but there can't be things we know that are not true. — Banno

What’s the difference between this and:

knowledge is a belief that cannot be false — khaled

How do you know that you know? — Banno

By your definition, I don't. At no point am I certain that my belief cannot be false.

Then again, by your definition, you don't either:

because if something we thought we knew turned out to be false, we only thought we knew it. — Banno

So you can be wrong about whether or not you know something. And you haven't given a method for telling the two apart.

SO do you have a different scheme? — Banno

Instead of saying knowledge is a belief that cannot be false, just say knowledge is a belief that we have very good reason for believing is not false. Put it on the "justification scale". Because saying that knowledge is a belief that cannot be false doesn't net you any extra certainty when you also admit that you can't tell if a given belief is knowledge or not.

But even if my scheme is whack (since it hasn't been scrutinized very much), you haven't told me what the point is still. Why move doubt "up a level"? What's different between saying that "knowing X means that X must be true, but I can't actually tell when I know X, I just think I know X" and just saying "I can't tell if X is true or not, I just think it's true"

but there can't be things we know that are not true. — Banno

Only because if something we thought we knew turned out to be false, we only thought we knew it. — Banno

So given some belief, how can I tell whether or not that belief is knowledge?

It's just weird to me that you define knowledge such that if we know X, then X is definitely true. But then you also say that we can be mistaken about whether or not we know X (it can be the case that we only thought we knew it but in reality we didn't know it). So it seems you just took any doubt and moved it a "step up". Instead of doubting whether or not X is true, now we doubt whether or not "I know X" is true. I don't see the point of that.

there can't be things we know that are not true. — Banno

Is the same as "Once we know something, we are 100% sure our belief can not be false" no? That's what I interpreted it as.

You accept a hierarchy of justification. You also propose a state (knowing) where the belief in question cannot be false. So where, on that hierarchy of justification, is that state? How much of what kind of justification do we need to get to that state?

I can make sense of a hierarchy of believe, or of justification. — Banno

but there can't be things we know that are not true. — Banno

So at what level on the hierarchy of belief are these things we know? How much justification do we need to reach this state of "knowing", where we are 100% sure that our belief can not be false?

If only there wouldn't be so many schools of psychology, so many different theories about the same thing!
— baker
This says it all. And they cannot all be correct. Science is about figuring out which of competing theories is the right one, psychology just enjoys them all. — tim wood

There are also countless theories in physics, until we settle on the best one. Then we continuously revise.

And psychology does not “enjoy them all”. You don’t see people taking B. F. Skinner’s theory about language acquisition seriously anymore for example.

Psychology hasn’t had a Newton or Einstein yet, it’s still in its infancy.

But non-eucledian triangles are still called triangles. — Isaac

Oh. Didn't know that.

It's not similar enough for their current purpose to the definitions the rest of their language community are using. — Isaac

Fair enough.

No, not at all. I've demonstrated above that there is no such idea. Just several ideas which share common features. — Isaac

Sure. The goal of my comment wasn't to defend the universality of certain ideas, but the existence of ideas. A largely similar idea of "New York" exists. And that idea is not material. Though not a separate substance either.

You shouldn’t care what others think and believe. — SteveMinjares

When any belief is allowed to fester without opposition you get atrocities like the crusades and Nazism. You should care what others think and believe, because when too many think it it will affect you. "It makes me happy to believe this" is not a good excuse for believing, say, that all the Jews should die is it? So why is it a good excuse for believing in God?

So it's being on a plane is not a property of your ideal triangle? — Isaac

If you think about it, being on a plane is implied in the definition. Any three points are always on a plane.

Would a non-euclidean object with those properties still be a triangle? — Isaac

If it’s non Euclidean it wouldn’t have straight edges.

What about shapes matching that description but in non-standard topologies? — Isaac

If it’s not on a standard topology it wouldn’t have straight edges.

They could not simply derive the answers by comparing their new objects to some ideal form — Isaac

False, that’s exactly how they found the answer. They had the ideal form, and checked if a non Euclidean “triangle” can have its proprieties. It can’t. Then they checked if non standard topologies can. They can’t. Etc.

It’s the same thing you do when asked when a square is a triangle or not. You compare the properties of what you’re looking at to the properties of a triangle. You find they don’t match.

So are we mis-naming the things we commonly call triangles? — Isaac

Technically yes.

There's only yours, mine, everyone else's. — Isaac

If someone’s idea of a triangle includes that it is comprised of 4 vertices, don’t we have justification to tell them they’re wrong? From where do we get that justification?

All, no doubt very similar to your ideas, since we share a culture, language community, biology etc. — Isaac

So there is a unified shared idea of a triangle? That’s what I’m saying.

And no “very similar” is not enough. When speaking of geometry, it has to be exact. Or you’ll fail your math test. And if it’s NOT exact we have justification to call that person wrong. Meaning there is some universal standard we all abide by.

There is a reason math is called the universal language.

and plenty of evidence from developmental psychology that we use our own personal models to identity objects, not ethereal universal ones. — Isaac

What you’re debating is the source of the idea of triangle. Either it’s just a shared social thing, or it somehow predated society, and all we did was discover it. I’m leaning towards the latter, but in any case you do admit there is a unified idea of “triangle” that we all (basically) share.

So why can’t the same be said of New York? Or “A”?

Maybe it would help if you could tell me some properties of this ideal triangle. — Isaac

It has 3 vertices connected by 3 edges and all of them are perfectly straight. Nothing material fits that description. Yet the description itself is very important and is the subject of a lot of study.

The form of a triangle exists. It's not a new substance. But it exists.

so we clearly need a bit more than merely talking about X as if it existed for us to conclude that X exists, yes? — Isaac

Are you proposing that the idea of a triangle doesn't exist, and only real physical triangles exist?

What about "tesseract"? Does the idea of a tesseract exist? Or what about vector spaces with more than 3 dimensions? Does the idea of a vector space with more than 3 dimensions exist? If no, what are all these scientists and mathematicians talking about when they talk about shapes in 4D, 5D, etc?

We can come up with imaginary triangles, yes. — Isaac

In other words, the idea of "triangle" exists. What else is an imaginary triangle other than the idea of "triangle"?

I'm not seeing how this proves that they are the 'ideal' triangle against which all shapes are compared to determine the correct name. — Isaac

You can tell the difference between a triangle and a square right? How do you do that except by comparing with some ideal triangle/square?

And I would bet money you'd be able to tell the difference between a triangle and square without having ever seen a triangular or square object, just from the descriptions of a triangle and square as long as you know what "Vertex" and "Edge" mean. How do you explain the ability to do that, without referring to the idea of a triangle and square?

I've never heard anyone in day-to-day language talk about the ideal mental concept of the letter 'A'. — Isaac

I'm actually with Olivier for once on this one. Maybe 'A' isn't a good example. What about "triangle". We clearly talk about the "ideal triangle" all the time in math, not any particular triangle. We even talk about shapes that don't exist, like a tesseract (4D equivalent of a cube). We can come up with properties relating to the ideal triangle, though no triangle that ever exists will be the ideal triangle. And we spend a whole lot of time and effort studying the properties of these forms.

Same can be said for "square" or "polynomial function" or "algorithm". Literally all of mathematics and computer science discusses these forms which are not material (in that they have no mass).

Why not? You think it is only if the past is necessary that we can know about it? — Bartricks

I didn't mention necessity once so you're just pulling things out of your ass.

I'm saying your God has the ability to change the past, and your memories of it, and not tell you. In which case you'd have no way of knowing whether or not he did so. So, you have no way of knowing whether or not he has or has not changed the past. You have no evidence in support of either proposition.

I am able to take the glass in front of me and smash it into my face. That is something I can do. — Bartricks

Look, I don't have a limitless supply of glasses to smash into my face. — Bartricks

Ah so every time someone disagrees with you, you smash a glass in your face. I see the problem now.

God can change the past. That doesn't mean he does or has. — Bartricks

You wouldn’t be able to tell if he did or didn’t so you have no reason to think he hasn’t.

Are they physical? I’d say, of course they’re not, they’re principles or observed regularities, discovered by the application of mathematical reason to phenomena. — Wayfarer

In other words, they are the forms that physical stuff seems to follow. In the end what exists is: The physical stuff, in different forms.

You take forms to be a substance, so you’re a dualist. I don’t so I’m a physicalist. In the end, I don’t think we disagree on much other than what counts as a substance.

Good conversation. I feel like we’ve reached some agreement?

Not 'entirely'? It's a moving target, it changes all the time. — Wayfarer

What I meant was that sometimes we call forms of physical things “physical” (waves) and sometimes we don’t (algorithms).

mind is a substance in the philosophical sense, that is, it has properties (such as knowing) — Wayfarer

I think I get what you’re saying now. I’d still struggle to call it dualism.

Algorithms are specific forms that the hardware follows. Algorithms are thus not material (don’t have mass). Algorithms also have properties (time complexity, space complexity, etc). Does that make algorithms a new substance? Is there an “algorithm-hardware dualism”?

Sound waves are physical for sure. But what about the probability wave? Are those waves physical? — Wayfarer

Definitely, or we wouldn’t study them under “physics”

I think a better example for you would be algorithms. We don’t consider those physical (mostly though we don’t bother to ask the question), even though they’re a set of instructions for a physical computer (or anything) to follow. We’re not entirely consistent it seems to me when it comes to what we call physical.

No, I’m arguing for substance dualism — Wayfarer

Except you think there is one substance not two. Different forms of one substance.

Physicalism believes that mind is a result of matter, the product of the material brain, whereas dualism believes that mind is the cause as much as the result. — Wayfarer

That’s not what either physicalism or dualism means. Physicalism is the belief that all that exists is physical substances. Dualism is the belief that there are 2 separate substances, one mental and one physical. You keep insisting that the mental, is not a substance, so you’re not a substance dualist.

Material stuff which could not exist without those forms. — Wayfarer

Sure.

So they’re prior to matter — Wayfarer

I don't know what "prior" means here. Are we talking about a timeline? I don't think it makes sense to ask when "triangle", the structure, started existing for it to be prior to any triangular object.

and they’re not physical in nature. — Wayfarer

Again, we call sound waves physical even though sound waves are a pattern of air and patterns don't have mass. Again, seems to me the disagreement is mainly whether or not to call these structures physical, not actually a disagreement over their nature.

They don’t have to exist - things do the hard work of existing - but things depend on them for existence. — Wayfarer

Sure.

So, they don't exist as a substance (holder of properties), and things do the hard work of existing as substances, while conforming to certain structures. I would call that physicalism. Considering it includes one substance (physical stuff) conforming to certain structures (which are not a separate substance)

I would agree, with the caveat that these structures and patterns are not material. — Wayfarer

But they are structures of material stuff. Always. So in the end the number of "kinds of stuff" that exist is still 1.

Sure we can talk of the structures without there being any material thing that takes on that structure (we can talk of triangles even if no triangular objects exist), but even there, all that exists is matter, and forms of matter. Not matter and another substance.

But they're not physical - they exist as bounds, limits, principles, and regularities. — Wayfarer

The structures are not material, in the sense that they don't have any mass (triangle, the idea, has no mass, but a dorito has mass). But usually when we talk of the structures of physical stuff we call those "physical" too. Like sound waves. We call sound waves physical, even though a wave is just a pattern of air, and a pattern has no mass.

In any case, the disagreement seems to be on whether or not to call structures physical or non physical. Not actually on what exists. Which is matter and its structures.

Care to explain then? Because last time you said a substance was a holder of properties. That’s the definition being used here.

You're trying to locate ideas in the physical world, but I think they're real in a different sense to existent phenomena. They're real as principles, as ideas although not simply the casual thoughts that occupy our minds moment to moment. But the domain of ideas is not dependent on the physical domain, rather they are the organising principles which underlie and inform the physical domain. — Wayfarer

But this still wouldn’t make ideas a substance. Do you think a triangle (the idea, not a physical triangle) is a substance? A holder of properties?

If so, what would happen if you removed the “triangle substance” from a dorito?

Incidentally, I agree with the above. What you mean by “organizing principles” is what I meant by “structure” and “pattern”

Pfhorrest put it really well as I was typing this:

That's the form-substance distinction again, which as stated already is not something anybody is denying: you can have multiple things of the same form. The question at hand is whether there's more than one kind of underlying substance — Pfhorrest

A form/structure/organizing principle is not its own a substance. Or at least, doesn’t need to be.

We casually accept that this is something that 'evolved', as if that amounts to an explanation for it. — Wayfarer

Sight is an awesome power. It is also evolved. I don’t see why patter recognition or reasoning would be any different.

Devices and beings are ontologically distinct. — Wayfarer

Rather, that is the point in question.

You don't murder a camera, and you can't repair a human being. — Wayfarer

You don't throw a magnetic field. And you don't measure the intensity and direction of a rock. Does that make rocks and magnetic fields ontologically distinct?

What I'm saying that we don't see is the way in which the mind, the subject, constructs or creates what we understand as the real world. We constantly interpret what we see to make our worldview. Heck even neuroscientists see that, although they don't always grasp the philosophical implications. — Wayfarer

And everyone agrees.

What they don't agree with is going from that to saying that the mind is ontologically distinct. It doesn't logically follow.

The other point you haven't addressed is the dualism of symbols on the one hand, and physical matter, on the other. — Wayfarer

Even if one admits such a dualism it wouldn't make one a substance dualist. Because symbols are not a substance, or they don't need to be.

A triangle doesn't exist in the same way a rock does. The triangle, is the expression of a certain structure. It is not a new substance. One could propose a "mental substance" that the triangle is made of but again I ask: Why would one need to do that? It doesn't seem to bring any advantages, and brings plenty of problems.

I didn't even notice you could like posts. But if the goal is to encourage better posts maybe showing the number of followers is better? That way it's a bit more annoying to manipulate and the "factions" that form become clearer. I think it's better if you just show nothing though. People will start conflating the numbers with authority and validity.

And what is my argument that breaks down exactly?
— khaled

I have no idea, it just breaks down — Noble Dust

Right. Good talk.

So what if the camera is part of a bot whose job it is to wander around and take pictures of ducks? Or is an automated security camera? In that case does the camera become ontologically different from the thing being photographed since it is the author of the photos (there are no users)?

and your entire argument breaks down — Noble Dust

And what is my argument that breaks down exactly?

I'm not making an argument, I'm saying Isaac's argument is fallacious. It goes something like:

1- The mind is the source of our concepts of "matter", "physical" and all other concepts
2- Therefore the mind is ontologically different from matter, and is not physical

2 doesn't follow.

No, the mind of the camera-user is what puts the photo together. They do this first and then take the photo. It's a shitty metaphor until you acknowledge this. — Noble Dust

What? So what if the camera user is blind? Or if the camera is a security camera with no user?

The camera user wasn't mentioned once because they are of no importance here. The point is, although the camera isn't, and can't be in the photo, the camera is not thus ontologically different from the photo or the things getting photographed.

But within the analogy, the person taking the photo/video is ontologically different from both the image and the camera. — Noble Dust

That's called begging the question. Whether or not minds are material is precisely what's being discussed here, even though that's not what the thread was intended for...

You haven't addressed the critique.

You don't see mind, because you are it. Everything you know empirically is presented to you as an object or relation of objects or a force. But the very thing which weaves all that together into a world is mind, which is not amongst those objects. — Wayfarer

Your argument is that since you can't see the mind, since the mind is what weaves the objects together into a world (and is also you). But then you go on to conclude that: Thus the mind must be ontologically different from the object.

@Pfhorrest's example shows that even though a camera is what puts the photo together, the camera is not ontologically different from the photo or the things getting photographed. Similarly, there is no reason to assume the mind is ontologically different simply because it is what organizes the objects and their relations.

A literal map of a geographic territory and the literal territory itself are both made of the same kind of stuff — Pfhorrest

The other point is, cameras are built and operated by humans. They have no ability to decide or intend, nor is there anything about them that is even analogous to those abilities, which are intrinsic to human beings. How can that not count as an ontological difference? — Wayfarer

What if we made a bot that seeks out and takes pictures of ducks? Does it become ontologically different then?

“The underlying, supernatural stuff that makes minds so obviously different than bodies, has sufficient properties with the physical stuff of nature that it can interact with the physical stuff that it does not violate the laws of nature.“

What are the “sufficient properties” shared between a non-physical undetectable “supernatural stuff” and the physical detectable “natural stuff”. Can anyone explain? Because I can’t think how they can begin to share properties as if they did, whatever the non physical substance, it would have physical properties.

A mind with mass is no longer a mind. An intention with momentum is no longer an intention. No?

I’d say there are plenty of people who should get banned on the site but 3017 was very far down the list for me. Don’t know why you’d start with him/her.

deleted.

Er, no, I did not say 'Reason is a faculty'. I said 'our reason' is a faculty. Christ, you people are soooo sloppy. — Bartricks

Well I had explicitly stated "There is no reason out there, reasoning is a faculty". Sure the use of "reasoning" as opposed to "reason" was a mistake, but otherwise I thought you agreed that "our reason is a faculty".

So you're proposing that there is a person called Reason, that is the source of reasons? Is there a Mr. Sight and Ms. Taste too?

YOu seem to be able to comprehend this with sight, so what's your problem? — Bartricks

I don't believe in Mr. Sight. So no I don't agree with this "setup" where you make faculties persons so you can play word twister.

Explaining the omnipotence of God is 'not' the issue. Can't you see this? — Bartricks

False. You just can't remember as far as 2 comments back in a conversation.

What is a justification made of? Well, a justification is made of God's attitudes. That is, to be 'justified' in believing something is for God to favour you believing it.
— Bartricks

Where’d you get this? — khaled

Ratiocination.

It follows from being omnipotent. — Bartricks

So it is crucial for you that your God is omnipotent, as apparently being the source of justifications follows from being omnipotent (which in itself is very stupid but if we stopped to critique every mistake we'll never get anywhere). However you continue to fail to show said omnipotence.

I can explain the mechanics of omnipotence, but here is not the place. — Bartricks

No you can't. As in every place you were asked to show that the mind that issues normative reasons is omnipotent you refused to do so.

If you can, show it. As this is clearly the place, since being the source of justifications follows from being omnipotent apparently. And your proof requires that God be the source of justifications.

What you're doing is focussing on normative reasons - which Reason will also be the source of and by dint of which she has colossal power - and not on the rational landscape more generally, all of which is a creature of her will — Bartricks

Thus, again, she can't move a rock. Since rocks aren't rational. Even if she made 2+2=5, she can't lift a rock with that ability.

This will go nowhere. I give up on you.

You make a very good case for antinatalism and that God can make mistakes!

And do you have reason to believe that, or no reason to believe it? — Bartricks

Regardless, that doesn't affect the rock. Are you questioning this belief? Do you think our beliefs can affect the rock? Yes or no?

And regardless, you haven't answered the critique that even if God changes the normative reasons, he can't do anything to those who ignore them. Your God cannot affect a single person, animal, plant or object reliably. Yet he/she is omnipotent somehow.

All being able to change normative reasons can do is change most people's beliefs and actions. That's it. Very far from omnipotence.

3 is clearly false. Even if rocks are not affected by normative reasons, it doesn't follow that the mind whose attitudes constitute such reasons is unable to affect rocks. — Bartricks

Here it is assumed that this mind is disembodied and that all it can do is issue normative reasons. You say that the mind which issues normative reasons is omnipotent. So we must assume that that is all that mind can do to test the hypothesis. You must get omnipotence out of just the ability to issue normative reasons. That you cannot do, without believing in telekinesis of some sorts.

Unless you meant to say that the mind that issues normative reasons (assuming it's just one) just so happens to also be omnipotent. In which case you're being arbitrary as you have no proof of that statement.

You must get omnipotence out of JUST being able to issue normative reasons. That you cannot do, despite being asked repeatedly to do it.

A mind that only issues normative reasons can't move a rock. So it can’t be God.

My case requires only that we acknowledge that being omniscient involves possessing all items of knowledge, and that knowledge has at least two components: justification and true belief. — Bartricks

It also requires that the source of justification be God. Being able to justify a belief based on just whether or not one wants to believe it seems to be something you share with your God...

But note too that my main case does not depend upon identifying Reason and God. — Bartricks

1- Reason is a faculty (your words)
2- God is a person (your words)
3- Persons aren't faculties (obviously)
4- Therefore God is not Reason

Dog shit post. — Protagoras

Coming from you? That's just confirmation I'm doing something right.

Head out of the scientists ass and in the real world. — Protagoras

You've determined I'm biased beyond repair based purely on the fact that I disagree with you. No reasoning is possible with such a creature. So have a good one.

No not majority rules. More like: if “what of all the people that experienced X” is an argument that X is genuine then the fact that the majority who tried have not experienced X should be a stronger argument that X is not genuine.

I highly doubt you got your scientist friend to say “I don’t know how DNA replication works”. See, all my scientist friends seem to know at least that much. Even many non scientist friends who took biology in high school seem to know that much. So I’d love to have a conversation with this friend of yours and ask exactly what he means by “I don’t know how DNA replication works” considering you can literally look it up.

I've explained enough in my posts for you to get what I'm saying. — Protagoras

When I asked you to explain what “non material but physical” means you told me to “raise your hand and observe” for Christ sake! You think I’ve never raised my hand before? I do so multiple times a day, and so does everyone who disagrees with you. And none of us get what we’re supposed to be noticing.

If you can't see it, then perhaps try to be less scientismistic and apply your own perception. — Protagoras

Curious. Being scientific is precisely about applying your own perception. Having done so, all I perceive is BS, no offense.

“If you can’t agree with me, maybe you should be less biased and agree with me! No I won’t actually try to convince you of anything nor even explain the position you asked me to clarify, maybe if you weren’t so damn biased you’d get it already!”

What of all the numerous meditators and religious people who experience this? — Protagoras

What of the majority that don’t?

He finally admitted he couldn't square how life actually started from matter,or how DNA replicates. — Protagoras

Your scientist friend doesn’t know how DNA replicates? I doubt it. I bet he’s just appeasing you.

If you want to know what non material but physical is raise your hand and observe. — Protagoras

Ok. Done. Still don’t know. Now can you actually explain your position?

Good luck!

Well I won't speak for him, and I can't see how what you quoted translates to "minds are an illusion" (which he explicitly denied before) but you don't actually seem to be arguing against materialism so bye.

If minds matter, then mental events are important and potentially effective. They are not necessarily illusions or mere noise. — Olivier5

Why do you seem to think the only materialist in the world is Dennett? No one here has called minds an illusion or mere noise.

The role of neuroscience is therefore to use mental events as a way to investigate how come mental events are so useful and powerful, and how we can make them even more so. The role of neuroscience is not and can never be to replace minds with another "realer" reality — Olivier5

So where is the part where this becomes a critique of materialism? Or is it not?

Therefore, all scientists actually trust the human mind quite a lot, even those who are not consciously aware that they do. — Olivier5

I don't know why people keep repeating this. Yes, minds exist. No, they're not immaterial. That's the position.

Everything you said also makes sense from a materialist perspective. Except the "it is dualistic by nature" bit. Which is the only bit that doesn't follow from anything you said.

'the experience of pain and the knowledge of the physiology of pain are different'. If you say they're not different, how could any argument prevail? How could it ever be proven that 'an idea of pain' and 'a pain' are different things, to one prepared to deny it? — Wayfarer

Similarly, if you say they are different how can Isaac's argument prevail? This is precisely where reasoned arguments are needed.

If starting from different premises makes reasoned arguments useless, people would have never agreed on anything.

Usually what you do when the other party has radically different premises is you try to show contradictions in their approach and show them that your position suffer from no such contradictions.