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Solving the problem of evilFree will requires evil, ergo pain & suffering, to be possible. You can't talk about free will without conceding pain, suffering should be part of the overall scheme. So, when you assert that God could've taken suffering out of the equation, what you actually mean is we shouldn't have free will. — TheMadFool
Substantiate this claim. And besides, I didn't say anything about suffering. I said "Why did God make it so that we can commit evil acts" not "Why did God make it so that we experience pain", those are very different.
This sounds exactly like "Free will requires the ability to levitate at will". No it doesn't.
Free will doesn't require that you possess certain abilities. There are disease where the individual cannot feel pain. Does that individual thereby possess no free will (assuming the rest of us do)? Psychopaths cannot empathize nor have a sense of morality, do they thereby not have free will?
But only so that we're truly free. That's the whole point. — TheMadFool
We aren't "truly free" given we can't levitate at will either by this logic. But we have free will. Ergo, not having certain abilities does not limit free will. Ergo, God could could have made it so that we cannot commit evil acts without infringing on our free will. Just like he made it so we can't fly without technology without infringing on our free will.
Choice is central to the free will question. — TheMadFool
Agreed. But God clearly has no problem limiting our choices. So instead of limiting us from levitating at will, and allowing us to commit evil, why didn't he do the opposite?
Think of evil as maximizing options. Sure, God made it impossible to walk through brick walls but at the very least, making us capable of evil, He expanded our choices. — TheMadFool
But that's arbitrary. Why did he give us the option to commit evil, but not the option to levitate at will. Giving us the option to levitate at will would also expand our choices. Why does he choose to expand our choices by making evil possible specifically? He could also have expanded them by allowing us to change shape, or to fly through space, or walk through walls. He chose to limit us in certain ways and to allow us to do certain things. Why is one of the things he allowed to do committing evil evil instead of, say, flying but with no ability to commit evil? -
Solving the problem of evilHe could’ve made it physically near impossible or impossible to perform evil acts (indestructible bodies for instance). Why didn’t he do so? It wouldn’t be infringing on our free will any more than limiting us from levitating at will is an infringement on free will.
He already decides what we can and can’t do arbitrarily (can’t fly, but can reason, but not very strong, but very persistent in a chase, etc) and we don’t think these qualities or lacks are infringements on free will. Why didn’t he make it physically impossible for us to do evil? -
Solving the problem of evilI think you're missing an important piece in the puzzle - free will. — TheMadFool
What exactly do you mean. Free will fits into this a 100 different ways. -
Solving the problem of evilSay it's in the 1800s. You're riding from your small town to another settlement and along the way you come across a man dangling from a tree with a noose around his neck - he's dead of course. Can you tell just from what you see - a man hanged to death - whether it's murder (evi) or it's a judicial execution (justice)? — TheMadFool
If it’s an infant and not a man, I know it’s evil.
There have been infants tortured to death before.
Ergo problem of evil (among many other sources of evil)
Also God would never need to enforce this justice. Justice is a punishment you inflict on someone for hurting you or someone else. You can’t hurt God, so he’s not the grieving party. And God could’ve removed every instance of someone hurting someone else, and chose not to do so. So in both cases, (whether the punishment is justified by you supposedly hurting God or someone else), God is being evil. -
Solving the problem of evilWe can question if this is fair — Count Timothy von Icarus
You’ve stated the refutation I wanted to state. If God is being unjust he’s not worthy of worship.
but we have to bear in mind that time is perhaps a meaningless concept to apply to a transcendent God. Perfect memory means that the past is perfectly accessible to God, able to be experienced as fully as the present. Perfect knowledge means the future, or perhaps knowledge of infinite possible futures, is also as accessible to It as the present. Thus, God exists outside the conventional boundaries of time, in which case temporal cause and effect can't be understood the way we understand it conventionally. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Yes they can. Because an omnipotent God could make it so that he can tell past present and future. He didn’t do so, and is now punishing people for things they haven’t done. Not very benevolent.
And if God really does know the entirety of the future, why doesn’t he ensure no suffering occurs?
This logic holds if one assumes the unit of analysis for guilt is the individual, not the people. However, in the doctrine of Original Sin, mankind as a whole is condemned for the actions of their progenitors, Adam and Eve. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Which is idiotic.
We use the collective as a unit for assigning guilt fairly often. Corporations are punished as a whole for bad acts. The German people were to pay reparations to the Jews as a whole for their collective, not individual actions. Arguments in favor of reparations for American slavery often also invoke a similar idea of collective and inherited guilt. — Count Timothy von Icarus
We do this because we need these reparations. The corporation or country hurt someone, and now they need that money to rebuild but there is no set group of individuals to blame. And always the problem is resolved after said reparations are provided (ideally).
God doesn’t gain anything from this punishment, it’s senseless. And it’s never ending. He chooses when it ends arbitrarily.
It’s akin to owning a chocolate factory, then telling 2 kids not to eat any chocolate, and when they eat a single chocolate bar (one you can reproduce effortlessly), you imprison them and all their children, with no chance of actually ever repenting for the “terrible evil” they committed. All the while you don’t specify when the imprisonment ends and choose to end it when you get bored.
Or, if you posit the God of the pietist tradition — Count Timothy von Icarus
But that’s very unlike what we’re talking about.
or for cosmologies where an evil god of equal, or almost equal power to a good one, struggles for control of reality (Manichean cosmology, Zoroastrian, etc.). — Count Timothy von Icarus
Again, not what Bart is saying.
There are ways to make God (not Abrahamic) work, Bart’s isn’t one of them. -
Solving the problem of evilBut it seems to me that premise 2 of that argument is not self-evident to reason. Our reason does not directly tell us that we are guilty or innocent - it is silent on the matter. — Bartricks
It is certainly more self evident to reason that a newborn is innocent than that God exists.
It appears that: God exists (at least to you), if God exists he wouldn’t let innocents suffer here, infants are innocent.
These aren’t consistent so which do we doubt? You doubt the third, that infants are innocent in this argument:
1. If God exists, then he would not suffer innocents to live in ignorance in a dangerous world
2. God exists
3. Therefore, God has not suffered innocents to live in ignorance in a dangerous world — Bartricks
You use the first 2 as fact. But one can easily use different combinations:
1- If God exists, he can prevent innocents from going into a dangerous world.
2- God exists and doesn’t prevent innocents from going into a dangerous world
3- Therefore, God doesn’t mind innocents suffering here
Or:
1- If God exists innocents would not be allowed into a dangerous world
2- Innocents are allowed into a dangerous world
3- Therefore God doesn’t exist
It really is a matter of which appearances you take as premises and which you don’t. Which is why (as I said) these questions keep popping up:
1- How do you deal with a conflict between your own appearances? Why did you choose the first argument instead of the later two? Does it not seem to you that infants are innocent? If so:
2- How do you deal with a conflict between what appears to you and what appears to others? It appears to virtually everyone that infants are innocent but you don’t trust it, but on other matters you’re happy to quote the opinion of experts as indicative of “proper” appearances, so when do you trust what appears to others and when do you not?
You think that everyone is incapable of understanding your arguments when, by your own words, fish sticks can understand them. Everyone understands your ramblings Bart, they’re doubting your “self evident” premises. -
Does God have free will?That’s what I thought too but he said God can’t divest himself while remaining God himself.
Just shows he doesn’t understand his own bullshit -
Does God have free will?I'll try one last time.
What on earth are you on about? Show your reasoning. How the hell do you arrive at the conclusion that a person who is able to divest themselves of abilities is less powerful than one who is not? — Bartricks
I did not arrive at that conclusion. The problem here is your lack of reading comprehension. I am not comparing one with the ability to divest themselves vs one who isn't. I am stating that there is something God cannot do, as you admit. That is: Remain God while not having one of the Os. He cannot do that. There is a thing he cannot do. Therefore, he cannot do everything. I'll repeat: He cannot do that. There is a thing he cannot do. Therefore, he cannot do everything. Understand? Do I need a third?
And my body is just as likely to be made of cheese as not, as I cannot rule out the metaphysical possibility that it is made of cheese. — Bartricks
Yes you can. Lick your skin. It doesn't taste like cheese (though in your case it honestly might). There. You ruled it out.
Now rule out the possibility that God is lying to us about what is morally correct. Go on.
incidentally, stop assuming I'm wrong - that'll help. Assume I might - might - just know what I'm talking about — Bartricks
The irony....
So, "I am sat on a chair right now". There. Do you have reason to think I am sat on a chair right now? — Bartricks
Not really. But I won't doubt it because it makes very little difference to me.
I don’t have a reason to think so because the person reporting in this case thinks rape and torture is not an injustice. They are clearly ill. So I do not trust much of what they say.
Testimony is as reliable as its author.
I told you I was sat on a chair. You have reason to believe I am sat on a chair. — Bartricks
But that's not reason enough to justify something of this scale. We're talking about our moral intuitions. These are pretty important. We'd need more reason to trust them other than simply "Someone said so". You haven’t established that this someone gives reliable testimony.
If we were trying to determine the shape of the earth thousands of years ago, and someone said "The earth is shaped like a tortoise" would that be sufficient reason to believe them? No, because we have no reason to believe their testimony is accurate in this case.
Similarly, you’ve provided no reason to believe the testimony of your God is trustworthy. Why is he the moral authority? You can say “because he’s omnibenevolent” but you’d be question begging. In order to establish his honesty about moral intuitions you refer to benevolence, but you need to assume he’s being honest about benevolence entailing honesty to use benevolence as an argument.
so how do we know anything? Could be a malfunction. It's the same point! — Bartricks
False. For instance, I can't doubt that our reason is malfunctioning without contradicting myself by using a reasoned argument.
However, I can doubt that God is lying about moral intuitions without producing contradictions.
It's not a point that arises specifically for my kind of view about Reason. It's a general point about how we know anything about anything. — Bartricks
It does arise from yours specifically. Because you think moral intuitions are someone's instructions, and that there is an objectively correct "moral intuition" that said person could be lying to us about. In other words, you're a moral realist. What God thinks is just, is what is just, and if you disagree you're wrong yes? The source of morality is outside of the minds of humans yes?
I am not a moral realist, and it's not a very popular view (it's different from objectivism). I don't believe the "correct" moral intuitions reside in a single mind or are etched on some stone tablet or anything to that effect. Their source isn't outside of the minds of humans.
They arise because you place the source of morality outside of humans, allowing someone to doubt how we come to access this source. In your case, the source tells us what is moral, why should we trust it? See how someone who doesn't believe moral intuitions stem from something outside of human minds doesn't have to deal with this objection?
Now, our reason tells us things. Whatever our reason tells us, we have default reason to believe to be the case.
I must have said this about 100 times now. — Bartricks
It tells different people different things though. For instance, I and everyone I've spoken to thinks you're an idiot. That's how things appear to us. Does that alone make you an idiot?
How do you determine whose appearances to trust?
It appears to virtually everyone that infants are innocent. Not to you though. And you believe that if an infant was tortured to death, that no injustice took place correct? What appears to everyone is different from what appears to you, how do we resolve this? -
Does God have free will?
What? No, being able to divest yourself of something is not a limitation. It's an ability. — Bartricks
But not being able to maintain your Godhood without one of the Os is a limitation. That too, is painfully obvious. If God has that limitation, he’s not omnipotent in the sense that he can do anything can he? He can’t be God while lacking in one of the Os. Do we agree then that God can’t do absolutely anything?
Because it is possible that p, p. That's your reasoning. Possible.....therefore actual. — Bartricks
False. The line is: The opposite is just as likely, therefore your statement remains unproven.
“I don’t have uncharitable interpretations”…. Right….
Possible also does not mean 'as likely to be true as any other possibility'. It is possible my body is made of cheese. Doesn't seem to be. — Bartricks
But in my example given, the point is that both cases will result in exactly the same appearances. God could be lying, or he could not be. Either way, the appearances don’t change. So as far as you know, yes, they are just as likely.
If your body was made of cheese it would result in drastically different appearances.
If you can provide a reason for thinking God is not lying about our moral intuitions, then they won’t be just as likely. So go on, produce one. -
Does God have free will?No. Of course not. — Bartricks
So then, wouldn't God be limited by the fact that he can't remain God while relinquishing one of the Os?
So, we are here because God wants us to be - and we are ignorant because God wants us to be, and we are exposed to the risk of harm such ignorance creates because God wants us to be. And why would he want us to be? Because he hates us. And why would he hate us? Because we attempted to do what he's doing to us to an innocent person or persons. — Bartricks
But how do you know? You would say that it's because he's omnibenevolent I bet, but how do you know that omnibenevolence entails hating and punishing the unjust?
What if God values lying and torturing the innocent. And since he values lying, he leads us to believe that omnibenevolence entails hating and punishing the unjust, which leads you to believe that no one is innocent, when they actually are. And since he values torturing, that's the real reason he puts us in this supposed hell.
Isn't this just as likely as the alternative that he isn't lying? There are no logical contradictions entailed in the above scenario. -
Does God have free will?If God decides to relinquish one of the Os is he still God? — khaled
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Does God have free will?God is shorthand for 'a person who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent' such that if you have those qualities you are God. It's like Dr. If you have a PhD, you are a dr. — Bartricks
Conversely, if you don’t have a PHD, you lose the doctorate, yes?
If God decides to relinquish one of the Os is he still God? -
Best introductory philosophy book?Sophie’s world if you’re looking for something more lightweight or entertaining.
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Does God have free will?I was trying the Bartricks thing where you purposely give the least charitable interpretation so that you can make a counter argument. So I interpreted God to be the name of someone who happens to be O,O and O who would still be God without those properties, as the way you phrased it allows for that clearly unintended interpretation. Then I made a parody of your argument to “show” that it doesn’t make sense. I don’t see what you find so satisfying about doing this all day.
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Does God have free will?God is the name of a person who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. Reason will have those qualities. Thus Reason is God. — Bartricks
Jeffrey is the name of a person who has red hair.
Henry has those qualities.
Thus Jeffrey is Henry. -
Love doesn't existChange my view, challenge me if you will. — obscurelaunting
Change it yourself you freeloader!
But most of these aren't the case:
Yet, when a friend changes and no longer offers what they used to offer, its easy for them to be discarded immediately. — obscurelaunting
You either haven't had good friends or are not a good friend yourself.
While this may appear to be the ultimate character of kindness and goodness, it can be said that there are underlying motives such as the feeling of a sense of proudness of their sacrifice and feeling as they are achieving their 'purpose' which in itself is selfish. — obscurelaunting
It "can be said" doesn't make it the case. The fact that there is some sense of purpose in helping others doesn't prove that is the sole reason people do it.
As for sacrificing lives, they would not sacrifice their life for one unless they have afterlife beliefs that ensure their safety. — obscurelaunting
How did you conclude this? Where is your data?
My last scenario is the 360 turn to hatred and everything that is not 'love' when there is a sense of loss of what one had that they can't get back. Their new hatred forms their next selfish action such as killing their wife and children. This is selfish as there is no concern for his family and the family's selfish wants. — obscurelaunting
You think everyone that loses something important they can't get back goes on to murder their wife and children, or is otherwise immediately impulsive?
Even if true what does this prove. Any emotion will be overpowered by rage. You can be happy relaxing then someone randomly assaults you or someone you know. There will be a 180* turn to hatred then too. Guess happiness doesn’t exist either….. -
Not exactly an argument for natalismAll you need is an agent who knows that preventing harm is good. The person who would benefit need not exist, just someone. — schopenhauer1
By this formulation: That same agent knows that preventing pleasure is bad. Therefore "If you don't have a kid, and they would've like life, that's bad" would follow. Still no asymmetry. It's Good/Bad vs Good/Bad. And that's what happens when you apply one formulation consistently.
But yet notice we don’t need to actually make this bad scenario happen to know someone would be harmed, and we have prevented that someone from the harm. — schopenhauer1
In the case of traffic laws, yes. In the case of not having kids, we know that we benefitted no one. We have prevented harm from no one. If you want to say we prevented the "future harm" of someone, and that's good, then by the same token, we prevented the "future pleasure" of someone and that's bad. Again no asymmetry.
It simply falls to the axiom that prevented bad is always good, where prevented good is only relatively bad. — schopenhauer1
But by this axiom we should never do anything to anyone. Anything we do has a chance of harming, and a chance of benefiting. If we do it: It can be good or bad depending on which there was more of (harm or benefit). If we don't do it, it can be good (if we prevented harm) or neutral (if we prevented benefit).
By this axiom the asymmetry exists when doing literally anything that involves other people and so we should not do such actions. Even you posting here falls under this. It would make every act wrong. It's a shit axiom that no one believes no offense.
I don't think it's fine. — schopenhauer1
So having children in a world where they can only experience pleasure because they snap away any suffering is wrong? If you want to bite that bullet sure.
Not this world though, so I don't see where that would lead us except to confirm, "Yep that world is not this world". — schopenhauer1
It would lead us to recognizing that the ease by which you can escape suffering is also an important variable. But if you will deny having kids under these conditions is wrong then not much can be said. At that point it just seems like a reductio ad absurdum of your position. Especially since you were fine with it at first.
Are you trying to ask what it would take to be permissible? — schopenhauer1
This.
As I said previously with hedonic treadmill.. If in this world, a challenge to us is like the relative challenge of snapping fingers to them, it's the same thing. Can it be judged as too much by someone? If so, why? All of a sudden it becomes more like our world. — schopenhauer1
That is the point. I didn't think anyone would say it's wrong to have kids under those conditions but if it is, kudos, you have an internally consistent system! Not that that's saying much, even Nazism is internally consistent.
Now that you have said consistent system what's left is to explain why everyone should abide by it. Why should everyone think this:
Inescapable without dire consequences, unnecessary to impose for that person who will be the recipient of negatives, set of challenges, judgement of negatives in the first place, that only humans are really capable of through linguistic self-reflective abilities. — schopenhauer1
Is wrong? Sure if you asked someone if they agree that impositions described as above are wrong, they'll probably say yes, but that's cheap. It's again like saying "Are you in favor of exposing children to risks of sexual abuse". No one would say yes to that. That doesn't make sending kids to school wrong. The above quote seems to me to be as accurate a depiction of life as "exposing children to risks of sexual abuse" is an accurate depiction of schooling. -
Not exactly an argument for natalismPerhaps.. but I can also argue that who needs gifts prior to being born? No one. And this goes to that asymmetry you hate. Positives aren't needed for any one. What's important is the baggage is given to no one, this is good (from the assumption that an agent exists in the first place not the meta tree falls in the woods perspective). — schopenhauer1
But you can't argue this in world X. And yes, I hate the asymmetry, because it makes no sense. The meaning of "good" and "bad" is not consistent in each quadrant. If you define them consistently you won't get an asymmetry.
"If you don't have a kid, and they would've like life, that's not bad because no one exists to suffer" if applied consistently would lead to: "If you don't have a kid, and they would've hated life, that's not good because no one exists whose suffering we mitigated"
The "traffic laws are good even though we can't point to who they benefit" that I keep hearing is bullshit. We can in fact tell who benefits from traffic laws. Suspend these laws and cover up traffic lights and signs. Whoever dies while the traffic light was red (but the driver couldn't see it) is the person who would benefit form traffic laws.
But in the case of birth, not having a child that would suffer benefits no one. It's not even a matter of "we can't tell who it benefits" no it literally benefits no one. So how is it "good".
"Good" in the asymmetry is defined as "good for someone" in each quadrant except the one causing the asymmetry. There, it is defined as a "better state of affairs than the alternative". That's why the asymmetry makes no sense. And why I never believed it even as an AN.
To me there is just something about creating unnecessary suffering that is wrong, full stop. — schopenhauer1
Doesn't seem like it. Counterexample: World X. Or even surprise parties. If you are ever at a surprise party and you feel awkward in a conversation, that's unnecessary suffering right there. Your friends could've just not held the party. And yet you think it's fine to hold surprise parties most of the time.
What do you think? Does it hold up to my philosophy? — schopenhauer1
It shouldn't. It fits the conditions that make something wrong for you. It is lifelong and there is a lot of suffering that you try to mitigate. But you think it's fine to have children in those conditions:
That they cannot do. But they can snap their fingers and leave any suffering they may be experiencing and thus, no one has ever complained. Call that what you will, utopia or not. Now what? — khaled
It seems to me in this world that they can sufficiently change the game without dire consequences. In effect, they can sufficiently "escape", so barring other information, this seems permissible. — schopenhauer1
So your problem seems to not be purely with how long the imposition lasts or how badly it can go, since both of those variables are the same in the real world and in world X. So those two variables are insufficient, as here is an example where they make something that seems fine to you wrong. So you tell me, what difference between the real world and world X makes having kids in world X fine but having kids in the real world wrong?
If the utopia involves strife, this too is wrong to impose. — schopenhauer1
It does, but you said it's not wrong to impose. If I had to guess, it's because said strife is very easy to escape (snap of a finger). That seems to be the variable you're missing. It's not just about duration and amount of suffering, but how easy it is to escape said suffering.
Snapping of fingers is equivalent now to what we do here.. It's all moved up a level. It's really the whole "At least you're not living in X" argument rehashed.. See, you're not starving in the third world, thus life must not be that bad.. Old school comparison switcheroo psychologically. Nothing new here to see. — schopenhauer1
The "at least you're not living in X" argument is used to tell you to quit complaining. I am not saying something like that. I'm giving an example to illustrate that you care about more than just whether or not the suffering is unnecessary or how long it's imposed for.
And is "snapping fingers is equivalent to what we do here" supposed to indicate that it's wrong to have kids under those circumstances?
I keep telling you, that by these examples I'm not trying to say "This imposition is fine so having kids is fine". So could you stop interpreting it that way? It's getting tiring repeating that "No, I am not implying that this imposition is fine therefore having kids is fine" every time. -
Not exactly an argument for natalismBut if there's no person beforehand to need an imposition, is that even right to impose with all the baggage we know is it can entail? — schopenhauer1
Yes. And you think so too for the Utopia example and surprise parties. Neither are needed impositions. The disagreement here is about the size of the “baggage”
I don't believe it's right to start negatives for someone else unnecessarily when the consequences are inescapable, it's lifelong, and there's not much other choice but to go with it or dire consequences. — schopenhauer1
Even if they would want you to? Ok. Now why should we think so? You want to convince others if this so how would you go about doing that?
But we don't because I didn't agree to your definition of utopia for reasons I stated in earlier posts. Utopia would simply not have negatives, but I also explained how it's almost impossible to conceptualize. It would be like being everything or nothing I guess. — schopenhauer1
But you’re going back to the standard definition of utopia, not the example I gave. Let’s call it world X then. It’s a world where you can remove all suffering at the snap of a finger. But you will suffer all the same if you refuse to snap your finger. And there is no way of escaping easily (euthanasia). Would it be fine to have kids in world X? There is no person beforehand to need the imposition, and there is a small amount of baggage (having to snap your fingers often). So shouldn’t it be wrong?
But you admit that the analogy doesn't fit, so why would I agree that this somehow negates what I'm saying? — schopenhauer1
It DOES fit what you’re saying. It’s an example where the condition for something being wrong is satisfied yet you don’t think the thing is wrong. Showing that the conditions you set out for making something wrong are insufficient.
A lifetime of all negative experiences that you experience, is what I mean by that. Do you deny that negative experiences exist in life (unless something like a life that lasts a very short amount of time maybe)? — schopenhauer1
No. I deny that life can be characterized as a series of negative experiences as you imply. -
Not exactly an argument for natalismI just noticed your name is rather fitting right now haha.
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Not exactly an argument for natalismThis though is not nuanced and dynamic enough. Is life really a pinprick? — schopenhauer1
No the point isn’t to say “getting pricked by a pin is fine so having kids is fine”. The point is to show that “someone could hate it” is not sufficient reason to make an imposition wrong. For that would make every imposition wrong.
The question really becomes, at what point does it matter if people report it’s worthwhile that you are not doing something right by the allowing of the negatives? — schopenhauer1
At every point. I don’t believe there is a scenario where someone can find something worthwhile and it be wrong to impose on them. It’s fine to have a happy slave.
And what if someone changes their minds at a particular time? — schopenhauer1
In other words, is it justified in all situations to base ethics on post facto reports? — schopenhauer1
Yes. And if they change their mind that would also be a post facto report.
Why should starting negatives (lifetime, inescapable) be good ever? — schopenhauer1
You think it’s good sometimes (being born in a utopia will last a lifetime and be inescapable) so let’s not question things we agree on.
It’s not instrumental here, it’s starting bads for someone else in an absolute sense (unnecessary). Since we get the doubly good outcome, that no one loses out (either), it would seem to be weighted to prevent the negatives, no matter what. — schopenhauer1
Again insufficient. What you’re saying here is that it’s wrong to start harms especially when someone will miss out. Using just that qualification, having a surprise party would be wrong. Yes I am aware it is very different from life. The point is, the above standard is insufficient to tell right and wrong. You need to add more conditions.
Once you have a set of conditions that make the statement “Acts that *insert conditions here* are wrong” true such that it isolates only what you actually think is wrong then you’d have a consistent case. You’d still need to convince people why they should abide by those conditions, but so far I haven’t seen what that full set of conditions is. The only time I’ve seen it it was something like “a lifetime of negative experiences” which doesn’t seem to apply to life, you need to show that life actually falls under that category. -
Possible Worlds, God exists.You have to prove incompleteness whatever that means in your case. — TheMadFool
No I don't. You stated the premise that if something is true, we can prove it. Prove that premise. You think if it is true, there should be a proof for it, so where is the proof for that.
I don't need to definitively state or even prove that there are true, unprovable statements. Because I'm not making a case here. You have a dubious premise in your argument, you need to back it up. It is not at all obvious that every true statement has a proof, not since Godel.
Here's the deal. I present to you a world Z that is not actual.
The question: Why is world Z not actual? — TheMadFool
Here is the deal. I present to you a red car.
The question: Why is this car red?
Answer that and I'll tell you why Z is not actual. -
What is it that gives symbols meaning?Is there a general philosophical concept that successfully describes why symbolic things have emotional meaning to an audience as opposed to the creator? — TheVeryIdea
I'd look to psychology or neurology. -
Possible Worlds, God exists.1. If world X is not actual then there's a proof why world X is not actual. — TheMadFool
Not necessarily. There could be some true statements we can't prove (incompleteness)
2. If there's a proof that world X is not actual then necessarily world X is not actual. — TheMadFool
Wot? Max I'd be willing to say is "If there is valid proof that world X is not actual then we are justified in believing that world X is not actual"
4. If world X is not actual then necessarily world X is not actual. (1, 2 HS) — TheMadFool
But those premises are false. -
Possible Worlds and Toity worldsSilly me. — Bartricks
First true thing you say in a while.
Truth is constitutively determined by Reason. So Reason determines what's true. — Bartricks
Sure.
Thus Reason would be able to do anything to anyone. — Bartricks
Doesn’t follow.
Those who choose to ignore Reason's imperatives are doing so because and only because she allows it. — Bartricks
How exactly would she go about disallowing it? The only power she has is the ability to determine the imperatives of reason. So what can she do to those who don’t listen to those such as yourself?
'It' is a premise. — Bartricks
Again, it is a premise, not a conclusion. Sheesh. Go to school already. — Bartricks
Can’t tell with the quality of reasoning you’re displaying. I thought they were intended as a consequence of omnipotence. And I was right for the last one…. So it’s not even a premise, but leave it to Bart to tell someone to go to school while being unable to tell apart premise and conclusion in his own argument….
Because for a proposition to be known is for there to be a reason to believe it. And guess who's in charge of what there's reason to believe? Yes, that's right - Reason. So Reason will be all knowing — Bartricks
“If you know something -> You have reason to believe it”. Sure I’ll take that, but it is NOT the same as, and doesn’t lead to: “If you decide what counts as a reason to believe -> You know something/everything”.
Reason is not in charge of “what there is reasonable to believe” but “what is a valid reason to believe something” (imperatives of reason). That’s what we established. She dictates the imperatives of reason, that doesn’t mean she knows what is reasonable to believe. Just like the dictator who decided the laws of a country doesn’t know who all the criminals are.
Reason's values constitutively determine what is morally valuable. — Bartricks
Evidence? In this instance we can very much doubt our moral intuitions if we believe they are being dictated by someone else. Whereas we can’t doubt our logical intuitions without a logical argument, making it stupid to do so, doubting our moral intuitions producers no such contradictions.
So, what reason do you have to trust your moral intuitions? What if your God is an evil deceiver? What if she values chaos, carnage and lies so she lies to us about what’s virtuous and tells us that the great evils of charity, tolerance and honesty are actually virtues! How dare she!
And Reason is omnipotent. So she won't be any way she doesn't want to be, or so it is reasonable to believe — Bartricks
Based on someone being omnipotent, with no further knowledge of their personality, there is no reason to conclude they won’t be any way they don’t want to be. Maybe she values effort and hates getting things for free and so doesn’t give herself the values she values, as that would he against her values due to its ease. (This is assuming she’s omnipotent, which she isn’t)
And this is another instance where you confuse the standard meaning of omnipotence with what your god is actually able to do. Let’s go back to the source shall we? What your God can do, is determine the imperatives of reason. How can determining the imperatives of reason, allow God to change herself, or give herself certain virtues?
And thus Reason will fully value herself. And that's what being morally perfect involves. — Bartricks
I value myself. Guess I’m morally perfect?
What does this word salad even mean? No, being morally perfect is about being the “best” morally. The most charitable, the most chivalrous, etc (assuming those are actual virtues, not vices that we’ve been tricked into thinking are virtues because of an evil deceiver) -
Possible Worlds and Toity worlds2. All of the imperatives of Reason have a unitary source — Bartricks
False. There have historically been multiple.
The existent mind whose imperatives constitute the imperatives of Reason will be omnipotent — Bartricks
False because it wouldn’t be able to do anything to someone who chooses to ignore it’s imperatives. Nor would it be able to lift a rock, just make the reasonable believe it was lifted. Last I checked, rocks don’t bow to the edicts of reason.
6. The existent mind whose imperatives constitute the imperatives of Reason will be omniscient — Bartricks
No premise leads to this.
7. The existent mind whose imperatives constitute the imperatives of Reason will be omnibenevolent — Bartricks
Definitely doesn’t follow from the above. -
Not exactly an argument for natalismbut how would you even know if someone will think it's worth it? — Albero
you can make an educated guess — Albero
what do we do if they end up hating it? — Albero
Try our best to make it better.
Imagine I had a magical pin that gives someone a million dollars on condition that they’re pricked without consent. Would it be wrong to prick people? Well the vast majority would probably appreciate it, so yes for most people. Now what happens if we’re wrong about someone and they hate it? Does the fact that someone could hate it make it wrong to impose? Well in this example, probably not right? Because the chance is so small.
In other words: If an imposition is wrong by dint of there being a chance someone will hate it, all impositions are wrong. Period. But no one here has said that I think. So the standard must be more than simply “someone could hate it” -
Not exactly an argument for natalismSomeone’s life is worth starting if they will feel it is worth continuing. Obviously you can’t feel if your life is worth starting or not, you can’t feel at that point.
-
Not exactly an argument for natalismI didn't mean to start another debate, just clearing up that I never said "Jeff said cock and ball torture is worthwhile so it's ethical to do it to Henry" (but generalized) which I thought you claimed I said. Regardless, it's not "if someone says it's worthwhile" it's "if it's an extremely high probability they will like it or at least not mind it"
Honestly I’d like to see other ANs debate here. — schopenhauer1
I don't mind. But so far you seem to be the only one arguing for it. If someone @s me I'll reply (probably).
Not purely, negative X is all negative experiences. — schopenhauer1
Then yes, it's ok to start all negative X because statistically they will think it's worthwhile. That's because starting all negative X also comes with starting all positive X (which is what makes negative X worthwhile in the first place) which you conveniently omitted.
What you did is like phrasing sending kids to school as "Subjecting minors to risks of sexual abuse" and concluding on that basis that sending kids to school is wrong. You can't just focus on what harms an act brings and then conclude whether or not it's right or else everything will end up wrong. -
Not exactly an argument for natalismwait, what is “it” here? — schopenhauer1
Life. I thought you were characterizing life purely as negative.
You are denying negatives exist now?? — schopenhauer1
Obviously not. Maybe take a charitable interpretation if you want to have a discussion. -
Possible Worlds, God exists.I couldn't possibly be wrong if I'm right. — theRiddler
But also, it's possible for you to be wrong, but only think you're right. And since if something is possible it is factual, you are in fact wrong.
It is also possible for you to be right while thinking you're right. So you are indeed right.
You're right and wrong. -
Possible Worlds, God exists.I don't think there is a gap. If X is possible, X is actual. — theRiddler
The God that kills the Christian God possibly exists, his name is Will Hoff.
Therefore Will Hoff exists.
God is dead and Will Hoff killed him.
It is also possible that you're not Christian and are actually lying about being Christian. Therefore it is actually the case that you're not Christian and are actually lying about being Christian.
You could be wrong about the possible being actual. Therefore you're wrong about the possible being actual. You could also be right about the possible being actual. Therefore you're right about the possible being actual. So you're right and wrong about the possible being actual.
And a whole lot of other messes happen when what's possible is what's actual. -
Possible Worlds, God exists.But it's not analogous at all.
In logic, A can imply B without B implying A right? Now replace "A" with "Actual" and "B" with "Possible"
Conversely, that B does not imply A doesn't mean A does not imply B. That's why a "gap" is not analogous. Because it's possible to be able to move from A to B without it being possible to move from B to A. -
Possible Worlds, God exists.If there's a gap between point A and point B, it doesn't matter whether I'm at point A or B, there's a gap. — TheMadFool
But we're not talking about points in space are we? -
Possible Worlds, God exists."There is a gap" is not a logical statement. I think what you mean to say is: Possible does not imply Actual. And 3 shows that Actual does imply Possible. Nothing wrong with that.
These "gaps" are sometimes not two way.
For example "If X is a butler, X is human", True. "If X is human, X is a butler", False. See?
Because the set of all butlers is a subset of the set of all humans. Similarly, the set of actual worlds, is a subset of the set of possible worlds. — khaled -
Possible Worlds, God exists.a possible world need not be actual. — TheMadFool
So P does not lead to A.
Suppose X is a possible world and that's all we know. — TheMadFool
X is P
1. X is possible & X is not actual. — TheMadFool
Thus X is P and !A? That doesn't follow. I think you're confusing "P does not lead to A" with "P leads to !A". With the latter it makes sense, but no one claimed that.
1. If X is possible then X is actual (False i.e. there's a gap between possible and actual)
2. If X is actual then X is possible (True? What happened to the gap mentioned above?) — TheMadFool
These "gaps" are sometimes not two way.
For example "If X is a butler, X is human", True. "If X is human, X is a butler", False. See?
Because the set of all butlers is a subset of the set of all humans. Similarly, the set of actual worlds, is a subset of the set of possible worlds. -
Possible Worlds, God exists.Suppose X is a possible world and is not actual.
Ergo, the following statement is true.
1. X is possible & X is not actual
If so, the statement
2. X is possible & X is actual
has to be false because X is not actual (X is actual is false)
But then look at 2. It says something odd: X is possible and actual is false. — TheMadFool
Obviously it says that because we established from the first line that X is possible and not actual. If we are talking about this world, well it's possible and actual.
The only way I can imagine you thinking this is odd is if you generalize X. As in, given a world, X, the above follows. But it doesn't follow, because if you generalize X you can't say that X is possible and not actual. -
Possible Worlds, God exists.1. World x is possible & World x is not actual (true according to all the posters above) — TheMadFool
I don't think anyone said this. What was said was: If world X is possible, that doesn't imply it's actual.
Ergo,
World x is actual can't be consistent with world x is possible. After all, world x is actual is the negation of world x is not actual. — TheMadFool
But this doesn't follow from either "world X is possible and not actual" or "If world X is possible, that doesn't imply it's actual" -
Possible Worlds, God exists.You don’t need to agree with that one. The first critique doesn’t talk about any of the premises but the scope of the argument. The “God exists” that you came up with isn’t the “God exists” that people care about.
-
Possible Worlds, God exists.your argument isn’t world specific. So you haven’t said anything about the existence of God in this world which is what people care about. That’s how I know that he doesn’t exist necessarily in this world, from your argument at least.
Also I disagree with premise 2.
2. If something is possible then there is a world in which that something is real. — TheMadFool
“Possible” means can exist in a possible world. Not actually exists in some world.
khaled
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