I'll put it another way. Physical difference result in mental differences correct? So let's split up physical differences into two types, structural, and content-determining.

A structural physical difference results in different structures of epiphenomena. So for example, glaucoma, is an example of of structural physical difference. As if I have glaucoma the structure or my experiences will be different from yours. You'll have XXY and I'll have LLL for example. I won't be able to tell that the last object has a different color. There is a clearly measurable difference in behavior.

A content-deciding physical difference results in different epiphenomena. So assuming neither of us is colorblind (neither of us has structural physical differences), it is still possible that you are having XXY and I am having something like AAB. We would still be able to communicate. But the content-deciding physical difference is what makes me have AAB as opposed to XXY.

My point is, we can never find out what the content-deciding physical differences are. Because, although they exist, we have no way of surveying the dependent variable. If you have XXY and I have AAB no test will tell me exactly why. I can come up with any number of physical differences between us that can account for the difference in experience. The size of your toe could be what's causing you to have AAB for all I know. So I can never narrow it down.

On the other hand, structural physical differences are very easy to see. Because we can test for the dependent variable (the structure). You can ask me to name the color of 3 objects, and if I can't distinguish, then you can scan my brain and compare it to people who CAN distinguish. In this case, you will be able to find out exactly what physical differences bring about color blindness. That is because you were able to test for the dependent variable (the structure).

Why introduce something for which there's no evidence? — Isaac

I am not definitively saying that our experiences are different I'm saying they could be. There is just as much reason to assume they are the same as to assume they are different. The model doesn't become any more or any less complex by assuming either.

So if there's a difference of any sort whatsoever in the epiphenomena, it must result from an equivalent difference in the the causing physical phenomena. Otherwise we've invoked some other non- physical causal factor. — Isaac

Correct, and we will have no way to narrow down which physical phenomena is doing it. Because a difference in the content of the epiphenomena makes no difference as long as structure is maintained. So we cannot access the dependent variable to see how it changes (because it makes no difference how it changes)

Alk the evidence you have so far is that our epiphenomena are the same in response to the same stimuli. — Isaac

False. We have no evidence of that. As I've shown, you can have radically different epiphenomena and still be able to do all of:

We reach for the same words, we understand the same implications, we even notice those who don't respond the same and single them out as being in need of help. — Isaac

So that in itself is not proof.

Other than that we've no reason at all to assume our epiphenomena are different — Isaac

Agreed. And no reason to assume they're the same.

a) had a modelling assumption that unique brain states resulted in unique epiphenomena, and

b) noticed unique brain states in response to identical stimuli. — Isaac

These would be reasons for deducing a differently structured set of epiphenomena not even different ones.

Let's say you have XXY and I have YYY. I would probably be colorblind in that case. Because I can't tell the difference between the first two and the last object. You do an fMRI scan and find some difference or other in my brain state.

But in this example, we have the same epiphenomena ( Y ) in some cases. So the difference the fMRI detected is not necessarily a difference in the Xs and Ys but again, a difference in their structure.

Epiphenomenon X doesn't pre-exist. We've got no reason at all to assume it. — Isaac

I would say that that we have experiences is a bit more than an assumption no? It precedes the neurology even.

Epiphenomenon X does pre-exist. The experience you get when looking at red things precedes your knowledge of whatever brainstate is behind that experience. Evidence: I have an experience when looking at red things, yet I have no clue what my brain is doing at the time.

Now, I can assume you also have some experience when looking at red things. We can call mine X and yours Y. Both pre-exist. Both precede the neurology. And they do not have to be the same.

The difference between them would be due to physical differences. Which physical differences, we have no way of determining. Because we cannot study these pre-existing epiphenomena.

As to why we would want to in the first place? No clue, you're the one that proposed it:

The point at which I disagree is that these are intrinsically private. They're different brain states. They may be accessible to introspection, in which case we can (and probably have) come up with words for them that way, or they may be accessible only to neuroscience or cognitive psychology, in which case we can come up with technical terms for them. — Isaac

Now you're leaving the realm of epiphenomenon. The epiphenomenon X can't 'cause' anything. — Isaac

Misspoke. How about "comes with". Idk why you're raising this objection now though because that's always what I've said.

Brain states. — Isaac

But we don't know if brainstate1 causes X or Y or Z or U or G. That's the point. We cannot see the value of the dependent variable to be able to find the independent variables.

But it is discoverable because it's associated with different brain states, which we can detect. — Isaac

But we don't know which brain state causes X as opposed to Y or Z or U or G. Because as long as the structure is the same we have no idea if the subject is having an X or Y or Z or U or G.

What is the experience of red of someone who is colourblind but does not know it? — unenlightened

You can't explain to someone what an experience is like so I'm not sure what you're asking. As you said: The subjectivity leaves the picture. We can't talk about it.

What's the experience of red to someone who is not colorblind? How would you even answer that?

I think you have to use the reply feature for me to get notifications because I missed this.

We do. We can detect brain states and XXY, ZZR and KKU are directly, inseparably linked to different brain states, so we know exactly which you're having. — Isaac

Let's look at the original example I gave. XXY and YYX. With the objects being red, red, green respectively. Here, it just so happens that the experience that causes you to reach for the word "Red" (X) is precisely the experience that would cause me to reach for the word "Green".

You can do an fMRI scan on both of our brains, and you wouldn't be able to extract this piece of information. We will show very similar activity. But since we don't have the exact same brains and bodies, that can account for why I'm having XXY as opposed to you having YYX. However you can't for example say: "Khaled's experience of red is Isaac's experience of green". You do not have evidence to conclude this. Because I could just be having KKR, or JJL, or MMW and in all of these cases we will both show similar fMRI scans.

Or to explain it another way:

Sure I agree that certain physical states cause certain mental states. Let's take an example where I have XXY and you have LLE. There will be a set of variables that determine why you have LLE and I have XXY. However this set of variables is undiscoverable. Since whether or not you have XXY or LLE makes no difference as long as structure is preserved. For all we know, the shape of your nose could be the reason you are having LLE as opposed to XXY.

There is a humongous set of things that are different about our physical conditions that can be used to explain why you have a different experience from me. We have no way to narrow it down. Because we have no "outside perspective" from which we can say "Ah, yes, it seems that people with this type of nose have Ls instead of Xs when looking at blood". We have no access to whether or not we are having the same Xs and Ys or how they're related.

We have no way of checking the dependent variable so we can't narrow down what the independent variables are. Though we know the independent variables belong to the set of "Physical differences".

This reads like a Sex Ed class. Everyone is talking about it but no one wants to spell it out. The forbidden word. Qualia. :rofl:

No one can solve nihilism because it is an internally consistent system. If you want to believe it, you will. And no one will be able to convince you otherwise. All people can do is attack your starting premises and your values. And that’s what Camus is trying to do. Reinterpret the meaningless as something absurd, maybe even funny instead of something dreadful.

Basically going from “Life is meaningless nothing matters....” to “Life is meaningless! Nothing matters!” It is an attempt to change your attitude to the same set of facts. Which is not logical by nature.

Most people starve, live in war torn areas, or live where illnesses are pretty common. — Darkneos

Not most people. I would be willing to bet that most people consider themselves “of the fortunate”. And that most people would say life is worth it. Despite the circumstances.

You seem to be looking for some objective argument that destroys nihilism. Some internal inconsistency or some grave logical error inherent in the belief. There is no such thing. Upside is: There is nothing compelling you to choose the set of premises that lead to nihilism. If you’re a nihilist it’s because you choose to be one.

except that I take it one step further, and say that things that make absolutely no difference should be treated as non-existent. — unenlightened

Nah.

If there was an app on your phone that repeatedly printed “Please don’t close me or I’ll be in terrible pain” would you be under obligation not to close it? I would say no. Because the app doesn’t have Xs and Ys. Even though it is clearly using the shared language and you know exactly what it’s saying.

Xs and Ys matter a lot. I would say they’re the basis of ethics. If we have good reason to believe that something doesn’t have Xs and Ys we don’t feel morally obligated towards it. Which is why I don’t say they don’t exist, even though they make no difference.

And even if they didn’t, I don’t see a reason to say something doesn’t exist when it merely makes no difference. All that does is be confusing. Just say “Xs and Ys make no difference”. It’s not much longer.

We all know what happened the last time someone started a thread about a bearded man talking about how Xs and Ys don’t exist. Interminable discussion.

So I never speak of X or Y at all — unenlightened

Nor can you. How you would you even start to do so? The difference has no perceivable effect. Only differences in experience structure have perceivable effects.

Subjectivity disappears from the conversation — unenlightened

It never entered. Doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist.

or do you have access to the structure of other people's experiences? — unenlightened

I can infer it yes.

Let’s call experience you are subjectively having when looking at a red apple X. And let’s call the experience I am subjectively having when looking at a red apple Y.

We both communicate our respective experience by saying “that’s red”

If we both look at blood, again you will have X and I will have Y. We will again say, that’s red.

But if you look at grass and have X, and so say “That’s red” then we have a different structure. You’re probably colorblind, as you can’t recognize green things.

I on the other hand properly have a different experience from Y when looking at grass (let’s call it Z) and so I say “that’s green”

Now, importantly: Whether or not X and Y are the same experience makes absolutely no difference. What matters is the structure. If the same objects consistently produce the same experience (X for you Y for me) we can talk.

X and Y do not have to be the same at all.

A public language, based on private experiences.

This is the problem: if awareness, senses, feelings, and thoughts are all subjective, there doesn't seem much left to be objective except some hypothetical noumenon — unenlightened

The structure of the thoughts senses and feelings can be the same.

Public language can’t talk about private/subjective events, only their structure. And that’s all you need for communication. See my replies to Isaac for details. Or the original comment of mine you replied to.

The “point of contact” is the similar structure of our experiences.

X,X,Y vs X,Y,Y example. — Isaac

XXY and YYX but sure. XXY and XYY are different structurally (person 1 thinks the first 2 objects are the same but person 2 thinks the last 2 objects are the same).

They may be accessible to introspection, in which case we can (and probably have) come up with words for them that way, or they may be accessible only to neuroscience or cognitive psychology, in which case we can come up with technical terms for them. — Isaac

Problem is, we have no way of quantifying the impact of brainstates on Xs and Ys. Maybe something very insignificant is the difference between you having XXY or having ZZR or having KKU. Nor will we be able to quantify said impact because we have no way of detecting whether you're having XXY, ZZR or KKU. That is because there is no practical difference between you having XXY or ZZR or KKU. But if you're having EEE that's detectable. Because you will give a different answer to the color of the last object. You will claim that the 3 objects have the same color.

Sure I can agree that an identical brain will produce the exact same experience but the impact of the brain on experience is unquantifiable.

So intrinsic privacy? No. If you have the same brain and body you'll have the same experience (and also be the same person). But pragmatic? Definitely. What differences in the brain produce which experience "flavors" (XXY or GGR or JJL or whatever)? I have no clue. Nor do I think we will have a clue. Because someone having XXY and someone having GGR will act the exact same way.

So then, if there are differences in the epiphenomena, those differences must have been caused by differences in the physical cause — Isaac

Sure. I concede.

Then again, you never have identical brain states. Or identical brains. So privacy can have a home there.

Do you believe epiphenomenon are caused entirely by physical factors? — Isaac

Sure.

And identical brain activity cannot produce different experiences (otherwise there would need to be some other physical source for the epiphenomenon)? — Isaac

No I don't agree there. What makes you think that?

I would agree that identical brain activity will produce experiences that occupy the same structure. But I don't see a reason to believe they're the same.

Say we have identical brain activity when looking at the 3 objects. It could still be the case that you see Y,Y,X and I see X,X,Y. Assuming neither is colorblind.

If absolutely every measure we can detect shows no difference — Isaac

We have taken no measures to examine X and Y directly.

Every measure we have taken would produce the same result were they different. Because every measure we have taken can only say things about the positions, not contents of our experiences. If you think otherwise give an example.

What measure have we taken that can definitively say that X and Y are the same and not just that they occupy the same position?

What I'm asking is why postulate that I'm having X and you Y, unless you've got some reason (my response or my subsequent words) to believe our experiences are different? If they seem the same in every conceivable way, why fabricate a possible way in which they might, nonetheless, be different? — Isaac

I am not definitively saying they are different. I am pointing out that we have just as much reason to believe they are the same as to believe they are different. As they can be radically different without breaking anything (We'd still be able to talk and do everything exactly the same way as we used to before)

I would ask you the same question. What's your reason for believing that they are the same? Even though nothing changes were they different.

They're different components of experience, epiphenomenologically arisen, just like 'decision'. — Isaac

Correct.

Too bad words don't refer to components of experience.

The words don't refer to X and Y. But only their position in the structure. When you say "That is red" I can infer that you had some experience X. When I say "That is red" you can infer that I had some experience Y (again, these are just variable names). However you cannot infer that X and Y are the same. As they don't need to be at all. — khaled

As long as everything that produces X for you produces Y for me, we can talk. Once something produces X for you and produces Z for me for example, we will have a disagreement about what color it is. Not because X is different from Z (as X was already different from Y but we were talking just fine), but because the structure is different. — khaled

But we have a word for 'decision' because the feeling is a part of our lives. — Isaac

The word for "decision" is not referring to an experience. But its position within a structure.

Just like in my example: We looked at 3 different objects. I had X,X,Y experiences and you had Y,Y,X experiences (Z,Z,F would also do. Point is structure is preserved).

Yet we both called the first and second objects "red" and the last one "green".

So "red" cannot be referring to X (as you were having Y) and "green" cannot be referring to Y (as you were having X)

So then what "Red" refers to is the position of these experiences within the structure. Their relationship to others. And not any specific X, Y, Z or F

Again, really weird for me that now you're the one saying that words refer to experiences or aspects of experiences. When you adamantly disagreed last time.

But your example of radically different experiences consisted of saying that experiences of red for one person might be constituted of X,X, and Y, yet for another X, Y and Z, yes? — Isaac

No. It was X,X, Y and Y,Y, X. Point is it's the same structure. As in, the first two objects are the same color and the last one is different. I am not using them as variable names here. X is distinct from Y.

If you were seeing X, X, Y respectively and I was seeing X, Y, Z respectively when looking at 3 objects one of us is color blind. Portably you. As for you, the first and second object seem the same color. While for me all 3 are different colors.

We've just established that we do, in fact, have words for X, Y and Z — Isaac

We don't.

The words don't refer to X and Y. But only their position in the structure. When you say "That is red" I can infer that you had some experience X. When I say "That is red" you can infer that I had some experience Y (again, these are just variable names). However you cannot infer that X and Y are the same. As they don't need to be at all. — khaled

As long as everything that produces X for you produces Y for me, we can talk. Once something produces X for you and produces Z for me for example, we will have a disagreement about what color it is. Not because X is different from Z, but because the structure is different.

So they're not private then. We talk about them and have words for them. — Isaac

No. As my example showed, you can have radically different experiences and still talk. A public language about private experiences.

If, when looking at something you experience what red refers to for you (X), and I experience what red refers to for me ( Y ) we can talk.

However X and Y do not need to be the same. X and Y are variable names. They can contain anything.

Not that we can confirm if they are or not. Because whether or not they're the same makes no difference to communication or behavior.

The words don't refer to X and Y. But only their position in the structure. When you say "That is red" I can infer that you had some experience X. When I say "That is red" you can infer that I had some experience Y (again, these are just variable names). However you cannot infer that X and Y are the same.

You didn't say anything about being, you said 'knowing'. — Isaac

Fair enough.

there's something there to be referred to so we came up with a word for it and we talk about it. — Isaac

Correct. That's precisely the Xs and Ys. I just use them as placeholders. Because the point is, we do not all need to be having X to refer to it as a "decision". All we need for communication is for our experiences to have the same structure. Not the same content. The content never comes into the picture and it makes no difference.

We talk to other people about them. — Isaac

So if you never learned a language you couldn't be angry?

We have a word 'decision' because we all have some feeling about having 'decided' something, even though physically no action-initiation actually took place. — Isaac

And we all have a word "Red" because we all have some experience of X/Y/Z/J/G/H/Doesn't matter as long as the structure is preserved. Even though no action-initiation actually took place.

I'm saying without the equivalent for X and Y, why are we postulating their existence? — Isaac

Xs and Ys are experiences. They're that "feeling of deciding something" in epiphenomenalism.

You ask how we know our own experiences exist? You also have to answer that question then. I don't think it's a meaningful question.

Surely Whatever these Xs and Ys are they have a physical effect — Isaac

No. Different physical effects produce Xs and Ys. We just came back from an epiphenomenalism thread so you know what I mean here hopefully.

If there's no such effect, the X isn't really different form Y, is it? — Isaac

It still is. I don't see the problem with there being a difference that has no effect.

Red” isn’t referring to a particular experience — khaled

Sort of. — Isaac

We had a whole fight about this on the last qualia thread. You insisted that "red" does not refer to experiences. If you were going to disagree with anything I definitely didn't expect it to be this.

But I'll take a sort of.

What's wrong with the following conversation (using your terms)

"What's 'red' like for you?",

"Oh when I see red I get lot's of X's and a Y"

"Yeah, I get a few Xs too, but for me it's mainly Ys, plus a Z oddly enough" — Isaac

We don't have an "outside perspective" from which we can see that I am seeing Xs and you are seeing Ys. We can't talk about the Xs and Ys. You only have access to your experiences and I only have access to mine.

The answer to "What's red like for you" is "How the fuck do you expect me to answer that?"

Outside of a fantasy show, we can't "swap bodies" to check.

I can buy that.

And the experience is not mental stuff?

I don't recall agreeing to such a claim anyway. — Banno

Here:

Subjectivity is not socially constructed.
— khaled

Why are you so sure? Why so certain?

The myth has you in its thrall; how could things be otherwise? — Banno

You called it a myth.

I'm too tired at the moment to follow the confusion in this discussion. — Banno

Me too honestly. I think we mostly agree, just keep misunderstanding each other.

I don't see how "Subjectivity is intersubjective" is the same as "without the word, the emotion would somehow no longer be experienced", — Banno

Well I read it something like: "Experiences are socially mediated". As in without the word the experience doesn't happen. I can't really interpret that 3 word combination. Just looks like word salad to me. But that was my best shot.

I thought you were saying that without the word, the emotion would somehow no longer be experienced. If not then I don't get what "Subjectivity is intersubjective" means even though you and unenlightened seem to be agreeing on it. What does that mean?

care to elaborate what issue you see with it?

can’t tell if that’s agreement or dismissal. Which is it?

Since chess is a social construct, playing chess by yourself is also a social construct... — Banno

Sure but I’m saying that even if you had no one to play with the board doesn’t disappear. If that makes sense.

Even if the word “fear” was never created, people would still be afraid in certain situations. They just wouldn’t know what to call it. And they might consequently “play chess with themselves” and call it “reef” or whatever.

The word comes into circulation when you notice that everyone has a word that describes similar situations (when you’re afraid)

No matter how we break up these multi-propped terms, we end up only with individual props which are themseves shared. I don't see where you end with with subjective meanings. — Isaac

I wouldn’t say “subjective meanings” so much as “subjective experiences”. But I think it’s possible to have a public language, about subjective experiences. That’s what intersubjective means (though this thread quickly deviated from the distinction between intersubjective and objective)

You don’t need to have the same experience to talk about something, all you need is to have a similar “structure”.

Say when I look at objects A, B and C I have experiences X, X and Y. When you look at objects A, B and C you have experiences Y, Y and X. Or even Z,Z,R. When we want to communicate these experiences, we would BOTH call A “red” and C “green”.

Different experiences, shared meaning. Because the meaning comes not from the experiences, but their structure, their relationship to other experiences. As long as the structure is the same, we can talk. “Red” isn’t referring to a particular experience, (not a particular X or particular Y) but rather a shared structure (A and B are the same experience but C is different. Doesn’t matter what the actual experience is. Same structure)

Now if someone looking at the same set of objects experiences Z,Z,Z, and he learned that “Things that produce the experience Z are called red” he would be colorblind. In his world there is no distinction between C and B/A. He would look at C and say “this is red” because that’s what he learned to call objects that produce the experience Z. That’s when we know he’s colorblind.

I should elaborate. When I say “subjectivity is not intersubjective” I don’t mean that in a linguistic sense. Obviously the world “subjective” has a socially constructed meaning. What I mean to say is that, even without any agreement, people still have subjective experiences. That even if no language existed, people wouldn’t suddenly stop experiencing fear or anger. Even if there were no words to call those things.

We're going around in circles. I think you can infer the answer to both of those questions from what I said previously. Cheers.

These things you move to long term memory when you sleep, do they have a mass, a volume or a number? — Olivier5

"Moving to long term memory" is nothing more and nothing less than a figure of speech describing a neurological process.

Take the laws of physics for instance. They have no mass either, so by your criteria the laws of physics are not physical. — Olivier5

Agreed. The laws of physics are not physical. They are models in our minds. They're mental.

And yes, the laws of physics do not exist in the same way a rock does. They exist as models in our minds and nothing more.

Who said anything about not changing the brain? — Olivier5

Me. Here:

I meant you can’t remove JUST the mind. You can’t create a philosophical zombie. — khaled

and here:

Plenty of physical changes happen when you sleep. You can’t remove the mind without making these changes. — khaled

Our bodies can rest without sleeping — Olivier5

Not the kind of rest you get from sleeping. A quick google search came up with this:

Human growth hormone (HGH), on the other hand, is one of the primary compounds that allows muscles to recover and grow. Among other functions, our bodies need it to actually use the amino acids present in the protein we eat. As it happens, the time when the bloodstream is flooded with the stuff is - you guessed it - during sleep.

Among countless other examples.

Our brain, maybe, possibly because sustaining a mind is a very tiring thing. — Olivier5

Or because sustaining a brain is a very tiring thing.

Comatose people, brain damaged people etc. — Olivier5

Brain damaged people are an example of removing the mind without changing the brain? No. By definition of "brain damaged"

And thus this pebble would have had an effect on us, since we saw it. — Olivier5

Alright fair enough. I can't think of any other examples of a causal dead end other than minds. But that's not a problem for me since I don't have a problem with causal dead ends existing, or us knowing about them.

This might not be exhausted by the label we give to some predictive model — Isaac

I don’t think “anger” works as a label of a predictive model in everyday use. Sure, certain neurons firing cause anger, but we don’t use the word “anger” to bring that to mind typically.

Other than that, sure agreed.

Before neurons we would have had very different models. — Isaac

So, the word “anger” had a different meaning before neurology?

What do you mean?

You can lose your mind. You can also temporarily suspend its operations. It's called sleep. — Olivier5

I meant you can’t remove JUST the mind. You can’t create a philosophical zombie.

Plenty of physical changes happen when you sleep. You can’t remove the mind without making these changes. The mind is not some “extra sauce” added to the brain that you can choose not to add. It comes with it. And if you change the brain up enough you lose it (such as when you sleep)

Why do you think people have to sleep? — Olivier5

Definitely not to rest our minds, but our brains and bodies.

It could be that minds suck up a lot of energy, or something else that gets depleted after a while, needing restauration. Sleep may be the price to pay for minds. — Olivier5

Maybe. Or maybe it’s just the cost of brains and bodies.

Otherwise how do we know it exists? — Olivier5

I can imagine a pebble in space that is still and so far away from anything that it’s effect is negligible.

If such a pebble existed we would know it exists by seeing it.

When certain neurons are firing and we want to minimise the surprise in the hidden states (we don't literally know which neurons are firing) we create a model which we call thoughts — Isaac

Wouldn’t that require us to know what neurons are before making words that describe their hidden states? But clearly words such as “anger” are older than “Amygdala”

Only part I disagree with really, that the model “thoughts” and “minds” is used to talk about neuron firings. If it was I would think you need to know what neurons are before talking about thoughts.

What 'you are saying' constantly changes, so it is impossible to address it. — Wayfarer

Then either I am misspeaking or you’re misinterpreting because what I have in mind has been constant.

And no it did not cause me to type this!

Anyways good luck spoonbending. (Joking)