ristotle text is just drawing out what we already know about the virtuous man — Leontiskos
In fact I was recently at my cousin's wedding, and the food at our table was extremely late, arriving about 90 minutes after dinner was supposed to begin. At about 30 minutes into the dinner my nephew received his kid's meal: chicken strips, mac and cheese, and cauliflower. Everyone was gratified to see that at least someone had received their meal, and it looked to be the ideal meal for a hungry toddler. But to everyone's surprise he lost his shit and had a complete meltdown. This caused the whole table to erupt in laughter and festivity. We later learned that his mother had been misinforming him for weeks that the wedding would be wonderful and he would have a delicious meal of chicken strips and French fries - oops! I don't know that he even prefers French fries to mac and cheese, but the expectation threw him. It was a teaching moment for him where he learned that life is bigger than his misplaced French fries, and in time he will learn that life is bigger than many other disappointments, too. As Eichendorff said, "Thou art He who gently breaks about our heads what we build, so that we can see the sky—therefore I have no complaint." (The irony here is that children solve the problem of antinatalism, for it is hard to believe that anyone with the task of parenting a child could subscribe to antinatalism.)
It seems that all the opposed are agreed that antinatalism will not be cured by more of the overly serious, self-centered gravity of analytical argument. Such is not its cause and such is not its cure. What the antinatalist lacks is the subtle virtuous demeanor that Aristotle attempts to paint, and such a thing cannot be bought and sold with mere arguments. The cure for the ridiculousness of antinatalism is laughter, for like the child on the parent's lap we cannot help but laugh at the prognosis. You need only join in and we will be laughing with you and not at you. :wink: — Leontiskos
I don't vociferously disagree with it actually. Depending on how "it" is presented. E.g. If someone said to me, "I don't want to have children because the world is a dangerous and corrupted place and I don't want them to suffer", I'd say "makes sense". But as we discussed before, you were creating literally dozens of threads on the same theme, and it is a niche topic, hence this is the solution. — Baden
only you know if there is anyway to close the rifts in your own family. — universeness
I get that, but how does one differentiate between all the threads of argument dealing with the subject? — schopenhauer1
Anti-life discussions (personal or otherwise) will be merged below. Please join this discussion rather than starting any new threads on this theme. — Baden
So this is why we shouldn't debate Benatar's full position here without actually having Benatar's full positions available to us. — schopenhauer1
Take your time and review Benatar's books if you like, but don't say that my objection is null because I haven't read a book. Besides, the first you've spoken about his books addressing this objection was yesterday. — Leontiskos
as I have answered you about the stabbing that reanimates — schopenhauer1
Also to add, yet again, when I mentioned Benatar, [...] It wasn't to introduce Benatar simpliciter. — schopenhauer1
Why should I believe 3a or 4a?
The other problem here is that most 2a's presuppose the falsity of 1a, whereas 2 does not presuppose the falsity of 1. Or in other words, Benatar's argument contains no implicit logical clause, "...Unless the world is situated such that happiness far outweighs suffering for all." That's the very problem with his argument that is being highlighted.
Contrariwise, prohibitions against stabbing are premised on pain, injury, and mortality, and therefore the sort of world you suggest logically invalidates the prohibitions (and hence 3a). This is completely different from Benatar's argument, for the case I gave clearly does not invalidate his prohibition. That's why, in a fit of honesty, you told me that the question may need to be reconsidered in light of such new circumstances. So if you want to pull your head out of the sand you will answer the question: What would you say to Benatar in that scenario? Why trust an argument in our world that you would not trust in that world? The argument by its very nature cannot be invalidated by the minimization of suffering, and yet this is what you are committed to. — Leontiskos
Life has necessary and contingent suffering. Necessary suffering is often considered "Eastern", similar to how Buddhism defines it. That is to say it is a general dissatisfaction stemming from a general lack in what is present. Relief is temporary and unstable. If life was fully positive without this lack, it would be satisfactory without any needs or wants.
Contingent harms are the classic ones people think of. It is the physical harms, the emotional anguish, the annoyances great and small. It is the pandemics, the disasters, the daily grind of a tedious work day. It is the hunger we feel, and the pain of a stubbed toe. It is any negative harm. It is contingent as it is contextual in time/place, and situation. It is based on historical trajectories and situatedness. It is based on the "throwness" (in Existentialism terminology). It varies in individuals in varying amounts and intensity, but happens to everyone nonetheless.
If so, none of that resembles the NATURE OF SUFFERING as it pertains to this world. — schopenhauer1
1. Suppose every living human being is guaranteed a pinprick of pain followed by 80 years of pure happiness.
2. [Insert Benatar's antinatalist argument here]
3. Therefore, we should never procreate — Leontiskos
which sorts of suffering need to be prevented — Leontiskos
I think this is more-or-less the discussion ANs have — AmadeusD
it's the balance (ironic, given apokrisis' objections in the other thread) between suffering and other considerations — AmadeusD
The position is that suffering always wins out — AmadeusD
Congratulations on finally making a counterargument, though I'm not sure it is a very good one. It certainly opens the can of worms as to which sorts of suffering need to be prevented and which sorts don't, and that is a can of worms that antinatalists take many precautions to keep closed. — Leontiskos
The position is that suffering always wins out — AmadeusD
3. the absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone;
4. the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.
The antinatalist will always say that in the case of future people, we have no obligation to add happiness for them, but ALL the obligation to prevent the harm. — schopenhauer1
I think you're overlooking the simple fact that premise (1) was already about posterity. If mitigation and balancing considerations can only be applied to the current generation and not to posterity, then Benatar's argument succumbs once again to the reductio. — Leontiskos
So I am offering two arguments — schopenhauer1
1) Suffering in Pinprick World isn't "suffering" as we know it — schopenhauer1
2) Since there is no one to miss out on the "good", no obligation was intendent on the missed opportunity. In other words, your world could be COMPLETELY all BLISS.. and if you did not create someone into that world, you are still NOT in the wrong by preventing that birth. — schopenhauer1
Perhaps there are different approaches than his. — Leontiskos
Because I see apokrisis' objections as apt I see it as inevitable that questions of balance must emerge. — Leontiskos
how could there ever be a balance between suffering and other considerations — Leontiskos
ANs do the balancing exercise, and suffering tips the scales. — AmadeusD
Either the suffering of the pinprick is for some reason not counted as suffering; or else the antinatalist is in fact balancing suffering with some other consideration, in which case suffering does not always tip the scales. — Leontiskos
the consideration is that there are no people deprived of good and that is not bad — schopenhauer1
It is undisputed that in this world, at least there will be suffering — schopenhauer1
Who is making this consideration? Certainly not me, as I explained above. — Leontiskos
I would say that it is also undisputed that in the pinprick world there will be suffering, at least until you give an actual explanation for why a pinprick does not count as suffering. — Leontiskos
I think this is more-or-less the discussion ANs have (and honestly, the one whcih is usually attempted cross-positionally). The type though doesn't seem that interesting - it's the balance (ironic, given apokrisis' objections in the other thrad) between suffering and other considerations. The position is that suffering always wins out — AmadeusD
I think the discussion of which sorts of suffering need to be prevented is more or less the discussion that antinatalists have among themselves (and it is also the discussion that others wish to have with antinatalists). The type of suffering doesn't seem that interesting - it's the balance between suffering and other considerations that is interesting. The antinatalist position is that suffering always trumps any other consideration. — Interpretation
And I answered you. — schopenhauer1
Ill try to re-word your interp. to see if it gets you anywhere..That said, I don't really understand Amadeus' post here. This is how I read it: — Leontiskos
As a clarifying point, to me, 'other considerations' could be positive experiences, bare pleasure (in an abstract sense), character-building, the achievement of some life-long goal etc.. etc.. But the problem with all of this is it's speculation. We're only talking about unborn people - in this way, we can see that suffering is ensured (by the journey to Death) but positive experience is not vouchsafed by being born. One could have an all-in-all 'good' life, but that's highly unlikely on the view of the world and life ANs take, and at any rate, the suffering which comes with one's death (ones anxiety, fear etc.. and the pain of those around us) would usually trump that possibly-good life. Only religion can break that loop, and I think that's a poor way to gt around it myself. — AmadeusD
But the idea that one should cause suffering SUCH THAT we can THEN LATER MITIGATE IT (i.e. favoring OUR positive projects over SOMEONE ELSE'S negative ethics), is what is the violation going on here. — schopenhauer1
Prima facie, I would say it doesn't tip the scales because other pleasures out weight a pinprick (scratching a decent itch would be enough v a pinprick). — AmadeusD
Ill try to re-word your interp. to see if it gets you anywhere.. — AmadeusD
As a clarifying point, to me, 'other considerations' could be positive experiences, bare pleasure (in an abstract sense), character-building, the achievement of some life-long goal etc.. etc.. — AmadeusD
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