"From nowhere" like thoughts or moods ... The relationship of sex to pregnancy is statistical not deterministic - not a matter of volition. Not "nowhere" but somewhere other than the couple's (coupling's) choosing. — 180 Proof
Strawman. The "already born" who procreate are not a "third party" ... — 180 Proof
Your argument "discounts" prospective parents - procreators - as already suffering individuals ... — 180 Proof
If frustrating / blocking the desire harms either father or mother or both by not having children, then antinatalism is self-harming. Again, "conditions of harm" are not harm itself ... just as (e.g.) an acorn isn't a tree or a caterpillar isn't a butterfly or breathing isn't singing. — 180 Proof
"The best option" is "best" IFF neither "already born" is harmed by not procreating nor the procreated is harmed by being born - both conditions met - otherwise, it violates the prohibition against doing any harm. — 180 Proof
... then any foundational belief which ends with "... and so we ought to wipe out the human race" is as good a candidate as any I can think of for revision. — Isaac
So to stay on OP, I think that past philosophers would struggle in this venue but that it would truly separate the wheat from the Chaffe and some would adapt and each time struck down would rise more powerful than ever; just like Obi Wan Kenobi, wiser each time. Except for the original actor, who hated the franchise. Hes a bawhair. — Mark Dennis
From the outset, we can’t demand that anyone does anything, but we can demand that they abstain from doing. — Congau
The ideal amount of suffering that a person should cause is zero – an absolute specific number. There is no ideal amount of well-being to be caused. We can only say “the more the better”. However high a number you make (for example the number of people you have made happy in any way) you can always make it higher, and you will never get closer to any perceived perfection. — Congau
Causing zero suffering can conceivably be a duty. You will fall short, but at least you will know when you have transgressed. It wouldn’t make sense to claim that we have a duty to cause as much well-being as possible. You would never come any closer to having fulfilled this duty. — Congau
Ethics by no means stops at negative ethics. A person who does absolutely nothing, is not a good person although he doesn’t cause any suffering. Also, when actively doing something to promote well-being, there will inevitably be missteps on the way that will cause suffering, but it is to be hoped that the suffering will be much less significant than the well-being. — Congau
My point is that pain has very little to do with suffering and science and technology have thus far mostly treated pain. There are cancer patients that are perfectly content and millionaires struggling with depression. There is surprisingly little evidence to suggest that human suffering has declined over time though pain definitely has. — khaled
But on the other hand today it's very easy if you let's say have a totally new idea to contact people with similar ideas. Assume you have a radical insight or new approach to something in philosophy. Now if there is absolutely nobody touching similar issues at all, then likely you are simply put it, crazy. But otherwise with search engines you will find in no time people who have similar ideas to you. And if you are truly ahead of your time, then likely those others that have similar ideas will be glad to hear from you too. — ssu
I still don't understand where you're going with this. If all you have are some unsupported first principles which (on the face of it) are quite odd, and so unlikely to be shared, then what purpose could possibly be served by stating them?
You can't realistically hope to convince others to hold them too - after all, you can forward no rational argument for having them in the first place. You can't expect anyone to be drawn by the consequences - the extinction of the human race. So what is it that compels you to keep writing this stuff? — Isaac
They likely fell to similar responses in their time. It's only when the later generations respect the philosopher. I think it's highly coincidental that someone is put on a pedestal and treated as an important philosopher. What isn't so random is that schools of philosophy emerge in an distinct period of time.
How much would we know about Socrates without Plato? How much would we know about Greek philosophy if the Persians would have destroyed all Greek cities and communities and replaced the people in Greece with some other people and hence utterly annihilated Greek culture? Yet a philosophical school interested in math and logic and creating a basis for proto-science is something that likely would have happened sooner or later even without Socrates et al. — ssu
That's why philosophy classes are often structured such that you read some passages from primary sources in advance of a lecture about that topic, then write about the topic in advance of a discussion group about it. Reading, lecture, writing, discussion, 'round and 'round, filling out your breadth and depth of philosophical knowledge and establishing a well-grounded but agile footing for your own philosophical thought. — Pfhorrest
I would like to see your argument in a logical form, as i can not imagine such an argument which does not beg the question or has premises that i have no reasons to accept. — HereToDisscuss
Yes. Why avoid causing suffering? — Isaac
My feeling with all these antinatalist arguments is that they're putting the cart before the horse. They name some ethical principle which (unless you're religious) can only have been derived from some aspect of human nature. Then they use this one ethic to suggest we should ignore a whole series of other aspects of human nature (the desire to procreate, a feeling of belonging, a sense of community etc).
I just want to know - why pick that one. — Isaac
So I'm just wondering what the point would be. Why not cause suffering? — Isaac
I'm wondering specifically if you have any other ethics or if this radical non-aggression principle is your only aim. — Isaac
So no one has any duty to alleviate suffering? — Isaac
The anti-natal theme in Christianity is quite strong, in the monastic tradition, the celibacy of priests, the Shakers, Cathars, and the general notion of the fallen state of man and the vale of tears. And it ends in apocalyptic fantasies of rapture, second coming and so on.
My question isn't really about relationships, but about the morality. The Shakers were anti-natalist and their way of life did not survive. So there is a pragmatic moral principle that anti-natalists should have children to spread the word. Rather like the Bodhisattva reincarnating after enlightenment... — unenlightened
I didn't ask you how you know there are such people. I asked you how you know there 'always will be' such people, which is the claim required in order to support your position. — Isaac
And i will accept this conclusion that is prima facie counter-intuitive. What is wrong with it? — HereToDisscuss
It was a weaker form of my view that negative ethics entails that we ought to destroy all human life-which was the main topic the whole time. The weakened version was that.
Do you agree with that at least version? If not, which part of my reasoning was wrong? — HereToDisscuss
Certainty is a state of mind. It is an indulgence, people like to think that what they know is certain. However, it is not conducive for a philosopher to take such a dogmatic view, hence it is best forgotten. — A Seagull
So what would be my position if my daughter were so miserable as to wish she had never been born? what would be my responsibility if she were a tedious repetitive proselytising anti-natalist? Should I be proud or ashamed? — unenlightened
I'm also of the view that we are all part of a single being (us and all life), that giving birth doesn't create a new being out of nothing but that it shows us another part of that being, so in that view we suffer because the whole being also suffers, and then it doesn't create new suffering to give birth, what creates new suffering is how we treat others and ourselves. In order for the whole being to get better we have to care for one another, if we simply all stop procreating then other forms of life will take our place, and if somehow all life in the universe disappears then the whole being would simply create another universe and start again. Maybe the way to reduce suffering is neither suicide nor antinatalism, but love. There are so many things we could do to make the world a much better place, so let's keep working in that direction, let's try everything before giving up, the way I see it we have barely begun. — leo
If some people want to give up that's okay, and if they want to share their views on antinatalism that's okay too, but it would be a sad thing if somehow antinatalists came to rule the world and force everyone to stop procreating against their will no matter the suffering they cause. If existence doesn't end with death in this universe (which I firmly believe) then that would cause more suffering than it would prevent. But the way I see it you don't force your beliefs onto others, so if it's therapeutic for you that's good.
Indeed we're all in this together, but while you see the problem in life itself, I see the problem in what we do with life :flower: — leo
Julio Cabrera has some interesting arguments, and I agree with many of them when considered from his point of view, as I do yours. Cabrera is reacting to what he calls ‘affirmative moralities’ - which is not the same as ‘positive ethics’, by the way. Affirmative moralities lack a negative perspective - they seem to be ignorant or in denial of the necessity of pain, loss, lack and humility, not just to experiencing life, but to existence. By ‘Affirmative morality’ Cabrera refers to a positive ethics that fails to acknowledge its own limitations. But Cabrera’s (and your) ‘objective’ and universal evaluation of these necessities as ‘harm’ is an equally limited perspective. — Possibility
But a non-judgemental view of pain from all possible perspectives of existence (not just of life) shows it to be simply an awareness that energy, effort or attention is necessary to adjust to change. That we accept and even invite pain in our life as evidence of effort or resilience in an ever-changing world is not to suggest that pain is ‘good’ instead of ‘bad’, but that it is both - and ultimately neither. In a universe where change is ubiquitous, it’s understandable that pain is a fundamental experience, so it seems ridiculous in this light to call it ‘harm’ - as if existence without instances of pain were possible - or to include all possible instances of pain in a single moral perspective. The negativity of pain stems from its significance to our experience of life, not from its meaning. By understanding the meaning of pain as both positive and negative, we can make more effective use of it as an informative experience. — Possibility
Cabrera is correct in arguing that most moralities reject the negative in favour of the positive, but even his own morality exists within a limited perspective of life. When we recognise the limitations of this perspective, we can then begin to understand that what is both ‘bad’ and necessary in this perspective could relate to the broader universe in a more meaningful way than we think. — Possibility
Procreation, regardless of whether we consider it good or bad from whatever perspective, is objectively not necessary. I think that’s the important thing that everyone needs to understand. But the ignorant will continue to believe it is what they are supposed to do, for whatever reason. Most of those reasons are directly related to their value systems, their moral perspective. So you can argue from a moral perspective if you want to, but you’re spending all your time arguing for your moral perspective, which is far more difficult and complex. If that’s your agenda (and I suspect it is), then go for it, and I’ll leave you to it.
But if your agenda is antinatalism, then I would suggest that it’s certainly possible (and more flexible) to argue its merits from an amoral, objective position. — Possibility
Well, the discussion was not about that, but if you really want to criticize my position, please do it without assuming that ethics should be based on the individual and not society as that is just begging the question. Why is "overlooking individuals for 'third-parties'" bad? — HereToDisscuss
Violating the principle by forcing everyone not to procreate is not bad as one is preventing harm from the violation of non-aggression by doing so.
I believe that just entails my conclusion above, which is what i was trying to say the whole time. It is a case of one's non-harm principle and non-aggression principle being violated from something else. — HereToDisscuss
I don't. It's my personal choice. I just looked at how I act when it comes to any other situation where one can choose to use another's resources in any way. Most people (including myself) are risk averse in those scenarios. For example if I saw a house I think you like going on sale, I wouldn't just steal your credit card and buy it without your consent simply because there is a chance you don't like it or don't want to spend the money right now. I doubt you would either. So I just extended that to procreation out of a desire for consistency. — khaled
I believe most homeless people suffer from depression due to the dangerous nature of sexual relationships. I believe many homeless people could find peace by making some sort of peace with their former lovers. Unfortunately homeless people are very often the types to take relationships very seriously which is largely what drives them to for lack of a better phrase "an extreme lifestyle". — christian2017
If no amount of uncertainty is acceptable, what does this mean for human interaction in general?
It seems to me man can never be absolutely certain of anything. Wouldn't that make all human interaction immoral, in your view? — Tzeentch
"The conditions of harm" are not the harm itself. And there is no "aggression" against an embryo that gestates through foetal and prenatal stages to live birth. Harm and aggression only apply to a sentient human being which a human foetus only becomes once her thalamocortical system is fully connected (enabling pain circuitry and sensorimotor coordination (i.e. functional sentience)) in CNS around 26th week, that is, the last trimester of pregnancy, and then thereafter. Prenatal sentients are always indistinguishably "already born" persons (e.g. premature births); therefore, negating any increase in harm simultaneously reduces hindrances to positive growth and well-being. — 180 Proof
Of course, abstinence, contraception or sterilization only prevent conditions of fertilization and pregnancy but do actual harm to the "already born", who desire to procreate, by depriving them - whether by State Coercion (e.g. Nuremberg Race Laws, Margaret Sanger's "Negro Project" (& other U.S. eugenics sterilization policies)) or Ideological Conformity (e.g. millenarian, malthusian, eco-catastrophist, antinatalist, etc) - of procreating. Is this 'desire to procreate' morally wrong? No. That would be accusing them of "thought crime", which like "blasphemy", harms the integrity of persons. There simply aren't any grounds to judge any desires "morally wrong" absent harmful conduct or without aggravating factors in attempts to exercise or fulfil them. — 180 Proof
Your 'metaethical' argument, schop 1, just doesn't hold up under scrutiny which exposes again that it's a false dichotomy; 'negative ethics & positive ethics' entail each other in practice; the choice isn't ever 'either dystopia or utopia' (i.e. mammon or Eden, hell or heaven), but rather to struggle - alone and collectively - with the choice: to do or not to do to anyone what you find hateful, or harmful. The more reasonable interpretation is, I think, (mine) to avoid mitigate or relieve NET harm rather than (yours) to, much less reasonably, (attempt to) prevent / eliminate ALL harm. — 180 Proof
I don't think so. This just means that (your? Cabrera's?) conception of ethics is (too) ideologically, or rigidly, one-sided to be widely applicable in the "messy" real world. Thus I differ in my metaethical interpretation previously (above). — 180 Proof
Only "no conditions" (i.e. no exceptions, no edge cases, no reflexivity) which your ruleset doesn't account for ... à la Kant's "CI" mistake redux. :roll: — 180 Proof
So what amount of uncertainty is acceptable? Or is uncertainty always unacceptable? — Tzeentch
I meant it differently. How can parents of happy children be held responsible for another couple's unhappy children? The way you phrase your previous argument you make it sound like parenting is a combined effort by all parents everywhere. I disagree with this. I think it is an individual effort and it should be judged on an individual basis. — Tzeentch
And you believe this is what makes procreation immoral, no matter how good the "odds"? — Tzeentch
Okay, what does that have to do with anything again? — HereToDisscuss
Premise A: For every situtation, the principle applies to that situtation if and only if the person affected is fully autonomous (or is autonomous enough) and following that principle will not result in the principle being broken by someone else.
Premise B: Following the non-agression principle in this particular case will result in the principle being broken by humanity. (Because humanity will procreate and thus violate it many times, not to mention will force animals to procreate too)
Therefore, the principle does not apply to this particular case.
If you have a problem with Premise A, then give me your own rule like i said just before the thing you quoted. — HereToDisscuss
Well, there doesn't have to be, unless you believe that parents of happy children are somehow also responsible for unhappy children. — Tzeentch
I suppose this ties in with that last line: I don't see how successful parents can somehow be blamed for the failure of unsuccessful parents, which is what I believe you are implying. — Tzeentch
There will be another generation, that generation will have problems to solve. Those are not ideological commitments, they're just inductive beliefs. I have two choices - have children and raise them to help solve those problems, or not have children and leave those problems to someone else to deal with. I can't see any sound ethical position which supports the latter. It sounds like nothing but selfishness. — Isaac
I'm asking how you know this. — Isaac
What is 'society' other than 'many individuals'? — Isaac
I'm pointing out that this new tack of 'experimentation' does not add anything new to your previous approaches. If one agrees with your ethical foundation, then it leads to the position you hold. If one has different ethical foundations, they lead to different positions. Your argument that we should not 'experiment' on future generations does not hold if we hold to certain duties (which would then apply also to future generations). If, rather, we only hold to a radical non-aggression principle, your argument stands, but if we hold to such a position, your other arguments stand too, this latest adds nothing. — Isaac
Why is it hubristic for me to state that we know how to make people happy, but not equally hubristic for you to say you know there will always be those who don't fit. How do you access knowledge of the human condition which is hidden from me? — Isaac
Good point - 'experimentation' suggests raising happy (as opposed to distressed) children is an unknown quantity. We know plenty about how to raise happy children, we know plenty about how to make happy adults. The fact that we're not doing either is social and political, nothing to do with procreation. — Isaac
The fact that there exists a distribution between happy and unhappy people doesn't lead to the conclusion that procreation is experimentation. It means that a number of parents are right in their assessment of being able to properly raise children and a number of parents are wrong. — Tzeentch
This attempt to turn "some procreation is bad" into "all procreation is bad" just falls flat in every regard. — Tzeentch
So you have duties to another single individual, but not duties to a number of individuals collectively. That seems like rather an odd ethical position. Which individual should we pick when more than one is going to be effected by our actions? — Isaac
I can't make any sense of this. Either we all simply do as we please (complete respect for autonomy) or we accept duties which constrain our behaviour with respect to the welfare of others. Given the former, there's nothing stopping us having children, given the latter (presuming they are an inherent part of being human) then any children, real or potential, are going to have those duties too. You seem to want to constrain the current generation with ethical considerations, but absolve the next generation of all responsibilities. — Isaac
But, assuming that you have the power to "prevent" people, by not doing it, you let the 15 billion people come into the world and have their consent violated. Are those individuals not the center of your ethical considerations because they are not born or..? The problem is-in the scenario i presented, it is not only the living people that will be autonomous but rather also the people that are not born yet.
Maybe you should say why you think those are not individuals that matter. — HereToDisscuss
But i do not think that is your rule, since we know that people will make babies left, and thus, humanity will break this principle if we continue to follow this principle. Therefore, the principle would not apply to the above scenario.
What exactly is the rule that applies universally? — HereToDisscuss
So it is with this latest incarnation of how evil it is to have kids. We're taking a gamble on the relative consequences for the whole community (or at least, I think we should be - I'm not about to argue that most people make moral choices about having children, I'm pretty sure they don't). — Isaac
So there will be a next generation. The choice then is - is it better for that community that I have and raise children, or that I don't. — Isaac
It seems to follow from this that if one considers oneself more likely to raise children more beneficial than average one is obliged to do so. If one is of the opposite opinion, one is obliged to not. — Isaac
Given the above, the only remaining issue would be if your, as yet, unborn child also carries that duty. If not, then you'd be imposing on their autonomy. But if such a duty of care were not considered categorical, then we need have no care for the future children in any case, so we must presume it is categorical. Given that, we can be certain that our, as yet unborn, children will inherit that duty. It is therefore no additional imposition on them. — Isaac
So the 'experimenting' issue doesn't arise at an individual level. There may be some merit in it at a community level (we're gambling that continuing the human race is overall a good idea), but such decisions (as far as individuals are concerned) have already been made. — Isaac
There seems to me to be two main justifications for having children. Either - "I think they'll like this", or "I think they ought to help with this", or I suppose a bit of both. Both are estimates where there's no loss to the individual for not even taking the bet (the antinatalist argument in a nutshell), but both estimates run a risk to the community from not even taking the bet. — Isaac
