I have never seen your thought experiment as an actual experiment. If you are a physicist, could you please do the experiment and share the actual results with us? — Truth Seeker

What would that do? I'm not a physicist, but it is well known that Quantum effects can have macro consequences. If you don't believe me there are many articles from reputable institutions that show this, here is one:

https://www.wtamu.edu/~cbaird/sq/2014/04/22/why-do-quantum-effects-only-happen-on-the-atomic-scale/

If it is involved then quantum mechanics could affect our choices which would make our choices random instead of deterministic. How can we be culpable if our choices are random instead of deterministic? — Truth Seeker

That's a good question. Personally, I think this quantum randomness can provide a "refuge" for souls or spirits or whatever flavor of immaterial stuff you like. One could say that it is consciousness or souls or spirits or whatever that collapses wavestates, or that it at least has something to do with it. That would give "us" (if you define as some sort of immaterial soul) real agency in inacting physical change in the world.

I am not sure about the validity of any of these theories, though they are certainly comforting if true. I just wanted to bring your attention to them:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_mind

But if that is NOT the case, if it really the case that quantum processes are completely random, you'd have to believe in some sort of compatibalism to believe in free will.

So, we are and always will be prisoners of determinants and constraints — Truth Seeker

That is true. My question is, why do you require that we be COMPLETELY free to have ANY responsibility. Let's do a thought experiment.

Let's say that you were omnipotent, free from all constraints, and you decided to kill someone. Your decision was made without any determinants or constraints, surely you are morally responsible for it in that case, correct?

Now let's add a limit. Let's say you are not quite omnipotent, you can only exert enough force to lift 10^9999999 tons. Quite the limit from pure omnipotence, but still extremely powerful. If you decide to kill someone now, would you still be responsible? I would say yes, DESPITE the fact that you have a constraint. Because I cannot see how this constraint would influence your decision on whether or not to kill someone at all, do you agree?

Now we keep adding limitations and limitations, until we get to a point that, say, you're a starving beggar, and steal a bit of food from someone who wouldn't even notice. Most people would say you are not morally culpable for this, because your limitations and constraints are influencial enough that you can be excused.

Now, where does the line lie for you? The line that separates "constrained enough to not be morally reponsible" from not constrained enough. Is it when we've added hunger? When you get confined to a physical body? When you became faced with death? Or was it all the way at the beginning, at the second you lost your omnipotence and got your first limit, that you no longer became morally responsible?

I clearly stated my position that "Organisms make choices but their choices are not free from their genes, environments, nutrients, and experiences. Their choices are determined and constrained by their genes, environments, nutrients, and experiences." — Truth Seeker

Would you agree that the effects of genes, environments, nutrients and experiences can theoretically (not practically) all be reduced to physical phenomena? As in: Changing X gene does, deterministically, result in changes A, B and C. And placying someone in Y environment will, determinisitically, result in changes in D, F and G. And A, B, C, D, F, G are all physical phenomena (think: bigger nose, different neural connections, etc)

I will assume yes.

Do you agree that quantum randomness CAN under certain setups, cause macro level changes? (see cat)

I will also assume yes.

Do you agree that there is a chance that some of these setups actually exist in nature? I don't see a reason to disagree with that one, so I'll say yes.

It then follows that one of these premises is wrong, and I am least confident of the first. Maybe putting someone in environment Y will NOT result in D, F and G, as there is the possibility of quantum randomness causing a butterfly effect somewhere in the causal chain from Y to D, F and G.

There is a 50% probability that the electron would spin right and a 50% probability that the electron would spin left. Due to quantum decoherence, our genes, environments, nutrients and experiences don't behave like electrons do. — Truth Seeker

Ah, how are you sure of this? How are you sure that none of the setups where quantum randomness can have a macro effect (like with the cat) don't already exist in some environments or within our own bodies?

This is a testable hypothesis, but until we know the effects of genes, environments, nutrients and experiences on organisms fully, it will not have been tested. Until we fully understand our body and our world, it's still a possibility that such a quantum-randomness enabling setup already exists within us or our environment.

Currently, our technology is not accurate enough to detect these things. Our technology does not have the processing power to even model classical systems with 100% accuracy, much less be able to tell between "classical noice" and any potential effect due to quantum randomness.

It would be hard for you to predict this with 100% accuracy. It's logical to state that the more you knew about my genes, environments, nutrients, and experiences, the more precise your prediction would be. — Truth Seeker

Yes, but it is not clear that it would ever be 100% accurate. The only way it can be is if there is no setups that allow quantum randomness to have a macro effect anywhere. And we don't know that.

The key issue here is not complexity. The key issue here is the structure. — Truth Seeker

These attributes are weakly emergent properties of the electrochemical activities of the brain. — Truth Seeker

Yes, I understand. Your claim is that the structure of the brain is such that it can have accurate representations of reality as well as rationality correct? How did you know that the brain is so structured so as to be rational? (I understand the basics of neurology. I know what electrochemical activities are. That does not change my question)

The atoms themselves are rational? That can't be it, they're clearly not.

Complexity? That's clearly not enough. The city of Tokyo is complex yet can't think rationally.

Having electrochemical activity and neurons? Many animals have brains equipped with neurons and plenty of electrochemical activity, and yet are not rational.

Evolution would favor a rational brain? Not necessarily. Even we have irrational biases drilled into us through evolution.

So what makes you so sure?

I did not say that events are predetermined. I said that events are determined in the present by the interaction of variables. Even in your thought experiment, what happens is determined in the present by the interaction of variables. — Truth Seeker

Well... Duh!!

If you count even quantum randomness as a "variable" then that's obvious. With this definition though, how come there is a contradiction between free will and determinism? There would no longer be any contradiction between having a "will" variable which acts freely, and determinism.

I have noticed something interesting about your posts. You frequently misquote me by claiming that I made statements I never made. — Truth Seeker

I don't mean to misquote you... I misunderstood your position. Frankly, I think your position has shifted and I'm not sure you noticed. The way people typically use "determinism" is to say that every event is predetermined by the previous event, and so if we had enough computational power we would know everything that happens (including people's behavior).

I believe this is also what you meant by it initially, through quotes like these:

We don't have enough knowledge to predict people's behaviour with 100% accuracy but that does not mean that the behaviours are not deterministic. — Truth Seeker

Here you imply that if we did have enough knowledge then we would be able to predict behavior correct?

Now:
1- We cannot predict Quantum events as they are inherently random
2- Quantum events can cause changes on a macro scale (see cat)
3- Therefore we cannot predict events (including people's behavior) on a macro scale

Just so we're on the same page, let's first decide whether you're arguing for determinism as outlined above or just in "causation" (that present events are determined by the interaction of variables). And if it is the former, do you find the above argument satisfactory in showing that determinism is not the case?

The way clouds behave and the way brains behave are due to their structure. A cloud can't assess whether 2+2=4 or 2+2=5 is true. We can. The reason we can assess it is due to the complexity of the human brain which is due to our genes, environments from conception to the present, nutrients from conception to the present, and experiences from the womb to the present. — Truth Seeker

How would you go about proving that our brain just happens to be set up such that it produces true statements (at least, often enough for us to have meaningful discussion)?

Complexity is not a good explanation. Why is a cloud incapable of assessing wether 2+2=4 but we are? When do atoms get "complex enough" to be rational? The city of Tokyo is very complex, but I don't think you'd say it's capable of rational thought, right?

The point still remains, that from my POV, under your brand of Materialistic Monism all I know is that there is a bunch of atoms doing a bunch of physical processes, and in the end producing that post you just wrote. Why should I believe a bunch of atoms? I don't believe the cloud atoms, why are your atoms so special?

Now what I ACTUALLY think is happening, is that whether through a soul, or something else, there is a part of you capable of choice, and thus is capable of choosing what to think about, and thus is capable of forming rational conclusions by consciously choosing to think rationally. Because, again, I do not think a thought can be rational if you are FORCED to think it, and cannot think of anything else (which is how all thoughts are under a deterministic framework). Frankly, I used to be a Materialistic Monist like yourself, but I don't know where I stand now, so my view may be full of holes, but I'm just pointing out why I no longer found MM satisfactory.

I didn't claim that humans are rational. — Truth Seeker

Well, we have to assume we're rational enough to at least have a discussion! Or else, there is no point in continuing! From now on, when I say "rational" I mean "rational enough to have a discussion" or "can access whether or not 2+2=4 is true".

Quantum decoherence is the reason the macroscopic world does not exhibit the superposition, indeterminacy, and entanglement that exist in the quantum world. Can you show me even one instance when macroscopic objects have exhibited superposition, indeterminacy, and entanglement? — Truth Seeker

I did not set out to show that macroscopic objects exhibit superposition. I set out to show that the world is not deterministic, even on a macro scale. In order to do this, I would need an example of a macro scale event, that is not determined by prior events, correct?

I think the cat shows that very well. There is a scenario where the death or life of the cat is NOT predetermined. Therefore the world we live in is not predetermined. What am I missing?

What evidence do you have that souls exist? How does an immaterial soul grant organisms rationality? How does an immaterial soul interact with a material body? How would idealism make us rational? — Truth Seeker

I didn't really argue for souls, although I believe in something like a soul. And I have no clue how they would interact with a material body. But the thing that all these beliefs can do is outright assume that the "soul" (or whatever they use) is rational. Which as far as I understand is what they often do.

Your brand of Materialistic Monism cannot do that, because it also has to contend with the fact that the atoms that make us up are not rational, AND that evolution does not necessarily favor rationality, AND that there is nothing more that makes us up or determines our behavior other than these irrational atoms. You have to believe that we got really, really lucky.

First we have to assume that a collection of atoms can be set up to have a good representation of the world it's in (this is not a given. Look up the "The Self-Referential Sentinel" paradox)

Then we have to assume that our particular collection of atoms happened to find one of those good setups, despite knowing that evolution does not necessarily favor these complex setups with accurate representations of the world, much less rationality.

To understand what you're saying better though: Do you believe that rationality is strongly or weakly emerged from our atoms?

There is nothing irrational about any physical processes e.g. clouds forming shapes. What shapes a cloud forms is entirely deterministic. It occurs due to the laws of physics acting on matter and energy. So, your claim “Every other physical process is not rational” is false. — Truth Seeker

What I meant by "irrational" is that we aren't justified in believing the cloud if it happens to spell "2+2=5". Or even if it spells "2+2=4". Are we agreed on that?

If so, what makes us justified in believing our brains? Even though they follow the same "irrational" processes.

Sight is not the only way to create a model of one’s environment. — Truth Seeker

You're right. But without it, the model is incomplete. And if we know that evolution can create creatures with incomplete models, why do you trust that it would create creatures with a valid or accurate rationality?

As far as I understand, you claimed that:

1- Our brains our products of natural selection
2- Natural selection would favor rational organisms that have accurate representations of their environments
3- Therefore our brain is rational and has an accurate representation of its environment

I am doubting #2. I do not see why it would be true apriori, and can think of circumstances where irrationality or inaccurate representations of reality can actually aid survival.

I agree that our brain doesn’t perceive everything. It doesn’t have to perceive everything for humans to survive and reproduce. It has to perceive just enough about hazards such as falling off cliffs or getting eaten by lions to ensure our survival and reproduction. — Truth Seeker

Exactly. We are evolved to reproduce. Not to be rational. So what makes you so sure we're rational?

A dualist doesn't have to deal with this issue, since they can maintain that rationality comes from the immaterial "mind" or "soul" or whatever they call it. Neither does an idealist. However a naturalist determinist does, since he has to concede that:

A- Atoms aren't rational (in the sense that we are not justified in believing any statement uttered or written by any random assortment of atoms... like a cloud for instance)
B- Somehow our brain (a collection of atoms) IS rational

The evolutionary argument you outlined is a good attempt. IF it is the case that Natural selection favors having accurate representations of the world, and rationality to boot, then we can reasonably think that our brains were naturally selected for so as to be rational and have an accurate representation of the world.

However, that premise itself needs to be proven, and I don't see how it can be as there are many examples of inaccurate representations of the world being more beneficial for survival, and thus being selected for. There are even examples of irrationality being more beneficial for survival, see cognitive biases such as sunk cost fallacy.

Yes, your thought experiment about connecting the trigger of a gun to the spin of subatomic particles is interesting. However, that is not how the macroscopic world works. — Truth Seeker

How do you know this? Have you examined every single physical configuration in the universe and determined that there is nothing akin to the thought experiment I outlined?

The workings of the brain create perceptions, thoughts, emotions, actions. None of these things are dumb physical processes. — Truth Seeker

"I am not sure that government official is very trustworthy"
"But look! He said he's trustworthy!"

That's what this sounds like to me. See why I don't find it convincing?

Note, that it's not that I think that our brains are unreliable, it's that I think that we have no reason to think they're reliable under a deterministic framework and we have reason to think they're unreliable under that same framework. Namely: Every other physical process is not rational, how come our brains just happen to be?

Again, I am not saying that our brains are irrational under a deterministic framework - which seems to be what you're arguing against - I am saying we have no basis for thinking they are, and some basis for thinking they're not. I would need you to argue that we have a basis for thinking our brains are rational, which you attempt to do by arguing that a rational brain would lend to better survival odds, but:

That's not true. If an organism's brain can't produce an accurate enough model of its environment it dies from environmental hazards or predation. — Truth Seeker

Perception requires some sort of energy. Sight, hearing, etc, all require different organs which consume energy. Which means evolution has to find what are the most beneficial things to perceive in compairson with how much they take to perceive. It's not like creating an omniscient being is just as "cheap" materially and in terms of food intake as creating something that sees much less. Spiders are almost blind and they survive just fine.

It is well known our brain doesn't perceive everything. We don't perceive UV, we don't perceive microwaves, we don't have that ability that birds have to detect the magnetic field produced by earth's core to know which direction is north (despite it being a very useful ability, considering how impactful compasses are).

Since we cannot perceive what our brain doesn't perceive (by definition), we cannot know how much we do perceive or how much it is altered by our brains (we know our brain alters perceptions, or else how would optical illusions arise?) So I don't believe the argument from evolution works when you take into account that there is a cost for exact perception which might not be worth the payment. What do you think?

We can choose to think about a specific topic but the thoughts arise unconsciously. — Truth Seeker

See, what's what I think, but you tell me there is no "choosing" at all.

We subject our thoughts to analysis to work out if the thoughts are rational or irrational. A cloud is not sentient. A cloud has no control over the wind. We are sentient and we can control which topic we choose to think about. — Truth Seeker

If you contend that we can control what we think about, then we can't be running deterministically right? How can we be in control if everything we think is predetermined?

I understand that there are compatibalist views which support both free will and determinism, but you stated multiple times that you don't believe in those, and that we'd need freedom to have any choice, and so any responsibility. For the last couple of paragraphs though you suddenly mentioned "choice" a dozen times. I'm confused...

Quantum decoherence stops quantum indeterminacy from creating macroscopic indeterminacy. At macroscopic levels, events are still deterministic. If you toss a coin, whether it lands on its head or tail depends on the forces acting on it. — Truth Seeker

Funnily enough, I asked ChatGPT the same thing earlier, but I don't think it is an adequate response. It descirbes what occurs in most quantum systems in nature, but I'm just curious how it meshes with the experiment I outlined.

I thought it was clear from my example that under certain setups quantum indeterminancy can cause huge macro effects (like determining the fate of a cat). I understand that these stetups would be extremely rare, but who is to say they never exist naturally. They definitely can exist in a lab.

I doubt the qualifications of ChatGPT as a physicist, but since you quoted it, here is what it has to say about my thought experiment:

What if we took the Stern-Gerlach experiment and extended it, so that when a particle's spin is up, a gun is fired at a wall, and when it is down, it isn't fired. Wouldn't that be an example of quantum indeterminance having macro effects?

ChatGPT:

Yes, that's a fascinating thought experiment! What you're describing is a hypothetical scenario where the outcome of a quantum event at the microscopic level (the spin of a particle in the Stern-Gerlach apparatus) directly influences a macroscopic event (the firing of a gun).

In such a scenario, if the particle's spin determines whether the gun is fired or not, and if the spin is truly subject to quantum indeterminacy, then the firing of the gun would indeed seem to be influenced by quantum randomness. If you repeated this experiment many times with identical setups, you would observe a statistical pattern where approximately half the time the gun fires and half the time it doesn't, mirroring the 50/50 outcome of the particle spin measurement.

This concept highlights the intriguing aspect of quantum mechanics where seemingly random and unpredictable events at the quantum level can potentially lead to observable effects at the macroscopic scale. It's worth noting that while this thought experiment is intriguing, actual implementation would be extremely challenging due to practical constraints and the delicate nature of quantum systems at the macroscopic level. Nonetheless, it serves as a thought-provoking illustration of the foundational principles of quantum mechanics.

It seems to agree.

However, brain activities are not dumb physical processes. — Truth Seeker

Is a thought produced by dumb physical processes.

So are these:

The human brain is the product of billions of years of evolution. It doesn't function the way clouds do. It has responsive feedback systems that are self-correcting to make sure that the model of reality generated by the brain is accurate enough for the organism to survive and reproduce in the real world. — Truth Seeker

Even if we accept that the brain is evolved for survival (which is another thought resulting of dumb physical processes), then that wouldn't imply that our thoughts are accurate. We have no way of knowing the degree of correlation between accurate representations of the world, and evolutionary success, so we cannot assume from evolutionary success that our brains are accurate.

And on a simpler level: I do not think you can rationally think, if you are being FORCED to think things. Why is a cloud that spells "2+2=4" not rational? Because it did not choose to spell that, it was just the wind. Similarly, under determinism, I cannot call any thought rational, even if it happens to be accurate. I'm curious what you think. How can rationality arise from a bunch of irrational processes?


However I am also so interested in why you think the world is deterministic in the first place, especially given that science doesn't support the notion anymore as far as I can tell. You read the thought experiment with the cat and the gun. There is also a much clearer example:

In order to discovere quantum randomness, some scientist would have had to repeat an experiment and observe that he randomly got different outcomes correct?

What if that scientist (I am unfamiliar with the history so I wouldn't know who) just got unlucky, and got the same outcome every time he repeated the experiment.

Then the discovery of quantum randomness would have been delayed years. The discovery of quantum randomness is a huge macro event in itself if I've ever seen one, and it's borne out of randomness.

Your argument for how determinism removes our brain's credibility did not make any sense to me. — Truth Seeker

I'll try to rephrase it then. Note, that this isn't an argument that determinism is NOT the case, but rather that we are not justified in believing it.

The argument rests on the fact that physical processes aren't rational. For example: if a cloud is shaped to spell "2+2=4", that's not the cloud thinking and coming to a conclusion then communicating it. It is just dumb luck.

Now, in a deterministic world, even our thoughts, statements and written word are determined, yes? Doesn't that mean they are also produced by similar "dumb luck"? Then why should we believe them?

The atoms bumping around in your brain that produced your thought or speech or reply are exactly as believable as a cloud happening to spell out your reply. Why should I believe either? They're just dumb atoms bumping around.

So if the dumb atoms make you type "determinism is the case" I have no reason to believe it any more than I would believe it if a saw a cloud that spelt it, and if they make you type "determinism is not the case" I similarly have no reason to believe it.

Now, by some epistemic luck, it COULD be the case that the atoms bumped around and produced a true statement, just like the cloud that spelled "2+2=4", but we have no reason to think so, since any thought we have will also be a result of dumb bumping atoms. It could even be the case that our atoms are so positioned that they almost ALWAYS produce true statements! But again, no reason to think so.

I say "dumb bumping atoms" as shorthand. I know it's not that simple. Replace it with "dumb physical processes" if it makes things clearer.

Are you talking about this? https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/01/140116085105.htm — Truth Seeker

That wasn't the specific one I read. It was years ago. But please go ahead and do your own research, I am no expert.

The macroscopic world is deterministic despite quantum indeterminacy. You can test this by doing the following experiment. Take a coin and toss it. It will land on its head or tail - it will never be superpositioned or indeterminate. — Truth Seeker

Ah, but I don't want to prove that large bodies can be in a superposition. All I set out to prove was that quantum events can have consequences on the macroscopic scale (it can determine the fate of a cat under the right setup for example). And if that is the case, then determinism must necessarily not be the case, since quantum events have some randomness.

Did you read the two articles I gave you links for? — Truth Seeker

I admit, I only skimmed them, then realized I don't really know enough so I just took you at your word that it's not all chemical. Don't see how that's relavent though, my argument relies on it all being physical processes. Chemical, electrical, the nuances of how synapses work wouldn't affect this. Please correct me if I'm wrong.

I would rather the gun in your experiment was pointing at a wall instead of a cat. — Truth Seeker

Overdramatization is fun. However, it's not about the fate of the cat, it's about demonstrating that quantum processes can very much have an impact on a macro scale. And as you said yourself:

It's possible that our brain scanners are not yet good enough to see everything. — Truth Seeker

So there is no telling that it isn't already the case. In fact -and I didn't mention it earlier because I am not an expert on the field- I've read some theories stating that microtubules in the brain can actually maintain some quantum coherence despite the hot and chaotic environment, and therefore can actually have effects on a macro scale. I don't have the expertise to tell between science and pop-science, which is why I generally don't like reading short articles about these topics, but if you're interested, you could do your own research about it.

I am not convinced that determinism removes our brain's credibility. — Truth Seeker

Fair enough, but I hope I made a good case for it, so until you tell me why you don't think so, I don't see much point in continuing this.

To summarize, I've argued that:
1- There is little physical evidence the world is actually deterministic (the cat sure thinks so!)
2- Determinism is logically self-defeating in the first place

I don't see any evidence for any X factor in decision-making. Can you show me any evidence for the X factor that I could see using a brain scanner? — Truth Seeker

No I cannot, because our technology isn't good enough to see it! But I'm sure it's there!

That's what your argument sounds like to me. "I am sure these are all the factors. They are the ones I see, therefore they're all the factors."

Without better techonology, the jury is out for both sides.

Quantum indeterminacy does not lead to macroscopic indeterminacy due to quantum decoherence. At the macroscopic level, things don't happen randomly. They happen deterministically. — Truth Seeker

Quantum decoherence is what happens when a quantum system interacts with the environment, and so loses its ability to be in a superposition as far as I understand. Normally, this would eliminate indeterminancy, you're right, but it's very easy to bypass this. Here is how you would do it:

The Stern-Gerlach Experiment is an experiment where you investigate the spin of a particle if it's up or down. When measured, the particle will have either an up or down spin with even probability (quantum indeterminancy), but until then, it's in superposition.

What I propose is: Do the same experiemnt, but attach the detector with a gun pointed at a cat. If the spin is measured as up, it shoots the cat. If it is down, it doesn't shoot the cat. Clearly the attachments won't change the outcome of the experiment, yes? Any more than the scientists who read the outcomes, wrote them on a piece of paper, then published them did.

So it is clearly possible that a quantum event can have major macroscopic consequences with the right setup. What makes you so sure that our brain does not have similar setups?

At the macroscopic level, things don't happen randomly. They happen deterministically. — Truth Seeker

There is also another issue with this: That determinism is a self-defeating hypothesis.

If I see a cloud that spells "2+2=5", ought I believe that 2+2=5? Clearly not right? Because the cloud didn't think rationally, so I have no reason to believe it. It was strewn about in that shape by determined processes.

Now replace the rock placement with electron placement in your brain. That electron placement causes you to type "2+2=4". Why should I believe that? It's no different from the cloud.

Determinism removes our brain's credibility, which is what got us to determinism. It is self-defeating, similar to the statement "we shouldn't trust our thoughts". If we shouldn't trust our thoughts, we should trust the thought that we shouldn't trust our thoughts. Similarly, if we cannot trust physical processes to produce rational conclusions, we cannot trust our conclusions as long as we believe they are formed from purely physical processes.

I would love to know more about your experience of meditation. I meditate daily. I have not experienced what you described. How did you come to experience it? — Truth Seeker

I think Yoga would be faster for this, because you frequently find yourself in positions you don't want to be in, and yet push yourself to be in anyways. Also I'm not sure the issue here is which meditation to use.

Incidentally, in your model, what does "push yourself" mean? What's pushing what, it's all chemical reactions right? Is it just a confused phrase?

We don't have enough knowledge to predict people's behaviour with 100% accuracy but that does not mean that the behaviours are not deterministic. — Truth Seeker

Correct. It also seems to me that until we predict people's behavior with 100% accuracy, we can't be sure it's 100% deterministic. Maybe it's only 99% deterministic and a part of it is inherently random (like in quantum mechanics).

I have seen the evidence for the following groups of variables: genes, environments, nutrients, and experiences. I have not seen any evidence for the existence of other groups of variables. If you can show me the evidence for other groups of variables, please do. — Truth Seeker

We live in an embodied state. For any decision, there will be factors for making it, and factors against making it. For instance, for my decision to reply:

For:
I don't like not replying to people
I like mentally stimulating things
....

Against:
I need to pack up and go soon
I just woke up
....

Let's say that there IS an "X factor" if you will in one of these. That there is a "I freely choose to support this option" or "I pushed myself to choose this" on one of them (That is what I believe btw). How might I show that to you?

If I end up making the decision, it is easy to say "Aha, you did it because you don't like not replying to people and you like mentally stimulating things". If I end up not making the decision, it is easy to say "Aha, you didn't do it because you needed to pack up soon and you just woke up"

See the issue I'm facing here? If you believe things are deterministic, it will be easy to point to the factors for or against any decision, and then to decide from there that they are the only factors, when there could have been another "free" factor.

As for why I think such a factor exists? Again, direct experience.

I carried out experiments to test the roles played by our genes, environments from conception to the present, nutrients from conception to the present, and experiences from the womb to the present. These experiments were not published in any journals because I carried them out alone and I was my only test subject. I compared myself with myself under different situations e.g. how lack of oxygen affected my decision making, how lack of water affected my decision making, how lack of food affected my decision making, how lack of sleep affected my decision making, how cold and heat affected my decision making, etc. I also compared myself to how I was before significant life events with how I was after significant life events. By significant life events, I mean being kidnapped, being raped, watching people murder each other, being in natural disasters which killed lots of people, relatives being murdered, etc. The more I experimented and compared, the more it became clear to me that our wills are determined and constrained by our genes, environments from conception to the present, nutrients from conception to the present, and experiences from the womb to the present. You can do the experiments on yourself - it's not necessary to take my word for it. — Truth Seeker

First off, I assume you cite these significant life events as examples, not actually things that happened to you. If they happened to you then... I don't know what to say, that's one long TERRIBLE list, I'm not sure "I'm sorry" would even suffice.

With that assumption:

Funny thing is, I did the experiments myself. I am a big fan of meditation, and I try to be as aware as possible of my internal state. I found that DESPITE all the differences in environment and circumstance, there still remained a "will" which was free of all of these impositions. Getting into the nature of this will is outside the scope of this thread I think, so I won't. That's not to say that this will is capable of moving mountains. There are things I can't do, but there is nothing I can't TRY to do. The existence of such a capacity in itself constitutes free will for me.

How much do you know about neuroscience? Have you ever seen PET scans and functional MRI scans of humans? — Truth Seeker

I have, though I admit my knowledge of the subject is rather cursory. Frankly, I have my own reading list, so I don't think I'll be pursuing a PHD in neurology for the sake of this discusison.

So, do you now see the roles played by my genes, environments, nutrients, and experiences in the typing of this post? This is why I am convinced that we don't have free will. Do you understand my thoughts and reasoning? — Truth Seeker

I do, but I do not think your conclusion follows from your reasoning. You've pointed out many ways in which genetic, environmental, etc factors affect our decisions, but you have not proven that they are ALL that affect our decisions. Listing many factors does not prove that they are all the factors.

It is easy to look at a decision (such as typing this post) and then list all the factors that pushed you to type it, then claim it was determined. It is just as easy to look at a decision (such as me replying) and then list all the factors that pushed me NOT to reply, then claim it was my free will that made the difference. I'll demonstrate:

I want to play video games right now.
I am tired and I should fix my sleep schedule.
I am currently on vacation and would rather be relaxing.
I am surrounded by friends I could be talking to.
etc etc

AHA, but here I am replying because I chose to reply in spite of all the above. See! I have free will!

I could also do:

I like to debate.
The guy I'm talking to is interesting.
A part of me wants to change his mind.
etc etc

AHA, this must be why I am replying. It's all deterministic! There is no free will!

I don't give the best examples but I hope you get the point. No matter how long the list gets, it does not follow that those are all the factors contributing to a decision.

It seems to me that the only way to be sure that our actions are purely determined by environmental factors is to take stock of ALL of them (somehow), and then see if that is enough to predict what a person will do, think, and feel (somehow). Correct me if I'm wrong.

Not everything, just what's recent. Apologies if I misinterpreted anything.

I don't know if souls exist or not. — Truth Seeker

It's not really about souls or ontology, I just picked the situation which I think has the highest "freedom". That we are souls inhabiting bodies, and somehow the souls can interact with said bodies. I wanted to determine what exactly consitutes free will for you.

My definition of free will is a will that is free from determinants and constraints. — Truth Seeker

Completely free? Wow. That's a high bar. No wonder you think it doesn't exist!

What about situations where all the determinants and constraints happened to align with what we would have willed anyways? Think: Prisoner wants to escape prison and finds his cell door unlocked and all the guards are on vacation. Do you think the prisoner was not free to choose to escape even then?

I think our choices are the result of the interaction between genes, environments from conception to the present, nutrients from conception to the present, and experiences from the womb to the present. — Truth Seeker

This is the point I was trying to make above. How did you come to this conclusion? To confirm this for sure means you accounted for all the interactions between genes, environmental factors, nutrients and experiences from the womb, and then found that all of these factors add up to predict everything a person would do. I doubt you, or any scientist has done that. And I do not think it is obvious that they would add up either, so I've always been puzzled why people are so sure.

Why are hard determinism and free will opposed? They can be, depending on your definition. I think hard determinism is pretty well defined, but how do you define free will?

You seem to define it as the ability to make decisions without any constraints, but I'm not sure that's a fair definition. We are embodied beings, we will ALWAYS have constraints. It is easy then to look at any decision and say "That was entirely determined by your circumstances" even if there truly was a "free element" in us

To illustrate, let's assume that all of us are souls inhabiting bodies and that souls magically impact the physical world. Let's also assume that the souls are entirely free and can make any decision they want. This is about as "free" a conception of humans as I can think of, some weird magical dualism. I'll assume you agree that this soul has free will correct? Since it can make any decision it wants without any external factors.

Then, let's say you're picking between a cheeseburger and a burrito and give a number to every factor to simplify. So for example:

"The cheeseburger has more cheese and I'm craving cheese right now" -> +50 points towards cheese burger
"The burrito is cheaper and I don't like spending money" -> +20 points towards the burrito
"The burrito guy needs the money more" -> +50 points towards burrito
etc

Add all of your determinants and constraints with whatever unique values they have up and then in the end you add:
"I (the soul) picked cheeseburger" -> +100 points

In this example, which would be a "free" choice?

1- Burger: 700, Burrito: 500 In this case, the +100 didn't matter, the external circumstance alone would have moved us in the direction we wanted

2- Burger: 600, Burrito: 500 In this case, the +100 is what made the difference

3- Burger: 500, Burrito: 600 In this case, the +100 wasn't enough

Does it need to be situation 2? Would 1 still be freely willed, even though the factors alone moved us in the direction we would have chosen? Would 3 be freely willed?

Most importantly though: We do not have this point analysis in real life. It is impossible. Even if we had free souls, we can't "calculate" how much effect they have. It will be just as easy to say "souls add 0 to what they choose, and your choices are all determined by circumstance" as it is to say "souls add 9999999999 to what they choose, and can always easily overpower circumstance".

From what I read, you seem to be saying the former, that we (whether we are souls, or bodies, or whatever) add 0, and everything is determined by circumstance. How do you know that? And how much would we need to add before we have free will?

Currently: Materialism with a splash of platonic realism. Learned from @180 Proof later that it's called hylomorphism. But my mind changes often.

Holy late Christmas gift! I can't believe I missed this. I'm not sure but I think I might hold the record for "Most words wasted on Bart".

I figured if I was meticulous enough with my argument and wording I would be able to at least make Bart unable to reply. A little personal challenge. But, the man is a Master at trolling.

The way he balances reasonable statements with nonsense, the way he manages to find the smallest inaccuracy in your wording to write an essay about, the way he commits a different fallacy each reply so that you can never pin him down, the way his insults are (almost) never actually ad hom. Masterclass.

Assassin
1. Life 30
2. Agility 60
3. Strength 40
4. Defense 60 — Agent Smith

What kind of assassin has as much agility as defense??

The problem with this view is that you cease to exist when you go to sleep and then re-exist when you awake.

If we decide we want to slowly re-arrange an individual into an entirely different organism, at what point can they no longer be considered the same "self"?

Both matter replacement and rearrangement occur in nature and prevent us from safely defining any solid, constant, material thing that we can call a "self". — tom111

I don't see this as an issue but more of what it SHOULD be like. Why makes you think there is an unchanging part of us (like a soul) in the first place?

Upon thorough examination, the idea of a "self" is as arbitrary as the idea of a "chair", or any other object. In a purely material world, concepts like these simply don't exist. — tom111

Add them to your ontology then if their non-existence bothers you. Check hylomorphism.

Ok Bart.

Your claims contradict mine. But all you are doing is assuming that artists are obliged to produce art and taking that for granted, even though that's intuitively false. — Bartricks

No. I’m saying what I find to be intuitively true. Which is that when 1 and 2 are met, artists have an obligation to create art. And now you will just say “Ah, you disagree with my premises therefore you are too far gone” as usual. It’s like a script with you.

Again, why do you post here if you don’t want your premises to be doubted? You keep harping about self evident truths but cannot conceive that what is self evident for one is not self evident for another.

But even when not doubting your premises, I already said why your explanation is bad. Why have you not addressed this? If you don’t again, I can only assume it’s because you cannot.

There are many things that do not show disrespect to any person or object and yet are morally obligatory. For example, reporting a robbery if you see one. So it seems that "does not show disrespect" is not enough to guarantee something is not obligatory — khaled

Maybe the reason you (and I) cannot find a good explanation for both statements to be true is that they’re not both true.

Just the threads by Bart. And they haven’t fallen anywhere, they were always like this.

What's that got to do with anything? — Bartricks

I cited 2 things that would make producing art obligatory:

1- Have very good reason to think that his art will bring about much good before they produe it.
2- Be able to produce it relatively easily. — khaled

In an attempt to refute 1 you say:

First, you clearly know nothing about art or artists if you think any of those artists I mentioned didn't know they were creating era defining work. Believe me, most great artists - most great anything - knew full well they were great at the time. — Bartricks

I pointed out that knowing one is a great artist does not give one good reason to think his next painting will bring much good (it does not satisfy 1). Picasso might have known he was a great artist, but he could not have known his next paintings would ever bring much good. Similar to how a gold medalist could not know that he will get another gold medal on the next Olympics, or even a bronze. Thus, Picasso was under no obligation to create art despite satisfying 2 (again, due to not satisfying 1).

You have provided no evidence to the contrary. — Bartricks

Except I have, and you continuously ignore it:

it is not morally required. Why? Because omitting to create such works does not show disrespect to any person or to any object. — Bartricks

There are many things that do not show disrespect to any person or object and yet are morally obligatory. For example, reporting a robbery if you see one. So it seems that "does not show disrespect" is not enough to guarantee something is not obligatory. — khaled

Those were the only falsehoods in your reply that are correctable. The rest show a confusion so profound I wouldn't know where to begin. You have shown that there is no merit in debating you, so I will take my leave now.

Believe me, most great artists - most great anything - knew full well they were great at the time. — Bartricks

Knowing you're a great artist =/= Knowing the next piece of art you produce will bring about much good. Similar to how a gold medalist, even though they (and everyone else) knows they're a great athlete, cannot know they will get a gold medal, or even do well at all in the next olympics.

we can just as well imagine an artist who knows full well that were they to exercise their artistic ability, they would create great art (for there is no contradiction involved in the supposition). — Bartricks

But I already did a while ago:

If the artist could magically create era defining pieces of art at the snap of his fingers, and chooses not to do so, then yes I’d think he’s in the wrong. — khaled

And you did not deny that when it was first said. That makes me think:

it remains as obvious as ever that there is no positive obligation on the person to exercise their ability. — Bartricks

Is false. If it was obvious, you'd have denied my quote above.

But at this point I'm just saying X and you're saying "Obviously not X" without any support. The classic "I'm right you're wrong because it's self evident" argument you love so much.

I can't understand why you post discussions in the first place if you believe all your premises are self evident and all your reasoning flawless. That's something I've wondered ever since your first post. What are you even trying to accomplish?

it is not morally required. Why? Because omitting to create such works does not show disrespect to any person or to any object. — Bartricks

I have offered an explanation. The job, then, is to test that explanation. — Bartricks

If that was the job then why no response to this?

There are many things that do not show disrespect to any person or object and yet are morally obligatory. For example, reporting a robbery if you see one. So it seems that "does not show disrespect" is not enough to guarantee something is not obligatory. — khaled

Oh, what a brilliant distinction......not. Same applies. See? — Bartricks

I'm afraid that if you cannot grasp the distinction then I think you're too far gone to be worth debating. Please reread what I wrote. These quotes could help you out.

How do you draw that conclusion? No, none of them were obligated to create art, because none of them could have known their art would have been worth creating. — khaled

They didn't have the benefit of hindsight. — khaled

An artist cannot know that his piece will bring much good. But if he did, and he could create it easily, then yes he would be obligated to do so. — khaled

That is to say, if the artist can produce art he knows will be good (and can do so very easily). Which never actually happens. — khaled

Here let me say it one more time Bartricks. Maybe 5th time is the charm. For creating art to be obligatory for an artist, the artist must:

1- Have very good reason to think that his art will bring about much good before they produe it.
2- Be able to produce it relatively easily.

You will notice, Bartricks, that having produced era defining art does not meet condition (1). See?

Jeez. You said that if an artist could produce art with the click of his fingers — Bartricks

False. I said if an artist can produce era defining pieces with the click of his fingers. That is to say, if the artist can produce art he knows will be good (and can do so very easily). Which never actually happens.

See?

Most importantly it requires one to understand that unethical behavior always comes from a place of suffering — Tzeentch

Always? I'm curious where you got this. Not saying it's wrong, I don't know.

Huh, we got to the point of "I'm right you're wrong because it's self evident" quicker than usual this time...

Guess that's that then.

Punishment, and severity of punishment have never stopped people breaking the law. — Vera Mont

I didn't say that having punishment guarantees a safe society, but it is a prerequisite. If you really believed this, then would you be fine with your state/country employing a "free crime zone" in your city specifically?

Punishment and rejection further alienate an already disaffected member of society; severe punishment can turn him into an active enemy of the existing structure. — Vera Mont

Sure, but the alternative is them running rampant. I'll take the punishment and rejection.

To imprison large numbers of disaffected men in harsh conditions for years on end is to build a hostile army in the very heart of one's nation. — Vera Mont

Better that army be behind walls than roaming around.

But John Singer Sargent or Picasso did have an obligation to produce art, as they worked very quickly and with ease (as much ease as clicking one's fingers). That just seems prima facie false — Bartricks

How do you draw that conclusion? No, none of them were obligated to create art, because none of them could have known their art would have been worth creating. There are many people who can create art quickly and with ease, and who even think their art is fantastic, yet there are very few Picassos. They didn't have the benefit of hindsight.

My example was a hypothetical. An artist cannot know that his piece will bring much good. But if he did, and he could create it easily, then yes he would be obligated to do so.

Because omitting to create such works does not show disrespect to any person or to any object.

Is there any reason to reject that analysis? — Bartricks

There are many things that do not show disrespect to any person or object and yet are morally obligatory. For example, reporting a robbery if you see one. So it seems that "does not show disrespect" is not enough to guarantee something is not obligatory.

I am presenting a different analysis. That the creation of art is not obligatory because it is effortful and not effective at producing much good (statistically). I don't think something effortful can be obligatory unless it has a very good chance to produce a lot of good.

A system of thought where animals are not a being seems to convoluted for me...

There is cohesive form. — neonspectraltoast

And that form is the person? Yea that's the closes I got to an answer too.

An eye for an eye approach just seems the most practical. If there was no deterrent to crime, we could not have a safe society.

But what I find most interesting is the virtue people see in forgiveness. Personally, I think forgiveness is only virtuous if the criminal has changed. If you have the opportunity to catch someone that attacked and have them answer for their crimes, but you instead choose to forgive and let them go for no reason, you have just greatly increased the chances they go and attack someone else. Not good.

If said attacker gets away without you being able to catch them, but then they change their ways out of remorse and start leading an honest life, then you stumble upon them years later, it would be virtuous to forgive them. Because punishing them at this point does not prevent any more harm. The main point of eye for an eye is deterrence, if it doesn't do that, then what's the point?

What I'm not so sure of though is that an eye for an eye approach is just, as opposed to just practical. Would it be wrong of you to report them years later? On paper, doing so would cause harm for no practical reason. They no longer need deterring. But I am not sure it would be wrong, still.

What if you saw the assault, as opposed to being assaulted yourself, and you know that the victim still holds a grudge when you stuble upon the changed criminal. Would it be "better" to report them then since you're not doing it for yourself? Would you be obligated to tell the victim what you saw and leave the choice up to them?

Jane 'deserves' X, does not mean the same as "we ought to give Jane X". — Bartricks

What does deserving something entail then?

A rapist deserves to be raped (according to the lex talionis). — Bartricks

Not necessarily. They deserve a punishment comparable to being raped. Like multiple years in prison (whether or not that is actually comparable I am not sure). Which they get.

There are lots of things that are unnecessary, yet morally permissible.

And a person who has an artistic ability and is in perfect health, mental and otherwise, is still not under any positive obligation to exercise their ability. — Bartricks

Destroying something beautiful is generally not only entirely unnecessary, but also harmful (more specifically, denies people pleasure).

There is also the fact that tearing down something beautiful is destroying someone’s property (again, unnecessarily) assuming it is man made. That should be reason enough for it to be wrong.

But even if someone with artistic ability is in perfect health and has the motivation to make something they think is beautiful that doesn’t change the fact that it will take a lot of effort and time, and is not guaranteed to even produce a positive result. It’s not clear it would be worth it for the artist. So there is no obligation to do it.

If the artist could magically create era defining pieces of art at the snap of his fingers, and chooses not to do so, then yes I’d think he’s in the wrong.

It seems clear enough that you have not. It seems a good thing if you exercise your ability. It might be praiseworthy. But you are not doing wrong if you do not. — Bartricks

The reason for this may shed some light on the question.

If someone held a hostage at gunpoint and demanded you draw them a beautiful painting to let the hostage go, I think you would be obligated to draw said painting if you can. The difference between that situation and the situation where you decide whether or not to draw under no stress, seems to be the clarity of the consequences.

It is not at all clear that if you do not exercise your ability to create beautiful things that anyone would be seriously (if at all) hurt by that. But if there is reason to think that creating said beautiful things will serve to relieve a lot of suffering (somehow) and you choose not to do it, then you would be wrong.

It depends on the situation. There is no clear right/wrong to it. But generally, an artist can't guarantee that their work will have some sort of significant positive influence that justifies the effort, so they are under no obligation to make it.

Note, even if you think that we - those of us with an ability to produce beautiful things - are positively obliged to exercise our abilities, surely even you admit that it is far more wrong to destroy a beautiful thing than it is to fail to create one? — Bartricks

That's because generally, destroying a beautiful thing is entirely unnecessary, whereas an artist may have reasons for not creating a beautiful thing (burnout, no time, mental/physical toll, etc).

Then how come that I'm the same person even if 99% of the cells in my body are not the same ones as 7-10 years ago?

I like that answer

So at what point does that potential get realized and what's a being?

"Person" does not have the sort of sharp and unambiguous meaning as — SophistiCat

Sure, as with many things. But what about a blunt ambiguous meaning?