It's that bit that prevents events from ever totally repeating a non-specific je ne sais quoi.

I propose a test. If JTB correctly describes knowledge then every permutation should correctly describe some type of thought one might have?
Unjustified False Disbelief - unwarranted skepticism
Unjustified True Disbelief - unwarranted yet accurate skepticism
etc.

If it is a system of measuring thoughts and not just an overfit method for the things believed to be knowledge.

Now, do you agree that we have a sensation of change? If no, why not? — Bartricks

I agree a change might be known by a sensation. I don't think this is helpful in defining or understanding the notion of change; because it is so general as to nearly apply to anything.

And if there is a sensation of change - and there does appear to be - do you agree that sensations can only resemble sensations and nothing else? — Bartricks

No, I don't think this is correct. Some sensations are very different, so equating them in this fashion is confusing and misleading. A sensation of self-immolation does not resemble a sensation of watching a pendulum swing and yet they are both types of change.

The concept 'true' is an artefact of human language and it (mostly) means something like 'everyone clever enough would agree'. I argue it means this on the grounds that this is the use context in which we find the term. — Isaac

Interesting, considering it's a logical operator. Really, it's the only part of JTB that isn't dependant on the frame of reference. I always read it as justified, believed and also happened to be true.

We thought we knew X but we were wrong. We didn't know X because not X. — Michael

Right, I'm suggesting a present tense where we don't assume to know the future. We think we know X but we may be wrong. We may be wrong because we can't know all future observations which involve X. I understand the difference in the words intent and the imperfect state of people knowing things.

Gettier's demonstrations show JTB isn't precisely exclusive for every bit of information one can imagine. Considering the set JTB had to tackle it did a pretty good job and still is a good jumping off point. Personally, I think 'belief' seems a bit unnecessary. I could write something down that is knowledge. I could parish and it could remain. Would that information cease to be knowledge?

Doesn't this all get resolved if it's acknowledged that on occasion knowledge is wrong because humans make mistakes. I think knowledge can be improved; which means it must be imperfect. So, it's justified true belief, and occasionally a mistake.

Take yellow. We are aware of yellow by sensation. Yet we can infer that an object is yellow despite never having seen it. — Bartricks

We don't infer the "sensation" of it being yellow though; I don't see something brown and infer the fruit was previously yellow by some retro sensation experience. Even saying change 'can be' a sensation seems to confuse a thing with the sight of it. Do we then suppose all sensations are changes? That might improve the case.

I am talking about what change itself is. You are talking about when people infer it. I am talking about the 'it' they are inferring. — Bartricks

Right, but it was never a sensation in the case of having been inferred. If change occurs apart from being a sensation, then your conclusion is underqualified.

Supposing your model of information is true; what does it add to note change is subject to it. I could say for example; then ____is a sensation if, that is, there is a sensation of ____ . Why choose to fill the blanks with "change" as opposed to any other subject? — Cheshire

↪Cheshire Because the question I am addressing is 'what is change?' — Bartricks

Do you have any objection to the argument? — Bartricks

My initial objection and a few others, yes.
1x1 = 1 isn't really an argument in any normal sense. So, 1x Change = Change doesn't bring anything new or make a statement; which seems to be partially conceded in your reply.

Secondly, people deduce change long after it has occured. Say for example the fossil record. Are you extending "sensationalism" to change that isn't sensed directly?

It takes its name from the ancient Greek thinker Plato, who imagined that mathematical truths inhabit a world of their own — What is Math?

It sounds a bit like obsessing over ideals leads to the thought that there's a place they come from? Maybe there is, but the ideas I know of seem to rattle around in this world. And there's communication among animals about their physical environment. So, plenty of examples of ideas existing within the physical realm. I'm in no place to judge Penrose's interpretation of mathematics, but hesitant to suppose another realm of existence just to fill in the space my ignorance occupies.

It is exchanged between physical sources and resident in them. Information is created by physical beings. Categorically speaking, do we have a non-physical subject to compare it to? Is there criteria?

If the latter is true - and it is, of course, for the sensible world just is the place that our sensations resemble - then change is a sensation if, that is, there is a sensation of change. — Bartricks

Supposing your model of information is true; what does it add to note change is subject to it. I could say for example; then ____is a sensation if, that is, there is a sensation of ____ . Why choose to fill the blanks with "change" as opposed to any other subject?

Wasn't lost on me. Is it a premise; is it a amuse-bouche? Hard to tell from the menu.

A sensation cannot 'tell' us anything - sensations do not have little mouths or little notepads on which they might write things. Insofar as our sensations give us some awareness of something other than themselves, they do so by resemblance: that is, our reason tells us that there is a world out there that our sensations (some of them) are resembling. — Bartricks

I disagree. I think you can sense something new correctly the first time. Even if it's novel. Otherwise, there's no basis for constructing this reference for resemblance.

Now, there is nothing like a sensation except another sensation. Thus, if we have a sensation of change, then change itself must be a sensation. — Bartricks

It is a bit clearer when isolated from the annotations.

↪Cheshire I don't understand your point. The argument I provided was seductively valid, so you have to dispute a premise. Which one are you disputing? — Bartricks

My point is the conclusion is a non-sequitur in a modified sense. Premise 2 appears to be deliberate nonsense. So, anything could technically follow without a violation of logic, but in this context the objection should maintain. If premise 2 can't be stated clearly without misc. notation then I'm afraid the matter will remain illusive to any remedy. Thanks for the reply, as always.

1. There is a sensation of change
2. A sensation can only resemble another sensation (and so if a sensation is 'of' something, then what it is of is itself a sensation)
3. Therefore, change is a sensation. — Bartricks

1. We can sense change, so there is a sensation of change.
2. Appears to be several English phrases arranged.
3. Change can be sensed; it doesn't follow that change is the mere sensing of an event.

Take an explosion. I can sense an explosion. Does it follow that only the "sense" of the explosion is what has transpired? Probably, not. I'd imagine there's plenty of empirical evidence corroborating the sensed event occured.

Ok. I don't think it's uncommon for notions like unattachment and detachment and apathy to merge into a maelstrom of studied indifference in mainstream Western eyes. — Tom Storm

It is hard to separate how the enlightened might appear versus speculating about the internal state. I'd suppose for contrast an unenlightened person being very anxious and insistent regarding their state of enlightenment.

Fair enough.

Am I really that rough on you guys?

I think Mr. Cheshire just means that he doesn't understand and can't imagine what is meant by "Enlightenment" in the context we are discussing it. That allows him to reject its value with a smug sneer. — T Clark

Always happy to be an inspiration.

Can you say more? Do you mean to say that unattachment is a less pejorative manifestation of apathy? — Tom Storm

I can say that the closest I've gotten to what I imagine Enlightenment to be like; is a moment of clarity and acceptance that happens to correspond with the state of affairs. Something along the lines of arguing a point until arriving at the obvious realization that being convincing and being right aren't the same thing. But, genuinely not really caring or maintaining an importance around this or that. I don't know what it really is; but that's how I translate it.

What is it to be Enlightened?
Less sarcastic form of apathy.

I stated that in both instances there was an imposition.

In the other instance where there was no desire to block the sidewalk, there was no imposition, because there was no desire to impose anything. Desire plays a key role, which I think I've highlighted. — Tzeentch

Is this ambiguous or contradictory? You can't always tell whether some one desires to be in the way.

One cannot seperate these things, even if one wanted to. One never experiences the external world directly - everything goes through the mind. — Tzeentch

Sure you can. There is the thing and your beliefs about it. Even the statement above imposes your understanding that a frame of references is not the thing.

If we're just arguing for sport, then that's all well and good. But, it's looking more untenable to deem things unfair do to a perception of impositions when rather convention suggests it's the other way around.

↪Cheshire If you have a point to make, make it. — Tzeentch

I'm not sure how compelling you will find it , but the point was to isolate what happens in the physical from your perception and argue these claims of imposing seem to translate as measures of either ego or willingness toward dogmatism. In one case I'm blocking the sidewalk and in the other I'm blocking the sidewalk. However, I am only imposing upon you in one case. So, I submit the definition is problematic.

Didn't think so.

There is no argument to dismiss. You've put forward that change is a part of the human experience for the same reason other things are part of the human experience. In summary; change is a sensation therefore all the implications of being a sensation apply to change. End summary.

I don't know. What would you call it? — Tzeentch

A Tzeentchian-imposition by principle?

Yes, for it was not a mere persisting. The refusal implies to consciously attempt to deny. — Tzeentch

Excellent, so there is a differentiation. If the situation were the same but I don't see you or block your path by happenstance. Then, what would I call it?

Yeah, this problem goes all the way back to the Cold War where the US government always had the issue of whether it was better to invest in either butter or bullets. Since we have almost always had to spend more money on our military than pretty much all other countries combined it is pretty much a given which of the two gets the most attention. I have a feeling that this isn't going to change at any time in the near future. — dclements

The "had to" is debatable. We have to in order to prop up a manufacturing sector with inefficient contracts because our consumer goods corporations went overseas to increase their profits. We have 11 aircraft carriers and twice the deck space of the world combined. I think the Chinese government is more concerned with their government not being undermined by appearing weak. Trying to get 1.4 billion people operating under a system that is not tailored to competitive interests is a contest against human nature.

Depending on the situation it sure can be. — Tzeentch

I think we'd have to settle this before making further progress. Where's the limit? At the extremes any perceived opposition to one's will becomes another's "imposition". Suppose I refuse to stand aside while you walk down the sidewalk. Has my mere persisting as a physical being managed to become an "imposition" by unnatural definition?

Well, the individual was there before society, so who was the first to impose? — Tzeentch

It's not matter of cardinal order. Unless you want to argue that limiting one's ability to trespass is an imposition. At which point we are using "impose" in an unnatural way in order to support some ideal or dogmatic sense of personal permanent right of way.

So when someone imposes, that gives another a right to impose as well? After the drunk driver is imposed upon does he then also get a right to impose back? How does this system work? — Tzeentch

When someone imposes on society, by using roads they don't solely own in a fashion that indicates they feel otherwise; then yes, it gives some agent - reason- to act on the right to limit another's actions. If the drunk driving public wants to gather the political will to provide drunk driving certifications and resulting emergency care; then they are free to act in their interest.

Since that discussion has been been more or less exhausted as to what could be talked about, I thought it might be better to discuss a even bigger issue of China's desire to become the dominant super power in the world and whether they can achieve such a goal. — dclements

I think China has the potential to become the new American right-wing bogeyman that keeps us dumping 700 billion tax dollars into a peacetime war machine while children starve, bridges collapse, and public education devolves into for profit bible schools.

What makes one opinion better than the other? — Tzeentch

One opinion takes into account the context of drunk driving. The public pays for the roads and as a result should claim some right to use them. A critical mass of drunk drivers would make roads unusable; in a normal sense. Really, it's the intoxicated driver imposing their will in other's space.

↪Cheshire You don't seem to grasp the point — Bartricks

I question whether the point has been extended. At this point you could replace the word 'change' with anything from human experience and not lose informative content. The arguments contradictory already anyway. At first we can't compare like things to make a determination about them;

we can’t appeal to another change as then we are trying to explain change with change — Bartricks

But, we can generalize change to sensation and make any number of statements? What is the motivation for this slight of hand?

That's not a view about what change 'is'. — Bartricks

It also wasn't a fair representation of my statement; per creationist tactics.

How is there an exception? Either an argument is sound, or it is not. At no point do the motives matter. — Bartricks

I'm going off pure pattern recognition. Change is an interesting topic and fertile ground for some new ideas I imagine. But, when it's creationism being served under a guise I end up sifting through 300+ posts to find a position I wouldn't have invested in refuting. If I'm wrong, then there is no concern. Motives matter in the sense a life is finite.

Generally, I'd agree. But, in the case of creationism, where the supporters won't even acknowledge their position falls under the heading in fear of automatic dismissal, I can make an exception. Glad it's not the case. As you say.

that has nothing to do with what I was saying. — I like sushi

From the reader's perspective it is the question being begged. Hence the early opposition.

Yeah, I could’ve done a much better job with the original post. I did think about editing but thought it would be messy. — I like sushi

Seems honest. I can respect that.

There you simply express a prejudice: you believe any analysis is false that implies the existence of a god, yes? Why? — Bartricks

I actually don't; just skeptical that Bartricks is interested in change and not undermining evolution. If I called it wrong then it saves the disappointment of having unintentionally entered a discussion about creationism.