Much of Africa, Latin America, and Asia have both water supply and potability problems. Solving these problems for rural and urban areas requires different kinds of solutions -- all involving a great deal of time, effort, and cash. — BC

Right, and I acknowledged the reality vs the ideal. But my question was why that wouldn’t it be priority number 1. Why isn’t there an Agua Potable party? It’s a measurable policy goal. It’s unifying. And it’s really important. Why wouldn’t that be THE major rhetoric in political aspirations?

Indeed, thanks for the response!
A couple things to note.. There are two things we are discussing, and they are a bit diferent:
1) The water shortage problem, and that affects almost every country, or at least parts of every country with significant resource strain, etc.

2) The water potability problem. This seems to affect certain countries. Latin America, as you mentioned is quite well-known for this, especially because they are widely visited by vacationers who are warned to bring bottled water, etc.

My question is more about 2- the potability problem. In the DR, if it is known that the water is not very safe to drink without gastrointestinal problems, due to high rates of microbes, why wouldn't there be a country-wide initiative by political factions/politicians to rehaul the whole system?

Now, before we get into the practicality of it, we must agree that ideals and reality can be different. For example, the ideal is for world peace, even if you maintain a functioning and well-trained army because the reality is that this isn't the case. So, why wouldn't there be MAJOR political drives for potable water, being that water is so essential to a healthy life?

I do recall recently reading that Mexico City is not at all far from a severe water crisis. But I do not know much more than this. — Manuel

Ah no problems. Not sure how I thought Brazil, sorry! Does the DR also have similar water problems.. if a tourist went there are they advised to drink out of bottles only, even for brushing teeth? If so, what is it that would prevent governments from doing an absolute overhaul.. I am not saying it's practical even, but rather, why wouldn't that be the ideal.. It seems like it's just a known thing that everyone puts up with. Again, I know the solution isn't easy, but I am talking the politics, ideals, and rhetoric surrounding it.. Like a "Space Race" for potable water.

@Manuel, if I remember, you are from Brazil, so in the hemisphere. Maybe you can speak to this.

@BC, randomly picking you, but you seem to be in the know about random political things, current and historical :D.

It does not follow that my action is moral or permissible just because it does not treat another as a mere means. — Leontiskos

You'd have to qualify this again in context. Perhaps I wasn't really addressing your objection.

But I'd say we can move this to the other thread as I addressed you there, and actually have more to add so going to do that...

That's interesting. I had never put together that freedom could act as a kind of limit to practical reason, just as metaphysics is a limit for theoretical reason. Though I'm not sure it's strictly Kant as this point, it's still an interesting parallel! — Moliere

Two things here...
Isn't Kant's philosophy predicated on a "free will"? So that being said, having the maximum playing field to enact one's will freely, would seem to be entailed for this to be played out, no?

For example, a highly totalitarian society might not allow enough freedom of choice for one to even make a free will decision in regards to various personal decisions...

Also, my deontology isn't strictly Kantian-based, though I think most modern deontology is inspired by his framework... Intent/autonomy/rights/dignity/not being used, etc..

We force a decision upon them either way. I don't see how only one direction is paternalistic. — Leontiskos

Because only when born is it paternalistic, as there is someone aggressed. The aggression only works one way.

Our obligation is to prevent the suffering of persons, not to prevent persons for the sake of suffering. Our primary suffering-obligation is to prevent existing persons from suffering. Additional argument is required to show that this means that we should prevent persons from existing. Your aversion to suffering is overwhelming, and out of sync with common intuitions. Common intuitions merely say that suffering should be mitigated, not expunged at all costs. ...but maybe I would be better off directly addressing Benatar's argument... (and I do so at the end) — Leontiskos

No, going back to the Kant thread, not preventing all counts of suffering BECAUSE (X reason that parent has), IS using as means to an ends, overlooking dignity. It is this crux of dignity that you are missing. It was unnecessary, other than promoting some cause.. That project is done on behalf of the child- hence aggressive paternalism.

Why not? Does existence suddenly become a non-harm once someone is born? Is life bad before we are born and good after we are born? So that we must avoid it before we are born and embrace it after we are born? — Leontiskos

No, because again, one could have been prevented, one violated and justified with mitigation or because of X conflicting reason of the parent, to be carried out for the child, but can never be the child.. there was no child to begin with to even need happiness.. nor to need the suffering which ultimately comes along with it... And again, "merely" becomes a cover for everything. I merely let that thing hurt you because in the future, it could be in your interest. There is an reductio for ya.

Again, why are they not symmetrical? I am guessing that unhappy people correlate to antinatalism and happy people correlate to "pronatalism," because there is symmetricity. Again, the whole thing is based on the question of whether life is good or bad, and that determination should hold steady. So if you really think life is bad then you should think that other people should think that life is bad, and that other people should consent to painless euthanization. If euthanization is not the rational choice for living persons, then why would you promote antinatalism? (Note that when I talk about the "rational position," what I mean is that this is the choice that the rational person ought to freely choose for themselves.") — Leontiskos

I've already answered and you conveniently ignored and cherry picked so I will present it again:

Can it be that once existing, different priorities are considered in regards to harms and goods? Perhaps. For example, I wouldn't recommend forcing X upon someone. But once someone has X done upon them, if it means that they have abc experiences, and they value them, I see no need to get rid of them, unless indeed they thought they were were worthless. So perhaps nothing should have been done to that person, but once it's done, it doesn't take away the value they might have gotten. They do not have to be mutually exclusive. This is a trap many anti-AN arguments fall under. If there is good from a bad, then the bad must not be that bad. That is faulty logic. — schopenhauer1

If X doesn't want to be euthanized because they find life beautiful and valuable, then either they are irrational or else the antinatalism thesis suffers a blow. That person would literally resent your antinatalism, because it sought to "paternalistically" prevent their fulfilling life. These two realities are directly opposed. It is not faulty logic. — Leontiskos

Actually, if we want to use Benatar here, that matters not. If no ONE is deprived of the good, then the decision does no good or bad that "no benefits" took place for someone. The onus is on the creating the bad "for someone". I might even argue that creating bad "for no one" is not good or bad either. It can only be formulated as a maxim for someone making the decision.

And yes, the ethic assumes that creating suffering is more important ethically than promoting happiness. And hence why even the pinprick argument is a sort of shrug because due to the non-existing people to not care about it, it becomes moot. It's only YOU the person existing crying on the sidelines over non-existent spilt milk.

Do you agree that, one way or another, we must make a choice for the unborn? That to give birth is to choose life for them, and that to abstain from procreation is to choose non-existence for them? (Really "them," as I am now swimming in the metabasis). I don't accept the purported neutrality of the antinatalist position, as if so-called "paternalism" is not inevitable. — Leontiskos

No it's precisely this kind of formulation I am against. The only scenario where something would happen for/to them is the one where a person results, none of the others. At this point, it might be helpful to draw a table...

Reconsidered on what basis? I am offering a reductio, and if your argument succumbs then the argument itself is problematic, as it "proves too much." — Leontiskos

No, not really. When you create a fantasy world and that changes the very terms of how existence works, I don't see that as proving anything. What if gravity didn't exist? How would that change ethics? What if time and space could be changed so that we can redo actions? Again, none of this is this world. We can argue facts, but then at least we are arguing what is the case, and not hypotheticals that change how ethics would work because circumstances of the very conditions for ethics have changed.

It wouldn't be wrong in the same way as it is now. But your theoretical does not function as a reductio to any argument that I have offered, and that is the primary difference. — Leontiskos

It's to show an illustration of what is going on when you change things to a certain extent.

Are you starting to see the reductio? The reductio has force because we know that any (2) that can get you from (1) to (3) is faulty argumentation. — Leontiskos

I answered your hypothetical

The fact that "the person wasn't even there to begin with" is what makes the whole antinatalist project so logically out of kilter. — Leontiskos

Makes it unique, but not out of kilter.

It is goofy, and schopenhauer1 is ignoring arguments in the antinatalism thread whilst arguing antinatalism in a thread on Kant. — Leontiskos

Im not ignoring anything. But I’ll look at the rest

Seems a bit goofy to me. — Moliere

I mean again, Kant thought not lying to a killer was appropriate if one was to be truly moral, assuming with a straight face, so I guess any philosophy can be deemed so...

You could get around all this notion of suffering simply by noting, or adhereing to, a duty to preserve life, suffering or no. — Moliere

But ironically, it is the duty to prevent life that would do this (presumably not doing so would fail to prevent the suffering that could have been easily prevented. Not like losing limb for country, or um, not lying to a killer).

I think a hedonic ethic or a utilitarian ethic or a consequentialist ethic will serve AN better. Not that you couldn't put AN into deontology -- here you are doing it -- but others will have different maxims from you, and part of deontology is respecting others' choices. — Moliere

And I agree it works on multiple grounds.. It works on negative rule utilitarian grounds. It does not work on totalizing/classic utilitarian grounds, or rather, if it does, it leads to contradictions. I also just don't believe those types of ethics are actually "moral", as I think it conflicts with basic deontological considerations which I am laying out here.

You want an ethic that lets you tell when others are wrong, but deontology is more about the self choosing actions, I think. It's only in the eyes of God that we could tell if someone is right or wrong, but we only have the eyes of a human. — Moliere

Granted, which is why I think the freedom to choose is part of deontological considerations.

And in any case, while AN isn't self-contradictory, if you're to respect the autonomy of other human beings you have to let them make their own choices under deontology, which would include having children. (it's not like that's self-contradictory... ) — Moliere

That would be a strawman to what I am saying as I never said that someone's choice should be limited here, so not sure why this part is necessary to include.

There are circumstances where I can imagine having a child violates the 2nd formulation -- say that you decide to have a child to save a marriage. That would be something where I can see how the child isn't being thought of at all, but is a solution to a problem: a marriage. That seems to violate the second formulation.

But I'm not seeing it for all birth. Sometimes people have children because they want their child to have a better life than they had, for instance -- they care about the child as an individual. In those circumstances I'm just not seeing how you could make the case. — Moliere

Because of the what I have been repetitively saying now- that causing known/unknown conditions for suffering, EVEN FOR THE GOAL of some positive ethic (happiness, etc.) is still causing those known/unknown conditions of harm that could have been prevented. And which is why I made the distinction with preventative to palliative. So my claim of how I am looking at violating the 2nd formulation is that if you overlook or BYPASS the preventative of suffering, to in fact cause the very conditions that someone will suffer, SO THAT you can follow through with a project, EVEN IF FOR THE CHILD, it is still using in such a way, even with the caveat of "merely" as a means, in fact, duly so because there is no way to cause the suffering that must then be mitigated, as it is known that suffering will occur. In other words, you cannot justify preventing suffering (or actively promoting it even), in the justification that later, you can MITIGATE it for someone.

You can swing back at me with general child-rearing or government actions, but I already addressed that with palliative versus preventative, and government I'd rather not discuss as much as its a category error to apply it to personal ethics, but even if so, go back again to palliative and preventative.

Also, something Rawls points out, deontology is a literal lack of a goal: so to treat someone so that they fulfill a goal would be to violate them. — Moliere

Again, my point.

In one sense treating others to become better, for instance, is to treat them as means to an end: to the end of virtue. Even if they would, in fact, be better, we wouldn't be respecting them as end-makers if we manipulated them into being good, regardless. — Moliere

You almost understand my AN ethic.. That is to say, to create someone who will suffer unnecessarily is to use them as a means for something other than the person. As the person wasn't even there to begin with.

Well, if they are a slave and the apple is merely meant to nourish them to better serve me, then yes. But if the apple is intended for their own intrinsic good, then no. I don't have to ask them if they desire nourishment before I can legitimately give the apple. As long as I think it will serve them in themselves apart from any motive on my part, it is not treating them as a mere means. — Leontiskos

That is to say, to create someone who will suffer unnecessarily is to use them as a means for something other than the person. As the person wasn't even there to begin with.

That, however, is a far cry from having children at all schopenhauer1 -- I think utilitarianism, and psychological hedonism would be better friends to you than deontology, at least if you want to universalize anti-natalism (I did admit some conditions where I could, and even in my own life I can see, where having children isn't a good choice -- but the universal program is a bit much for me) — Moliere

If suffering is given a priority and is tied into not using people as a mere means to an end, then it certainly can be deontological to not cause unnecessary suffering. Think about it.. All justified harm to someone is MITIGATING whilst unnecessary harm causes it for no reason necessary FOR THE PERSON (or potential person) IN QUESTION.

Again, the invalidity of your argument lies in confusing a prohibition with an allowance. Kant is saying, "You cannot use others as a mere means." This does not mean, "If you are not using others as a mere means, then whatever you are doing to them must necessarily be okay." It is logically impossible to use the second formulation as an excuse to act. The second formulation prohibits actions, it does not greenlight actions. I think you would see this more easily were not the planet of antinatalism exercising an undue gravitational pull on your thought. — Leontiskos

But that's my point, dear Leontiskos, that negative ethics take priority! One doesn't violate the negative ethics to promote some welfare creating one.

But Kant's position on lying follows even from the "merely." When you call into question the legitimacy of the "merely" you do not soften the prohibition on lying, you significantly strengthen it. So if you think Kant's position on lying is incorrect, then a position which calls "merely" into question would be all the more incorrect. — Leontiskos

I am not necessarily denying the "merely", but simply saying that the application can be quite tricky. That is to say, if I create conditions for someone else's suffering, justifying it by some cause, in what way is that not using someone? And if you say, it is, but they are not merely using someone, how is that not a slippery slope? If I beat someone to make them stronger, and then at the end of it, they indeed are stronger, am I not violating their dignity? Well, you might say "No, because it is not MERELY using them" that is simply "USING THEM", as indeed, I can always say that I was looking out for them by way of initially harming them..

But you will protest, but then that is my point... that WHERE to draw the line of "MERELY" is tricky.

The claim that such a purchase is an "excuse to cause harm," is highly implausible — Leontiskos

I wasn't saying that example was an example of using "mere" for justification. But of course, there are others that are more egregiously so.

At the very least it is an undue imputation of motive. (And if you insist on the idea that the shopkeeper consents, then consider the tourist who asks a native for directions. It's not as though every time we "burden" someone consent is involved.) — Leontiskos

Well, it depends. I would contend that again, not all circumstances require preventative action. Am I disrespecting the dignity of the native by asking for directions? Well, there is one scenario where one simply says, "Excuse me sir, I need directions to X".. That would be not merely using someone. However, if I was to say, "Excuse me sir, I need directions to X, but I am giving you no choice but to help me, and don't worry, after you help me, you will thank me later for the privilege of having me force you to do so" then we are giving no "outs" for the native, and disrespecting is right to decline.

The key problem with your reliance on consent is that it is moot for Kant. For Kant you cannot use someone as a mere means even if they consent to being used as a mere means. Consent is irrelevant to the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative. — Leontiskos

Indeed, nor would I place all of a justification ONLY on consent. I usually say, violating someone's dignity...Consent is one component of that.

The first problem is that this is invalid: even if antinatalism were true there could still be true moral principles that do not prohibit procreation. Not every moral principle will justify every moral conclusion. — Leontiskos

Again, I am allowing "merely" but if it is not being an excuse to actually violate dignity... In other words, "I get to use you for X, because I have in my heart that it is good for you". That can become a slippery slope.

The second problem is that this is more a dispute over antinatalism than a dispute over Kant. Your argument has no force for anyone who doesn't already agree with you on antinatalism, and antinatalism is a highly controversial thesis. As I said, we already have a thread on antinatalism. — Leontiskos

I mean, Kant himself is highly controversial and I am trying to keep this at the level of Kant. Kant thought that lying is technically wrong no matter what, including about where your friend is when people are out to kill him, so if you think AN is controversial...

I think Kant is rightly interpreted as prohibiting using others as a mere means, and I think it is a social impossibility to try to remove that word, "mere." If we remove that word then we cannot buy goods from the shopkeeper at all. — Leontiskos

I responded that “mere” should not be an excuse to cause harm, by use of it as justification to do so. This is why I made a distinction between preventing and mitigating that which was not prevented. And thus, negative ethics takes precedent, unless someone is already in need of mitigation (hence how child-rearing, for example, falls under mitigation).

:razz:
Well I provided my response

One thing that comes to mind is that I think of it as not merely using people. — Moliere

Yes clearly I don't agree with this idea. Merely allows a LOT of leeway. But say we are granted "merely", I don't think causing (all future) harm to mitigating harm would fall under "merely", that is an agregious use.. But again, since decisions are ambiguous with Kant, my theme here seems to be popping up, that we are going to be stuck as to what counts.. I say this certainly counts as not simply "merely".. For example, I can say that I can FORCE you into a game because I think you would like it, without your consent, and you can say "Because I was thinking of YOUR interests, I can be justified". But that really does fly against autonomy, non-malfeasance, and the rest that you would think that goes with respecting someone's dignity, and not using that person. So I don't think "merely" should be used as a "do what you want" card because you can always justify anything by saying that you weren't "merely" using them...

when, in your heart of hearts, you ask yourself if you're using people, even if you do not want to use people, you'll admit that you go to the shop keeper not because you're following a duty, but because you want to buy something for yourself. (EDIT: That is, you are using the shopkeeper, but you don't need to use him merely as a means to an end -- you can still respect his humanity) — Moliere

Sure, but the shopkeeper, of his own volition is working there, and is choosing to interact. He wasn't forced. But in a way, he was.. He was forced to be in the situation whereby he needed to find a way to live in the first place, which was unasked, and forced... Not "merely" anything.

So going along with anti-natalism: if the reason you're creating a child is to use the child as a means to an end, and there is nothing more to it than that, then sure. But I think many parents feel a deeper attachment than that: they can recognize the biological inclination to continue on the species while at the same time treat their children as more than means to satisfying that biological inclination.

There are many maxims, after all. — Moliere

Indeed, but it's precisely this way of thinking that can justify doing anything in an aggressively paternalistic way towards another. I can force X upon you, because I deem it is good for you. That to me, is disrespecting an individual. There is the imposition, and then there is the negative outcome from the imposition.. In fact, TWO uses of imposition which make this a wrong.. Force-Imposition, Burden-Imposition. In this case it is the prevention of both a force-imposition AND a burden-imposition. Mitigating an already-existing set of impositions would be AFTER the initial preventative measure was bypassed and USING this notion to justify bypassing it.

Go on. — Moliere

That's the crux of it. There can be a lot more:
Don't cause harm, and justify it by mitigating harm if you didn't have to.
Don't assume for others what is good for them, and worth suffering for, especially without consent.

All this comes down to the second formulation of not using people.
Don't use people, disrespecting their dignity, by putting them in harmful conditions because you have positive-ethical project you would like to see carried out.

Sure. But if you're asking "How do we make a choice?" then it seems obvious -- we don't always make choices based on maxims, but upon inclination. — Moliere

Yeah sure, but I'm not sure that contradicts what I was saying about dignity. If you don't want to follow a maxim, don't follow a maxim.. According to Kant, that would not be moral though.

If I was to force someone into a game of unknown amounts of suffering, even if I gave them the tools that may or may not help mitigate it, and even if there were benefits from this force, it was still an unnecessary force. One would be using the other for some end, whether that is "living", "carelessness", "happiness-promotion", "legacy", or "something to do". All these other "reasons" would be indeed self-interest, or as you might say, "inclination".

Only if we must always have a maxim in order to make a decision -- but given that Kant believes we usually follow our inclination, rather than a moral maxim, we could just admit that there's no maxim here to making a choice. — Moliere

I am not getting what you mean. Kant would say we follow our inclination but should follow a moral maxim.

Where's the violation of dignity in feeding the hungry? — Moliere

It's more complicated I should say. All things being equal, certainly feeding the hungry is recognizing dignity. But if you save a person after putting them into harm, that would not be recognizing dignity. So, if you could have prevented the harm to someone, but instead did things that allowed harm, so that you can justify it by taking care of the problem afterwards, that would not be respecting someone's dignity. So it is a matter of preventative over palliative if possible, not bypassing preventative with the justification of palliative.

Not want to, it's your duty too -- even in misery, you have a duty to not commit suicide, by kant. So even if the anti-natalist demonstrates that hedonism is satisfied this will not move the deontologist who is fairly easy to imagine having a duty to preserve life, given the Christian trappings. — Moliere

About that, I think the second formulation and the "not causing suffering" go together, so can be uncoupled by the, as you say, "Christian trappings" of "preserve life".

Most deontological ethics revolve around dignity. I think autonomy, non-malfeasance, non-paternalism, etc. fall under this ethic, and leads to one that is negative ethics. A positive ethics, "We must live for X cause/objective", becomes a violation of the respect of someone's dignity.

So if a person held to some maxim, which is that doing such and such is a good thing or not doing such and such is a bad thing — Moliere

But my point was that maybe one cannot discern this is "a good thing". For example, if I tell myself, "Don't make the cashier go back to the register from the window to get the quarter he owes me. Let him keep the quarter because I can afford not taking the quarter and rarely use change..." Can that be universalizable? Perhaps, but then someone else can say, "No sir! That quarter, if you don't let the cashier give you the quarter when it is owed you, then it justifies not being provided one's fair share!" Or another person might say, "No sir, if everyone was to not take money they are owed, then the principle of saving and thrift would be violated, even if one can afford it!".

Now, this EXTREMELY minor, but that's the point.. Everyday living is unclear and full of contradictions and hard to discern values that often compete. Just following one version of an imperfect duty might override another version of an imperfect duty.

Now, it looks like you are prepared to say that Kant thinks that as long as we are following this imperfect duty out of respect for universal law, then it is all good. But then, how is the universalizable principle useful to tell us what to actually do? It becomes impotent. You seem to indicate that here:

So if a person held to some maxim, which is that doing such and such is a good thing or not doing such and such is a bad thing, and it's done out of respect for the moral law rather than inclination then it is moral. — Moliere

At least, this is what I would say. I'd think that for a maxim to fall to the first formulation it'd have to somehow mimic those examples where the maxim followed by an individual in a society can be followed, but if somehow everyone magically started to follow that maxim no one could follow the maxim anymore. — Moliere

That is the first formulation in regards to perfect duty, not imperfect duties. A lot fewer things fall under a performative contradiction. It is arguable that even the perfect duties could be interpreted rather indecently by someone who doesn't mind living in a "man eat man world", Mad-Max style, so they never thought of it as "theft" to begin with, just "might makes right". And we are at square one, because their ethic universalized would be just what they are doing.. "Come get it, bitch, or I will take what's mine!". Not decent at all!

In terms of a dispute between two decisions, well -- that'd be a split in the soul, in the case of an individual trying to make a choice. And of course choices are hard -- but that's what the power of judgment is about! :D — Moliere

In fact, his notion that people should do things to maintain a society because then we wouldn't be alive to enact our free will in the first place, assumes a certain goal that doesn't seem to itself have justification. "Well don't you want to live in a society so you can carry out your ends?" can be answered, "No, not if it means that suffering exists!" And hence, antinatalism.. Ironically though, it is based on Kant's second formulation (that people have dignity), that I think the real value of a basis for ethics is defined more clearly, and is part of a basis for antinatalism. "Not causing suffering" is no longer a contradiction in regards to procreation, if we consider that the decision will affect someone.

Indeed, but then ethics is telling us very little how to act if the choices aren't really clear, but just there to make you feel better that you had a reasoning behind the decision.

But oddly enough, the Protestant background comes into play... As faith alone in the belief in Jesus is considered the height of Protestant understanding of salvation, so too does one's faith in respect for the universal law as the arbiter of "moral worth" for Kant. However, again, this might be seen as not enough, as we can never know if the decision itself was morally good, only our faith in our belief in the decision's intent.

I'm not sure a person can adopt the maxim that "Everybody should not. . . " -- that's not of the form of a maxim, is it? Individuals will maxims, so quoting from the Groundwork of metaphysics of morals: — Moliere

I mean reformulate it how you like to fit the definition of a maxim.

Since the ethic is based in freedom which one's we pick to universalize is kind of up to us -- but a meta-ethical description from the philosophy would say that if you picked a maxim which might only look universalizable but carries special exceptions to it then it would fail the first formulation and could not even be a candidate for the moral law (since it, somehow, undermines the notion of law itself) — Moliere

But that's the point, is that it's hard to figure out in every situation.. and since..

Given the large use of jurisprudence in Kant, and especially taking after his deduction, I take it that if we wanted others to adopt our maxims we'd have to present them in some sense as we would to any tribunal of reason: So we tell which ones we can universalize through rational judgment. — Moliere

...there's no objective tribunal, it's hard to tell what matters and what doesn't, and thus, it's hard to determine who is applying it correctly.

You may think being an asshole isn't universalizable, but I might think it is. And even the subject of this thread.. the Pietism for which he may have been influenced comes in mostly it seems, in the parts of his philosophy whereby he thinks we are being moral when we will ourselves out of respect of the law, which is a state that is impossible to ascertain.

And regarding that earlier concept of communal self-interest the question arises of whether a failure to universalize results in a contradiction or whether it results in societal disintegration. For example:

If everyone follows the maxim "Do not lie" or "Always tell the truth", that would not lead to some contradiction in actions between the group of people who have adopted the maxim.
— Moliere

...Moliere talks about a "contradiction in actions between the group of people," which is apparently social conflict. — Leontiskos

Could this distinction be between perfect and imperfect duties? I see imperfect duties as close to Rawls' Veil of Ignorance. What do you think?

I found this website helpful in a very brief sketch of the problems:
https://myweb.ecu.edu/mccartyr/GW/perfectandimperfectduties.asp

Though I don't think it's that hard, given Kant's examples and reading in context, what he has in mind. If not then I'd be on flimsy footing with respect to my assertion that we can differentiate the four formulations in the way I've attempted to make them more mutually supportive. — Moliere

It does seem rather hard because how are we to determine if something like, “Everybody shouldn’t be an asshole because if everybody were assholes, we might live in a world without congeniality,” is universalizable? That he would say wouldn’t lead to a logical contradiction. Therefore, it’s an imperfect duty.

However, stealing would lead to a logical contradiction because property itself would be undermined if everyone followed this. I am sure that there are many maxim that if universalized would lead to contradictions or absurdities. It’s hard to figure out what rules would be necessary to universalize and what ones are not important enough for this universalization.

On a tangent based on last notions of CI.. IF CI cannot be practically reasoned as to "what" counts as universalizable, what practical use is it?

For example, if All X, did Y, then there would be no need for X.. I know he presents "perfect" and "imperfect" as a way around this, but how is this really solving the problem and not being accused of ad hoc rationalizations of this "pristine" ethic that arises from the non-empirical?

Rather, I think the second formulation is simply a good basis to deem an ethics proper from, because it provides a locus of ethics (the individual), and the content of the universal principle (dignity, people as ends). Any other universalizability principle from the first formulation is bound to come up with application problems as to how one can and cannot universalize.

Without something good in life to compare to, how would we recognize suffering. We had to have a happy finger first before we could say that on prick was suffering. But then, does that mean the good and happy finger is a cause of the suffering too? — Fire Ologist

Suffering is intrinsically negative and harmful regardless of comparative happiness. The existence of suffering is ethically significant on its own, as it involves harm and distress that should be prevented when possible.

But maybe life is living. And living is many things, with the many things we live with. One of them is suffering. One of them is ecstasy. One of them is sleeping. One of them is a pin-prick, or reading. Life is reading, right now. — Fire Ologist

Promoting happiness at the expense of causing harm violates the principle of non-malfeasance by justifying harmful actions for potential positive outcomes. It involves using individuals as means to an end, imposing projects on them without their consent, and treating them as tools for achieving broader goals. Ethical consistency requires prioritizing the avoidance of harm and respecting individuals' autonomy and dignity, rather than foisting known and unknown conditions of harm upon them, for the sake of some positive-ethical external objectives.

Also, this premise is where we assume a sub premise “suffering is only bad.” Suffering is bad, but it is not only bad. Some suffering is called work. Some called really hard work. Some called loving. Some called longing. Some longing is suffering deeply. Some longing is not. — Fire Ologist

While some people argue that suffering isn't all bad and can lead to growth, this idea falls short when you look at the bigger picture. First off, suffering is inherently harmful. Even if it might lead to some positive outcomes, the immediate distress and pain it causes shouldn't be ignored or justified. The principle of "do no harm" should always come first, and causing suffering to potentially promote happiness just doesn't cut it ethically. Plus, making someone else suffer because you believe it's good for them totally disregards their right to make their own choices. It's like deciding for them that the end justifies the means, which is a huge overstep.

Treating people as tools for achieving a goal (like personal growth through suffering) is another major issue. People aren’t just instruments for projects we believe in. Everyone has different ways of dealing with and understanding suffering. What might be a meaningful struggle for one person could be devastating for another. This unpredictability means you can't assume suffering will lead to positive outcomes for everyone.

Respecting personal autonomy is crucial. Everyone should have the right to decide whether they want to endure suffering for a potential benefit. Foisting this decision on someone else is ethically wrong and incredibly paternalistic. It’s like saying, "I know what's best for you," which often isn't the case. Growth and fulfillment can happen through positive experiences and challenges that don't involve suffering.

Finally, there's a big difference between preventing harm (preventative ethics) and trying to fix it after the fact (palliative ethics). Creating situations where suffering occurs and then trying to justify it with potential benefits is backwards. It’s better to avoid causing harm in the first place. All in all, assuming that suffering is valuable and imposing it on others without their consent is unethical and dismissive of individual autonomy and well-being.

After reviewing your P2, that last response answers that as well, so moving on...

This conflates begetting, or giving new life, with infliction on a subject. When we inflict, we inflict upon. There must be an object that we inflict something specific like suffering upon. But that object is missing in the syllogism. Take the antinatalist negative approach and flip it, and you see the hole, the missing object when one tries to inflict something onto the unborn, the non-existent.

If we do not procreate we will not inflict suffering upon……..who? (I get it, the answer is: on the possible child that would have been had you gotten pregnant.). But really, who benefits when I do not have a kid so I can not inflict suffering? Can I say I benefited 10 babies because I was going to have at least 10 kids, but now since I’m an antinatalist, I benefited 10 people? That seems really odd. But if making up some number of never-existing people as beneficiaries of my good antinatalist deeds is odd at all, so is saying I benefitted one person. There is no one person who benefits if you conflate the Infliction of suffering with procreation and respond by not procreating. I’m just procreating. There is no one there to enjoy my mon-procreation with, as there is no one to say “thanks for not inflicting suffering on me” because I didn’t create any such life. — Fire Ologist

This principle doesn't need to be about a specific person who benefits or says thanks. It's about the ethical stance of the decision-maker to prevent harm. The decision not to have children because you want to avoid causing potential suffering is about maintaining an ethical standard. Saying "who benefits?" misses the point because it’s not about imaginary future people celebrating your decision. It's about your commitment to an ethical choice that avoids creating a scenario where suffering is possible. It’s not about benefiting non-existent beings; it’s about making a responsible and ethical decision based on the understanding that creating life inevitably involves creating suffering, and the ethical imperative to avoid this suffering outweighs other considerations, and the recognition that not doing so, is a paternalistic overstep in foisting one's projects onto another, using them. So, this strawman argument oversimplifies and misrepresents (this particular) antinatalist position.

When thinking ahead for the unborn-yet-to-be-procreated persons, the potential ones antinatalism is trying be ethical toward, couldn’t we just as easily instead think of those unborn persons and make the rule “one cannot deprive someone of happiness without their consent.” — Fire Ologist

No, causing happiness is not an obligation in the way NOT causing harm is. Causing pain in order for them to also have happiness is still a violation of non-malfeasance.

Happiness-promoting is not obligatory, and especially so if to promote happiness you knowingly create the conditions for someone else to be harmed. Procreation creates the very need for palliative measures to mitigate suffering. Preventing harm by not procreating avoids creating this need altogether.

Antinatalism isn’t tailored to the specific problem it is trying to prevent, and is way overboard of a response to just suffering. — Fire Ologist

Again, you ignore what it means to cause suffering and back-filling the justification after-the-fact with palliative ethics. You don't intentionally cause the situation for which you think you then have the remedy. And since you really ignored my argument, and simply show your distaste, I don't know what else to say other than you have failed to show any meaningful objections other than indeed your distaste for the logic.

The ethics are to do with our actions now. Not unborn people. The potential suffering itself is not hte moral crux. The action that (on the balance of probabilities) will make it come about, are. This is a gross oversimplication (or, overcomplexification, depending where you stand) of the point of antinatalism. — AmadeusD

Yep

Then it would stand to reason you are an anti-abortionist? Someone who would not look twice pulling out in the road? Wouldn't remove broken glass from a playground? These are all potential harms to no one in particular (the A-symmetry argument beats this anyway). A starker example is, why keep NICU's sterile? Hehehe. — AmadeusD

Yep/.. I am not sure why @Fire Ologist isn't quite getting this.

Benatar, particularly, addresses this issue. It is far more likely the figure is closer to 80% (this is interpolation based on my thoughts along with his arguments around it). Polly-Anna syndrome is rife. Most people are genuinely mistaken about how often they suffer. That said, I'm unsure this is a particularly strong anti-natalist argument anyway. I don't care what living people think about their lives. The vast majority of anti-natalists hold that the living have a deep interest in continuing to live. Perhaps there are situations in whcih this isn't the case, but overall, its hard to find examples of that.

Your earlier two objections are to stronger arguments, and I think your objections are just your taste. They aren't logic objections or reasonable ways around the claims made. They just illustrate that you do not accept htem, prima facie. That's fine. None of that has to do with the strength or weakness of hte anti-natalist position other than how it strikes you (weakly, it seems). — AmadeusD

Yep.

All of these are basically my points as well.

When thinking ahead for the unborn-yet-to-be-procreated persons, the potential ones antinatalism is trying be ethical toward, couldn’t we just as easily instead think of those unborn persons and make the rule “one cannot deprive someone of happiness without their consent.” — Fire Ologist

No because that's the point, that in matters of ethics, preventing suffering is weighted more important than promoting happiness. And indeed, causing suffering in the hopes that one promotes happiness would thus be a violation therewith.

If that is our new rule, it becomes ethical to ask everyone to procreate as much as possible. Which would also be absurd as it would tend to deprive everyone of happiness if everyone was cranking out and trying to manage babies all of the time. — Fire Ologist

But you point out the absurdity indeed of defending certain forms of utilitarianism. In fact, you have stumbled on the repugnant conclusion.

This highlights something else. There is not really any duty one way or the other to non-existing potential people. Antinatalism is good for potential people who will by design never exist. Ethics arises between two existing, actualized people. We can act today thinking of its impact on future people, but until those future people are actual, our present actions can’t be seen as ethical, or not ethical. The ethics of the actions only arises where the people arise, actually. — Fire Ologist

No, not at all. As I said here:

Let me walk you through some situations. Will you grant me that instead of an existing "person", I can instead use an existing "state of affairs"?

If you allow me that, we can use the following analogy...

There is a state of affairs whereby I can put someone in harms way by X action (it need not be procreation).

The state of affairs does not exist yet, however. You can always say, "How can you prevent a state of affairs that is not existent! That situation has not come about yet.. In fact, we don't even KNOW which person might be harmed by the situation, but we know that in all likelihood, a person WILL be harmed, if YOU (the person who is doing the action) does X".

In this state of affairs scenario, it is doubtful you will find this thinking absurd. That is to say, just because there isn't a particular person that this state of affairs will affect, doesn't mean we are not incumbent to prevent the situation. All the more so, the more important the harm that will occur, that it can be prevented reasonably easily, etc. etc. So no, I don't see this situation applying. — schopenhauer1

Also highlighted and not addressed in antinatalism, the world isn’t just suffering, or even enough suffering to contemplate a need to end all human beings. It’s just not compelling. — Fire Ologist

How is it not compelling to prevent suffering when one can?

We don’t need to solve the problem of any suffering. We will want to solve the problem of the individual actual person who is actually suffering greatly. But because of that person’s existence, and because other people experience happiness at times, we don’t need to end all people. — Fire Ologist

But this is exactly the misguided thinking I explain between the tension of preventative and palliative ethics. You don't CREATE the situation of palliative ethics by bypassing the preventative part. I don't CREATE your suffering so that I can help you fix it.

To conflate the situation where the child does not have to experience suffering with the situation where the child does not have to experience suffering because there is no existing child to suffer is part of the problematic equivocation. You are not merely proposing removing suffering from a child, you are proposing removing the existence of the child as a means to avoiding that suffering. — Leontiskos

This seems to be the same problem as Fire Ologist, but a variation. The ethic is on the part of the person enacting the suffering onto the other. At this point, it is not about the "other".

Let me walk you through some situations. Will you grant me that instead of an existing "person", I can instead use an existing "state of affairs"?

If you allow me that, we can use the following analogy...

There is a state of affairs whereby I can put someone in harms way by X action (it need not be procreation).

The state of affairs does not exist yet, however. You can always say, "How can you prevent a state of affairs that is not existent! That situation has not come about yet.. In fact, we don't even KNOW which person might be harmed by the situation, but we know that in all likelihood, a person WILL be harmed, if YOU (the person who is doing the action) does X".

In this state of affairs scenario, it is doubtful you will find this thinking absurd. That is to say, just because there isn't a particular person that this state of affairs will affect, doesn't mean we are not incumbent to prevent the situation. All the more so, the more important the harm that will occur, that it can be prevented reasonably easily, etc. etc. So no, I don't see this situation applying.

If suffering is the real problem, and life has no intrinsic value, then if Thanos can remove suffering by removing life—without causing suffering in the process—then on your principles he should do so. You relegated consent to a caveat, <1. Do not cause suffering, absent consent>. Because Thanos is not causing suffering consent cannot be relevant. If you reject the Thanos comparison then consent must play a more central role than your defensive argument permits. — Leontiskos

I didn't say consent was ONLY necessary when doing harm to someone. In fact, I didn't even mention whether ONCE ALREADY EXISTING, non-existence is or is not considered a harm. You cannot put the genie back. Where as with birth, there is no one that can get consent, NOW someone exists.. The very basis for this kind of deontological basis of ethics (respect, dignity, autonomy, etc.) now applies to a person.

Coming at this from a different angle, if Thanos attempted to obtain consent before snapping each individual out of existence, do you think this attempt would be rationally sound? Does it follow from your argument that consensual euthanization of the entire race is the ideal and rational solution? — Leontiskos

Well, now you've changed it. If he asked, and everyone consented, ethically speaking, this isn't violating an ethic. Whether this is the right "solution", I don't know, because I don't believe already-existing to be symmetrical for never-existing. In modal thinking, never-existing is simply the potential of something to exist, and the already-existing is the factuality of someone's actual existence. Can it be that once existing, different priorities are considered in regards to harms and goods? Perhaps. For example, I wouldn't recommend forcing X upon someone. But once someone has X done upon them, if it means that they have abc experiences, and they value them, I see no need to get rid of them, unless indeed they thought they were were worthless. So perhaps nothing should have been done to that person, but once it's done, it doesn't take away the value they might have gotten. They do not have to be mutually exclusive. This is a trap many anti-AN arguments fall under. If there is good from a bad, then the bad must not be that bad. That is faulty logic.

I think also what you are struggling with is that antinatalism tends to be void of a positive value that we must live for. You can try putting in the value of "not suffering", but that doesn't get at it. Rather, we are NOT LIVING for that value, but rather, preventing that negative state of affairs from befalling someone. On the flip side, any other reason to have a child that is not purely a selfish reason by the parent, is one whereby you want the child to LIVE FOR some value, thus violating the non-harm prevention SO THAT they can live out this value. And it would indeed be on the anti-AN to prove that this violation is fine and dandy without just resorting to "It has always been done this way and thus appeal to tradition, yadayada".

So again, your argument here is bound up with the claim that the world has inherent negative value. More precisely, it is bound up with the claim that human existence has negative value (i.e. is evil). This is in no way tangential. If we remove that premise then your argument disintegrates, does it not? — Leontiskos

No, because you don't need to view the world as evil for this argument, just that preventing suffering is a priority. Tangentially, the world might have inherently suffering, adding to the evidence FOR the suffering of the world though. I refrain from using "evil" though as it sounds like the world is "out to get you", when it could just be an inherent factor of our condition.

It's not at all clear to me that your position is the one that favors inherent dignity and worth. To nix life on account of suffering seems to be contrary to notions of inherent dignity. If humans have inherent dignity, then they have it regardless of negative attributes or accidents such as suffering, disability, etc. That is basically the heart of what we mean by dignity, "Even in spite of your inadequacies, your life still has intrinsic value." Suffering is merely one form of inadequacy. — Leontiskos

So whilst I agree with what you have said there, the point is that paternalistically making a decision on behalf of someone to not prevent them from suffering, and thus basically forcing the conditions of suffering onto them, would not be respecting the dignity, as this becomes aggressive paternalism. You can probably think of your own scenarios where aggressive paternalism would be violating this dignity, other than procreation.

. . . There is the danger here of an argument which proves far too much. Imagine a world where every person suffers a pinprick but no more, and the remainder of their life is pure happiness. Why wouldn't your or Benatar's argument also prohibit procreation in this world? The pinprick of suffering seems to fuel your arguments just as well as extreme suffering. Benatar's asymmetry holds just as well in that case. — Leontiskos

My point was that empirically-speaking, in the real world, there are no such charmed lives, so it is de facto out of the question other than a thought experiment. Supposing only a pin-prick was the suffering, I guess the scenario could be reconsidered. But I just want you to know, every single ethical consideration can be reconfigured if you change the conditions for which ethics plays out... So for example.. What if when you stab someone, they reanimate every time you do it instantly.. would that be wrong? I don't know, but that's not the world we generally live in..

But ok, let me take your bait for taking the strongest position just for the sake of argument..

Benatar thinks indeed, being that no one being deprived of this "almost charmed life", there is no foul. No person harmed, no foul. Rather, the violation still takes place in this scenario. It's not like the child is being "saved" from non-existence, so this isn't a palliative situation either.

No. My argument is if there are no humans around there are no ethics around. — Fire Ologist

Correct...

. Your argument is if the ethics is antinatalism, there would be no humans around. You just just don’t see the absurdity of keeping the ethics in place without the humans to place it there. — Fire Ologist

Huh? I am not following.

If there is no potential for procreation, there is no need for the ethic. Similarly, if there is only one person in existence, there is no need for ethics against murder.

Because as you said “Ethics is present because humans are around.” — Fire Ologist

Your argument is something like this:
"If there are no humans, the ethic cannot be followed".

My point is, "Correct".

And you see a problem there, but I don't see where.

Because it undermines its enactment in the first place when it results in no ethical beings. — Fire Ologist

Why I don't see the problem. "What" is being undermined if there are no ethical beings? You are making it as if ethical beings are necessary to exist in the first place.

If humans disappear because all humans follow the rule, and with humans the rule disappears, then such humans would be being ethical for sake of a world without ethics. — Fire Ologist

And the problem is?

we would be inventing ethical rules to justify not only antinatalism, but mass suicide, after wars to enforce the ethical rule once and for all (if we weren’t too incapacitated by suffering to act at all). — Fire Ologist

But life is not only suffering. We generally don’t think that. At least most of us. Often. — Fire Ologist

I can say that the potential of suffering is always on the table, but that the world isn't constant suffering might be a different standard for things like suicide. Rather, the case isn't being born and leaving, but putting other people into the situation in the first place. I think the AN argument has presented a cogent case against this decision.

And some suffering is good (like right now I’m starving and soon I will be eating). “Hunger is the best sauce. The poor always eat well.” - Sancho Panza, Don Quixote. — Fire Ologist

Yeah, but this indeed highlights the underlying tension between positive and negative ethics. It would be wrong of me to make you suffer just to overcome the suffering. Rather, it was better you didn't suffer at all. And then when you inevitably tell me, "But the suffering is where the meaning is!" Then I would say that this is misguided. If meaning entails suffering, there are a few things going on:

1) YOU should not be the arbiter of the suffering. Even if suffering is supposedly "good", it is not ethically encumbent on someone to take it upon themselves to be the executioner of the suffering onto someone else, violating the dignity, consent, autonomy, of a person, and violating the basic principle of "non-malfeasance" towards fellow humans.

2) Perhaps a world where "meaning" entails suffering, isn't one where it is best to bring someone into in the first place.

2a) Even more salient, and related to this Veil of Ignorance, we don't even KNOW how much suffering one's life might entail. Let's say you think that 22 is the threshold of suffering any average life should have to endure, because that is the number for "growing".. Well, if someone lives a 47 life, you can never predict that, where the suffering has now exceeded the amount necessary for a balanced, happy life. It is now excessive.

3) It is aggressively paternalistic to assume for someone else that THEY need to suffer because YOU think there is some "good" to it. Again, it's the ugly side of "positive ethics". We MUST save blank from certain death is a different situation than we MUST create beings that MIGHT experience happy lives. And you add to this that the cost of this is a lifetime of negative experiences, in unknown quantities, enacted without consent, this simply does not have much merit for its assumptions.

It boils down to whether it is absolute that inflicting suffering without consent is always and only wrong. Life is not only the suffering of being wronged, it is also forgiveness. You really can suffer and move away from suffering. There really are both. I will be done eating today. You can give consent after the fact, after you’ve suffered without consent and say “oh well, life goes on.” Because there is not only suffering. — Fire Ologist

The problem again is with preventative and palliative ethics. In almost every other situation in life, it is a palliative measure.. You temporarily cause discomfort for a child because they need to learn to survive. But not procreating is simply preventing all suffering, period. All things being considered, not causing harm is the ethic that has no need to be violated. There is no one that needs "palliative harm". Rather you are CREATING THE VERY NEED for palliative harm. This is now in the realm of preventative ethics.

Most real suffering is self-inflicted. We break our own rules all of the time, and shoot ourselves in the foot, just so we can say “see, life is only suffering” to ourselves, regardless of those around us. — Fire Ologist

The point is we need not put other people in this situation in the first place. I don't throw you into a game and say "Tough luck, bitch" and then gaslight you by saying, "Hey it's your fault. I tried to give you tools!". It is actually quite manipulative, what you are suggesting.

I just disagree it is moral or ethical that we should only focus on the suffering when deciding what world is better for any other people, such as any future generation. We need to see what is good in life just as well before we make out ethics and enact it. — Fire Ologist

Actually, no we don't. Let's say for the sake of argument that both absolute hellish lives and absolute charmed lives are not really existent (though there is way more evidence for more hellish lives).. Even if there was some mix, the "happiness creating" aspect has no bearing if that happiness is also coming with the "gift" of unknown amounts of burdens. There is no amount of paternalistic ethics that can be justified for such hubris.

Antinatalism upholds ethics high above the life and suffering of the human beings it is designed to promote, and this is absurd to me. If there is to be some grandiose place for any such high and mighty ethical laws, such as “thou shalt not inflict suffering without consent,” then there must be humans there to uphold it in that place. Ending humans ends any good ethical laws protect. — Fire Ologist

You keep claiming this, but for no good reason. Why must there be humans there to uphold it in place?