The point about zombies is not whether or not you believe in them (nobody except Daniel Dennett does), but whether a functionalist account like yours plausibly rules them out. Your account of an organism that models its environment and makes predictions based on that model is good, I like it. But the question of whether such a creature is conscious or not remains open. I see nothing in that account that rules out the creature being a zombie - it seems to me all the functions you have described could just as well occur in a creature with no experiences. Using the word 'zombie' is just a convenient and intuitively accessible way of making the point. And being lazy, I like that. As a theory of the self I think your account is much more plausible. — bert1

The neverending debate between mappers and terrainers.

and get on with playing the cards you were dealt as well as you can – get on with living and thriving – or die trying (as per e.g. Laozi, Epicurus, Epictetus, Pyrrho, Montaigne, Spinoza ...) :death: :flower: — 180 Proof

I will not play into the conspiracy:


I've discussed this before, there are coping mechanisms of acceptance (Stoicism, Taoism et al.) and there are coping mechanisms of rejection (Schopenhauer, Buddhism, et al).

We have gained a consciousness not like the rest of nature. It creates immense burdens. Suffering in the present for other animals, becomes self-knowledge of suffering- suffering on steroids. There is a malignant uselessness hanging around our every decision, goal, desire, and action. The precariousness of contingency, loss, fortune, a fact that we are uniquely and acutely aware of, not just effected by, making it all the much crueler for us.

Dude, "the world" is not an intentional agent so it cannot be "unfair" or "unjust". Stop whining about your category mistake, for fuck's sake, and get on with playing the cards you were dealt as well as you can – get on with living and thriving – or die trying (as per e.g. Laozi, Epicurus, Epictetus, Pyrrho, Montaigne, Spinoza ...) :death: :flower: — 180 Proof

So as usual, you fail to understand what I said and make a strawman of it.
Let's breakdown what I said:

As long as we live in a world not of our making, that often causes great harm to the users and which the users cause great harm to each other, then no, this world isn’t fair and just a priori from any individual instance. No political arrangement will save this fact.

Notice I said "live in the world", NOT the world itself.

I also said "this world isn't fair and just a priori from any individual instance". That is to say, from the human perspective. If you boil it down, it just says that because we didn't choose to be here, the situation humans find themselves in is unfair from the start.

So stop fuckn whining about my whining. For some odd reason, your comments are unnecessarily vitriolic and ad hom.

They also take the least interesting parts of what I am saying and raising it to the main point and attacking that. I guess that's just more strawmen and red herrings.

These two ingredients are not mutually exclusive at all. — Lionino

True, I did think that too.

As long as we live in a world not of our making, that often causes great harm to the users and which the users cause great harm to each other, then no, this world isn’t fair and just a priori from any individual instance. No political arrangement will save this fact.

He fails to see that our preference for the good over the bad, founded on the good as an absolute good and the bad an absolute bad. Our preferences are entangled in wants and needs as Schopenhauer says they are, but a further examination of the nature of a want or need reveals a ground of presuppositional significance he didn't see.

Apodictically good is different from contingently good, the latter being a good couch or a good knife, the former, good itself. As with apodictic logicality, the latter cannot be anything other than what it is. Just as modus ponens will not be contradicted, so the good of being in love and the bad of having your kidney speared cannot be other than what they are. This is the point in the OP.

You know Schopenhauer better than I. Perhaps you can see a way out of this? — Constance

I think you fail to grasp Schopenhauer. Good is not positive because it is temporary. Much like Heraclitus, he sees the flux of existence and sees this as proof that satisfaction is unstable and unattainable. Want is the hallmark of lack. Something we don’t have now. We would not lack for anything if we were whole and not unstable. Instead our very existence as individual beings is inherently intertwined with lacking.

Good and bad in the hedonistic sense..being embarrassed feels bad. Winning a game feels good, is not quite what he’s getting at.

Fascinating. I trust he is being truthful, and there is only one way to explain his position: He truly did not understand happiness, love, music; of course, music of great bravado is the exception, as is love in the broadest sense — Constance

So actually, he is one of the most notable philosophers of music, raising it to some of the highest levels of his metaphysical system/sotieology. That is to say, in his view, if the problem of suffering is our "Will", then, one way for a brief respite from it is aesthetic contemplation. The artistic genius and to a lesser extent, the observer, they are seeing the very Ideas themselves (pace Plato but not exactly), through their aesthetic lens. Whereas images and other mediums are more stationary, representing the ideas, music solely, has represents the Wills very flowing nature, being even more abstracted from the already abstract nature of art and aesthetics. See here:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schopenhauer-aesthetics/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthur_Schopenhauer%27s_aesthetics

Just more red herring. Do you like to cook it on garlic or lemon butter? As I said:

The deliberation may be "weighted" one way or the other due to various factors, but to us we are making decisions and following goals that we construct. That's how the phenomenology seems. You decided to go to the market, go for a jog, post on a philosophy forum, read up on the newest existentialist author, or any number of things. To YOU, YOU could have done OTHER. It's not a debate on what causes your decisions, it's the difference of phenomenology between humans and other animals. — schopenhauer1

That is at odds with naturalism. I suppose you could see catharsis in a naturalistic sense as a purgation of traumatic memories. In some of the awareness-training workshops I did back in the 90's I witnessed a lot of that - people bringing things to the surface that they have been carrying around for decades. Involves a lot of crying but also a great sense of release - your archetypical 'cathartic experience'. — Wayfarer

Yes it is in this vein that I mean catharsis. If "Pessimism" is the reality, then catharsis is when everyone sees what you see (reality). So the scales over the eyes has been lifted. We are no longer seeing what is not. We both understand not only each other's suffering, but Suffering. We are all in the same situation. We are all part of the same scheme.

You know that the term ‘catharsis’ (and also ‘therapy’) both have religious roots, right? The Cathars were a powerful gnostic sect of the Langue’doc region (now southern France) in medievaldom. They were subject of a notorious act of mass slaughter by the Pope’s armies in the notorious Sack of Bezier in 1209 (wherein an entire town with all its inhabitants was set aflame, with the presiding general saying famously ‘Kill them all, God will know his own.) — Wayfarer

Yes I am aware of all that. But what is the "super-natural" other than the longing for something different?

Rather, all I am asking for is consolation.. therapy in seeing what I see. Get what I am saying?

Yes, well I don't know where you got the idea that Schopenhauer is only for the depressed. Philosophical pessimism does not make one depressed. Correlation does not imply causation. — Shawn

Where the hell did you see me say that notion? If you read my profile I think quite the opposite of that. I suppose you have seen my profile. And if you haven't, read it, you might get my viewpoints on the whole pessimism thing as I lay them out there. If you have read it, you are just trying to get a rise out of me by accusing me of literally the opposite of what I think on that matter.

of copping-out by shadowboxing with a strawman. :wink: — 180 Proof

Right.. then you try dealing with my arguments first ;).

... are mostly not conscious decisions / choices according to (e.g.) Buddha ... Socrates, Pyrrho ... Spinoza, Hume Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Peirce, Wittgenstein ... and corroborated by (e.g.) cognitive neuroscience, behavioral economics, embodied cognitivism & CBT. :roll: — 180 Proof

This is just a bad steelman/strawman. I am not talking about the debate about determinism, or brain chemistry, or destiny,.. Nor am I discussing the addicted person, or a mental disorder, or whatever crappy rebuttal you are trying to concoct contra the human animal's ability for deliberation and goals. For example, you decided to sit down and write a post. Sure, maybe your personality and brain chemistry uniquely made you do this and say that, but my point is that you are AWARE of counterfactuals and you CHOSE this one (whatever else might be the case surrounding this decision). You can try to put as many dumb strawman responses to the contrary but humans have a higher degree of freedom and awareness of counterfactuals at a level and kind much different than other animals. The deliberation may be "weighted" one way or the other due to various factors, but to us we are making decisions and following goals that we construct. That's how the phenomenology seems. You decided to go to the market, go for a jog, post on a philosophy forum, read up on the newest existentialist author, or any number of things. To YOU, YOU could have done OTHER. It's not a debate on what causes your decisions, it's the difference of phenomenology between humans and other animals.

Frustration is not what results in suffering, nor is want or deficiency. There, of course, are examples of suffering, but suffering itself "stands as its own presupposition," requiring no wordy accounting, and again, not that wordy accountings are wrong, they just miss the point: The bad experience (not a bad couch or a having a bad day) finds what makes it bad in the pureness of badness itself. — Constance

I am saying, if you want to know what the basis is for the injunction not to bludgeon your neighbor with a hammer, the basis for the laws against doing this, all one has to do is bludgeon oneself, and the authority of the injunction not to do it rests solely with what it feels like to be bludgeoned. It is not a deficit nor the frustration of being bludgeoned (whatever that is), but the "presence" of this value-in-the-world we call bad. Likely due to Schopenhauer's exposure to Buddhism which, as you likely know, puts the onus on the idea of attachments, but this too begs the same question: what is wrong with attachments? Such inquiry always comes down to the foundational pure phenomenon of value. — Constance

So, Schopenhauer has a theory of Will whereby it operates in the negative. That is to say, for him, satisfaction is the freedom from pain, not the attainment of a good. He has a deprivationalist view whereby, wants and needs are the given, and satisfaction is simply a temporary stasis that is achieved when goals are achieved/consumed/partaken in. The suffering is that we are dissatisfied, and thus his quote:

The truth of this will be sufficiently obvious if we only remember that man is a compound of needs and necessities hard to satisfy; and that even when they are satisfied, all he obtains is a state of painlessness, where nothing remains to him but abandonment to boredom. This is direct proof that existence has no real value in itself; for what is boredom but the feeling of the emptiness of life? If life—the craving for which is the very essence of our being—were possessed of any positive intrinsic value, there would be no such thing as boredom at all: mere existence would satisfy us in itself, and we should want for nothing. — Schopenhauer- Studies in Pessimism/ The Vanity of Existence

The bolded part is the major metaphysical point for him. For his definition of suffering (what I call "inherent" suffering versus "contingent/situational suffering"), is there is a dissatisfaction at the core of animal being. The dissatisfaction is akin to an "incomplete" state. This is what he is deeming as "suffering". And this conception I again demarcate as "inherent" or even "Eastern" definitions of suffering, which elevates it to a metaphysics, one of incompleteness as its definition. The mainstream version of suffering is more akin to what you may describe. It is the hedonistic harms we face based on biology, circumstances, and contingency, that play out in everyday life.

This is confusing to me. Levinas said the opposite. One's own suffering translates into a knowledge of suffering that there is a metaethical grounding to one's compassion. The Other's suffering has always been understood empathetically, which places the nature of understanding always with the self. Transcending one's self begins with self knowledge: I see another suffering, and "it hurts; it hurts and I know it." This is the foundation of empathy. — Constance

This seems the foundation for Schopenhauer’s notion of compassion and thus the foundation of his ethics:
https://iep.utm.edu/schopenh/#:~:text=The%20dictum%20of%20morality%20is,thus%20does%20not%20affect%20us.

What I would point out is that the description of humans as 'animals' is very much part of the naturalist worldview (naturally!) It is taken to be an inevitable entailment of evolutionary biology, which displaced the supernatural accounts of creation. But then, there was a great deal attached to that supernatural account, including much of what was thought worth preserving from the Greek philosophical tradition. So, yes, we did evolve like other natural forms, but at a certain point a threshold was crossed which separates us from nature (and which I think is very likely the origin of the myth of the fall.) And I don’t know if naturalism has the depth to deal with it, not least because of the rigid and often unspoken barrier cordoning off anything it considers supernatural. — Wayfarer

As has been the case, I enjoy your posts more than most people who disagree with me. They seem the most informed, even if we disagree, allowing for more in-depth conversation. It isn't just being knee-jerk contrarian and "gotcha"... This elevates conversation at least.

I agree with the "myth of the fall" being a metaphor for our "separation" from the rest of nature. It's an apt metaphor, that Garden.

Yes, that is where we will indeed part ways, as far as the supernatural goes. I would replace your soteriology with catharsis. If we recognize the situation, it might impel us to act in certain ways different than the current. One of the greatest stories we "anchor" ourselves in is our economic way-of-life. Work hard, play hard. One must feel "useful", and so on. These are powerful. The motivations for it are easy enough to answer, but one must recognize the Schopenharian nature of what is going on to answer it. It is manifest in the boredom and despair we feel when we don't "feel useful", or if aren't anchoring ourselves in something (work hard/play hard, travel, climb the mountain, experience life, drugs, family life, etc. etc.).

The Dionysian instincts that the ancient Greeks alluded to are tame in the mind of a human being nowadays. We have aspired towards an Apollonian way of life. By doing so, we have reduced the brute aspect of existence that we once endured, per our evolutionary history. It would be strange to say that the fundamental reason we are unhappy or suffer from boredom is something to be overly concerned about. Existence is becoming more endurable than it once was seems like a common theme amongst academics. — Shawn

It's not something we are "overly concerned about". It just "is" the case. I don't have to "add" anything to it. It's like the difference between "demonstrates" and "explains". Sure, I can remain silent and let life "demonstrate it" (show the gadget work), or I can explain the mechanisms underlying it (explaning).

As Zapffe explains better:

Zapffe's view is that humans are born with an overdeveloped skill (understanding, self-knowledge) which does not fit into nature's design. The human craving for justification on matters such as life and death cannot be satisfied, hence humanity has a need that nature cannot satisfy. The tragedy, following this theory, is that humans spend all their time trying not to be human. The human being, therefore, is a paradox.

In "The Last Messiah", Zapffe described four principal defense mechanisms that humankind uses to avoid facing this paradox:

Isolation is "a fully arbitrary dismissal from consciousness of all disturbing and destructive thought and feeling".[5]
Anchoring is the "fixation of points within, or construction of walls around, the liquid fray of consciousness".[5] The anchoring mechanism provides individuals with a value or an ideal to consistently focus their attention on. Zapffe also applied the anchoring principle to society and stated that "God, the Church, the State, morality, fate, the laws of life, the people, the future"[5] are all examples of collective primary anchoring firmaments.
Distraction is when "one limits attention to the critical bounds by constantly enthralling it with impressions".[5] Distraction focuses all of one's energy on a task or idea to prevent the mind from turning in on itself.
Sublimation is the refocusing of energy away from negative outlets, toward positive ones. The individuals distance themselves and look at their existence from an aesthetic point of view (e.g., writers, poets, painters). Zapffe himself pointed out that his produced works were the product of sublimation.

What I'm trying to say, that there are things a person can be certain of regardless of whatever rationale we assume. Some rationales may be more truthful than others.

So, with the assumption that some rationales are more true than others, what do you think is true about the lack of concern with ethics, in our world? Is it really ignorance of the good or unrestrained wants and desires that make us suffer? — Shawn

In the Schopenhauerian view, our constant willing nature, and dissatisfaction make us suffer, yes. In the more "empirical" world of a utilitarian or hedonist, it might be the accumulation of the preferences frustrated, or pains felt, or harms encountered, with the world, along with the emotional distress this causes our psyche.

With Schopenhauer, compassion is all-apart of the same manifesting premise. That is to say, if the world is Will, individuated into an illusory version of itself (the manifold beings of the world), then a saintly person is driven from the feeling of "fellow-suffering" of all the manifold beings. That is to say, they can feel this agapic love and then act upon it. The acting upon this feeling is saintly compassion for Schop, and this has the effect of making one less individuated.

In a purely contemplative way (rather than the saint that simply feels and acts upon), the way forward is to recognize what is the case. That to Schopenhauer would be to understand the mechanism of how we suffer. That we suffer is taken for granted. If we don't know that we suffer, we still suffer. His dwelling on it, is only because that is the very thing he is explaining and studying. Suffering is the label he has for what is happening. If we talk about thermodynamics in physics, but we don't "think" thermodynamics in everyday life, well, duh, that's the difference between simply "stuff that's happening", and an "explanation of the stuff that's happening".

"Responsibility" to whom?

"Justifying" other than that "we must"? — 180 Proof

To lay out in its clearest terms:

"We primarily don't operate by instinct like other animals and this makes us an animal apart from the others, even though derived from the same evolutionary nature in that we are constantly under the pressure of making stories and reasons.. that is not to say only after-the-fact stories of 'why' but also the the fact that we have goals we attempt to seek. In short, a self-awareness of our own very willing nature". This adds a burden, a layer of responsibility (suffering) that no other animal must deal with.

especially by lucid absurdists, who neither absurdly 'idealize non-ideal' existence (re: hope) nor absurdly 'nihilate non-negative' existence (re: despair), insofar as we strive – suffer – to create manifold spaces by and within which to thrive aesthetically and ethically between absurd extremes. :death: :flower: — 180 Proof

This will ever be my debate with Nietzscheans on this forum. I'm sorry but Schopenhauer cannot be surpassed by Nietzsche's contrarian view. Schopenhauer is what all must deal with, and though attempts were made, they failed to address it. Suffering is real. The fact we must contend with it at all, absurdist stance, or any delusional stories (religious, hedonistic, tribal, familiar, or otherwise), shows this.

As schopenhauer1 suggests, the existential stance of "pessimism" is also a "delusion" for coping with, imo, a (mostly) maladaptive habit of neurotic overthinking – anxiously fearing for (pace Epicurus/Epictetus ... Spinoza) – our species-specific defects-dysfunctions aka "suffering". :fire: — 180 Proof

I agree and disagree with you. In the fact that you are answering @Shawn, I agree. He does seem to be a case of overthinking, living in a basement, wallowing in it (didn't he have a theme of this with his piggy stuff?).. making a sort of cliche out of Schopenhauer only being for the depressed and inert.

I disagree with you that "pessimism" is neurotic overthinking. This is a contrarian cliche. The problems, at least, as I present them, are apparent and paramount at almost each and every moment you deliberate and decide. The reasons you chose, whatever they are, cannot in good (academic) conscience be called "instinct" unless you reduce it that "all animal behavior is instinct" which it is not. Rather, we have that extra layer of "Why must we?".. And it is exactly the "denial" of this into tawdry and easy existential "modes" of coping such as "Denying, distraction, anchoring" make exactly the point I am making. So, I find it ironic you mention Zapffe to contradict me when he is very much in line.

Yes, I believe what you are saying is true and more fruitful to the understanding of human nature, which has been a debate framed in the right manner by Schopenhauer. The issue Schopenhauer bring up, in my mind, is the importance of attitudes, and how they form beliefs or, as you call it, "forms of life." — Shawn

First we must define suffering...

Suffering as my profile already states (take a look I'm sure you've seen it) comes in the "inbuilt" and "contingent" varieties.

Contingent varieties are the cheap/easy ones to identify. These are the ones that analytic philosophers are going to hang their hat on because they are more "empirical". They are everything from ill-health, disasters, to any harm you can think of.

Inherent suffering is the kind that is more what Schopenhauer was getting at.. That even if you stripped away all the contingent "slings and arrows" of life, there is still something underneath that is driving this dissatisfaction that doesn't go away. This is akin to the Buddhist notion of Dukkha or dissatisfaction. Humans have a self-awareness that no other animal has in that we can see this dissatisfaction play out in real time, and know its happening as we are living! @Wayfarer can do a deep dive on all the Buddhist/Hindu ways of describing this, I'm sure.

And then I added in a more "meta" sense of suffering pace Ligotti. That is to say, we are a species that evolved like the rest of nature, but yet is not in a "balance of nature". Where other animals have a form of life that is instinctual, ours is by-far more deliberative, which adds another burden uniquely human. This is what I mean by "forms of life".

Schopenhauer thought that indeed people had "fixed" characters that were basically more attuned to suffering. These characters had the ability to "deny their wills" in saintly empathy (agape love one can say). Other people might not have as much ability to penetrate this understanding. I added in ideas that they were too fixated in their coping mechanisms (distraction, ignoring, etc.).

Humans can form narratives to suit any rataionale they want to get to... So if life is supposed to be X, Y, Z, they will develop a story to provide it that rationale. These are all justifications for why we (must) pursue X, Y, and Z. But the fact is that our very ability to form counterfactuals and diverse narratives tells us that we don't have to have this rationale. That it is indeed only a rationale...That we are the species that needs a rationale.. We don't just "do", we know we do and we have provide reasons for why we do.

I am simply questioning whether it is something that can be justified as a reason to operate on, or whether these reasons are brute facts about existence. The facet of attitudes on one's life or arising due to lived experiences, resulting in, dispositions is what I wanted to consider.

Maybe in another thread I would frame the issue about what do attitudes mean to a person; but with respect to Schopenhauer (generally speaking, monotheistic religions are also associated with this tendency, which Schopenhauer did not like or favor) what is the function of an attitude, such as pessimism, in one's life? — Shawn

I'm trying to say that there are various "coping mechanisms" that people use to ignore the notion of suffering in life, and thus the need for empathy in the Schopenhaurian fashion is not even considered.

If your asking for my opinion or thought on the matter, what I understand about the very will to live is that by most theories it is healthy and good to want to live, and the denial to live from an attitude (for example, "pessimism") is irrational or maladaptive. What are your "meta"-cognitive beliefs about pessimism, and what it may mean to a person? — Shawn

I'm not asking your opinion on "the will to live", rather I am pointing that you are questioning it. And even now, we can debate it, giving reasons for enjoining with it. This is telling us something.. my theme of how we are not on balance like the rest of nature...

That they are delusions are also a matter of conviction. — Wayfarer

Stories that become one's way of coping, I have deemed "delusions" but you can call it a number of things.. reasons, rationale.. etc. Either way, this is not how the rest of nature works, and hence why we are uniquely (suffering) Homo Exisentialis.

The evolutionary history of humanity points at making tools and practicing some form of empathic concern for those within our sphere of interest. With such an evolutionary history, how can one negate the very will to live that brought us to life through a struggle with nature? Why would anyone want to dispose of one's will to live, and sublimate it with pessimism. In a sense some people unbiasedly might say that it would be irrational to do so. — Shawn

You are questioning it right now. Isn't this your answer, the germination of which is in your very inquiry? Why is nature creating creatures that question the "will to live"?

@Wayfarer edited above look at last sentence :D.

And as there is nothing beyond nature, we’re stepping off our own meta-cognitive awareness into the void of nothingness or meaninglessness. The best we can do, pace Camus, is bear it heroically. Fair description? — Wayfarer

I would agree with this summary except the "heroically" part. We simply (must) bear it. Camus' hero is ironically a form of bad faith too. It is a form of "ignoring" of the problem. If one can pretend one is a hero, one can try to give a reason for bearing this or that.

The point is then, we are the species that needs the delusions to get by. Ignore, distract, take on a role (existential hero, replete with cigarette or narcissistic personality disorder!.. pace Nietzsche!!!).

I have been summoned...

I don't believe that his philosophy was the result of his upbringing or nurture. Pessimism towards the world that Schopenhauer describes is, to me, still a mystery. I'm hoping someone can help the fly out of the bottle with this one... — Shawn

I'll explain again.. I of course invite you to the countless threads on this subject that I have started/participated in but let me add some more...

We are the only species that bears a responsibility that no other animal must endure, that of justifying why we must do/endure anything. We are self-aware creatures, that know that we can do something counterfactual. We are not instinct-driven, as is the case with other animals (for the most part). Thus comes into play "bad faith" in that we must figure out a reason why we stick with what we do, abandon it, or do any other number of decisions. We are burdened with our own reasons for why we do anything. Thus we often try to "pawn off" our self-awareness to a number of things, whether that be distraction, ignoring, anchoring (in roles of socio-cultural origin), or a number of other methodologies.

As I've said in other threads (greatest recent hits):

I think Ligotti had a nice phrase that characterized the world as malignantly useless. When it’s supported by tons of tedium, self-awareness of the buzzing of meaninglessness as its background radiation that we add our bits and bytes to, it’s quite distressing in its malevolent indifference.

Instead of like other animals, driven by the bliss of instinct sprinkled with some deliberation, experiencing in the moment, we are burdened with our own storm of deliberative thoughts. To form goals and habits and to choose to do so. We have gone beyond what is harmonious and we must always trick ourselves which is why things like values, and self-restraint and shame are what keep us from a kind of freedom that leads to hopeless madness.

Your definition of “just world” itself is an unfair game being that no one born agreed to it. If anything, that’s using people for an ends of whatever game of Justice, Karma, or otherwise this world represents.

We are used. Enough said about “just world”. Add to that contingencies of luck, cause-and-effect, our own striving nature, individual pathologies, and a self-reflective animal that knows its own condition- forget about it.

Generally speaking, Ligotti's assessment holds.. we are a species that has gone beyond the "balance of nature".

So yes, in a way, Schopenhauer's compassion for the human condition, and suffering makes sense. We are outcasts from nature, even as we are originated from it. I don't mean this biologically, but in our mode of being, our "forms of life". We are Homo Exsistentialis. Procreation isn't an outcome of simply being, but an understanding of what we are doing. Now even that is suspect. We NEED reasons to put more humans into the world.. Glorification of X, more labor units, expectations, personal fulfilment, and on it goes.

Of course atheism will merely categorise that as 'religion' and reject it, and then carry on whining about suffering. :naughty: But that is the zeitgeist, isn't it? — Wayfarer

Don’t you dare mix average atheists with us enlightened pessimists :wink:

Nonsense: "existence" is not a voluntary agent (re: category error). — 180 Proof

Is it fair doesn’t need agency on both sides.

You went for human-on-human fairness. Fair enough. I went for existence-upon-human.

I'm a big fan of Ligotti ... but what's your point in mentioning him? — 180 Proof

Make of it what you will. I was riffing in the OPs question, albeit in the key of Existentialism.

I think Ligotti had a nice phrase that characterized the world as malignantly useless. When it’s supported by tons of tedium, self-awareness of the buzzing of meaninglessness as its background radiation that we add our bits and bytes to, it’s quite distressing in its malevolent indifference.

Instead of like other animals, driven by the bliss of instinct sprinkled with some deliberation, experiencing in the moment, we are burdened with our own storm of deliberative thoughts. To form goals and habits and to choose to do so. We have gone beyond what is harmonious and we must always trick ourselves which is why things like values, and self-restraint and shame are what keep us from a kind of freedom that leads to hopeless madness.

There is the issue of what springs from an evolved nature though. In our case, what we find to be good is substantially a matter of our ancestors having evolved as members of a social species.

We might imagine a devil species which evolved from relatively asocial ancestors. (Though I think the plausibility of human level intelligence evolving in an asocial species is pretty low.) Assuming something like human level intelligence evolved in an asocial species. I would think it quite surprising if such a species had a morality very similar to us. — wonderer1

I don't know.. Warfare, torture, tribalism, narcissists, anti-social personalities, all of these things have been advantageous if we were to look at "purely" traits that led to increased survival. This is why I tend to reject naturalistic explanations for any ethical actions. You can argue anything is natural, and you might be right, but informs little on what is ethical other than possibly vague descriptions of mechanisms that might be the physical substrates for which ethical considerations are made.

Karma is like our conscience, divine justice, or OCD. It’s self-fulfilling superstition butting against the contingencies of cause-and-effect.

The powers and growth of the executive branch over time. This started because a weak executive branch failed on various fronts. Also, arguably, it was Europe and WW1 that pulled America onto the world stage beyond, though a strong case can be made with the Spanish American war and gunboat policy.

Rule by executive order (which have included travel bans, torture (Bush's classified "directive"), immigration, listening in on all data (for "security" EO 12333), healthcare reform and environmental policies).
Veto legislation.
Deploy troops in foreign territory without congressional authority (because technically it isn't a war) — Benkei

Many of these were because of the failed government right after the Revolutionary War. See here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Articles_of_Confederation
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annapolis_Convention_(1786)

And then called the more famous Constitutional Convention in 1787 which was held in secret:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitutional_Convention_(United_States)

Before you respond to all of the things I got wrong, can you at least admit how far I DO seem to understand it? Most of this whole post was me trying to restate you without causing any cringing. — Fire Ologist

Yes, thank you for actually trying to analyze and parse out the arguments. I appreciate that, and now we can have a much more interesting discussion :clap: because we are not talking so past each other, but seriously engaged in the content. This was actually very good, along the lines I was looking for.

That sounds like a rule in there. The rule seems to be to “prevent harm when possible, especially when unnecessary.” Then, once procreation happens and the rule has been violated, you move to a different rule where, if there is harm already done “a set of actions is needed to remediate it.” — Fire Ologist

Correct.

I think you said before AN has nothing to do with remediative actions. Which makes sense since AN is a pre-procreation moral guidance. — Fire Ologist

:up:

This seems to be about a wider moral position, and has stepped outside of a narrow focus on AN. The above all talks about how to treat other currently living people. In this context, and if I got the rule right, the rule being: “prevent harm when possible, especially when unnecessary”, in the wider context of other living people we still must try to prevent harm, especially when unnecessary, but there can be harmed caused that is “unintentional harm.” And any step we take is towards remediation, not prevention first. — Fire Ologist

Correct

[Could negligent behavior blur the line between preventative and remediative acts? Is there a duty to try to prevent negligence, and while some acts are purely unintentional, others are wanton and grossly negligent sorts that we all have a duty to prevent? This is a tangent - forget the question.] — Fire Ologist

Absolutely, but as further down it discusses that once born, "positive ethics" does come into play (people's interests, goals), complete avoidance of harm, and to what point negligence matters is a sticky situation. But correct, at this point tangential so can be tabled for another thread/discussion. AN does not matter for these cases being that it's still remediation, and then a matter of "To what degree?"

I sum this up as making the point that what is wrong about procreation is that we are recruiting a future person into a life of suffering, and failing to prevent obviously unnecessary suffering. — Fire Ologist

Correct. There are multiple violations here having to do with violating someone's dignity, encapsulated with "Don't harm" and Don't violate people's autonomy" (both of them being further grouped as types of the principle "Don't use/mess with people", but I'll explain that later).

You said “especially since the amount of suffering is unknown.” That adds an interesting element. “Amount of suffering” as a concept, plus this amount being “unknown.”

I don’t think the amount of suffering matters, and I don’t think the fact of suffering is unknown. We know every time we procreate we are recruiting someone into suffering. Period. Right? — Fire Ologist

Correct, but with a caveat. The non-harm/autonomy principles were violated, and it was unnecessary (no remediative reason for it), so in an absolute sense, always wrong. However, I don't discount that the extent of suffering is in play. But it is in play to the detriment of the pro-natalist argument, not the other way around. Whereas, if no one was born, literally no one would be deprived (non-identity issue) of the goods of life, once born there will be suffering/harm as a fact. And it is empirically true that this world holds a great deal of it in known and unknown quantities. That adds to the antinatalist case. It also leads into the idea that if we distill down the (six or so to my estimation) goods of life, causing people suffering so they can experience the goods is problematic itself in breaking the ethic of "not using people" (by unnecessarily harming them, and "messing" with them/violating other people's autonomy).

As far as the re-education, I agree it would be in the face of inclinations and old habits. But I’m still trying to parse out the content of the education. That is a 2.0 discussion about inclinations and where they come from and why someone might resist AN. I’m just sticking to what AN is.

You even said yourself after talking about people who aren’t inclined to have kids, about religion and family as urging kids, as existential need for purpose.. “…Though of course, there are also plenty of horrible parents as well, but all of this is besides the point.”

So I don’t think I need to parse that part out yet to focus on what AN is. — Fire Ologist

Yes, my point to bring that in the discussion was many people, and I believe earlier you did as well, try to invoke some procreative/natural "necessity" into the human psyche. But I am encountering with empirical evidence that humans don't even work that way. Rather, we are very much learned/cultural/existential/deliberative creatures, and less so "instinctual". This gets into a lot of side avenues of discussion but generally what I was getting at is that "Wanting to procreate" or "Wanting to have kids" is not an instinct but a (very culturally weighted) preference. Childfree-people and their GROWTH as societies get more educated (that is, away from familial and tribal and religious pressures), they tend to become more individualistic, and PREFER to procreate less over time. That to me indicates that "wanting kids" is not instinctual but very much contingent on social and existential pressures. I also mentioned that it's simply a personal preference one takes on because for many, it seems like an ultimate "purpose" because it is so all-encompassing. Also, I am acknowledging that this is a hard decision and a powerful "inclination" for many people. I am explaining possible origins, but also disregarding that any of it is relevant to the moral considerations at hand. Thus it's a classic case of "inclination" vs. "morality". You feel a "loss", but what if I told you that this feeling of "loss" can be transferred to any number of things that one might miss out on? (trips, experiences, rights of passage, etc.). This is a bit outlandish, but imagine a young Spartan who was all prepared to do all sorts of horrible things to their helot slaves. It was a right of passage they were looking forward to, but Athens takes over Sparta (this didn't happen) and forces Sparta to stop the practice of killing helots as a right of passage. Does the young Spartan have a right to feel a sense of loss? That's all he's ever known or looked forward to. Obviously, I recognize procreation is so integral to society as to be a matter of course and thus deemed as irrevocably different than the "obvious" example of inclination and preference I provided. But isn't this the point of these debates on this topic? That perhaps our normative understanding IS incorrect, and we must re-evaluate?

So it is more about not forcing someone to be born at all, regardless of any suffering; it is about how “recruiting them into projects” is wrong. The fact that it is a project “that will harm them” makes it all the worse, but “it is more than just suffering. […] It is rather about not using people by force.”

This is why you don’t like my arguments about the amount of suffering. Suffering in life is a part of what is wrong about procreation, but it is the involuntary recruitment that might be the real heart of the rule that is violated.

So I had the rule as (trying to quote you) “ prevent the harm if possible, especially if it is unnecessary to let the harm happen in the first place.” But there is a second rule or complication to the rule (again that I hope you will clarify) something like (as tight as I can make to build less room for misinterpretation): “do not impose harm, especially when it can be avoided.” — Fire Ologist

Yes good catch on the two themes/points of violation here. Roughly they correspond to non-harm principle violation (don't unnecessarily cause harm), and autonomy principle (don't unnecessarily mess with people/ violate their autonomy). And thus, as you state, the extent of suffering is not the crux of the position, but it can inform it. Why? Because part of the "non-harm" principle entails two things:

1) Known harm
2) Unknown harm

So the violation happens because you know there is harm, but you choose to impose it anyways. And you know that you cannot know "unknown harm" that might befall someone- so you are gambling with other people (again all these are principles of using someone.. harm/autonomy, etc.).

And this brings me to another point, that of the notion of "aggressive paternalism". This is the stance one takes when they deem that it is OK to violate these deontological principles of non-harm/autonomy (to use people). That is where this notion of "Your positive ethics does NOT justify violating someone else's negative ethics".

So I think all of the arguments over prevent versus remediate and suffering and amounts of suffering, were off the mark (or at least my objections and rebuttals to those aspects of the arguments were off the mark). Because that wasn’t the real heart of the problem. That’s why it can be ok to cause some suffering in living people, because they can consent to that suffering. — Fire Ologist

Nice takeaway, and good example of walking through the dialectic and how it relates to the arguments and seeing where some errors could be on initial interpretations and arguments.

The mark for AN has to do with the lack of consent to live at all.

It is wrong to force a being into existence when no such being could give its consent, therefore one should not procreate.

Is this right? — Fire Ologist

Yes, but I don't think the rule relies solely on consent. There is definitely the principle of non-harm, so you can combine it with what you were getting at earlier, "One should not cause unnecessary harm, or violate someone's autonomy (consent)" This is an example of the more basic principle of "Do not use people". And to violate this would be to take a stance of "aggressive paternalism" where you deem "Ok to violate other people's negative ethics for the cause of one's own positive ethics". In other words, "You deem what is best for others, even if that brings with it harms/suffering for others."

It is right. It sounds right to me. I still don’t think I’m mischaracterizing anything you are saying. — Fire Ologist

:up:

And I also still think it can all be summed up in a tighter argument where every word counts better than I’ve done here. I’m not sure if the best formulation of the rule involved ( “prevent harm” or “not imposing harm”). — Fire Ologist

Indeed, I also wonder this because, as you stated, they both convey different but related ideas. You are preventing harm AND imposing harm. In the negative sense, you are not violating non-harm. In the positive sense, you WILL be imposing harm, presumably for some positive ethic. You are IMPOSING a project, creating unnecessary harm (aggressive paternalism- feelings that one has the right to violate negative ethics for one's own estimation of what should be/positive ethics).

But the rule itself seems to invoke the existence of a baby that cannot give its consent, to whom life is being imposed involuntarily; there’s a tension there that you (not me) introduce into the text. The existence of the baby seems to matter (actual) and not matter (potential) to the world this ethic describes. — Fire Ologist

This is why I reformulate the general "asymmetry" here. Even though I might say that a potential child not born is "good" for not suffering. You might say that it is neutral. And I am willing to say that I am okay with this. We can say in fact, that prior to procreation, no ethical thing is happening good or bad. It is only one way that it is bad, the scenario of procreation. There may not be an equivalent "good", just "not bad".

And I still see a hole in the value of suffering to the AN argument. Something needs further clarity here. Does AN hold its ground regardless of any suffering or not? — Fire Ologist

This is indeed a whole discussion in itself. But to be brief, this is answered by being contra the "aggressive paternalism" stance. That is to say, it is hubris to assume for others that there is a certain amount of suffering that is acceptable or even "good for someone" to take place, even if it doesn't have to. You are indeed violating someone's dignity (using them) because you deem a certain set of positive principles as above and beyond the violation of someone else's negative principles.

Thank you for taking the time to do this "close/charitable" read! Now we can have productive conversations around the same set of ideas rather than talking past each other. Even if we disagree, we are at least doing it on the correct set of ideas, or at least near close to it (I'm sure we will still talk past each other).

Not quite. This is what supports it. It relies on the state of affairs being that suffering is the overwhelming mode of experience for humans.
The a-symmetry simply supports the ethical solution of not procreating. Not the position itself. — AmadeusD

So the initial asymmetry is presented by Benatar as the following:
3 the absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone;
4. the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.

So I further explain this asymmetry by reformulating it a bit. The reason is because people often think that 3 runs into the "non-identity" issue because it is an impersonal "good". In other words, "Who" is benefiting from the absence of pain? And if no one, then how is it in any sense "good"?

Now, I think this is easily defeated in modal understanding of future conditionals. That is to say, we just say "It is a good state of affairs" that no one was harmed, WHEN THERE VERY WELL COULD HAVE BEEN SOMEONE HARMED. That's all that is needed to defeat this point.

However, even if someone had a weird metaphysics that denies future conditional states of affairs, you can rephrase the asymmetry as this:
1) Having a person will cause the harm/cause the breaking of some principle. This is a bad situation.
2) Not having a person will not cause the harm/cause the breaking of some principle. This can be either good or neutral situation, it doesn't matter.

All that matters in this is 1 (the bad situation) doesn't obtain.

Read this more carefully. Then re-read it. Make sure you can summarize the main points to yourself. Then when you answer, probably best to go paragraph by paragraph and ask a question if you don't understand, or raise an objection to discrete points, but don't lose track of the bigger picture each point is trying to paint. Here it is again:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/915425

Frankly don’t know why this is antagonizing. I’m trying to debate the logic of AN. — Fire Ologist

Because I had a long post and you ignored it. Yes it's about suffering. Duh. But it's not suffering "tout court" in this case. It's about what surrounds it. The context. In this case the context that occurs when deciding to procreate.

To me it seems you are saying “there is enough suffering in every life that it is not debatable to evaluate that suffering as anything other than bad, harmful, fruitless, and unethical to inflict on another to any degree. — Fire Ologist

Nope, I am not saying that at all really because again, this is not my argument.

Are you really going to leave this conversation without showing me MORE CLEARLY how I am wrong? — Fire Ologist

Yeah I am ready to do just that because as with even this last post, you misconstrue it, make it into your own version of an argument (straw man), and then ask why I'm pissed.

I could level accusations of bad faith around too, but I’m just trying to point out the logical inconsistencies and am open to reasonable opposing views. — Fire Ologist

But you're not.

And instead of thinking I am fully aware of what I’m saying and acting in bad faith, show me how what I’m saying is not reasonable. Don’t just say it’s bad, show me. — Fire Ologist

I had a whole freakn' post with a bunch of detail you ignored.

But you haven’t shown me otherwise. And instead like calling me a bad faith straw man builder. Over and over. — Fire Ologist

No, I don't have to prove shit to you. It's time for you to actually do some work in understanding my argument.

There is no need to. We are are discussing the logic of ending procreation to make the world more ethical and prevent future suffering.

There is a law that murder is wrong. The fact that I am never inclined to murder and likely never will be makes it easy for me to follow that law. That’s a different conversation than whether “murder is wrong” is a good law, is something universal everyone should follow, and something we should teach all to understand. Even if we logically showed “murder is good” I still wouldn’t murder. — Fire Ologist

Wow, you are so far from what the point of that was to prove. Try again.

I am trying to use logic only. I never raised any of these non-sequitors. You did, which makes it a non-sequitor to the conversation I’m having.

I only point this out to show you how much I’m trying to avoid bad faith. I’m sticking to the text and bringing up logical issues with it and new premises (like suffering is of less import and less valuable than the life of the one who suffers). I’m not resorting to anything else but my observations and wits - no insulting references to religious practices.

I’m not belittling the AN person - I’m attacking the logic behind the conclusion that in order to be ethical, we should not procreate.

If AN is an issue of personal faith, like other “holy hosannas and spouting out other nonsense, then I wouldn’t be arguing the way I am. But it’s a logical, ethical stance. One that doesn’t seem sound to me. — Fire Ologist

You are barely sticking to the text. Try again.

It’s not my job to demonstrate that the suffering that exists in life is only animating factor of ethics. — Fire Ologist

Way to ignore my whole post for making this (weak) rhetorical flourish :roll:

That’s your job as an AN proponent. By simply avoiding the issue you sound like a flat-earther. — Fire Ologist

I made a whole post, for the Nth TIME, laying out my case, in a pretty lengthy detailed way. This is so uncharitable and untrue as to be laughable at this point. This is the kind of thing where I can respond with a million different lengthy treatises, and you will just dismiss them (without actually addressing the points) so as to constantly make me repeat my points. It's a argumentative overextension. At some point, in debates like these, you acknowledge that the points have been addressed, and you either need to think more on it, or you simply disagree an lay out your counter-arguments.

Life is waaay more than suffering. I argued that. You don’t respond. — Fire Ologist

That is a strawman because I never made that point! Keep using bad faith arguments though if you think that is "winning" you rhetorical points.

If you are frustrated with me, I think it’s because you cherish suffering too much.

Life is suffering is your strawman. — Fire Ologist

No I'm frustrated with you because you have not actually understood what I have written, you are uncharitable, and you are making straw man arguments of my points. I think that's pretty good reasons to be frustrated! You can stop arguing now, because it looks like this is just turning into bad faith ones. This last post has now proven it for me at least. You can say you're bad faith response to this, but that would just be proving it more now. I'll entertain good faith arguments, but in these last posts, I have now seen I am arguing with someone who doesn't care to actually debate, just antagonize, so good day.

If I go to Chicago, there’s a chance I cause somebody in Chicago to suffer. So if I never go to Chicago I have prevented all of that possible, likely (because life is so full of suffering) suffering. Therefore, I should never go to Chicago. — Fire Ologist

Again, you have failed to interpret the arguments, by mischaritable reading or just outright failure to tackle what I am saying.

You are now wearing out my patience with this kind of thing. Either debate the points, or don't. But stop misconstruing and strawmanning it.
Let's look at your responses...

I get it.

Dignity is preserved in the person who prevents suffering by not procreating.

I get it. — Fire Ologist

No, you don't get it then. It's NOT about the dignity of the PARENTS. Rather, it's about the dignity of the (future) child. Dignity is not violated by NOT allowing the suffering to carry forward (i.e. non-harm/non-autonomy principles are not violated). That is say, no person exists to be violated prior to procreation. The violation only takes place once procreation occurs.

And again, if you want to parse out "suffering" and throw out categorical errors and strawman for examples, you can save it, as like in previous posts, I have provided the distinction between preventative actions (prevent the harm if possible, especially if it is unnecessary to let the harm happen in the first place!) versus remediative harm (the harm is already taking place, now a set of actions is needed to remediate it!). — schopenhauer1

Once born, the person is in remediation ethics. They have interests and goals, and these are weighed against other interests and goals. It would be indeed, an indignity to NOT allow people to pursue their goals within reason, once actually existing. This doesn't mean that they then get to FORCE others, unnecessarily into harmful projects of their personal preferences (as this would be unnecessary violation.. it didn't need to happen). Rather, it means you have to learn to live together and respect each other's rights. Needing to survive in a given context of a society means having to move about in public spaces- in the situatedness of a social sphere. This means, inevitably you will cause unintentional harm. You try to be careful to avoid violations, but it cannot be prevented (unlike in the case of procreation), and thus why it always falls under remediation whereas procreation falls under preventative. Positive ethics DOES matter in the sphere of existing to some extent, as long as it doesn't unnecessarily violate others. Remember the bridge argument? The fishermen want to catch the biggest fish of their life. It's blocking YOUR right to go to your car. Whatever pleasure they get from fishing and the collateral damage of causing your harm, it was unnecessary to "recruit" you into their project. This is different than being one car of many in traffic "recruiting" you into traffic. With the road situation, it is tacitly accepted that this is part of how roads worked. However, if a car wanted to stop traffic so they can look out the side of the road at some attraction, that is now falling into unnecessary "recruiting" territory.

It’s not convincing to keep saying discussions about the suffering prong of the argument are strawman arguments. — Fire Ologist

Some people believe the world is flat. They are UNCONVINCED. Some people think Donald Trump doesn't pose a threat to the democratic order. They are UNCONVINCED. Some people think the world is 6,000 years old. They are UNCONVINCED. It's not my job to try to convince every Harry, Dick, and Jane of their intransigent, unsound beliefs. I can only present the argument faithfully and to the best of my ability and they can do whatever they want. They can handle snakes, pray to their god, say their holy Hosannas, spout out nonsense, red herring non-sequitors on an internet forum, do whatever.

So what if you come from a long line of procreators, all of your parents and grandparents were all procreators (weird how that works) and all you want to do is spread a little love and joy and hope for a better future around like your mother did….. Don’t you think you will cause fresh new suffering to make this person doubt procreation? You are saying “it’s for your own good, despite all the people on your family tree who love and admire, for your own ethical good you should not cause suffering, so you should not procreate.” The rule itself as a thought causes suffering too, to someone who had long plans of a family and grandkids one day. It’s nice that no one is talking about actually forcing people not to procreate, but that’s not the point; even asking (most) people to reconsider any more procreation, is going to cause suffering. How do you answer that without being paternalistic, and without:
YOU deem the game necessary for someone else to play based on your personal estimation.
— schopenhauer1 — Fire Ologist

This is actually the thing I am saddest about when arguing the case. I am not a Spock-like figure. I think people can be great parents, and are good people, but that procreation is still wrong. The two can be separated out. No one is doubting that certain people are very good at parenting and raising kids and I feel for the idea that they feel they are missing out on something. But this is a classic case of "inclination" versus "moral". The inclination is to want to fulfill this desire to raise a child. The ethic is to not unnecessarily create more people that suffer, and to force people into a world based on one's own estimation of how much suffering is good (especially since the amount and kind of suffering for another is unknown as just a fact of the matter). It's then the inclination that must be re-educated, not the ethic.

Everything seems counterintuitive until it becomes the norm. How do you explain people who value being "child-free"? These people don't even have the inclination to have children. They rather live a non-child lifestyle. They don't want to raise them, some don't even like kids (though many do, they just don't want them). This isn't even a small segment of the population. Child-free people aren't antinatalists usually, but they are a growing trend in society, and it grows with each generation, leading to a decline in fertility rates in most developed and highly educated nations. These people simply don't have this "inclination". This is just one of many proofs that the desire for procreation (literally the desire to want kids) is not a function of "instinct" so much as nurture/personal preference. In traditional societies, families are seen as paramount. Religious/tribal notions often reinforce this familial pressure. Family, society, and tradition, reinforces it with enculturated expectations. Many times, especially in atomistic societies (such as this "modern" one), it's a function of existential angst. "What is my purpose without a family"? And it gives at least 20 or so years of solid "something" to pay attention and attend to for parents. It becomes its own reason for existing.. Why work? To help raise a family! Why go on vacation? To take your (or alternatively to get away from) family!. Why do anything? Because of family. It becomes its own built in purpose. But I am not giving justification for causing suffering, unnecessarily (because it gives YOU purpose), only providing some reasons for the procreation inclination. Again, I don't look down on or castigate parents, or people that want kids. They are generally good people, trying to do the right thing, generally. Though of course, there are also plenty of horrible parents as well, but all of this is besides the point. I am just addressing this idea that AN is cold-hearted or doesn't understand that perspective. Most thoughtful ANs do, they just don't think it is relevant in countering or addressing the issue at hand in the ethical consideration.

Not causing suffering isn’t strong enough of a moral code versus the chance at bringing about a human good through that suffering.

Suffering matters greatly to your argument and you take it for granted that everyone should know this suffering, and that no one could dignify this suffering, and instead call it a strawman. — Fire Ologist

So this isn't quite true. It is more than just suffering. If it was just suffering, I would consider myself a hedonic utilitarian or some such. It is rather about not using people by force recruiting them into projects that will harm them. Suffering matters here, but it is the particular nature of preventing suffering absolutely in the case of procreation that makes it exceptionally different than already-existing scenarios, where we are simply remediating suffering (doing the best with what we have, trading greater with lesser harms, negotiating our interests, etc.). Raising a child, forcing education, etc. then can be justified due to remediation measures for preventing greater suffering later on, it is argued. The prevention is not in play anymore. Since someone is born, they DO have interests, goals, etc. It would be wise to trade long terms harms for short term harms in some cases.