Because the question I am addressing is 'what is change?'

Do you have any objection to the argument?

Your objection is that I am confusing a means of awareness with an object of awareness - an objection I anticipated in my OP and explicitly addressed. Our sensation of change is not itself change. It is 'of' change, by which I mean that it is a vehicle of awareness, not the object of awareness. Change itself is the object, but because sensations can only resemble other sensations, change itself can nevertheless be concluded to be a sensation.

Ironically it is you who is committing a fallacy - for you are clearly thinking that as it is a mistake to confuse a vehicle of awareness with an object of awareness, then objects of awareness and vehicles of awareness cannot be made of the same material. That's patently false.

Now, to sensations. No sensation by itself 'refers' to anything. Agents refer to things, sensations do not. Sensations are just a kind of mental state. (Philosophers sometimes talk of mental states that have 'representative contents' - but this is really nonsense as that states themselves do not 'represent' anything to be the case, for 'representing' is an exclusively agential activity).

But by reason we know or are told that some of our sensations 'resemble' a world. And it is in this way that we - we possessed of reason - come to the conclusion that there is a sensible world. The sensible world 'just is' the place our sensations give us some awareness of by resemblance.

Now, as a sensation can only resemble another sensation, then a sensation of change can only resemble another sensation. And as the word 'of' there means no more or less than that the sensation is resembling some aspect of the sensible world, we can conclude that change itself is a sensation.

So, once more, I am not committing the fallacy that you are trying to attribute to me. I am abundantly well aware of the fallacy, as a careful reading of the OP would tell you. And I have not committed it. Our sensation of change is not constitutive of change itself. It is 'of' change, by which I mean precisely that it is a means of awareness, not an object of awareness.

What you are doing is reasoning that as it is a fallacy to go from vehicle to object, then no object can be made of the same material as the vehicle - which is fallacious.

Supposing your model of information is true; what does it add to note change is subject to it. I could say for example; then ____is a sensation if, that is, there is a sensation of ____ . Why choose to fill the blanks with "change" as opposed to any other subject? — Cheshire

↪Cheshire Because the question I am addressing is 'what is change?' — Bartricks

Do you have any objection to the argument? — Bartricks

My initial objection and a few others, yes.
1x1 = 1 isn't really an argument in any normal sense. So, 1x Change = Change doesn't bring anything new or make a statement; which seems to be partially conceded in your reply.

Secondly, people deduce change long after it has occured. Say for example the fossil record. Are you extending "sensationalism" to change that isn't sensed directly?

1x1 = 1 isn't really an argument in any normal sense. So, 1x Change = Change doesn't bring anything new or make a statement; which seems to be partially conceded in your reply. — Cheshire

I don't see how that relates to my argument. My conclusion is that change itself is a sensation. That's a substantial conclusion. And it is certainly new. Who else has made such a case?

Secondly, people deduce change long after it has occured. — Cheshire

I am talking about what change itself is. You are talking about when people infer it. I am talking about the 'it' they are inferring.

I am talking about what change itself is. You are talking about when people infer it. I am talking about the 'it' they are inferring. — Bartricks

Right, but it was never a sensation in the case of having been inferred. If change occurs apart from being a sensation, then your conclusion is underqualified.

I presented an argument that appears to demonstrate that it is a sensation.

It is sufficient that there is a sensation of change to establish that change itself is a sensation. I have not claimed that the only way we can be aware of sensation is via a sensation.

Take yellow. We are aware of yellow by sensation. Yet we can infer that an object is yellow despite never having seen it.

Likewise, we can infer that there has been change without having any sensation of change. But we can also sense change directly, and that's sufficient for my argument to go through.

@Bartricks

> Change itself is the object, but because sensations can only resemble other sensations, change itself can nevertheless be concluded to be a sensation.

In what respect do they resemble and in what respect do they differ? And if your conclusion is that change is a sensation then why would I need a sensation of a change (actually a sensation of a sensation, a second order sensation) to detect it?! Or are you saying that change is a sensation that is not sensed? Which doesn’t make sense (pun intended!)

> objects of awareness and vehicles of awareness cannot be made of the same material. That's patently false.

Why? What is the argument? Can you show your point with an example other the sensation of change?


> But by reason we know or are told that some of our sensations 'resemble' a world.

We know or we are told?! Why some and not all? Also the idea of an external world is a sensation? How can a sensation resemble a magnetic field or a quantum leap in the real world?

Take yellow. We are aware of yellow by sensation. Yet we can infer that an object is yellow despite never having seen it. — Bartricks

We don't infer the "sensation" of it being yellow though; I don't see something brown and infer the fruit was previously yellow by some retro sensation experience. Even saying change 'can be' a sensation seems to confuse a thing with the sight of it. Do we then suppose all sensations are changes? That might improve the case.

Just another way of asking Who am I?

I'd think so. That's one of my operating assumptions about this physical and human landscape we call reality; ingredients make a cake. And I think that with the correct digital measurement tools, it is possible to know everything about a cause, before "it" even becomes one.

n what respect do they resemble and in what respect do they differ? And if your conclusion is that change is a sensation then why would I need a sensation of a change (actually a sensation of a sensation, a second order sensation) to detect it?! Or are you saying that change is a sensation that is not sensed? Which doesn’t make sense (pun intended!) — neomac

Those seem like confused questions.

We are aware of a world via some of our sensations. It's why we call it 'the sensible world'.

Now, I have argued that we have a sensation of change.

And I have argued that sensations give us an awareness of the sensible world by resembling it. If you think that's not how sensations give us an awareness of the sensible world, please say how you understand matters to work on that front. My account is perfectly straightforward. Do Rembrandt's self-portraits give us any insight into what Rembrandt himself looked like? Yes, insofar as the sensible image they create in us resembles the sensible image looking at Rembrandt himself would create in us. Do you not agree?

Now, consider your questions in that context. I say that a portrait of Rembrandt - or to be tediously accurate, the image it creates in us - gives us some insight into Rembrandt's appearance by resembling the image that looking at actual Rembrandt would have created in us. So, in this case it is an image of an image of an image. Would you raise the same questions? Would you ask me "in what respects does the image accurately resemble the image that looking at Rembrandt himself would have created in us?" No, for that would be beside the point. Similarly, would you ask "why would I need a portrait of Rembrandt if the image it creates resembles the image looking at him would create in me?" - no, for it makes no sense. Sensations don't answer a 'need' in us. It's just confused.

And as for asking "Or are you saying that change is a sensation that is not sensed?" no, I am not saying that. Where have I said that? All sensations are sensed. I explicitly stated that it is their essence to be sensed. So as change is a sensation, then it is sensed. We are aware of change via a sensation that is not itself constitutive of change, though resembles it. Change itself is a sensation, and it too is sensed, but not by us, but some other mind.

We don't infer the "sensation" of it being yellow though; I don't see something brown and infer the fruit was previously yellow by some retro sensation experience. Even saying change 'can be' a sensation seems to confuse a thing with the sight of it. Do we then suppose all sensations are changes? That might improve the case. — Cheshire

I don't know what you're on about now.

It is sufficient for my argument to go through that we have a sensation of change. I do not need it to be the case that we can only know of change through having a sensation of it. We often infer that change has occurred without having any sensation of it (which underscores that change itself is not made of any sensation of ours).

Now, do you agree that we have a sensation of change? If no, why not? Can we not get the impression a change has occurred when no change has occurred? That is, can we not suffer illusions of change? Of course we can - we often do - and yet that illusion would have to be made of false impressions, else in what sense is it an illusion?

And if there is a sensation of change - and there does appear to be - do you agree that sensations can only resemble sensations and nothing else?

Why? What is the argument? Can you show your point with an example other the sensation of change? — neomac

No, you owe the argument - what, you think that you can 'only' sense something that isn't a sensation? On what basis do you think that means of awareness have to be made of distinct material from that of which they give us an awareness?

But I can provide one, even though I do not owe one. It is by introspection that I am aware of my own mental states. Yet introspection is by mental states. And so, when we introspect, we are aware of mental states by means of mental states.

By your logic, of course, introspection is impossible. Which is absurd.

Now, do you agree that we have a sensation of change? If no, why not? — Bartricks

I agree a change might be known by a sensation. I don't think this is helpful in defining or understanding the notion of change; because it is so general as to nearly apply to anything.

And if there is a sensation of change - and there does appear to be - do you agree that sensations can only resemble sensations and nothing else? — Bartricks

No, I don't think this is correct. Some sensations are very different, so equating them in this fashion is confusing and misleading. A sensation of self-immolation does not resemble a sensation of watching a pendulum swing and yet they are both types of change.

@Bartricks,

> And I have argued that sensations give us an awareness of the sensible world by resembling it.

I doubt that. First of all notice that we can refer to the world independently from sensory resemblance: the term “one” denotes a number but is there any resemblance between them? The term “democracy” stands for a political regime but is there any resemblance between them?
Besides reference is an asymmetric predicate (a name refers to an object not the other way around) while resemblance is symmetric (a picture of an object resembles the object and the other way around). So how do we settle their relationship? First we establish if there is a resemblance on top of that we ground a reference claim oriented in one sense or the other: in other words if an agent is referring to something based on sensory resemblance first the sensory resemblance must be identified by comparison of entities that can be independently experienced, then the agent can take one of the entities as referring to the other by resembling it!
Yet what you are trying to argument is the opposite: you’re trying to infer the sensory-resemblance between sensations of change and real changes from the putative ability of sensations of change (assumed you are right, and I doubt that too!) to refer to the world, prior to having made any sensory comparisons.
Besides sensations do not require “sensory” resemblance to be able to inform us about the world: e.g. a red sensation can be triggered by an electro-magnetic wave coming from a given source, now how does the red sensation “sensory”-resemble the electro-magnetic wave or the source? There is no such “sensory” resemblance since electro-magnetic waves and their source are not sensations!

> I say that a portrait of Rembrandt - or to be tediously accurate, the image it creates in us - gives us some insight into Rembrandt's appearance by resembling the image that looking at actual Rembrandt would have created in us. So, in this case it is an image of an image of an image. Would you raise the same questions?

Of course not, because the resemblance is always between visual sensory patterns. Besides to each of them you can in principle have independent access: the image of Rembrandt as directly perceived, the image of Rembrandt as perceived in his portrait and the image of Rembrandt one can remember. Just because you have independent access to all of them you can compare them and notice the resemblance. Based on that you can take these images “stored” in memory or in paintings to refer to the visual object. All of them belong to the domain of visual phenomena, and can be experienced independently from one another.
But how can this example help you prove that changes in the real world are sensations?
I don’t see how for several reasons:
1. The two domains are categorically heterogenous: A. Physical particles are not even accessible to our senses, then how can changes affecting them (like quantum leaps) be sensations? Consider the symptoms a person gets even weeks after the cells of her body got infected by a coronavirus: if the changes in her cells during the infection were “sensations” happening in her body how come she became aware of the infection only days or weeks later, namely when experiencing the first symptoms of the viral disease?
B. And, as I previously clarified, the sensory-resemblance is unsustainable even for explaining what of the world is accessible to us through sensations.
2. As I argued before, the possibility for an image to refer to a certain object by resembling it, is grounded in the possibility of detecting the resemblance by direct comparison of 2 sensory patterns that one can experience independently, however it is no possible to experience the world independently from our sensations to make sensory-comparisons between the world and our sensations.
3. If we need a resemblance argument to prove that change is a sensation, do we need a resemblance-argument to prove that red is a sensation? If not, what is the reason?

> Change itself is a sensation, and it too is sensed, but not by us, but some other mind.

What is the mind that is sensing a quantum leap?


Pls give and argue on examples if possibile to not get lost in abstract arguments

I don't understand you.

The example of the portrait was to show you how resemblance works. The portrait would not, for instance, give us any insight into what Rembrandt sounded[/i] like, because a visual sensation does not resemble a sound.

You then go on to point out things I am clearly aware of and that have no bearing whatever on my argument. For instance, it is no premise of my argument that resemblance is the only way in which we can come to understand something. A book about Rembrandt does not, for instance, resemble Rembrandt, yet I can learn about Rembrandt from it. My argument requires merely that when it comes to sensations, they give us an awareness of what they are sensations 'of' by means of resemblance.

Imagine that the external world bore no resemblance whatsoever to any of our sensations. Well, in what possible sense would we be perceiving the world by means of them? We would conclude not that we are perceiving the world by means of our sensations, but rather that we are subject to a systematic hallucination of a world that is no actually there.

So, when it comes to sensations, if they are to be 'of' a real external world and not a hallucination of one, then the world they are 'of' would have to resemble them. And as sensations can only resemble sensations, the external world would therefore be made of sensations too.

Among the sensations we have are sensations of change, and so the same applies: change is a sensation.

So far as I can tell, you have made no real objection to my case.

I agree a change might be known by a sensation. I don't think this is helpful in defining or understanding the notion of change; because it is so general as to nearly apply to anything. — Cheshire

But if you agree that we are aware of change by sensation, then this - once it is acknowledged as well that sensations can only resemble sensations - establishes that change is a sensation.

You seem to think that if that applies to other things too, that somehow refutes the analysis. How? That's like arguing that water is not made of molecules, because any case that seeks to show water is made of molecules will apply to all manner of other things too.

@Bartricks

Indeed if you understood, you would see how catastrophic your argumentation still looks to me. And it’s catastrophic for 2 main reasons:
1. It’s grounded on very bad premises.
2. Even if the premises were acceptable (and they aren't), the entire argumentation would still be completely useless to prove your point.

OK let me try once again:

1. Concerning your premises, a very bad one is that we become aware of the world through sensation by sensory-resemblance. Why? Because it is unsustainable not only for entities inaccessible through direct experience (like physical particles) but also for entities accessible by direct experience: e.g. a red apple is a physical entity that reflects some electromagnetic waves which hit our sensory organs and may result in a sensation of red. Now how does the red sensation resembles the electromagnetic wave or the apple that reflected that electromagnetic wave? Since electromagnetic waves and apples are not visual entities per se, but physical entities existing independently from the experience we have of them and can not share ontologically intrinsic sensory properties, it’s impossible to detect such sensory resemblance. So if entities that we can access through direct experience and entities that we can not access through direct experience are not sensations, how can changes affecting them be sensations? And here, I’m assuming that you are not committed to a pure empiricist (say, humian or berkleyian) ontological framework. If you are, then just tell me in advance and we can spare ourselves from arguing further. Besides this is also why your example of the painting look completely misleading in explaining how sensations refer to the world, unless they are suggesting that everything in the real world (not only change) can be reduced to sensation.
The other very bad assumption is that change can be sensed (which for me it’s impossible, even when change concerns sensations, go figure!) but I’ll leave it for next time.

2. Even if your assumptions were sound (and they aren’t to me), your argumentation is useless to prove your point, namely that change is a sensation due to a sensory resemblance to the sensation of change. Here are the 2 steps to get that:
A. Reference by resemblance is logically warranted by resemblance not the other way around. If you want to talk about X referring to Y by resembling it, then I challenge you to clarify the relationship between the “referring” and “resemblance” between X and Y because “referring” and “resemblance” are logically distinct predicates: indeed there can be X referring to Y (but not the other way around) without X resembling Y ; and there can be X resembling Y without X referring to Y (nor the other way around). So how do we explain the co-occurrence of both predicates when X is referring to Y by resembling it? Your example of the portrait shows that claims of reference by resemblance is proven by prior resemblance detection, not the other way around: it’s because a portrait painting resembles Rembrandt in the first place that then we can take that portrait to refer to Rembrandt by resemblance not the other way around. So, by analogy, only the prior detection of resemblance between sensation of change and real change that can allow us to take the sensation of change is referring to real change by resemblance not the other way around!
B. The detection of sensory resemblance is possible only by comparing entities directly and independently experienced: it’s because the Rembrandt perception, the painting perception, and the mnemonic images can be directly and independently accessed that one can do the comparison among their visual properties and detect similarities. In other words to detect visual resemblance between X and Y, then X and Y need to be directly and independently experienced as visual entities. By analogy, you can detect the sensory resemblance between the sensation of change and change only if each of them would be independently and directly accessible as sensory phenomena. Hence if change was not evidently a sensation independently from any comparisons, it would be impossible to detect any resemblance between change and the sensation of change. Indeed as much as you do not need a sensation of a sensation of change to know that the sensation of change is a sensation, then you do not need to have a sensation of change to know that change is a sensation. This is true for all sensations: sensations are categorized as such by evidence and without any need of comparisons or ensuing resemblance detection or second-order sensations, were this the case this would lead to an infinite vicious regress! There is no need to argue that change is a sensation based on resemblance, or worse, based on reference by resemblance (as you fancy to do), were this really the case.

If you do not address my points as they are, after reading them carefully, it’s useless to continue the exchange. Of course, if you feel so badly the urge to remind me once more that “So far as I can tell, you have made no real objection to my case” (when I made plenty and didin't even finish yet), be my guest but pls skip at least the part were you pretend to counter my objections.

But if you agree that we are aware of change by sensation, then this - once it is acknowledged as well that sensations can only resemble sensations - establishes that change is a sensation.

You seem to think that if that applies to other things too, that somehow refutes the analysis. How? That's like arguing that water is not made of molecules, because any case that seeks to show water is made of molecules will apply to all manner of other things too. — Bartricks

I think we passed by here before already. "Change is a sensation" isn't an informative conclusion. At best an imprecise way of speaking.

I think we passed by here before already. "Change is a sensation" isn't an informative conclusion. At best an imprecise way of speaking. — Cheshire

No, it is a substantial conclusion. It is not an imprecise way of speaking. Some things are not made of sensations - minds, for instance. And some things are. And change, I have shown, is one of them.

No, it is a substantial conclusion. It is not an imprecise way of speaking. Some things are not made of sensations - minds, for instance. And some things are. And change, I have shown, is one of them. — Bartricks

Fantastic. What absurd implication is all this intended to support?

What?

The context in which this makes sense is the assumption of an unknown tangential argument that regards the "single mind" you periodically reference. If "change is a sensation" is an end in itself then I'm lost. And very much ok with that;

I have literally no idea what you're on about. There's no excuse for being lost - I presented a deductively valid argument. You seem to want things not to make sense.