In economic theory, Hayek in his epoch The Road to Serfdom, concludes that it only gets worse when the means of production are in the hands of the government. The classic economic theory just says that you have the choice to live a poor life though, with the opportunity of that changing. — Posty McPostface
When I am useful it is on my own terms, and my worth is based on my control of my time to utilise as I wish. — charleton
As for me, I have been trying for a long time to be useless. I was almost destroyed several times. Finally I am useless, and this is very useful to me. — unenlightened
Well, I think your questions start from the wrong presuppositions. You presuppose we must have a positive reason to procreate and to help - but the truth is that we need a positive reason to do the opposite. Procreating and helping is what comes naturally.
For example, what I like most is problem-solving, pretty much regardless of what problem is in question. I enjoy the process, and it comes naturally to me. It's sort of like being an adventurer. — Agustino
In any kind of society that you'll ever imagine, people will generally be appreciated for their usefulness to others, and this doesn't include just economic usefulness. Helping others is key to being appreciated. Solving your society's problems is likewise key to being appreciated or valued. — Agustino
They can't. The large scale systems we need to live together in large numbers require us to perform certain roles. We can't have a large scale system that enables people to live as if they were hunter gatherers. Only the folks at the top of the heap can live however they want, which is made possible by their vast wealth accumulation. And even the super rich have to drive on the correct side of the road, not try to defy gravity by stepping off of their 80th floor penthouse balcony, and not antagonizing other people too much. After all, a bullet will go through a rich brain as well as a poor brain. — Bitter Crank
Hey, I have to attend to a shelter meal, just right now. That will take the rest of the afternoon to get ready. Shelter meals help destitute, homeless people not die under their bridges. People hate it when that happens. — Bitter Crank
Without granting your usual conclusion that "therefore, not having children is the best response", then yes, all this is true. — Bitter Crank
Marx, for instance, spells this out clearly. One of the tasks of the working class is to reproduce society, so that capitalism can continue. In the heyday of industrial capitalism, most people worked in factories, farms, and allied businesses. Some -- women raising children at home, teachers, religious, doctors, librarians, musicians, volunteers in civic organizations, etc. reproduced society and contributed directly to the transmission of culture.
The working class in Marx's day didn't consume that much (not by choice, but because of their low incomes).
Factory production as a share of work has dwindled, and providing services has greatly enlarged. Also enlarged is the working class's role of consumer. The task of reproducing society is still there, however, and it hasn't changed much. Have children, raise them to be stable, functional, productive people, and transmit the culture. — Bitter Crank
Various groups have tried to escape the system. Some hippies tried living in communes. Some of them succeeded, a handful of these efforts continue, but they have about zero effect on society. Today, much larger group have escaped the system by becoming destitute and homeless, living under a bridge to escape the hot sun and cold rain. This approach works in warmer climates -- it doesn't work very well in cold, northern climates. A bridge is no protection from sub-zero temperatures.
I tried to escape the system for a while by working as little as possible. That approach works until one runs out of cash, then one has to go back to work. — Bitter Crank
Even a suicidal person is looking for relief (read happiness) from his suffering. So, if we want something so badly and the world isn't being helpful why not simply be happy? Is it impossible? — TheMadFool
Humans do not generally reason by principle, they reason by an intuitive glance at whatever the situation is, where the principles are operating discretely in the background. — darthbarracuda
Well put. I call this 'world weariness.' I experience it occasionally. Especially in my 20s, I would sometimes be struck by an intense longing for death. But I was still attached to life, too. So I was ripped in half. Reality was nightmarish, obscene. It was 'noise.' But (humoursly) I could be contemplating suicide, more or less theoretically, and then a pretty girl would cross my path. I would be ripped out of my gloom by her pretty face. Then she'd vanish and I'd laugh at the ridiculousness of this zig-zag. I speculate that there's a shift of eros or libido from the death-object to the life-object to the death-object, etc. We don't lust for death when are lust is aimed at objects that exist. — t0m
For me the desire for the female and the desire for knowledge have been dominant. We might think of this desire for knowledge as narcissistic --since it involves playing the knowledge-hero, being noble via possession of or proximity to the truth-as-god. The dangerous thing about this chasing of truth-as-god is that it involves the ideological violence that can (for us has) put the value of life itself in question. In some sense the most radical and fearless doubt is that which doubts the value of life and therefore of knowledge itself. In short, there is a 'suicidal' potential lurking in the knowledge-hero understood as demystificaiton incarnate. Demystification makes short work of everything sacred. Otherwise out of targets or prey, its greed for domination is turned back against itself. This opens both suicide as a beautifully decisive action and/or 'the laughter of the gods.' For me Steppenwolf is largely about this revelation, and Hesse, of course, sides with laughing with the gods. His protagonist is opened up by sex, drugs, and rock-n-roll jazz to a less rigidly rational or stuffy sense of life. He has visions of the wicked laughter of his hero Mozart (one of the immortals originally justifying his disgust for middle-class intellectual/emotional complacency.) To be sure, Hesse is biased. He is 'decorating' his own choice, not doing science. — t0m
In some sense yes, but not in the typical sense. I acknowledge something like a 'primordial' desire to influence others. There is a 'fight for recognition' of one's own interpretation. But my own view strives for an awareness of precisely this kind of fight. It doesn't escape or pretend to escape from what it describes. That it explains itself (or seems to) is one of its virtues. This theme is big in Kojeve --the idea that a philosophy should be able to explain its own appearance. — t0m
I see that. I understand. I think the sense of winning involves a kind of faith in the unjustified foundation of one's justifications. I postulate a sort of brute self-assertion. But that's another reason that I experience the contingency of perspectives, including (problematically, confessedly) my own. — t0m
I don't deny that there is some hard kernel, but I think the boundaries of this kernel are established by interpretation. — t0m
I do cherish the tool metaphor as a corrective of mind-jamming representationalism. But I think truth as correspondence is great most of the time. I do think, however, that this correspondence paradigm breaks down as we move away from practical life and toward interpretations of existence as a whole. — t0m
I added underlining because I think you missed rationalization as understanding. Of course I believe in the world outside of language. I even believe that understanding is not necessarily conceptual. But I was just trying to stress that our understanding of the world is its conceptual structure 'for us' almost tautologically. To call it a 'rationalization' is of course to add bias to this understanding, but I thought we agreed on that? — t0m
But we've talked about that, in terms of 'post facto.' We are thrown into life. If a titty or a bottle isn't shoved into our mouth, we die. If we don't eat, the brain dies. A pretty face annihilates the pride in one's high talk. We are ripped down from ironic-pessimistic into the primordial game of wanting a smile from that face. In some ways, my view is the opposite of faith in language games. The 'tool' metaphor is an acknowledgement of the primacy of desire. We only represent to accomplish something, possess something, enjoy ourselves as something. This desire glues us to the senses, the world outside language --with the important exception of wanting to be a strong poet. For Bukowski, writing was a way to kick death's ass. I'd say he was really living his death. — t0m
The idea is that we are mostly no one in particular when we move in the daily world. We do what one does, say what one says, drive how one drives. The very language we use is crammed with a pre-interpretation of existence, of the things we encounter. 'This is for that.' This 'they' or 'anyone' is a personification of the generic personality of a culture, a personality we have to 'incarnate' to become functioning, sane adults who are capable of understanding one another. I can't be me until I've become the we and started to question the very 'operating system' that makes this questioning possible.
My current understanding is that our 'finitude' is the impossibility of every getting completely behind or around this inherited 'software.' We might say the desire to get around this finitude is the desire to be one's own father, to have one's foundation in oneself. (Joyce, Sartre, Bloom). I'm sure I'm laying the Heidegger down pretty thick, but I'm pretty dazzled by the fresh territory. It'll become taken-for-granted at some point. 'Whatever we can find words for is already dead in our heart.' — t0m
I don't exactly deny the there there. I would have to appeal to this there in order to deny it. There is something like 'logical space' or 'being-with-others' that is prior to the objective world of science. I say this because I can imagine someone denying that the world of scientific theory is not the true world. The 'true' world is 'primordial' or something understood vaguely as the 'shared world' or the mysterious 'that' to which non-scientific propositions must conform to be correct.
I suppose I do have doubts about the logical space of interpretations of existence. I experience this space in some way to the degree that I believe what I believe. But thinking about this space puts it into question. To be clear, the ordinary version of this space is as intact as ever. I think the houses outside my window are really there. I can't move them or make them vanish with words. But my belief in God vanished once, washed away indeed by mere words. — t0m
That is a great example as you say of what I theorize about, this way that we enclose and neutralize one another's assaults on dearly held beliefs. That's part of the thrill, testing ourselves in a friendly kind of war. I have played bullet-chess obsessively in my day. But 'just trying to prove my point' is somewhat reductive. I really love writing. Conversations with others inspire me. I find new metaphors. I overhear myself. This 'overhearing' is very important, I think. We automatically see ourselves through the eyes of our conversational partner, sometimes discovering certain excesses or failures of style through this empathetic leap. Of course I also learn from others, assimilate what they offer. Finally this conversation is life experience. I'm a theorist of the dialectical clash dialectically clashing with others in the presentation of this dialectical clash. It's strange, exciting, absorbing. — t0m
I underlined the part where you pretty much agree with me. Maybe there's a quantitative difference, but we both see that existential truths are quite different from math. For me math is the 'pure form' that is also in language. Language has a logical core. Entities are still 'units' or unities. But metaphor is foggy. It is liquid as opposed to crystalline. The metaphysical dream needs a language as rigid as math, a language that doesn't rust and mutate, subject to time. It was Eliot of Pound who stressed that poets have to keep making it new, precisely because poems lose their force away from the living, linguistic context of their day. — t0m
It probably goes without saying, but for many people, having children is the life-defining project. The goal is to marry and have a stable income so you can raise your progeny. In many respects, life is seen as a creative process, the object of art being descendants. It brings many parents great joy to see their children succeed, and go on to have their own children, and on and on and on. Personally I think it's absurd and if I were in the scenario of being a grandparent I would be horrified that all "this", my children, and their children, and their children...all started from my loins. A single orgasm enabling centuries, millennia of faces. A single orgasm condemning so many souls to life, and death. Haunting. — darthbarracuda
Neither I am, or I wouldn't be convinced of it. It's 'paradoxical' or 'mystical' perhaps. It's 'behind words.' For me the 'mystical' can't be about hidden entities, apart from the hidden 'entity' of feeling. In the high moments this 'irony' becomes poetry, rock-n-roll lyrics. A Hendrix guitar solo is more properly its theology. Myth and music express 'the highest,' for me, though I like trying to mechanically conceptualize this transcendence of the 'mechanical-conceptual.' That's why I stress the 'irrationalilty' of the hero-myth. Our 'final vocabulary' ultimately just happened to seduce us. If 'rationality' is central to this image, then we have an especially volatile dialectic, since we experience facing criticism as a duty. — t0m
I agree that 'irony' is most naturally understood this way. I take the term itself from Rorty, without completely intending the same thing.
Ironist (n. Ironism) (from Greek: eiron, eironeia), a term coined by Richard Rorty, describes someone who fulfills three conditions:
She has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabularies, vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has encountered;
She realizes that argument phrased in her present vocabulary can neither underwrite nor dissolve these doubts;
Insofar as she philosophizes about her situation, she does not think that her vocabulary is closer to reality than others, that it is in touch with a power not herself.
— Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p.73
— Wiki — t0m
Respectfully, I think there's a tension here between 'rationalization' and 'closer.' The rationalizating (for me) is our understanding of the situation. — t0m
Indeed. 'Everyday Dasein' is lived by the 'they.' Only the top-layer is sophisticatedly non-contingent. — t0m
Right, so we feel a common restraint or duty to respect the other's freedom. I think Hegel applies here. The 'master' can only be satisfyingly recognized by another 'master.' For me we have something like incarnate freedom that wants a very high notion of friendship (that of 'kings' who recognize the limits of their realm and co-participate in a notion of virtue, allowing for non-central differences.) For Blake this is the 'forgiveness of sin,' which I read as an embrace of difference. An old line: we are bound by our desire to bind. — t0m
Well I won't claim that my stance is perfectly liquid. It melts at the top, with a foundation of the undeniable common sense that we call sanity. Language is received like the law. I can't get behind my past completely. I suppose I don't think in terms of a crystalline set of systematic propositions but rather in terms of a network of metaphors. I was just re-reading Kaufmann's translation of Hegel's preface to the phenomenology and (with new Heideggerian notions at hand) saw it in a fresh light. — t0m
The first part must have influenced Heidegger. For me 'liquidity' refers (as a start) to the instability of the concepts that we tend to 'compute' with as fixed points. For me it's not a crystalline network but something slimy, more or less liquid.
Then there's this, a little further down:
The life of mind is not one that shuns death, and keeps clear of destruction; it endures death and in death maintains its being. It only wins to its truth when it finds itself utterly torn asunder.
— Hegel — t0m
I don't deny a certain 'divine malice,' but for me it's not primarily ironic teasing. That would be a 'hardening' of the position into something fixed and mechanical. I think the anxiety of influence (Harold Bloom) is central here. We might say that there is no ironist-in-general but only the type of the 'strong poet' waging the 'war against cliche.' The strong poet is exactly he who does not want to be just a type. (Of course I wouldn't be 'ironic' in my own terms if 'ironism' was important to me as a label. There is a behind-word-ness here that is central for me. The terms are draped over something like an intuition --but this intuition is maybe just a liquid-network of concept. It's a table with hundreds of legs. If it's ultimately conceptual, no particular term is too precious to abandon. The 'feel' of the whole is what's important.) — t0m
Since for me rational frameworks have ultimately irrational or rhetorical foundations, I understand poetic descriptions to be primary. 'Poetry' or 'productive logic' institutes the very frameworks in which arguments can take place. For instance, Popper's falsifiability criterion for science. I love it. But is this criterion itself science? Or something like pre-science? — t0m
It's true that parents throw their children into struggle. They plop them down on the roller coaster without asking them first. Some will give you a metaphysical answer to the why. Others will give the esthetic answer. I'm not a parent so this is theoretical for me. But isn't sentimentality in terms about an overall feeling about life central here to either position, yours or theirs? I think there's a dialectic between thinking and feeling. We might agree that 'reason is rhetoric' or 'rationalization' in the hands of something darker. Representation is the tool of will or care. But this must be haunted by irony, since the notion that 'reason is rationalization' calls itself one more rationalization.
Note that I'm not saying you are wrong. I defend/present a certain undecidability, but I don't present this undecidability as binding on others but (with a certain distance) as a first-person report. I don't deny that there is a sort of imposition in all philosophical dialogue. There is a wanting-to-convince, something imperial, a 'fight for recognition.' But awareness of this gives it a different flavor. — t0m
I agree that we were forced into duties, trouble, vulnerability. But for me we are also forced into 'post-facto sentimental gymnastics.' As I see it, I 'confess' that that's what my position is. As I read you, you half-way confess this. Perhaps you can clarify. Is it the metaphysical truth or do you understand it as the best 'rationalization'? — t0m
Note that I'm not saying you are wrong. I defend/present a certain undecidability, but I don't present this undecidability as binding on others but (with a certain distance) as a first-person report. I don't deny that there is a sort of imposition in all philosophical dialogue. There is a wanting-to-convince, something imperial, a 'fight for recognition.' But awareness of this gives it a different flavor. — t0m
To be clear, I never asserted that everything is contingent. Only the 'upper levels' of interpretation have such freedom. The daily world of trucks hurtling down highways is no place unbounded fiction. It's the 'global' interpretation that's contingent. I focus especially on the image of virtue at the heart of an interpretation. I'm very Nietzschean in this regard. Look at how a system/interpretation places the individual in a hierarchy. For me this tends to be the gist. I'd interpret both of us as variants of the 'knowledge-hero,' since we esteem ourselves and others in terms of what they understand. I can't really speak for you, so I'm just sharing a perception. — t0m
This is dead on. Some will sugar it up, but there is an 'evil' march to the future that leaves the 'wounded' behind. — t0m
For me the 'we' here deserves analysis. If I show up to work, I've decided to play the game, be good, do my duty, maintain the structure of my life. The same applies to my coworkers. A dark joke can go over quite well (I've tried it), as long as it doesn't have the 'feel' of compulsion. If I doggedly attempt to convert someone on the job (to pessimism or ironism), they'll experience this as a violation. Work is 'not the place.' But the resistance is individual. There's no sense of the we apart from the shared insistence of individually not-having-to-hear-it at work. That kind of talk belongs between trusted friends. It's too intimate for work. It's fraught like discussion of one's sexuality. — t0m
This is the basic metaphysical move, the distinction between illusion and reality. The countermove would be to present pessimism as a nightmare. I'm neutral, or rather my dream is that it's all dreams a the contingent/optional apex of a worldview. But I believe my dream, and the distinction of dream and non-dream is part of the dream of metaphysics. All these terms 'melt' upon analysis. They aren't fixed. The are caught in the 'liquid' dialectic.
(Again, the foundation of the worldview is non-optional immersion in a common-sense that makes metaphysical theorizing possible.) — t0m
I like the theory of anchoring. It's vaguely what I mean by 'image of virtue.' Stressing the social aspect seems to align the pessimist with the 'Satanic'/Romantic individualistic rebel. I love the old rebel. My own philosophy evolved from the image of the rebel. But language being so social suggests to me that any earnestly presented metaphysical position (including Zappe's) is a claim on the norm. Earnest metaphysics attempts to justify the imposition of a new norm (ethical socialism.) — t0m
I respect Zapffe for understanding himself to be one more 'poet.' But for me this is just an inch from ironism. If I myself am poetic sublimation-anchoring-rationalization, then how can I cling to the dream versus reality distinction in the traditional way? — t0m
For me the success of these happy little coping strategies would endanger the 'life is no good' position. — t0m
Yes, accepting the 'guilt' or the 'evil.' I can't speak for you, but I think lots of dark positions are 'righteous' in a certain sense. I sense in them a frustrated desire for purity and innocence. Accepting guilt and finitude is accepting the bloody hands and not-having-chosen-one's-self that comes with life. I understand resenting the burden of accepting/adaptation/adjustment. The dream is to be one's own father, self-created. I think God is a pretty good image of the massive pride in man. It's an indignity to be vulnerably and needfully embodied, but we only dreamed of God from within this indignity of finitude and guilt in the first place. (As always, this is just-my-adaptation, even I try to convey it persuasively.) — t0m
I think we can agree on the absence of a "metaphysical" answer to this "why." It seems to me that conscious procreation at least involves at least an implicit decision that life is good --or that the child's life will likely be good. Probably lots of secular types think in terms of the rollercoaster metaphor in the movie Parenthood. Life is a ride, an experience. It's a mixture of bad and good. It's likely "worth the trouble," a parent decides. This roller-coaster metaphor arguably includes the absurdity-consciousness. Life is not "fundamentally" about anything in particular. It's a piece of music that some think worth hearing, even though some of it really sucks. (I stay neutral for reasons already mentioned. I don't defend life-in-general. I currently like the "music" I hear more than I dislike it.) — t0m
Right. But "apparent" necessity is just that, apparent. For me, for instance, anti-natalism as an 'objective' position is optional, contingent. It's a form of ethical socialism, the projection of a duty-for-all in terms of a truth-for-all. — t0m
I think we agree that life is 'care' or 'will,' but I interpret that care or will to have a height-seeking nature. So I look at the general tendency of a world-view or personality to assert its dominance or priority. My own theory of transcendence is of course one more move in this game. For me it is"freer" than other positions. Root-seeking is maybe the general structure of 'deep' thought. What is the deepest truth? The most basic nature of man? We seem to agree that 'will' is a word that points at this, though we disagree on the structure. Both of us interpret the other in terms of our own fundamental concept. This is of course compatible with my concept, since it is a theory of the dialectical/rhetorical clash of contingently established worldviews. (It's ironic because it recognizes its own contingency or groundlessness without thereafter becoming 'faithful' or 'objective' again.) — t0m
In the workaday world, complainers will not go far. When someone asks how you are doing, you had better be wise enough to reply, “I can’t complain.” If you do complain, even justifiably, people will stop asking how you are doing. complaining will not help you succeed and influence people. You can complain to your physician or psychiatrist because they are paid to hear you complain. But you cannot complain to your boss or your friends, if you have any. you will soon be dismissed from your job and dropped from the social register. Then you will be left alone with your complains and no one to listen to them. Perhaps then the message will sink into your head: If you do not feel good enough for long enough, you should act as if you do and even think as if you do. That is the way to get yourself to feel good enough for long enough and stop you from complaining for good, as any self-improvement book can affirm. But should you improve, someone must assume the blame. And that someone will be you. This is monumentally so if you are a pessimist or a depressive. Should you conclude that life is objectionable or that nothing matters–do not waste our time with your nonsense. We are on our way to the future, and the philosophically disheartening or the emotionally impaired are not going to hinder our progress. If you cannot say something positive, or at least equivocal, keep it to yourself. Pessimists and depressives need not apply for a position in the enterprise of life. You have two choices: Start thinking the way God and your society want you to think or be forsaken by all. The decision is yours, since your are a free agent who can choose to rejoin our fabricated world or stubbornly insist on…what? That we should mollycoddle non-positive thinkers like you or rethink how the whole world transacts its business? That we should start over from scratch? Or that we should go extinct? Try to be realistic. We did the best we could with the tools we had. After all, we are only human, as we like to say. Our world may not be in accord with nature’s way, but it did develop organically according to our consciousness, which delivered us to a lofty prominence over the Creation. The whole thing just took on a life of its own, and nothing is going to stop it anytime soon. There can be no starting over and no going back. No major readjustments are up for a vote. And no melancholic head-case is going to bad-mouth our catastrophe. The universe was created by the Creator, damn it. We live in a country we love and that loves us back. We have families and friends and jobs that make it all worthwhile. We are somebodies, not a bunch of nobodies without names or numbers or retirement plans. None of this is going to be overhauled by a thought criminal who contends that the world is not doubleplusgood and never will be. Our lives may not be unflawed — that would deny us a better future to work toward — but if this charade is good enough for us, then it should be good enough for you. So if you cannot get your mind right, try walking away. you will find no place to go and no one who will have you. You will find only the same old trap the world over. Lighten up or leave us alone. you will never get us to give up our hopes. you will never get us to wake up from our dreams. We are not contradictory beings whose continuance only worsens our plight as mutants who embody the contorted logic of a paradox. Such opinion will not be accredited by institutions of authority or by the middling run of humans. To lay it on the line, whatever thoughts may enter your chemically imbalanced brain are invalid, inauthentic, or whatever dismissive term we care to hang on you, who are only “one of those people.” So start pretending that you feel good enough for long enough, stop your complaining, and get back in line. If you are not as strong as Samson — that no-good suicide and slaughterer of Philistines — then get loaded to the gills and return to the trap. Keep your medicine cabinet and your liquor cabinet well stocked, just like the rest of us. Come on and join the party. No pessimists or depressives invited. Do you think we are all morons? We know all about those complaints of yours. The only difference is that we have sense enough and feel good enough for long enough not to speak of them. keep your powder dry and your brains blocked. Our shibboleth “Up the Conspiracy and down with Consciousness. — Thomas Ligotti
For me it's about accepting the entanglement of the 'the divine' in the thorns 'down here.' It involves accepting the 'guilt' of being alive. In Siddartha the ferryman contains the murderer and the prostitute as 'subselves.' I think in terms of harmonization as opposed to purity. We agree on 'coping,' but this word does have a non-neutral slant. 'Play' is appropriate for many ways of being. 'Play' collapses into 'coping,' and successful coping leads back to play. — t0m
We agree that existence is goal-seeking, I think. You experience your view as a universal truth that at least suggests the duty to abstain from procreation, while I am neutral or agnostic about the value of others' lives in general and therefore apolitical on this issue. More locally, I believe that those in my peer group are more happy than unhappy, but I like to think they are above-average in terms of coping-play. It's arguable that there is an inherited baseline emotional valence that invisibly distorts this whole issue. What if pessimists tend to be wired for less pleasure? That could be an unrecognized truth as you mentioned above. I don't know. — t0m
Yeah, this nails a theme in Being and Time. Apparently Heidegger switches from angst-dread to the attunement of profound boredom in Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. These attunements "open" the world in a certain way (or just the abyss?) — t0m
As I understand it, Dasein is mostly not subjective. We are lived by the "they" for the most part. Not only that but our sense of ourselves disappears in the task. Dreyfus uses the example of driving. We become the driving. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aaGk6S1qhz0 The subject-object paradigm is inherited from Descartes and conceals/obscures a more basic revelation of what is. — t0m
Ah, yes, I remember that. I think he was on to something profound. As a philosopher who took music and sex very seriously, he drilled deeper than most. I first read about him in Durant's Story of Philosophy. I loved him right away. I still do, though I can only make sense of the world as will and representation along Heideggerian lines. Life is interpreting care or caring interpretation, a whirlwind of embodied passion-driven conceptualization (and maybe also a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, [ultimately or finally] signifying nothing [while otherwise signifying all kinds of things].) Music mirrors the caring aspect, while philosophy perhaps meta-thinks.
Schopenhauer thought music so profound he wrote: — t0m
Music … stands quite apart from all the [other arts]. In it we do not recognize the copy, the repetition, of any Idea of the inner nature of the world. Yet it is such a great and exceedingly fine art, its effect on man’s innermost nature is so powerful, and it is so completely and profoundly understood by him in his innermost being as an entirely universal language, whose distinctness surpasses even that of the world of perception itself, that in it we certainly have to look for more than that exercitium arithmeticae occultum nescientis se numerare animi [“an unconscious exercise in arithmetic in which the mind does not know it is counting”] which Leibniz took it to be… We must attribute to music a far more serious and profound significance that refers to the innermost being of the world and of our own self.
Music is as immediate an objectification and copy of the whole will as the world itself is, indeed as the Ideas are, the multiplied phenomenon of which constitutes the world of individual things. Therefore music is by no means like the other arts, namely a copy of the Ideas, but a copy of the will itself, the objectivity of which are the Ideas. For this reason the effect of music is so very much more powerful and penetrating than is that of the other arts, for these others speak only of the shadow, but music of the essence. — Schopenhauer
I suppose my theory is pretty similar to yours, really. We enact a fantasy role, just because. It's a brute fact of our nature, as I see it, that we wired to transcend/dominate. Maybe most of behavior is just "animal." There is only so much "spiritual eros" as the apex of a less glorious foundation. I continue to read the "slave" metaphor as embedded within a particular crystallization of this desire --one I can mostly relate to. Here's the "master" as opposed to the "slave." — t0m
This can be taken more or less literally. It implicity includes 'ironism," as I see it, although Hegel the system-man tried to downplay "The Irony." For me transcendence is the (theoretical) death of every "fixed idea" of the self. Man is incarnate/mortal freedom potentially dialectically revealed to himself as such. But "freedom" is the dying of the apparently necessary into the contingent. The metaphor works because that which is understood as necessity is therefore non-optional. Freedom-death discloses possibility buried in false necessity. — t0m
I should have acknowledged that admission more. I like the framework of comparing coping mechanisms, of "shopping for personality" as I call it. We create, discuss, and compare "operating systems." — t0m
I read Siddhartha first and loved it. I was locked up as a troubled teen when a Buddhist white-guy-teacher recommended it. I also read Anne Frank's diary and Catcher in the Rye. Of course I was a poet then, typing what I could remember of the notebook I lost when I almost drowned alone in muddy creek. The banks were slick mud. I had to plunge my hands into this mud to grab at tree roots. That was the second time that muddy water almost claimed me. Fuck brown water. — t0m
I don't deny that this plays a role, but the above also plays a role in your own defense of your interpretation as a better coping mechanism. I'm not claiming to be beyond investment in my own role, just to be clear. William James wrote about the inertia of belief systems. We all prefer to tinker rather than revolutionize. We evolve varying systems within our varying lives. As I see it, there's no reason to insist that any system is objectively right, though some hero-myths are founded on making these kinds of claims. My "ironism" is strongly connected to the making-contingent of what Spengler called "ethical socialism," which has nothing to do with economy. It's just the usually assumed "scientistic" framework that understands the spiritual-metaphysical in terms of finding and sharing a single truth-for-all. I now think in terms of offering sentences as tools/options that may or may not be useful to others. — t0m
This is the dark truth at the heart of the question: is life good? I have lived this question. I continue to live this question. It is constantly answered and asked again. Answering it for others strikes me as a stretch. For me life is justified, if it is justified, in terms of feeling, or aesthetically. Existence shines and screams against the foil of nonexistence. Suffering is certain. Pleasure is certain. The computation of what it all means or is worth is less certain--as I see it. — t0m
While no airtight case has ever been made regarding the undesirability of human life, pessimists still run themselves ragged trying to make one. Optimists have no comparable mission. When they do argue for the desirability of human life it is only in reaction to pessimists arguing the opposite, even though no airtight case has ever been made regarding that desirability. Optimism has always been an undeclared policy of human culture—one that grew out of our animal instincts to survive and reproduce—rather than an articulated body of thought. It is the default condition of our blood and cannot be effectively questioned by our minds or put in grave doubt by our pains. This would explain why at any given time there are more cannibals than philosophical pessimists. — Ligotti
I just can't agree with you here, though I have a sense of what you mean. I like the idea of the old man picking his moment, doing it to avoid the indignity of melting away cowardly from a hopeless disease. Or maybe his bodily frailty is such that the game is no longer worth the candle. Or maybe in a fight that he knows he will lose, striking at his enemy nevertheless (the stuff of movies.) — t0m
I can relate to this. We seem to agree that life is justified aesthetically. — t0m
Yeah, I understand myself as a "dark" thinker who "goes there." I do see that we are thrown into brute fact. We don't possess our own foundations. It is "shameful" to have a body in a certain sense. It makes us vulnerable to others. We are gods "trapped" in dogs. That's the crucifixion myth for me. The "divine" only exists in a context of suffering and humiliation. The given that you mention is what we interpret. That's why (for me) it's interpretation rather than pure fiction. It is constrained. It must cope, affectively justified if at all. I think we agree on that. — t0m
As I understand it, Heidegger doesn't think in terms of the "core" or the true entity --with the exception of the 'core' or most deeply explanatory kind of time. He (at first) just describes the different ways that entities appear or disappear for us (the ways that Dasein reveals and conceals them). His big picture purpose in The Concept of Time is (unsurprisingly) to offer a new analysis of time. He offers 'primordial time' or 'originary temporality' as an otherwise un-timelike irreducible explanation of world-time and physics-time. This primordial time is (as I read it) just left as the brute fact of Dasein's (our) basic structure. The metaphorical "future" of this primordial time is something like (?) a not-necessarily conscious 'ego ideal'. Or that's how Blattner interprets what he calls Heidegger's 'temporal idealism.'
So far Blattner's sense of the big picture gels most convincingly with what I've read. The "existential" stuff in B&T about living one's death is some kind of metaphorical portrait of the most Dasein-like mode of experience time. It's the hardest part to make sense of, but it seems to involve the 'poetic' revelation of reality. It's opposed to routinized idle talk and the crusty pre-interpretation of the world that one inherits from the they and mostly lives as the they. I think Kuhn's normal versus abnormal discourse is somehow analogous. Dasein is most Dasein-like (its 'own' or authentic) when in this revolutionary mode. Anyway, the 'authentic' mode of experiencing time is anxiously or soberly joyful. This 'authentic' mode is the hardest thing to parse, though, so that's just my tentative interpretation. — t0m
Heidegger may have had an analogous term for this which was that of being "Present-at-hand". Of course, this is not the case that we can see ourselves objectively. We are always viewing things from our subjective "I" self. Our stream of conscious inner world. Heidegger might have referred to this as "Ready-at-hand". This subjective world is the world of daily life that we all live in. Referring back to Heidegger, it seems our inner world can be seen as what we focus our attention on. In our day to day lives, we focus our attention on certain things to get things "done" or to entertain ourselves. The hunger-gatherer may focus on hunting the buffalo, or learning a tribal dance, the Westerner may focus on playing poker, or reading the newspaper. When our attention goes smoothly, we are very much "of the appearance of things" that everything is "all right" in our world. However, when our attention is not focused on a specific task, or is not consumed with something to take its mind off existence itself, boredom comes seeping in. The feeling of boredom may be analogous to Heidgger's idea of "broken tool". No longer does the world seem to run smoothly as it did in when our minds were focused or attentive to some task. Now the world itself seems to lack significance. The void of nothingness stares in our face and forces us to flee. The feeling of existential dread is that all consuming feeling that at the heart of the world there is nothingness, at the end of the day there is blankness. When we are focusing our attention we stay at the surface of things. Life makes sense.. things seem logical. Boredom breaks this barrier and shows it for what it is really. We cannot describe what the world is because there are no words. As stated before, it is ineffable. We can only describe the feeling, and that is one of existential dread. — schopenhauer1
On the other hand, I think that interpretation changes what it interprets. Our interpretative 'software' steers feeling itself. Apart from the structure which we both agree on, there's just ineffable feeling. Coltrane's 'Afro Blue' can be heard as a portrait of a more pleasant mode of this 'fending off' disorder. I'm very into music. I think it 'says' what concept can't say about feeling. — t0m
For me any particular 'big picture' also gets sucked into "instrumentality." I like to think of pragmatism as descriptive rather than normative. Coping just is the fending off of disorder. Or more completely it is just as much the institution of new order. We get more complex as individuals and societies. I like the widening, ascending spiral as a metaphor. The circularity of the spiral acknowledges the repetition. — t0m
Anyway, I can only see the theory of instrumentality itself as one more coping strategy. I view it as a form of transcendence. It imposes an 'essence' or 'understanding of being' that allows the imposing individual a distance from the 'devouring mother.' — t0m
The theory can no longer be asserted so innocently. It puts its own game in question without extinguishing that game. The role of the objective-knowledge-hero becomes optional, although it evolved from understanding this role as necessary. "Transcendence" is a newfound distance from every game, except from the game of perceiving the game as game. — t0m
Have you read Steppenwolf by Hesse? There's a great analysis of the "the suicide" as a type. It's a great book generally. Then there's Dostoyevsky, the master. The Possessed, for example, is just so wickedly, darkly funny. "Divine malice" and the "laughter of the gods" are choice phrases. I have been in extremely dark modes and suddenly burst out laughing. "Nothing is funnier than unhappiness" (Sam Beckett). Last but not least, there's Blood Meridian. Ol' Cormac knew the devil in man. The will-to-power is nightmarishly incarnate in "the judge," a radically dark philosopher who practices what he preaches. — t0m
On the last part, I understand the "hindsight" argument, but I don't find it conclusive. I think I addressed that in the biased interpretation that can actually steer the situation it interprets. — t0m
Well said. I haven't looked at Ligoti, but I've been deeply moved by Schopenhauer and Cioran. I especially like Schop's essays. — t0m
Perhaps the greatest strike against philosophical pessimism is that its only theme is human suffering. This is the last item on the list of our species’ obsessions and detracts from everything that matters to us, such as the Good, the Beautiful, and a Sparking Clean Toilet Bowl. For the pessimist, everything considered in isolation from human suffering or any cognition that does not have as its motive the origins, nature, and elimination of human suffering is at base recreational, whether it takes the form of conceptual probing or physical action in the world—for example, delving into game theory or traveling in outer space, respectively. And by “human suffering,” the pessimist is not thinking of particular sufferings and their relief, but of suffering itself. Remedies may be discovered for certain diseases and sociopolitical barbarities may be amended. But those are only stopgaps. Human suffering will remain insoluble as long as human beings exist. The one truly effective solution for suffering is that spoken of in Zapffe’s “Last Messiah.” It may not be a welcome solution for a stopgap world, but it would forever put an end to suffering, should we ever care to do so. The pessimist’s credo, or one of them, is that nonexistence never hurt anyone and existence hurts everyone. Although our selves may be illusory creations of consciousness, our pain is nonetheless real. — Thomas Ligotti, Conspiracy Against the Human Race
I largely agree with the first part. I won't say that there is no choice. Some do put that shotgun in their mouths. But generally we are thrown into caring and needing, and we don't leaving willingly, even when it hurts like hell. I occasionally contemplate suicide, not as a live option these days but what it means. I allow my mind to go there. I even keep it open as an optional response to brain cancer or other personality-melting diseases. Suicide can be noble, IMV, and I don't judge suicides generally. Who I am to judge? What do I really and certainly know of the feelings of others? I've had acquaintances who did it. Others overdosed on drugs. Yes, they are missing out on some amusing "ripples in the nothingness," but they also have fewer problems than I do (the usual taking-care-of problems of life). Yet I'm glued to these problems/projects. And I'm also glued to women in general and one in particular. And the pleasure of writing. A dead man has lost everything, both the agony and the ecstasy. — t0m
*I appreciate the friendliness. I enjoy our conversations. I respect that you are knee-deep in the "real" stuff like your namesake. — t0m
At the moment, though, Heidegger's analysis of time is really impressing me. — t0m
For me it's like conspiracy theory to understand a report of experience as a "spin." I don't deny that one could spin things this way, but the possibility of spin doesn't annul the actuality of amused absorption. It feels good to do something well. You can call that a flight from boredom. I'll even acknowledge that there's some truth in that. We are "programmed" for flow, for action, for productivity. Boredom is arguably a form of pain that directs us away from an unhealthy stagnation. — t0m
A "bad" flow would be an overwhelming challenge, more pain than pleasure. The you could say that we bounce between boredom and a painful taking-care-of. That's true, too, in its way. Those are the extremes, boredom and too-much-challenge. But between those extremes are non-negative and sometimes very positive states. We can imagine integrating a pleasure-pain function over time. Do you think this integral is always negative? — t0m
From my point of view, you are very good at describing what is especially sucky about life from the perspective of a philosophical type. I always relate to what you're talking about. I'm just surprised that you insist that this is the whole story or the final description. — t0m
Yeah, we "must" do it (except for the few with the nerve for suicide). I'll grant that. But doing it isn't always bad and is sometimes quite good. As far as aphorisms go, it's true that there are imperative platitudes like "enjoy the process." These can function as tools to get the flow back on track. If life is "meaningless" and one is nevertheless going to survive, it is only "wise" to learn to enjoy it. So that's the kind of thing one says to the unhappy. A less responsible person might encourage suicide, but who wants to get tangled in other people's deaths? — t0m
There's a certain amount of friction-frustration. But it's a net-good. I keep going back for more. I also just finished about 6 hours of statistical inference homework. Not all pleasure, but an absorbed struggle with the thoughts and symbols punctuated by victories. Then there's the satisfaction of writing out a nice final draft. Yes, I have to do it to pay my bills. But that's part of why it felt good. That "having to" gives a weight to the game. Living up to that having-to feels good, as long as it's not too difficult. — t0m
You use the "slave" metaphor. Are we slave though? Suicide is an option. We choose to keep fending off this disorder. I suggest that a certain kind of this fending-off is what we love about life. — t0m
We love imposing order on disorder. We are this imposition. If we fantasize about killing disorder, we fantasize about killing ourselves. I think this is the "death drive." Part of us wants to freeze time. That which is present is always slipping away. We don't have time. We want to grab the wheel and stop it, to have time to think and be. — t0m
Part of us wants to freeze time. That which is present is always slipping away. We don't have time. We want to grab the wheel and stop it, to have time to think and be. — t0m
We are absorbed in the process. We with all our vanity and ambition dissolve into the worked-over object. — t0m
From my perspective, you are maybe being still-too-metaphysical in "missing" a justification for human activities that exists outside of the pleasure in these activities themselves. We only occasionally "notice" the futility of our battle against disorder. To notice this we have to slip out of our usual un-self-conscious enjoyment or contentment in waging this "war" that is at best experienced as play. — t0m
My mission is to suffer for all those who suffer without knowing it. I must pay for them, expiate their unconsciousness, their luck to be ignorant of how unhappy they are. — E.M Cioran
Of course that's just another (particularly extreme) instance of pursuing a false hope. ...choosing to immediately achieve the ordeal at the end of a life, in hopes of gaining......what? Nothing? For one thing, we never reach Nothing. — Michael Ossipoff
If there's reincarnation, then the good things and the adversity average out over many lives (good along with bad experiences), and the inclinations or un-discharged consequences will eventually be satisfied, and the lives will be done. In the meantime, maybe we can usually realize the temporariness of the bad parts. — Michael Ossipoff
death. — Noble Dust
I know. I intuited that you meant something negative by saying "coping mechanism". But that's not always the case; sometimes experience presents us with unimaginable shock; PTSD, for instance, or sexual trauma as a minor. In these instances where the offense is incalculable, a coping mechanism isn't a balm to unwilling eyes; it's a balm to an uncomprehending mind. The balm, here, is categorically good. — Noble Dust
Since when?? — Noble Dust
I'm using it via my interpretation of what you're saying specifically in this thread. — Noble Dust
Why? — Noble Dust
What is metaphysical rest? — Noble Dust
How does saying "the challenges of life make one better" equate to a coping mechanism? What is a coping mechanism? — Noble Dust
Why do people need to be born to face challenges? They aren't. People are born. Challenges crop up. There's no epistemology as of yet, given those two circumstances. — Noble Dust
What? — Noble Dust
Why champion nihilism and then say this? — Noble Dust
So what's the point for you? The telos? — Noble Dust
Perhaps this can be solved thus: (I think you are intimating at this) In renunciation and compassion willing does continue, but willing-to-live ceases. Both renunciation and compassion require the denial of individual egoistic willing, but in both cases willing goes on. If one's body exists, it must will! — jancanc
Also, all the ascetic saints Schopenhauer talks about in WWR are very compassionate beings, Jesus, Buddha, etc. — jancanc
Apparently Schopenhauer's theory of compassion is mutually antagonistic with his theory of salvation.
Briefly stated: compassion requires stimulation of the will (to help another) but salvation requires cessation of the will.
However, Schopenhauer said that both compassion and renunciation come from the same source (intuitively recognizing that all beings are metaphysically one) and they have the same result (denial of the individual egoistic will).
Thus how can two things which are "mutually exclusive" both come from the same source and have the same result? Seems strange — jancanc
The execution is the most important bit. What use - as Epictetus said - that you have read all those books, if you cannot execute? — Agustino
? — Agustino
No, just that thinking is irrelevant to actually climbing. It takes will, not thinking, to do that. Too much thinking paralyzes the will. — Agustino
Family life and downtime? No, I think in this economic world, family life and downtime figure into the economy as much as buying that can of sardines. — Bitter Crank
J+L are here not talking of course, about gene expression but inheritance systems in evolution more generally, but the principle is the same: that life itself may be considered as something entirely separate from the biotic. Life would thus be a formal principle rather than a material one: so long as the process and its organisation are kept in place, the exact ‘instantiation’ of the formal principle is - from a very specific perspective - a matter of sheer indifference (I take inspiration also from Robert Rosen and Nicholas Rashevsky’s imperative to "throw away the matter and keep the underlying organisation”, when speaking about biological systems). — StreetlightX
I might add to my last statement above a consideration on Schopenhauer's oft-repeated line about how the world "ought not to be." This is a curious statement, for it directly challenges the notion that the will is an "aimless" striving that exhausts objective reality. Rather, such a phrase suggests that the world, and therefore the will, must have an end beyond itself and that the will does not exhaust the real.
In order to resolve this contradiction, there are two options available to the follower of Schopenhauer. One option is to reject the statements that imply the will has an end. This negates the possibility of salvation and so tends to impel one toward atheistic materialism, nihilism, and negative utilitarianism (and thus anti-natalism). The other option is to reject his statements that the will does not have an end. This tends to impel one toward religion, Platonism, asceticism, and virtue ethics. I can admit that both are valid reactions to Schopenhauer, but as you noted, I lean toward the latter. — Thorongil
Presumably, the animal is determined by the accidents, so bringing up determinism doesn't seem relevant either. Anyway, there are several ways to answer your question. — Thorongil
I don't know about you, but I've had experiences in contemplating both art and nature that seem to correspond to what he describes as the contemplation of the Platonic Idea. — Thorongil
Well, maybe the first Westerner.
But that's impressive, that someone was saying that in 1818. — Michael Ossipoff
The reason species extinction and the Ideas are compatible is found in the nature of the Idea, which exists outside of time, space, and causality, and so exists irrespective of whether it happens to be instantiated in physical particulars at a particular moment in time. The Idea of a mammoth exists, even though there are presently no particular mammoths physically manifesting that Idea. And what physically appears as speciation, or the change from one species to another, is metaphysically the change in accidents of a particular species, which can eventually lead to the disappearance of one Idea's manifestations in time and the emergence of another's in its place. — Thorongil
Biological species can change in time without this entailing the non-existence of Platonic Ideas. — Thorongil
Now you may acknowledge this and have reasons for adopting such a position, but I merely wish to point out that I have a different perspective, one that is anti-positivist and anti-realist with respect to scientific claims (which isn't to say that I'm a social constructivist or epistemological relativist, mind you). — Thorongil
Now, what's philosophically interesting to me about all this is that, if I understand the implications correctly, it throws into question the specificity of life itself, or rather what does and does not count as 'alive'. That is, if we think in terms of networks,how is it possible to think the specificity of life itself, insofar as the dynamics of genome networks are defined as much by extra-biological factors as they are biological ones? Because extra-biological factors are as just as important as biological factors in the process of gene expression, it becomes very hard to draw any kind of hard diving line between the two. This also follows, as a matter of principle, from the fact that networks are simply indifferent to the 'content' of the nodes which constitute them: it's all just a matter of the organization and threshold levels.
There's alot more to say, but as usual, I'm going to stop before I go on too long. — StreetlightX
But this is just circular then: biological systems are systems with biological constituents... — StreetlightX
I don't understand what you're asking with these questions. Could you be more specific? — StreetlightX
This description would apply to literally any complex system, living or not. — StreetlightX
but whether one can discern whether or not such a criteria would apply to begin with. If you keep ignoring the fact that at issue is a question of individuation (what does and does not count as 'a' system), you'll miss what I'm trying to say. — StreetlightX
But this would include say, ecosystems and river catchments. In any case I'm not arguing that we can't distinguish between biotic and abiotic processes: my point is rather that life itself traverses both such that life cannot be defined in strictly biotic terms. And to be extra clear, I'm also not arguing that we can't distinguish between life and not-life, only that such a distinction cannot be 'read off' the phenomena themselves in any straightforward way, if only because what exactly would and would not count as 'a' phenomena is precisely what is in question: a question of individuation. — StreetlightX
It is no use, as such, in simply speaking of individual entities like 'organism', 'environment', etc - none of these capture of processual specificity of what is at stake here. — StreetlightX
