn't that tyranny as well? When you say that people shouldn't be used for their labor period?
now — L'éléphant

The tyranny is to cause people to be put in a situation whereby they must labor to earn a living.

So, how are people going to earn money?
— L'éléphant

Shit, sucks doesnt it? — schopenhauer1

Hence existential problem.

So, how are people going to earn money? — L'éléphant

Shit, sucks doesnt it?

Not in the sense of mass production. No.
But there are carpenters, bakers, and chocolate makers who truly enjoy their labor. — L'éléphant

Notice I didn’t attempt to say that, simply that people shouldn’t be used for their labor, whether it’s enjoyable or not. Hell, some assembly line workers might have enjoyed their labor under big capitslism boss man. Same principle applies.

And I see this as substantially different from schopenhauer1. This is something like consequentialist antinatalism as opposed to deontological antinatalism, and it does seem more rational and plausible to me. It certainly does not fall victim to the two counterarguments I formulated for schopenhauer1's position. — Leontiskos

This would I would think fall more into those objections as presumably, some condition of life would simply need it to be 51% good to procreate when you run the calculus. To me that’s a limited natalism. That’s actually a weaker/more conservative position than negative utilitarianism. A negative utilitarian would say for example, to cause the least amount of preventable harm the situation, especially because it’s very doable, unlike post-birth scenarios. I just don’t think the aggregate approach is amenable to certain ethics- even NU should be geared towards individuals. Not using people for a great calculus machine aggregating all suffering from everywhere seems to be a good start. [but a calculus for preventing an individuals suffering makes sense].

Fair enough, slightly different than what I meant but in the ballpark. My way of interpreting the balancing is more deontological I think than your approach which is more perhaps consequential but this just shows the diversity of AN whilst basically agreeing on the same foundation @Leontiskos

Simple, the ideal is that people should not be used for labor, not that labor is the purpose of human life. That’s one reason Marx was wrong. His very notion of happy producer is itself exploitive- it’s just pushed back to the existential level rather than the economic system level. My advice- get out of the “production is the point of life” mentality. Of course this leads to Pessimism and AN, but I’ll meet you there with open arms when you get there :wink:

Okay. Well at first blush it seems like you may be willing to balance suffering and other considerations in a way that schopenhauer1 is not. — Leontiskos

As I saw it, he was saying something very similar to me. He was saying those other considerations (not just purely pleasure) matter not against the one consideration that matters- suffering.

As a clarifying point, to me, 'other considerations' could be positive experiences, bare pleasure (in an abstract sense), character-building, the achievement of some life-long goal etc.. etc.. But the problem with all of this is it's speculation. We're only talking about unborn people - in this way, we can see that suffering is ensured (by the journey to Death) but positive experience is not vouchsafed by being born. One could have an all-in-all 'good' life, but that's highly unlikely on the view of the world and life ANs take, and at any rate, the suffering which comes with one's death (ones anxiety, fear etc.. and the pain of those around us) would usually trump that possibly-good life. Only religion can break that loop, and I think that's a poor way to gt around it myself. — AmadeusD

This seems in line with my interpretation to

Also, this is on line with what I was getting at here:

But the idea that one should cause suffering SUCH THAT we can THEN LATER MITIGATE IT (i.e. favoring OUR positive projects over SOMEONE ELSE'S negative ethics), is what is the violation going on here. — schopenhauer1

Projects is a good word IMO as it captures exactly what is hoped for or tacitly desired- character-building, someone to learn through trial and error, achievement, the “goods” of life. It need not be bare “pleasure”. But it’s the parents’ positive project, overriding (“I want X to happen) over the child’s negative ethic (right for non-harm and non-consent to be unnecessarily violated).

Who is making this consideration? Certainly not me, as I explained above. — Leontiskos

That is the consideration of the “balancing”. No one exists who is deprived of good. Someone will exist who will suffer and thus non harm violated.

I would say that it is also undisputed that in the pinprick world there will be suffering, at least until you give an actual explanation for why a pinprick does not count as suffering. — Leontiskos

And I answered you. If you want to attempt again to read it charitably, have a go.

Either the suffering of the pinprick is for some reason not counted as suffering; or else the antinatalist is in fact balancing suffering with some other consideration, in which case suffering does not always tip the scales. — Leontiskos

Generally, AN is about suffering AND consent- that is to say, the deontological principles of non-harm and non-autonomy are both broken in regards to procreation. So there is that, and one can go down that line of reasoning as well.

However, keeping it just to suffering, for the sake of this particular argument, the consideration is that there are no people deprived of good and that is not bad. Therefore, in the decision for procreation, at least, the balance is always against causing the violation of the non-harm principle because it was unnecessary to cause to another individual. It is undisputed that, in this actual world, at least there will be suffering, and therefore a state of affairs will occur which violates the principle and someone will suffer. This should be prevented of course.

I think you're overlooking the simple fact that premise (1) was already about posterity. If mitigation and balancing considerations can only be applied to the current generation and not to posterity, then Benatar's argument succumbs once again to the reductio. — Leontiskos

So I am offering two arguments:
1) Suffering in Pinprick World isn't "suffering" as we know it, and thus disqualifies for 2 in the asymmetry.
2) Since there is no one to miss out on the "good", no obligation was intendent on the missed opportunity. In other words, your world could be COMPLETELY all BLISS.. and if you did not create someone into that world, you are still NOT in the wrong by preventing that birth.

Edit: Added bold statement. That was important.

Congratulations on finally making a counterargument, though I'm not sure it is a very good one. It certainly opens the can of worms as to which sorts of suffering need to be prevented and which sorts don't, and that is a can of worms that antinatalists take many precautions to keep closed. — Leontiskos

I can make another argument along the lines of @AmadeusD':

The position is that suffering always wins out — AmadeusD

That is to say, what is the asymmetry about? It's about the following:

3. the absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone;
4. the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.

That is to say, the thrust of the argument is the obligations we have towards adding happiness to the world versus adding suffering/harm/pain into the world in the case of non-existent but potential people (that is someone who could exist if X, Y, Z actions are taken). The antinatalist will always say that in the case of future people, we have no obligation to add happiness for them, but ALL the obligation to prevent the harm.

Thus, I generally make sure to qualify the notion that "One should not cause unnecessary suffering unto another if it can be prevented. Why do I add "unnecessary"? Because a "potential future person" (one in consideration of whether it should exist or not), would suffer without any need for this to happen to them. At least in the case of the "procreational decision", we are in a unique vantage point, where we can prevent ANY suffering for another person, by simply not doing something, full stop. After someone is already born into the world, then we must play the game of "mitigation ethics" whereby we now start dealing not in digital but analog whereby we cannot avoid suffering, and in some cases it might be incumbent to cause it to prevent greater harm (e.g. raising children, education, inoculations, all sorts of learning experiences and enculturation). But the idea that one should cause suffering SUCH THAT we can THEN LATER MITIGATE IT (i.e. favoring OUR positive projects over SOMEONE ELSE'S negative ethics), is what is the violation going on here.

Why should I believe 3a or 4a?

The other problem here is that most 2a's presuppose the falsity of 1a, whereas 2 does not presuppose the falsity of 1. Or in other words, Benatar's argument contains no implicit logical clause, "...Unless the world is situated such that happiness far outweighs suffering for all." That's the very problem with his argument that is being highlighted.

Contrariwise, prohibitions against stabbing are premised on pain, injury, and mortality, and therefore the sort of world you suggest logically invalidates the prohibitions (and hence 3a). This is completely different from Benatar's argument, for the case I gave clearly does not invalidate his prohibition. That's why, in a fit of honesty, you told me that the question may need to be reconsidered in light of such new circumstances. So if you want to pull your head out of the sand you will answer the question: What would you say to Benatar in that scenario? Why trust an argument in our world that you would not trust in that world? The argument by its very nature cannot be invalidated by the minimization of suffering, and yet this is what you are committed to. — Leontiskos

So I said way back that a world where pain was ONLY comprised of a pinprick is NOT OUR WORLD. That is an interesting one, but not this one. I present to you this world is the following, as taken from my profile:

Life has necessary and contingent suffering. Necessary suffering is often considered "Eastern", similar to how Buddhism defines it. That is to say it is a general dissatisfaction stemming from a general lack in what is present. Relief is temporary and unstable. If life was fully positive without this lack, it would be satisfactory without any needs or wants.

Contingent harms are the classic ones people think of. It is the physical harms, the emotional anguish, the annoyances great and small. It is the pandemics, the disasters, the daily grind of a tedious work day. It is the hunger we feel, and the pain of a stubbed toe. It is any negative harm. It is contingent as it is contextual in time/place, and situation. It is based on historical trajectories and situatedness. It is based on the "throwness" (in Existentialism terminology). It varies in individuals in varying amounts and intensity, but happens to everyone nonetheless.

With that being said, does Pinprick World have the necessary suffering in it? Is it the case that ALL contingent harms are reduced to a single pinprick at one instance in time? If so, none of that resembles the NATURE OF SUFFERING as it pertains to this world. Thus, how am I going to compare morality when it is centers on suffering in such a world where suffering is so redefined and the realities of the situation thus so radically different? This world would have no suffering due to feelings of dissatisfaction, lack, boredom. It would have no force social situations like doing tasks and work one would rather not do, or come into contact with anything negative whatsoever. How can I speak to such a world without all that is the reality of the situation when suffering is so redefined into one instance of a pinprick and nothing else?

Also to add, yet again, when I mentioned Benatar, it was to bring up AN (not THE ONE AND ONLY) asymmetry that I then elucidated on, as my take on it. It wasn't to introduce Benatar simpliciter.

Take your time and review Benatar's books if you like, but don't say that my objection is null because I haven't read a book. Besides, the first you've spoken about his books addressing this objection was yesterday. — Leontiskos

No bro, you haven't answered my objections and we seem to be at an impasse, as I have answered you about the stabbing that reanimates. That's my answer to it if we are talking about the "statistical approximation of Benatar" and not Benatar himself.

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Case 1
God is finite, which means when we will try to define it, we will see that it will make god a mere object. If god is our creator, then he has authority over us but the problem is he is not a human being. So it means he is free from human desires, so why does he want to be praised? Why does he become angry with us, and why has he created hell for the people who disobey him? In fact, why does he want us to obey him? These questions prove that this definition of God looks human-made because this definition has human qualities. It just means this definition was made to make our society stable. if this concept of God does not exist whole of humanity would end in great chaos. — Haafiz Mohammad Beigh

Bingo!

When it comes to these things, I tend to think anthropological and historical. The God you bring up, seems to be the one from the Abrahamic variety- the one started in the Bible. Well, how did this God come about historically? If you look at the history. There were variations of a henotheism amongst the tribes of Israel, and Judah. Israel was destroyed by Assyria in 722 BCE and many of the inhabitants fled to the south to Judah. The scribes, priests, and "prophets" there incorporated stories and spun the history to be completely monotheistic stretching back to even before the Iron Age to a mythological Bronze Age (the stories of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, Joshua, etc.).

So when the elite Jews of Judah were captured to Babylonia in 586 BCE, their leadership coalesced the stories into what became the Torah and main prophets from Joshua down through ones like Isaiah and Jeremiah. The Leadership that coalesced these stories, had a vision for a very strict form of "ethical monotheism" whereby all aspects of life were accounted for by both the priestly class (the Koheins and Levites), and the laypeople (the Judhites/Israelites ). So this was okay for a while under the Persian period when they prospered under Cyrus the Great and all in the 400s BCE. But then the Greeks came around in 333 BCE under Alexander the Great who took control of Judea. Judeans became Hellenized to some extent, and Greek ways of life and philosophy entered their own religious system. Now, it wasn't enough to have ethical monotheism, but justifications. Why should one follow these rules set out by the elite during the Babylonian and Persian periods (that mythologically are supposed to go back to the distant past to Moses)? Are there rewards, punishments, an afterlife? Who should rightly lead, priests or layman scholars? How come the God in the Torah and Prophets seems to have human-like attributes if he is a transcendent God? Why does he look so human? Etc. etc. Then all sorts of answers and schools of thought started to form creating various subsects of Judaism, and theological discourse on the nature of the Godhead. We cannot discount the Hellenistic/Greek influence of Plato. That is to say, the notion of a soul, and of emanations leading to a perfect unity. And thus Jewish mystical traditions were born whereby the old ethical monotheism was combined with mystical Platonic aspects whereby the notion of a transcendent God above the fray can be justified with the one presented in the Bible that seemed to have human-like qualities. And thus all the questions you ask..

But notice it's really just a history of ideas and responding to these ideas, not necessarily actual metaphysics. It can lead to interesting metaphysics, but if you take the angle of religious tradition, you have already skewed it to be in this tradition which is again, just history playing itself out in this particular culture at this particular time in history.