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Free speech plan to tackle 'silencing' views on university campusWhat I'm trying to impart is that I don't buy the idea that all neurological processes are completely determined by antecedent neurological processes. If they were then we would not be in control of our decisions. — Janus
"The laws of conservation are false because I feel like I'm in control of my decisions"
So every other physical process is completely determined by antecedent physical processes, except for neurological processes in the human brain? What makes the brain special?
Unless you're saying that physical processes are not determined by antecedent physical processes in general? But then you'd have to show how that randomness equates to freedom. If I roll a truly random dice and get 3, I did not choose to get 3.
How do we know that energy all across the universe is conserved? — Janus
Because we've never seen an instance when it wasn't. Despite looking. We know it for the same reason we know unicorns don't exist.
What makes you think the laws you referred to apply to the mind? — Janus
They don't. That's the problem.
The laws apply to systems of physical things bumping into each other. So a mind causing any physical change is necessarily invalidating them. What exactly would it look like for a mind to cause something? Say we look at you raising your arm. You decide to raise your arm, then you raise it. You want to make the claim that the decision itself is what resulting in raising the arm. And I'm assuming here that the "decision" is not a physical thing you can hold.
Well that's testable. Check the neurological pathway that leads to the arm rising. At some point there, if the "decision" was the cause, we would expect some reaction or movement that was not caused by a previous reaction or movement. But that would fly in the face of the conservation laws.
I find it far less reasonable to believe that the conservation laws suddenly break once we look under the skull.
You're asking me whether I would consider something that doesn't cause some event to be the efficient cause of that event? — Janus
Yes because otherwise you'd have just said "cause". Maybe what you meant by "efficient cause" is that event A guarantees the occurrence of event B. -
Free speech plan to tackle 'silencing' views on university campusFor me being in control entails that your decision is not wholly determined by anything else, — Janus
Is your own brain something “else”? That’s the question. You seem like you’re treating your own brain as a stranger.
It also entails that the you that makes the decision is not reducible to neural processes, otherwise you would not be free at all. — Janus
So, are you proposing that you can make some decision without neural processes? How would that work? Telekinetically moving your hand?
The point was that it is only the fact that something is always correlated with an event that gives us reason to think it is the cause — Janus
Sure but there are also reasons to think the mind isn’t the cause. Such as the laws of the conservation of energy. If your mind causes some movement that would be energy addition, since the cause of the movement is nothing physical. It would look as weird as an astronaut floating in space with a uniform velocity who then suddenly... stops.... using his mind. In other words, telekinesis. Which is precisely moving something with your mind.
We cannot prove that our decisions are determined by antecedent events, but we cannot prove they are not either. — Janus
We have reasons to think it’s either. But I would put “If the mind caused movement then that would go against the law of conservation of energy and momentum” above “It seems that my mind causes movement”.
But you didn’t answer my question:
Would you consider A an efficient cause of B if A always precedes B, yet doesn’t cause it? — khaled -
intersubjectivityI don’t really think that’s an important question. Whether or not people can or can’t share the same pain token. Did you read what was after the “unless”?
It seems like a definitional thing. What can happen is for 2 people to have identical experiences. You can define it so that that is the same experience token or not. I don’t think it matters.
Though, I think it’s way less confusing to just say “2 identical experiences”. Same token or not, we can agree there.
Who cares if it’s same token or not? -
intersubjectivityI said the same thing to Isaac. It’s not necessarily, metaphysically, and transcendentally private. Just practically so. I don’t think it’s really an important distinction.
I think we are on the same page - I'd express this as that the private experience is irrelevant; it's that the language has a use that gives the utterances meaning.
— Banno
...and we are back to post 5, after an interesting journey. — Banno
Sure but you say things like “the private experience doesn’t exist”. Which I would never agree to. “The private experience is irrelevant”? As I said, yes to anyone but sci-fi and fantasy writers. Remember those scenes in predator where we get the POV of the predators? Those wouldn’t make sense without private experiences.
But still:
Same token though? No. Identical tokens? Possible. 2 instances of the same thing. — khaled
Like 2 identical legos. But I can’t conceive of 2 people having 1 instance of pain shared between them. Unless they are sewn together like Frankenstein. -
intersubjectivityJust to be clear, the contention is not that Salinus does feel another's pain; it is that he might; that it is possible. It is enough to show that it is possible for another person to feel your pain. — Banno
Was that it? Was that all you’re arguing? Then I’d agree. Though I’d add that we have no way of telling if this is what is happening or not. Even if they are both exposed to a same stimuli (the same slap for example)
The only way to know for sure is if you have 2 physically identical people in physically identical scenarios.
Different tokens though? No. Identical tokens? Possible. 2 instances of the same thing. -
Free speech plan to tackle 'silencing' views on university campusMy going to the shop could be determined by a neurological process (my decision) which is under my control — Janus
go to the shop because i am determined by neurological processes beyond my control — Janus
What’s the difference? How do you determine if you are “in control” or not?
Does the fact that it is your brain, and that you are doing what you want make you in control? Even if the processes of said brain decide your actions in full and are deterministic?
No evidence of any causation anywhere gets any better than this. — Janus
False. A color change always precedes reaching the equilibrium point in titration. Doesn’t mean the color change is causing the pH change. There are plenty of other cases where A always precedes B yet doesn’t cause it. Would you consider A an efficient cause of B if A always precedes B, yet doesn’t cause it?
in which case determinism would be a fantasy and there would be no problem for human freedom. — Janus
Randomness does not mean freedom. You’re not “more free” upon the discovery that when you want to raise your arm, your arm sometimes rises as opposed to always rises. -
intersubjectivityThis means that it is inappropriate to ask what the experience of red is like for you or for Richard; rather one should ask what it is unlike. — unenlightened
Which is exactly what I said.
We have to say of him, not that he has no experience of red (I am correcting myself here), but that his experience of red and his experience of green are 'the same'. — unenlightened
So the difference is structural. If you put a strawberry, a green leaf and a red apple next to each other Richard would have experiences RRR, respectively, in response (I’m only focusing on color). While the rest of us will have ABA or XYX or LOL or what have you.
The contents of the experience are not what Richard is missing, strawberries aren’t invisible for him, but they have the same color as grass. What Richard is missing is the correct structure. -
intersubjectivity
To say that your X and my Y are similar (same reason for division, same relation to environmental features, same features we're focussing on to group such chunks of experience) - we have to know something about the relationship between X (or Y) and the environment. If we didn't, then on what grounds are we saying that your X and my Y are even similar? — Isaac
That we use the same words.
When we both call something "red" that's good reason to believe we have cut up our experiences similarly. Or else one of use would say "That's red" and the other would reply "No, that's a circle".
But that we use the same words does not indicate that we are having the same experience, or even a similar one, in terms of content, only in terms of structure. We're "cutting it up" the same way. But the "it" that is being cut up need not be the same.
I'm not sure I'm understanding you. First off, what are you trying to argue? Assuming everything you just commented is true... now what?
I just read the edit, and I understand what you're saying less now.
I'm pretty sure I understand what you're saying now, thanks. It seems an odd theory, but valid. I just disagree about one point, but I think it's more a matter of personal judgement than logic or empirical fact
There is just as much reason to assume they are the same as to assume they are different. The model doesn't become any more or any less complex by assuming either.
— khaled
I maintain that creating subdivision where there need be none, creating alternate options where one would suffice - that is making a model more complex. — Isaac
What happened to this? I thought the only disagreement was over whether or not my model is more complex. Now, I don't get what you're disagreeing with. -
intersubjectivity
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intersubjectivitySo with your posited epiphenomena, by focussing on the similarity in the features relating to colour, we know that those features change in correlation mainly with changes in lightwaves hitting the retina. — Isaac
No, we don't. What we know is that which lightwave hits your retina determines the set of "similar experiences" to which your experience will belong. So a 600 nm lightwave hitting your retina will cause you to have an experience within the range of experiences you would talk about using the word "red".
We cannot go from this to saying that lightwaves have anything to do with the contents of that range.
If I was to use an analogy, imagine having a continuous color wheel with certain parts of it dubbed "red", "yellow", "orange", etc. The lightwave determines which part of the color wheel you experience. So a certain lightwave would cause the color wheel to land in the region dubbed "red" so you say "red".
However the lightwave does not at all determine the contents of the color wheel. The region dubbed "red" does not need to be the same for me and you. So long as the same wave causes us both to say "red" in the end.
And the difference in the content of the color wheel, can be caused by a difference in toe size for all we know. Because we cannot detect when such a difference is present. So we cannot narrow down what physical difference causes it. -
intersubjectivityX is the set of experiences that are similar enough to be called "red" by me. Y is the set of experiences that are similar enough to be called "red" by you. When I say "You had X" (or Y) I mean you had an experience that belongs to that set. Better?
The argument then still stands. The contents of X and Y do not need to be the same at all for communication to happen. — khaled -
intersubjectivityDoes that matter? Similar enough to be called "red".
But if I had to answer, similar in terms of content I guess. There is something similar about seeing sunsets and oranges. -
intersubjectivityI don't see how that gets around the problem. — Isaac
X is the set of experiences that are similar enough to be called "red" by me. Y is the set of experiences that are similar enough to be called "red" by you. When I say "You had X" (or Y) I mean you had an experience that belongs to that set. Better?
The argument then still stands. The contents of X and Y do not need to be the same at all for communication to happen. And we can never know what the content determining differences are.
How have you done so without some relation to light waves or something? — Isaac
What do light waves have to do with anything?
The moment you start saying that person 1's A and B are basically the same (XX) because they're about the same colour, you've decided on an arbitrary grouping based on some artefact of the real world (colour). — Isaac
Yup.
That means you're talking about light and wavelengths etc, so the physical cause of the epiphenomena has to be triggered by those external stimuli in some way. One's toe is not. — Isaac
Complete non sequitor. I legitimately have no clue how this follows from the rest of what you said.
Going from knowing that the V4 region is responsible for structural difference in experiences of color does not lead to the conclusion that it is also responsible for the content-determining differences. — khaled -
intersubjectivityI'd suppose it was sunset. — Banno
And if they called it purple? Or if it was the middle of the day?
I'm saying the range does not give the definition of red; nor is the range fixed; nor is it delimited. — Banno
Sure. But now what is your issue with my argument?
If I changed it to:
or do you have access to the structure of other people's experiences?
— unenlightened
I can infer it yes.
Let’s call experience you are subjectively having when looking at a red apple X. And let’s call the experience I am subjectively having when looking at a red apple Y.
We both communicate our respective experience by saying “that’s red”
If we both look at blood, you will have an experience similar to X and I will have an experience similar to Y. We will again say, that’s red.
But if you look at grass and have an experience similar to X, and so say “That’s red” then we have a different structure. You’re probably colorblind, as you can’t recognize green things.
I on the other hand properly have a sufficiently different experience from Y when looking at grass (let’s call it Z) and so I say “that’s green”
Now, importantly: Whether or not X and Y are the same experience makes absolutely no difference. What matters is the structure. If the same objects consistently produce the same experience (X or similar for you, Y or similar for me) we can talk.
X and Y do not have to be the same at all.
A public language, based on private experiences. — khaled
Does that satisfy? -
intersubjectivity...no specifiable criteria which determines when the word "red" is used correctly. — Banno
But there is clearly a range no? If I call the sky red I'd be incorrect. Outright. Or do you think someone calling the sky red is not wrong?
But you wouldn't even give that there is a range:
Would you give that there is a specific range of experiences that is common to every instance of the use of the word “red”?
— khaled
No. — Banno -
intersubjectivity
:brow:
But you use the same word - "red" - in talking about all three.
— Banno
Because they share something. — khaled
Because they share something.
— khaled
That's the assumption Austin pointed to. I think it is wrong. — Banno
Wouldn’t there have to be some commonality to experiences of “red”
— khaled
I say no. Why should there be? — Banno
if there is absolutely nothing in common in our experiences of colors...
— khaled
You keep atributing this to me and attacking it.
It's not what I said. — Banno
So what are you saying?
Your critique of my argument was:
Here's the point: Each of your experiences of red is different. You use the same word for them all. What is it that all your experiences of red have in common?
Now I don't see that there need be anything that each and every experience of red that you have has in common. — Banno
So I assumed that you meant.... you know..... that experiences of red have nothing in common.
But apparently not, despite all the above quotes.
So what is your critique of my argument exactly? -
intersubjectivityWhat do you think is the problem with that? Spell it out. — Banno
That if there is absolutely nothing in common in our experiences of colors, you'd expect people to guess randomly. On what basis are they choosing a word that might work? This is the first time they have this particular experience. They have not learned what words to call this particular object. So how come they tend to always guess something within the range of acceptable answers, even though it is the first time being exposed to that experience.
Unless there is something common to experiences of "red"? A resemblance they can use? They think to themselves "Oh that's a similar color to blood, so I'll call it red" or crimson or what have you. -
intersubjectivityWhen you see an object you’ve never seen before, and are asked what color it is, how do you guess the correct color the first time? No asking allowed. There may be no single correct color but there is certainly a fuzzy range of correct answers. How do you guess something in that range the first time? — khaled
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Free willI'm not sure I understand the point of the question you asked at the end of your post — Barondan
Good. Then I know you’re not being biased.
I don't think I would be anymore free than I was before they took the doors off. — Barondan
Well, before the doors were taken off, you had no ability to leave. IE, determinism. After they were taken off you had the ability to leave but you would get shot if you do. IE, indeterminism, but you would never do the act in question.
So it seems that determinism and indeterminism are not the issue here. It seems that “freedom” does not increase when you get the ability to do things you would never do anyways. Maybe the variable that matters is whether or not the thing you’re doing is what you want to do.
So maybe a more accurate definition of free will is “Doing what you want to do without outside influence”. In that case, whether or not the world is deterministic shouldn’t be a problem. It would be like whether or not the door is there. Doesn’t matter, you wouldn’t want to leave either way.
is it possible that quantum mechanics are only seemingly random because of our own ignorance about how things work? — Barondan
I think there was a paper stating that, no, quantum randomness is fully random and not due to our ignorance. How that would be proven is beyond me. But physicists on a whole also seem to think this. That quantum randomness is true randomness, not just ignorance. -
Free willWell if disproving determinism suffices for you you can go into quantum physics. There are events that are truly random there. The world is not deterministic. There was never evidence of that anyways. Because we can’t go back in time and check if it’s deterministic or not.
Otherwise, if you can’t shake the determinism off (and there are some that say QM don’t mean the world isn’t deterministic on a macro scale) then you should go into compatibilism the belief that determinism and free will are compatible.
Let me ask you this: If you were locked in a cell, and the guards told you one day “we are removing the door to your cell, but we will shoot you on site if you try to leave, and our snipers never miss” will you have become any more free? -
intersubjectivityOr did you learn to pass the red cup by comparing the various colours to a series of swatches that show the essential colour? Did you commit these swatches to your private, subjective memory? — Banno
Sort of.
If there is a crimson and a blue cup before you, and someone asks for the red cup, do you say "Ah - I can't - there isn't one!" — Banno
No, I’m not that precise.
But I know passing them the blue cup is wrong.
So, again:
Would you give that there is a specific range of experiences that is common to every instance of the use of the word “red”? — khaled
Again, you haven’t answered my question.
When you see an object you’ve never seen before, and are asked what color it is, how do you guess the correct color the first time? No asking allowed. There may be no single correct color but there is certainly a fuzzy range of correct answers. How do you guess something in that range the first time? -
Free willwell you first have to define your terms.
If you were predetermined to do something and so did it, is that free will?
If your decision was entirely random is that free will?
If it’s neither, then are you looking for a decision that is not determined and at the same time not random? Does that even make sense? I don’t think it does. -
intersubjectivityThere is a correct answer to “What color is this” more often than not.
How do people answer the question if they haven’t heard the answer before? How do they learn the word use?
Nothing about passing cups. Please answer the question. -
Free speech plan to tackle 'silencing' views on university campusThat said, in simple straightforward cases, people often can simply be believed. "Why did you go to the shops/" " To buy a hamburger". They didn't go to the shop because they were determined to do so by neurological activity which is beyond their control. What possible evidence could there be for such a conclusion? — Janus
You make it sound like the two explanations are contradictory.
As for what evidence: The fact that we have never seen the mind causing any physical change. No, you raising your arm shortly after intending to raise your arm is not evidence of causation. Just evidence that the intent precedes the act. -
intersubjectivitymight — Banno
I’ll take that as “is”. Otherwise you’re just being non committal.
No. The only thing common to our use of the word red might be our use of the word red. — Banno
Then how can people use the correct word when asked what color something is when they haven’t seen its color said before? They should have nothing to go off of. Since the only thing common to our uses of the word red is the uses. So given they haven’t heard what color word is used in this scenario, they shouldn’t be able to guess.
“What color is this” should be an unanswerable question, unless you heard someone call that thing a specific color before. Otherwise, how could you learn the word use? You’d just be guessing.
...and the structure is...? if it is the use of the word, then I don't see that we differ. — Banno
The use is born out of similar structures. But, again, the explanation requires that experiences of red share something.
More acutely, there need be no experience that is common to every instance of the use of the word "red". — Banno
Would you give that there is a specific range of experiences that is common to every instance of the use of the word “red”? -
intersubjectivityThe sky will not have changed colour, if that is what you mean. So what. — Banno
How could you tell? According to you the only thing common to experiences of red is the use of the word “red”. So if everyone calls the sky red the sky is, for all intents and purposes, red.
Another question: How can children tell the color of things they haven’t seen before? When they see something for the first time, and have never heard it being described as red or green or blue, where do they get the uncanny ability to guess the color correctly most of the time?
Heck, how do adults do it? When you see something you never heard described by a certain color before how come you’re able to tell what color it is? The only thing common to experiences of any color is the word use, according to you, so given that you’ve never heard it being described as any particular color how come you can guess the color? You should have nothing to go off of.
despite it so clearly being shared. — Banno
What is shared is the structure not the experiences. But this assumes there is something common to experiences we communicate by using the word “red”. More than just the word. -
intersubjectivity
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intersubjectivityThat they keep using the word for the wrong thing would be a big clue. — Banno
That would be the ONLY clue in your setup.
So if everyone starts to call both the sky and blood “red” tomorrow, that makes the sky red?
Also link isn’t working.
And again:
That's the assumption Austin pointed to. I think it is wrong.
— Banno
Wrong or unnecessary? — khaled -
intersubjectivity
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intersubjectivityBut you use the same word - "red" - in talking about all three. — Banno
Because they share something.
Now I don't see that there need be anything that each and every experience of red that you have has in common — Banno
There is no metaphysical reason or anything, sure.
It just so happens that all experiences of red share something. Beyond just us calling them “red”
To demonstrate: If a colorblind person called a green thing “red” he would be wrong. But on what basis? Wouldn’t there have to be some commonality to experiences of “red” for us to be able to see that that commonality isn’t present for the green thing and therefore the colorblind person is wrong? On what other basis is he wrong? -
intersubjectivity
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intersubjectivityMaybe this might do.or do you have access to the structure of other people's experiences?
— unenlightened
I can infer it yes.
Let’s call experience you are subjectively having when looking at a red apple X. And let’s call the experience I am subjectively having when looking at a red apple Y.
We both communicate our respective experience by saying “that’s red”
If we both look at blood, again you will have X and I will have Y. We will again say, that’s red.
But if you look at grass and have X, and so say “That’s red” then we have a different structure. You’re probably colorblind, as you can’t recognize green things.
I on the other hand properly have a different experience from Y when looking at grass (let’s call it Z) and so I say “that’s green”
Now, importantly: Whether or not X and Y are the same experience makes absolutely no difference. What matters is the structure. If the same objects consistently produce the same experience (X for you Y for me) we can talk.
X and Y do not have to be the same at all.
A public language, based on private experiences. — khaled -
intersubjectivityThere, I questioned what it was to share a common understanding of supposed intersubjective phenomena. Pain is taken by some as the archetype of phenomenon understood intersubjectively. On that account pain is private, unshared, only understood intersubjective.
If that were the case then talk of shared pain would not make sense. — Banno
Or you can check my discussion with Isaac (and with you) where I explain how you can have a public language about private experiences. -
intersubjectivitythen your example of reaction YYY is absolutely impossible. Everyone's structure is going to be ABC, or DEF, or GHI because no-one is going to respond in the exact same way to three separate instances of anything. — Isaac
Sure but I was simplifying by only talking about color.
but in doing that we no longer can claim to be unaware of what constitute the physical difference, we're constraining that to colour, so the physical difference is going to be somewhere in the V4 region. — Isaac
Not necessarily. Differences in the V4 region, that we have studied, are structural physical differences.
I'm imagining having a different experience due to having a different content-determining physical difference. And as I've shown, we can never narrow down what the content-determining physical differences are. The difference between AAB and GGR, constricting it only to color, could be the difference in toe shape of the participants for all we know. Even narrowing it down to color, we have no evidence that the difference is in the V4 region.
However we can in fact know, that the difference between AAB and GGG is a difference in the V4 region, or the eyes themselves, or what have you. Because we have access to the dependent variable (the structure) and so can narrow down what physical differences cause it to change. Going from knowing that the V4 region is responsible for structural difference in experiences of color does not lead to the conclusion that it is also responsible for the content-determining differences.
I don't believe you can. — Isaac
I can imagine what the world would look like with all its colors inverted. I'm sure you can too. -
intersubjectivity
We can say true statements about how things are, not just about our experiences of them. — Banno
Isn’t this just reinforcing the distinction you say we shouldn’t “invent”? A distinction between how things are and our experiences of them? -
intersubjectivityWe could say that we each have X and nothing about the world we experience would be less well explained by that. You add that it could be X or Y you create an unnecessary bifurcation. Additional bifurcations is pretty much the definition of complexity — Isaac
Fair enough. Maybe it is more complex. But definitely more intuitive and less confusing. Because we can picture having different Xs and Ys. I can imagine having different "flavors" of experience (same structure different content). Idk why I would choose a model that suggests that that cannot be done. When it can be. And I definitely find that less confusing than unenlightened and Banno's "Xs and Ys don't exist". Your model of "Only X exists, there can be no alternative called Y" is just unsupported, although simpler and adequate for explanation.
I like m'Qualia.
And regardless of more complex or not, the variable being introduced is unimportant for any scientist. The flavors of experience don't matter, nor can we investigate what causes them, nor can we even know if they're being caused or not. So regardless, neurologists will continue on their merry way whichever model is adopted. -
intersubjectivityRichard discovered that he couldn't see red, but he had been seeing red all his life. — unenlightened
If he couldn’t see red he can’t have been seeing red all his life. So idk what you mean here.
I would say “Richard discovered that he couldn’t distinguish red, but he had been having certain experiences ( Y) which he described by using the word ‘red’ all his life”.
So when you line up 2 green objects and a red one, you would have experienced ZZL but Richard would have experiences YYY. To Richard, there is no difference between the 3 objects (I’m assuming he’s red green colorblind) and he would call all of them red. Or all of them green. Depends on what he’s been saying upon having Y up to this point.
As to what Y is, I have no clue. Nothing to contrast it with. Can’t talk about it. Same with Z and L.
khaled
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