The "fact" of someone driving in another country is information, is the information not in your head? — Sir2u

Let's substitute the word "event" for "fact" here. And let's assume there's the event occurring of someone driving in another country. Before I introduced that claim, that event was occurring. After I focused on other things since I introduced that claim, that event was also occurring. The event is occurring as I type. None of what I have been doing has effected the event of someone driving in another country. My role has to just introduce the claim about that event. Introducing and making claims are (ontologically) mental events. So mental events are required to "discuss" non-mental events (someone driving in another country) in this example. But in this example, mental events do not cause non-mental events to occur. In other words, the statement/claim about someone driving in another country has no direct effect on the event of someone driving in another country.

Information might be observer independent, but a fact is something that has been proven/judged/evaluated to be true. That can only happen in someone's mind which means that a fact is not independent of the observer. Many things might be true even if we have no knowledge of their existence, but a fact is a human construct used to define the level of reliability of information. — Sir2u

It depends on what you mean by "information". I've just been having a conversation with someone in another threat about it, and it seems to me that "information" (in that thread) refers to meaningful statements/claims about phenomena that can be relayed via various means of communication to other individuals, and so on.

I don't define "fact" the way you do, and I don't think that's the conventional way in philosophy of talking about "fact" (not that things being unconventional/conventional are "wrong/right"). It seems that you think that facts are only facts if they are tied to truth-statements. I don't think that's a necessary condition for "fact" though. That's tied to what I think "truth" is too: an aspect/part/property of judgments/claims/propositions that relate to events/facts. "Truth" is a mental event about other mental events or non-mental events. "Facts" (i.e. events) do not need truth-statements to validate them as "facts". "Facts" are facts regardless of what any mind thinks about them.

I would think that there is no room for meaning in such an ontology. — Metaphysician Undercover

That would depend on what you think meaning is ontologically.

Ideas are reduced to mental states and mental states are reduced physical brain states. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct. Although I don't often invite notions of reduction as part of my view; reductionism is rather imposed upon my view by others. (Not that it can't be helpful to use "reduction", especially as part of the received/standard views in philosophy or other intellectual milieu's.) That's mainly becuase I think there's often a stigma when employing "reduction" in these debates (probably from those who aren't identity theorists and dualists, which makes sense), at least in my experience, and I think that can sometimes be a red-herring about views like mine. I'd rather frame your statement I quoted as: particular ways of organising reality that are identical to particular properties and processes. So in other words, I'd merely say "ideas are identical to mind states/brain states."

Where's meaning? — Metaphysician Undercover

Located in minds/brains

Still not the point. The particular piece of information in question - about the ship - can be described exactly, by any one of a number of media and even systems of representation. The same can be said for all manner of information. If I write out a formula or a recipe or an equation, I can employ a wide range of systems or languages to encode it. Yet, one digit wrong, and the chemical won’t form, or the cake won’t bake, and so on. So the information in each case is the same, even if the representation is completely different. — Wayfarer

So you're describing information as a (meaningful) judgement about phenomena (I'd include any experience of events or objects, including recipes or equations, as phenomena, btw), is that right? A formula, recipe, or equation is (or can be) a meaningful (set of) statement/claim(s) presented in particular ways/forms. People can "understand" the meaning of such statements and attempt to relay them to others via various forms of communication, or as you say, representation. In that sense, trying to guarantee that "information" (statements/claims) remains consistent is what you mean about "information" staying the "same" (barring nominalism re same/identical). Is that right?

The information could be transmitted wrongly, or correctly. If it’s transmitted correctly, then it stays the same. The rest is not germane. — Wayfarer

Well if you disagree with nominalism then that might make sense. Again, I don't think "information" is some static, object-like thing to get "right" or "wrong". That's because, under nominalism, "information" ontologically is just conscious experience of phenomena that is interpreted/judged in particular ways, which could involve truth-statements. What the "information" is about regarding truth-statements can be true or false, of course.

I am questioning whether information, generally speaking, is physical. — Wayfarer

As a physicalist, I'd say every thing that exists is physical. In your thought-experiment, it seems that, generally, "information" is being characterised as subjective experience of phenomena that is communicated via various means to other people. Every person who receives that "information" experiences it in its various forms in which it has been communicated, and also experiences "information" in different ways. "Information" in this sense, and ontologically then, is not a static thing or object, but a whole set of processes involving intention, interpretation, judgement, etc., and methods of communication regarding specific subjective experiences of phenomena.

The question I want to explore is: in such a case, what stays the same, and what changes? — Wayfarer

As a nominalist, I'd say nothing literally stays the same. The initial experience of the ship by the sentry will be communicated via particular instruments. But that experience cannot literally be communicated from a first-person perspective, only from a third-person perspective can others try to understand what the sentry is attempting to communicate. So it's not as if the "information" the sentry has of the ship in the first instance is a static or un-changing thing that gets tainted or reduced via methods of communication. Rather, "information" is just the sentry's experience of the ship in that system/context; and then the communication of the information that is received by another person occurs in another system/context. The shipping clerk, for example, is experiencing phenomena (the sea-horn) and interprets that as a communication from the sentry. This is because the clerk has already established what the sounding of a sea-horn within that context might mean. And the process continues from there.

By the way, I believe that "ideas" are physical as mental states/brain states.

I wouldn't say all facts are subjective. Some facts don't happen in the mind. — numberjohnny5

Name one please. — Sir2u

Sure. A person driving a car in another country.

The reason I believe this is because I think facts are essentially events, and there exist events occurring inside and outside minds. — numberjohnny5


Is a tree in the middle of the forest an event? When does it become a fact? — Sir2u

Yes. A tree in the middle of the forest is an event. I'd say events in this sense are "situational", that is, they involve objects "interacting" (which could simply involve "being" a tree in relation to other objects/trees/animals/etc.) in some way within a situation/context/environment.

Facts are observer-independent. Things don't graduate to become facts. Facts exist; observers can happen to experience/perceive facts; and they can make judgements about facts if or when they experience them.

What is the difference between a feeling (feeling love, anger, fear, etc) and an activity (or the participation in an activity) (e.g., a football match, a walk in the park, etc) (I do understand that feelings entail internal brain activity, yet I'm using "activity" to mean external, observable physical activity)? — jancanc

"Activity" (in the observable sense) refers to the behaviour one takes in a particular situation. In this sense, "activity" involves intentions, whereas "activity" in the "brain actiivty" sense (or "feeling" sense that I mention below) is a description of the facts of mental events.

"Feeling" refers to the conscious experience of particular states of physiological activity (ranging from less-aroused to more-aroused activity). This experience also involves nonconscious processes.

The problem with your argument is that it connects truisms with one or more false premises. The less time that is spent on these distracting truisms which you - and certain others who indicate a preference to be referred to in a certain outdated way which indicates a certain kind of haughtiness - raise, the better. — Sapientia

Well, thanks for your honesty. I don't know what you mean by "a preference to be referred to in a certain outdated way", but re "haughtiness", I definitely don't think I'm superior to anyone. I do think some of my views are more reasonable than others'; and I also think that some of my views might be incoherent or not very well-fleshed out. That's one reason why I'm participating in this forum.

The "problem" could be that you don't understand what I'm saying re "truth" and "fact", I don't understand what you're saying re "truth" and "fact", or that you're wrong (I obviously believe my views are true).

For example, it is a truth that Earth preexisted us. That is true whether it is judged or not. It would be absurd to suggest that the length of time that the Earth has existed depends on our judgement. You can rightly say that our judgement of that length of time depends on our judgement, but that's trivially true and beside the point. — Sapientia

I'd say that "that the Earth preexisted us" is an empirical claim, and I think you're saying that that empirical claim is "true". So you're judging a (meaningful) statement (that refers to the empirical domain) to be true. That's what truth is for me: a judgment about facts/events or claims (which are mental facts/events).

I'm also not saying or implying that facts/events depend upon our judgements about them; in other words, to use your example, I don't believe that the Earth's preexistence hinges upon our judgments.

As for meaning and reference, there is a charitable assumption that we are both competent English speakers, and that we aren't using words in unusual ways. So, "the cat" refers to the cat, and not a fish or an idea or my experience. If I had meant to refer to a fish or an idea or my experience, then I could have used the right words. That's a starting point to a sensible conversation, and that's the only kind of conversation that I'm interested in. — Sapientia

Even though we may want to enter into conversations with that "charitable assumption" in mind (and I often do), to do so without some scepticism would be foolish, in my view. I've taken part in many discussions in my life-time (which is nearing 40 years), and it's often the case that terms or words are being used conventionally and unconventionally among conversing participants.

I did take your "the cat" as referring to an actual cat, btw. And I don't think words can be "right" or "wrong", only conventional or unconventional. We may use the word "cat" to hold meaning unconventionally for an actual hat, for example. There's nothing "right/wrong" about that particular decision though.

No, the individual is not doing the corresponding. The individual can make a statement, and it either corresponds with the truth or it doesn't. The correspondence is out of our hands. We can make statements, not correspondence. — Sapientia

Ok, what is "the truth", ontologically? Does it have location? Does it have properties? What kind of thing is "truth" for you?

I never suggested that people can make facts about statements. That's a misreading of what I said, as can be seen by comparing the two quotes above. — Sapientia

You said "A fact is, or corresponds with, the truth." I understand "correspond" as something minds do--we make truth-statements in order to match/correspond with facts; this is because my ontology says that "truth" is a property of statements that are used to make judgements that correspond with the facts. So that's why I said "I wouldn't say that" because under my ontology it doesn't make sense to say "facts correspond with truth." Correspondence requires minds, in that sense. I think you're using "correspond" differently, almost interchangeably with "truth". I don't know.

It means that you're missing the bigger picture by focussing on what's close by. What's close by are the words that I'm speaking and the judgements that I'm making and so on. By I'm trying to get you to step back and look at the bigger picture, or at that which is outside of your immediate vicinity. — Sapientia

If we can't sort out the details (i.e. the trees) then the bigger picture is not worthwhile for me. The bigger picture (the wood) hinges on and is identical to the (all the trees).

Judgements don't make sense without something to judge. I'd rather we talk about that something, rather than getting bogged down by the judging and the judgement that is produced, as I think that it has a better chance of getting an answer to the question of the discussion. — Sapientia

I already have an answer for the OP. I'm not sure what question you're hoping to find an answer to.

So then you explain to me why my clarification has not clarified it for you, and we work from there. — Sapientia

Ok, re "fact" and "truth", I'm not clear because I don't understand how you're using those terms. So you can help me understand the difference (if there is a difference?) between "fact" and "truth". What is "fact" ontologically; and the same question goes for "truth" (which I already asked you above).

And I prefer not to digress too much by, for example, talking about talking, or talking about the other person, or their motives, or talking about myself, and so on. — Sapientia

Me neither, but if the issue that is causing an impasse is being caused by how we're conversing, our intentions, etc., then that needs to be addressed. Ignoring that would only make a conversation more impenetrable, don't you think?

I would turn that around and ask you why you think that that definition is inadequate, if that is what you think. — Sapientia

It's not that I think your definition for "criteria" is inadequate, it's rather that it's not conventional, which means it's difficult to be on the same page as you about what we're talking about. Here are some conventional definitions of "criteria/criterion":

- a principle or standard by which something may be judged or decided.
- A standard or test by which individual things or people may be compared and judged.
- a standard by which you judge, decide about, or deal with something

That's how I use the term: "criteria" are subjective/mental constructs i.e. standards/principles that we apply to or impose upon things. That seems to be different from how you're using "criteria".

Do you see why it's sometimes important to focus on the "trees" before we jump to the "woods"?

Furthermore, you said that "criteria" weren't subjective, which was what I was arguing against.

Some words are difficult to precisely define in a way which avoids problems — Sapientia

The way to try and limit that is to know the conventional or standard definitions being used in a particular intellectual milieu.

The words "subjective" and "objective" are like that. I don't think it necessary to attempt to precisely define them, and I'm not willing to do so unless you give me a good enough reason. I could quote you a dictionary definition or give you some examples, but is that really necessary? If your interpretation differs from the norm, then that may be where the problem lies. And if it doesn't, then I'm not sure why you think that there's a problem. — Sapientia

I disagree, and I have a precise definition of subjective/objective; a major upshot of that precision is that it helps make things easier to organise in my thinking/beliefs; and it also helps other people realise the difference between their and my definitions. From that starting point, some progress can be made. Whereas, the less precise definitions are, the much more difficult it can be to make progress.

I could quote you a dictionary definition or give you some examples, but is that really necessary? — Sapientia

It's only necessary insofar as it's helpful for a conversation to progress effectively. That's something I care about, so I deem it necessary. You may not care so much, and that's fine, but that's important to know for me because it can help make a decision re whether to continue conversing with you and to manage my expectations, for example. Not that I'm saying I'm not interested in conversing with you at the moment, I'm getting some value out of it, for one thing.

I use the terms in a not too dissimilar manner. Off the bat, and loosely, I'd say that what is subjective is what relates to, or comes from, or is about, or depends upon, or is produced by, the subject. So, thinking, judgement, opinion, evaluation, experience, and that kind of thing. And what is objective is otherwise, like facts, the truth, rocks, planets, reality, and that kind of thing. — Sapientia

Ok, thanks for clarifying that. I agree, except that I also use "fact" to refer to (non-associative) mental events (i.e. as distinct from mental events as statements about mental events); as well as non-mental events.

What about the collective mind? saving face, hive mind, group think. Don't they count for something? — matt

I don't think "collective mind" makes sense outside of thinking that it refers to multiple minds thinking in particular ways. But meaning is personal and not literally shared with/by others.

I don't know if I could definitively say if truth was subjective or objective. Is it possible that truth is beyond subjectivity/objectivity. — matt

I use "subjective" to refer to things existing in particular locations: minds. I use "objective" to refer to things existing in particular locations: non-minds. So I don't really see any other alternative option--"truth" exists in one of these, and in my view, it's "subjective".

Both fact and truth are subjective, they both happen in the mind. — Sir2u

I wouldn't say all facts are subjective. Some facts don't happen in the mind. The reason I believe this is because I think facts are essentially events, and there exist events occurring inside and outside minds.

Truth and fact are descriptive of the events and objects of the external world. And the are both relative to point of view. — Sir2u

That's almost close to my view. I think that "truth" is an aspect/part of statements. Facts can be mental (like neurons firing), but they are not meaningful statements that refer to things, which is what truth-statements are. In other words, "facts/events" only include those things that exist that aren't meaningful (i.e. non-associative qua minds).

If I am in the north in winter and you in the south it will be summer. The sun Is way down south is what I would say but you would say no it is on top of us. If the sun was over the equator both statements, the sun is in the north and the sun is in the south are true at the same time. — Sir2u

Yes, the confusion some people have about this issue, I think, is down to relative, spatiotemporal reference points. For someone in the north, they occupy a particular location relative to the sun; and for someone in the south, they occupy a particular location relative to the sun. So both people can make statements that are true relative to where they're situated in relation to the sun.

We judge, measure, compare the objects in our minds, even if we take measurements with a ruler, the results are processed in the mind. — Sir2u

I agree.

Exactly, the fact that you can measure 1km using a measuring device make no difference to the fact that both the km and the 1 only exist in the mind. As Plato said mathematics is what we use to describe the universe. — Sir2u

Yes, the concept of km and the unit of 1 only make sense in reference to a system of thought like mathematics.

I view truth as mental too. — numberjohnny5


Why? It's not. If a statement is true, then the truth is what the statement says. How is that mental? It isn't. — Sapientia

Because "truth" is an aspect of statements in which we make a judgement about things. Judgements are mental, something you agreed with in an earlier post. We say "the cat is on the mat" as a statement we believe to be true. Statements require meaning; statements refer to things. Meaning and reference are subjective, mental occurrences. What the statement is about can be a non-mental thing/event (i.e. the cat on the mat) (but it doesn't necessarily have to be non-mental either--it could be mental, e.g. making a truth-statement about your own mental experience).

A fact is, or corresponds with, the truth. If it's a fact that the cat is on the mat, then the truth is that the cat is on the mat, and vice versa. — Sapientia

I wouldn't say that because the thing that is doing the corresponding (i.e. the thing that is making the reference) is the individual in question. People make statements about the facts, not the other way around.

Or, better put, you're focussing on the map instead of the territory. — Sapientia

I don't understand the analogy you're making re woods and trees.

But no, I'm trying to clarify and distinctify the difference between subjectivity and objectivity when it comes to judgments etc. (By the way, the way I use the terms, "subjectivity" just refers to the spatio-temporal location of minds; and "objectivity" refers to the spatio-temporal location of anything that are non-minds.)

I've clarified what I mean, and it doesn't make that big of a difference whether we focus on truth or fact. — Sapientia

Just because you believe you've clarified something doesn't mean the other person is clear on what you mean. That's the whole point of a commitment to conversing and arguing with others' perspectives/views. I get the impression that you don't care to help me understand your views better with a statement like that.

Anyway, I think it's important to acknowledge the difference between "fact" and "truth" because the meaning we have for those terms influences the conclusions we make, as well as helps us understand each other. That's what I'm interested in--I'm not interested in being right mainly because I don't think that's generally, in my experience, a good way to argue philosophically. And not many people generally tend to agree with me so I don't bother (i.e. I'm not too emotionally invested in) trying to convince them either. But I do think it's good practice and healthy to challenge my own views and others' views.

Determinants. They can be objective or subjective. — Sapientia

I'm still not clear what that entails. Looking up a dictionary definition yields this:

"a factor which decisively affects the nature or outcome of something."

Is that what you mean by "determinant"?

Also, what are your definitions for "objective" and "subjective"? We may be using them in different ways, which would add to miscommunication here.

No, they're relational qualities between one thing and another. They're separable and independent from comparison or measurement. — Sapientia

I think we agree on that.

Another way of describing objects/things or facts (as events between things) is that, ontologically, there exist a variety of different stuff. What "makes" those things different are the particular properties they have relative to other things; maybe that's what you mean by "relational qualities." So while some objects are bigger than others ontologically, there is no comparison between "big" and "small" without minds. We make up a system of thought (like language, mathematics, etc.) that enables us to compare things with each other.

The act of perceiving, comparing, describing, measuring, judging etc. about that stuff is subjective (i.e. occurring in minds). When we say one object is bigger than another object and that matches/corresponds accurately to what we're referring to, that would be a true statement/judgement.

Another way of putting it is that relations exist and we make particular judgments about them. Some of those judgments can be true, and some false.

Measuring is a thing that subjects or apparatus do. Measurements are what they give when they're done. It can be subjective or objective. — Sapientia

I agree, although again, I'm not sure how you're using "subjective or objective."

But when I say that Usain Bolt is better than me at running the 100 metres, the judgement aspect is not as relevant as the truth aspect. — Sapientia

I view truth as mental too. Maybe you mean "fact" by "truth"...? I use the conventional definition of "fact" as "states of affairs".

Also, when it comes to judgements etc., "relevance" is mental/subjective too.

The truth is what answers the question. Pointing out that judgement and subject are involved does not answer the question. It doesn't do anything. — Sapientia

I think you mean "fact" by "truth."

And criteria are not subjective, even if they require a subject to set them, which they don't in at least some cases. No one really needs to set the criteria for what makes the moon bigger than my foot. The criteria are predetermined, unless you change them to something else. — Sapientia

What actually are (as in, ontologically) criteria to you?

Bigger/smaller/faster/slower/etc. are comparative measurements of phenomena, right? Where in the world does the act of measuring occur?

They're not judgements, assessments, evaluations, etc., because they are what we judge, evaluate, assess, etc. They're relational qualities, like larger, smaller, greater, etc. Whether the moon is bigger than my foot is not down to my judgement, assessment, or evaluation. It's down to objective criteria. — Sapientia

"They" are the objects that we judge, sure. I'm saying, ontologically, judgements etc. are mental though. Without minds "comparisons" and the like don't exist. Of course without minds objects are "bigger" or "smaller" in size, for example (even though the whole idea of "bigger" or "smaller" doesn't make sense sans mental ideas of measurement). But there are no evaluations about that without minds. Measurements, standards, comparisons etc. is mental activity only. The whole concept of "bigger" or "smaller" is subjective because they refer to a mental construction for measuring/comparing objective phenomena. Criteria is subjective too.

And there we have it: the false missing premise. There's nothing stopping you from strictly using those words in that way, but that's not integral to their definition, nor are they always used like that. In fact, they're often not used like that, as when someone says something akin to my example. I do not mean to suggest that it is only my opinion that Usain Bolt is better than I am at the 100 metres. He really is, whether it's my opinion or not. — Sapientia

You mean with regards to the conventional definition, right? I don't know if I use the terms "better/worse" unconventionally then.

Two things you've helped me realise is that I didn't read the OP very carefully (I assumed the OP was discussing only one species of "judgment"); and also, that I wasn't very precise in what I meant by "judgments, assessments, evalutations, etc." with regards to "better" or "worse".

Moreover, my premise (2) is not false; it is true. "Better" or "worse" are judgments, which occur in minds. Judgments do not exist external to minds (where would we locate them if they did?). Which leads me onto...

There are at least two species of "judgments, assessments, evalutations, etc.":

(1) ones that attempt to match onto objective (i.e. external-to-mind) things, which might include measurements, comparisons, standards, etc.
(2) ones that do not match onto objective things, which include personal valuations or preferences/taste.

I was referring to (2) with my argument of "better" or "worse". I agree that we can, for example, judge objectively whether one person is faster at running the 100m than another; or whether an artist is more accurately able to represent a landscape than another artist. These are measurements that we can judge and compare as we can observe and measure their existence external to minds. What we can't do is apply that logic to things like personal preferences, as personal preferences do not exist external to minds. I tend to avoid using "better" or "worse" when it comes to (1) because therein confusion/lack of clarity lies.

So I would put your Usain Bolt example like this: "it is a fact that Usain Bolt is faster than I am at the 100 metres." "Better" is too vague to me for me to know in which sense you (or others) are using it (although to be fair, it would be helpful if I analysed comments better too!).

Furthermore, one could use "better" in the sense of (1) and say "Usain Bolt is faster than me when running the 100m". But "faster" does not mean "better" in the sense of (2). Someone might think slower is "better" in the sense of (2), for example.

If I read you right, things just are properties, and it/they are in continual motion, continually changing. This iincludes mental states (from above). — tim wood

Correct.

From above, I argued that a bucket of chemicals does not explain your taste in neckties. I think you're in the position of claiming that it does. Please make your case. — tim wood

With the proviso that "bucket of chemicals" refers to "biological properties"; mental states are brain states, and brain states are biological properties. "Taste" refers to one's personal preferences regarding phenomena. Preferences, judgements, evaluations, etc. are mental states.

I have agreed that at some sub-atomic level, we're all electronic whizzies in constant motion - that as underlying ground, but not account. In the sense that metal is the "ground" of an automobile engine, but not the account of it. It's up to you to tell us how the sub-atomic particles that make up steel, for example, have in themselves the ability to become the engine. Or how your intestines, for example, cause you to favour striped over solid neckties. — tim wood

I don't know why you'd think that intestines would cause one to favour neckties in the first place. It's the mind/brain that favours; the intestines can play a role though (if you're into eating neckties).

I'm not sure what you mean by "ground" and "account" there. Do you mean ontology of the engine (i.e. what kind of thing is it?) by "ground", and "explanation" for how the engine works re "account"?

Re the engine, the materials are fashioned by people to produce an engine, of course. It's not like the sub-atomic particles decide to become an engine. The functioning engine works within a system of other materials too--the gases and fuel, for example.

Regardless of whether or not your conclusion is true or false, it doesn't follow from that premise alone. So, do you have any missing premises? And, if so, can you reveal them? — Sapientia

I wasn't trying to forward a formal argument (I shouldn't have used the word "therefore"); but if I were, it'd go something like this (btw, "subjective" = mental, and "objective" = non-mental):

(1) judgements, assessments, evaluations, etc. are mental states
(2) "better" or "worse" are judgements, assessments, evaluations, etc.
(3) therefore, people/existents/things aren't non-mentally (objectively) "better" or "worse"

In order to have complete knowledge of your own consciousness you have to be able to observe yourself being conscious. — Purple Pond

The idea of "complete knowledge" of anything seems absurd to me.

So let's say that science has advanced so far that they can show detailed brain scans of a you when you are conscious. All they are showing you are images/models/brain-scans of you being conscious not the actual consciousness. The conscious you is beyond the capabilities of science by the very limits of observation. — Purple Pond

What you're talking about there is the difference between first-person experience and third-person experience of first-person experience. For example, first-person experience is your conscious experiences; third-person experience of first-person experiences might involve scientists perceiving brain scans or behaviour of your (first-person) conscious experiences. So I agree; I don't think it's possible for first-person experiences to be experienced by others. That's always going to be a scientific limitation.

The question is: Are some people better than others? The answer is simple (isn't it?) — Purple Pond

Yes, the answer is simple: judgements, assessments, evaluations, etc. are subjective. Therefore, people aren't objectively "better" or "worse"--you can't be correct/incorrect with regards to whether someone or something is "better" or not.

I think this collapses to "collections of chemicals/particles/etc" explain phenomena. If not, what am I misreading? — tim wood

It's your usage of the word "explain" there that I'm not clear about. I'd rather say that "collections of chemicals/particles/etc." are identical to phenomena. That's what phenomena is.

I read this as, "A thing is [comprises the] physical components/aspects of matter/things. — tim wood

Yes.

That reduces to a classical deterministic movement or a random quantum movement. Take your pick. — tim wood

That's a false dichotomy. There are (at least) three "picks": strict determinism (only one possibility or 100% probability), indeterminism (non-equiprobable probability), or "pure" randomness (equiprobability).

I credit you with being able to demonstrate the impossibility of such an account. — tim wood

That's question-begging.

If it's chemicals/particles, then you don't get to have subjective - there is no subjective. That's why regarding you as chemicals/particles "is not... useful... in terms of your human being." — tim wood

Eh? I was using "subjective" there just to clarify that explanations are subjective, since you wrote "the bucket of chemicals does not explain, for example, your taste in neckties." We/minds do the explaining between or regarding phenomena, not the things themselves. (Btw, subjective--the way I use the term--just refers to the location of the mental. Mental states are brain states. Brain states are collections of chemicals/particles/etc.)

Sure. But in this you affirm properties (as opposed to their functioning). If functioning is all there is, then what functions? You can have all the doing you want, but you have to have something doing the doing (which is neither properties nor functioning!). Properties and functions are different; they cannot be one and a many at the same time. — tim wood

I was just following the distinction that you were making between what something is and how something functions. The distinction is a conceptual one (i.e. conceptualism) that minds focus on with regards to "things". We can focus on what things are made of; we can focus on how things function--what we choose to focus on is subjective (occrring in minds). The functioning of properties is an instrinsic property of properties. In other words, functioning is just how particular things change/move. You can't have properties not functioning in some way. That goes for inert or non-living things like rocks too.

By the way, I lean more towards "bundle theory" than "substratum theory". That is, things are just bundles of properties (functioning in particular ways).

1) is problematic. What is a thing? What is change? — tim wood

A thing is (a) a collection of properties (b) moving/changing dynamically in particular ways (c) relative to other properties within a thing, and relative to other external things. Change is just motion or movement or processes. Since it's relevant, functioning is about how particular things change/move/behave.

2) is a claim without evidence or argument. To be is to be just that that does not change. — tim wood

The evidence is that when you look around things are changing/moving. Things decay. Things accelerate. Things disintegrate. Things develop, bloom, and wither. You can also see change occurring microscopically.

3) Properties are qualifications of the description of a thing - thing as yet undefined and it needs to be. The description is not the thing. — tim wood

No, ontologically, properties are physical components/aspects of matter/things.

You may not like my arguments, but there is enough in them to point you toward rethinking your own. — tim wood

Thanks for the condescension. What you have helped me do however is give me more incentive to elucidate my views, so I'm sincerely grateful for the questions you pose. Also, I wouldn't say I don't like your (or others') arguments; rather, I don't agree with them.

As a tub of guts, you're different from a human being, yes? No? I think - possibly in error - that you're arguing that tub-of-guts and human being are reducible to a one. Maybe in some aspects, for some purposes, but not essentially. Or do you say they're essentially the same? — tim wood

By "tub of guts" do you mean the biological properties of a human? Then yes--a human being is biological properties. I'm also not a realist when it comes to essentialism, in case you're inferring that. I'm a nominalist.

What you are is ten to fifteen gallons of chemicals, mostly water - or at least that's one way of looking at it. Not a useful way in terms of your human being. — tim wood

I don't agree, since, using your analogy, "taste" refers to brain states, and brain states are collections of chemicals/particles, in my view. (With the proviso that "explanations" are subjective.)

Also, "usefulness" is subjective. It might be useful, for example, just to ascertain the properties of matter that make-up human beings.

On the other hand, if we focus on how something works - behaves - the question arises as to what it is that works. — tim wood

Focusing on how something works/behaves is just focusing on how particular properties function.

But this offers no account of what changes or moves. It appears that some account of being comes first, then comes movement or change. On that account, though, we need an account of what change is. — tim wood

In my ontology, (a) all existents are continually changing/moving, and (b) change or motion are identical. In other words, to exist is to change. Existents are collections of properties. So properties are what change. For example, small particles are changing on a micro level, and larger objects (as a collection of particles) are changing on a macro level.

We could call that spirit — tim wood

Why would we call what changes "spirit"?

The difference between an ontological claim and an ontological commitment is what, as far as you understand it?

Firstly, some ontological claims are identical with ontological commitments. That's why I wrote "where claims/proposals don't necessarily equate with commitments."

Ontological claims can be logical propositions about stuff that don't need to be committed to. For example, "I propose that based on model x and model y, String Theory could be true, but I'm not making an ontological commitment to it being true. String Theory could be true; it could also be false."

Ontological claims that aren't made from this logical perspecitve are identical to ontological commitments, which require a belief that some thing is the case, and it's not just a proposal one is considering or holding as a counterfactual, for example.

How it works, or how it is? Are these the same thing? Does working reduce to being? Or vice versa? — tim wood

In my view, everything is constantly in relative flux with other things (on a macro and micro level). So some x "working" or "being" in particular ways are identical ways of describing states of change or motion. It obviously depends on what you or others mean by "working" and "being"; but I interpret your initial questions (in the quote) as asking, ontologically, "how do things exist/behave?"

I was wondering, if "I exist" sole on the basis of thinking (all realms of thinking), how would I know that I'm think or what if something is controlling my thinking. — dakota

What would be a good reason to believe that "something is controlling" your thinking? Just because something is possible doesn't mean that's a good reason to believe it's true.

Also, we have very good reasons to believe that thinking beings (like humans) exist. It would be incoherent to believe that something that thinks does not exist, since thinking is an existent state.

(1) The criteria or standard to evaluate the moral value (goodness or badness) of an act is justice.

Criteria or standards are mental.

(4) If the criteria to evaluate the moral value of an act is justice, and justice is objective, then morality is objective.

Criteria, evaluation, and value are subjective (i.e. occurring in minds only).

I look at it this way. Science and philosophy, while sharing some similarities, are methodologically distinct: the former is generally more experimental, and the latter generally more analytical.

According to their (constructed) models, some scientists make ontological/metaphysical commitments and some make ontological/metaphysical claims (where claims/proposals don't necessarily equate with commitments). Both approaches (commitments or claims) can still allow for practical development in science. This is because there can be instrumental value (i.e. instrumentalism) in how commitments/claims help develop ideas and outcomes, regardless of whether the commitments/claims are ontologically true.

We're using seeing as a metaphor for all perceiving. — tim wood

We were initially, but then it became important for me to make distinctions between other senses, for the sake of clarity.

In sum, perception is always deficient with respect to what is there. — tim wood

This seems to presume that efficient or non-deficient perception would allow the perceiver to perceive all aspects of the tree (of an x) from all perspectives as well as all perspectives throughout the history of the tree--simultaneously. This is nonsensical though. That is the view-from-nowhere; the privileged perspective that I've been criticising. The reason it's nonsense (in my ontology) is that perspectives are neccesarily perspectival i.e. from particular frames of reference. There cannot be a perspective from everywhere in all those senses. That would imply that that privileged perspective is identical to all of the properties inherent in the tree simultaneously and throughout time. This is God's eye-view. You'd need to be all the facts of that tree. Plus, since things are constantly changing (in my ontology), the properties are never "complete", but always developing/changing. So you'd have to have that "God's eye-view" until the tree changed into another material structure to accommodate your claim.

Are you arguing that the appearance of things is how they really are? — tim wood

I am saying that, barring illusionary phenomena that don't correspond with the (objective) phenomena we try to perceive, the phenomena is the noumena.

Can you think of anything at all that you're willing to say is identical to your perception of it? — tim wood

Again, I'm not sure whether you're conflating the external-to-mind thing being perceived and the perception of it by the perceiver. What's possible is that my perception of an x is perpectival to that x (i.e. from a particular position relative to that x). It doesn't make sense to literally say that my perception of some x is identical to that x. It's a relational matter, not an identity matter.

Two problems: 1) perception is always deficient, never complete (that it may be complete with respect to some criteria is not to the point, here), and 2) perception is always through a set of filters, that you call our mental apparatus: therefore and thereby, the perception is filtered. — tim wood

With regards to your two problems:

(1) As I mentioned above, it's nonsensical to believe that perception can be complete. And that's not what I'm claiming.

(2) It depends what you mean by "filtered" there; I wouldn't use "filtered" in the Kantian sense of mental faculties. I'd say our mental processing allows for particular experiences from a particular perspective relative to whatever x we're perceiving. That means that perception is necessarily biased and subjective.

More to the point, we can all agree the tree is green, and a scientist can give an account for how green works. But at its core this is just a consensus and a naming. But there is never anything that says that your experience of green just is, or is like, my experience of green. This surfaces where people disagree about their likes and dislikes. — tim wood

Logically, it's possible that if humans' mental apparatus is structured and functions in similar ways, that our experience of some x under particular lighting will be perceived in similar ways.

Your argument that both practical and scientific knowledge are equal as products of indirect realism is challenging, until one recognizes that the language is off. — tim wood

I'm claiming that if indirect realism is true, then practical and scientific knowledge (any knowledge whatsoever) is relegated only to speculation about externals. In other words, if indirect realism is true, then any information one obtains from the external world can only ever be speculative at best.

I don't know what you mean by this sentence: "Nothing is a product of indirect realism." Indirect realism is just a theory of perception. If you believe in that theory, then you have to maintain that no knowledge/perception of externals is directly possible.

We do agree on the practical aspect of things. Green is green. The tree is a tree. To me this just means that the world's work can get done, and that the work is done within and with respect to appropriate parameters. — tim wood

The problem with that view is that I believe the work that we can "get done" is based on more or less accurate information about the world, whereas you'd have to maintain that your information is only speculative at best.

Part of the reason is that often enough we find that how things appear, isn't really how they are. — tim wood

That's too ambiguous a claim for me to be able to address.

What happened to your response to my question: "What would "exactly accurate" refer to? What does it mean to have an "exactly accurate" image to a thing itself?" In other words, what would need to be possible for this obtain?

People have a problem with Kant because they don't understand him. — tim wood

Some people have a problem with his views because they aren't reasonable.

They suppose he's saying you cannot know anything about the world because of the idea of noumena, and how can he then talk about knowing the world if he's already argued that it cannot be known. — tim wood

Btw, I understand that Kant is not saying externals don't exist because we can't access them without our mental faculties. For Kant, the whole of idea of "noumena" presumes that objects exist ("things that appear"); and the whole idea of "phenomena" ("the appearance of things") is that those objects appear to the mind in particular ways (due to the "rules" or structure of the mind). So you cannot know "ultimate reality", but you can know a mental construct (in the form of sense data and mental faculties) regarding noumena that are perceived as phenomena.

The other kind is practical knowledge, which is not so constrained. Never for a moment does he doubt that - or argue against - the tree is a tree, or that it is as it appears. From the standpoint of science, Gewissenschaft, he requires that science give a scientific account of the tree as tree, not as a pratical matter, but as a scientific matter. And he finds that science, because it works from perception/appearances, cannot. — tim wood

This distinction doesn't change the view that both practical and scientific knowledge occur via indirect realism. If we only have indirect access to externals, it follows that both practical (or common-sense) knowledge and scientific knowledge (or any knowledge at all!) are unable to access externals directly. So as practical knowledge, "the tree is a tree" is still just sense data in the same way that "the tree is a tree" is sense data via scientific means. In other words, we can only attain knowledge via perception/appearances, whether that's practical or scientific knowledge. But in that way, we can only know the appearance of noumena, and not as they "really" are. Here Kant is assuming that the appearance of things IS distinct from how things really are. I don't think he has any good reasons to support that view though.

Maybe here I can open the clam. I can observe/perceive - see - the tree only in so far as I can see it. If it has an ultraviolet or infrared "signature," I won't see it. — tim wood

Yes.

And to be sure, what I do see is just my seeing of it. — tim wood

I just want to clarify what you mean by this because I'm not sure what you're saying here. I read that as "I am perceiving myself perceiving some x". If that's the case, it doesn't make sense as one can't actually perceive oneself perceiving something unless one is using a mirror. You can be aware that you're perceiving some x though.

It seems to me an unwarranted assumption that my seeing somehow is the same as the thing itself. — tim wood

Again, just to clarify: seeing something is not identical to the object being seen. The former occurs in the mind, the latter is what the mind is perceiving.

As a scientific matter, concerning the tree as it really is in itself, then I don't. — tim wood

Again, I don't really see how this distinction makes a difference if you're an indirect realist, as I argued above.

Kant presumes that we perceive reality via appearances in the form of sense data (indirect realism). Plus, Kant believes that our minds make reality conform to its structure. So again, we can't begin to verify how externals are "really" like since our minds impose and construct major features of reality that are not identical to reality.

This means that we can only make sense out of the appearances of things and not the actual things that appear. We can access the phenomena as phenomena, but not without our mental faculties, which impose "rules" onto noumena and cause them to appear as phenomena.

If you buy sense data, then you cannot check to verify whether your sense data matches externals. The whole enterprise of science and empirical observation is obstructed/prevented from this position. The best you could do is make guesses about what externals are like, with no method or possibility of experiencing them directly to check whether they match your guesses.

But is the tree really green? — tim wood

Bear in mind that I don't agree with indirect realism, and I don't think noumena is different than phenomena (with the proviso that the phenomena isn't illusory and thus is the noumena).

With that in mind, any object that is perceived is perceived from a particular perspective/frame of reference, and with a particular mental apparatus. There are no privileged perspectives (which is how I interpret the claim that to know the noumena, one has to perceive it from a view-from-nowhere...a privileged perspective--as the subjective, mental faculties won't do). So for instance, the tree is "really" green from Person A's perspective; and "really" a similar "kind" of green from Person B's perspective; and "really" a lighter shade of green from Person B's perspective; and "really" blue from Person C's perspective (e.g. from that perspective, maybe the lighting is different); and "really" greyish from a particular dog's perspective, and so on.

By "mental apparatus" I'm thinking you mean mind. — tim wood

Yes. Just to clarify, we also have a sensory apparatus that detects externals/light-as-external/etc. Perception involves the combination of sensory and mental apparatus. Knowledge is mental only.

By "knowledge experience" I'm thinking you mean just that which is the reflection/awareness/consciousness of the experience - or that which is added to the experience-in-itself that makes it intelligible to consciousness - or something along these lines. — tim wood

Yes, more or less.

But the perception of the touching. Therein lies the problem. In this sense touching is like seeing. — tim wood

It's just employing two different "modes" of perception simultaneously: touching and seeing.

You're defining seeing, and touching, as the entire process, and presupposing that what ends up in your mind is what's out there. — tim wood

"Seeing" and "touching" is just referring to the process of experiencing some object via two "modes" of perception.

And again, saying stuff like "what ends up in your mind is what's out there" confuses/gets wrong what's actually going on, in my view. None of the tree is ending up in your mind when you touch or see the tree. Your sensory apparatuses properties and your mind's properties is being affected by the tree's properties (when touching) and the light's properties interacting with the tree and your mind (when seeing).

What we have learned to call a tree is out there. All we have to work with is perception of the tree (whether by seeing or touch or any other sense) - in short, an image. — tim wood

Like a mental construct of sorts?

I suppose the image is more-or-less accurate within the limits of my perception; I do not suppose it is the thing perceived (nor do you, I gather), — tim wood

I take it you're a representative realist? As I've said, I'm a direct realist. In my view, we perceive observables directly. We do not perceive an image/mental construct of what is supposedly an observable. If that were the case, we wouldn't even begin to be able to verify whether our mental construct or "image" (if that's how you're using it) matches the "thing itself". Which means the representative realist holds a solipsistic position.

nor do I suppose my image is exactly accurate, with respect to the thing - the tree - itself. — tim wood

What would "exactly accurate" refer to? What does it mean to have an "exactly accurate" image to a thing itself?

It's that "direct experience" that's throwing me. The only way I make sense of it is if the "observables" are the raw material of the perception, before it is put into order by the mind - but in no way to be confused with the thing itself. In this sense we do have direct experience of the "observables": we create them! As to direct experience of the tree, I'm with Kant (as I understand him): as a practical matter the tree is green and leafy and rough to the touch, and if it's a pine then it has a distinctive smell, and so on. And I don't doubt that the tree really is this way. — tim wood

The observables are the facts/states of affairs that we observe/perceive. The whole act of experiencing some object/observable is "processual", so what we are perceiving is continually being processed and changing/affecting our mental experience of some object/observable, moment by moment (as long as we're observing it, of course). Processing/experiencing a fact/observable/object is just our mental apparatus/phenomena (like qualia) interacting with external phenomena (like trees). So we don't actually create the external phenomena. Rather, our minds are causally affected by and process external phenomena via our mental apparatus.

As to knowing it in scientific sense, then no. — tim wood

By "scientific" I take it you mean empirical observations in lieu of theoretical/hypothetical support?

I think we can know things empirically (in the knowledge by acquaintance sense) since I buy direct realism.

(Btw, all experience is from a perspective; there is no "view-from-nowhere" experience or knowledge of some x.)

You offer an account: something that was outside comes inside, as qualia (fix this if I'm wrong), and the qualia - the "what it's like to see red" - is(?) the knowledge. Is that it? — tim wood

Using "inside" and "outside" like that I think confuses things. It's rather that properties of light (that are interacting with properties of the book) are interacting with properties of one's eye/retina, which in turn cause changes in the nerves that then cause changes in the visual system, and so on. The qualia refers only to the properties of the mental apparatus processing the environment in this case. And I'd say that the sensorial, perceptual, and acquaintance knowledge experience is not identical to the propositional knowledge one can infer from the experience.

There was a time when there was a "projectionist" theory of perception. As you recognize above, people realized that we don't actually see the tree. — tim wood

That's not what I said, nor implied; at least, that's certainly not what I intended to say/imply. "Seeing" a tree is identical to properties of light interacting with properties of the tree interacting with one's eye and causing particular changes in one's mind. "Seeing" does not refer to anything else (for instance, the tree actually touching one's eye). Touching the tree with one's hand is another way of perceiving in which properties of the tree interact with the properties of one's hand which cause changes to one's skin, nervous system, etc. I wouldn't say that touching the tree with one's hand isn't touching the actual tree.

So I find two flaws in the notion of qualia as an account of knowledge. 1) That qualia is the experience of what it's like to experience something (clearly not the experience itself, or the experience of the thing itself). And 2) even if it were, then how does it become knowledge. That is, how does the qualia itself establish knowledge and understanding? — tim wood

As per your (1), the qualia is the experience of some objective/external phenomena (provided that the phenomena in question is not illusory like, say, a projection of any object in question). "Experience" is synonymous with "mental experience", in my view. (2) In a nutshell, as we develop, observe, and "absorb" external phenomena, our minds learn to organise/classify different phenomena into abstract categories of experience. "Qualia" allow us the "material" (i.e. the experiences) from which we make sense of reality.

We can't both have and not have direct experience of externals. We agree we can't (we don't see the tree itself). Because we can't, we can't know about the world. — tim wood

Again, see my comment above: we have direct experience of observables; it's just not in the way you think qualifies as direct experience. Let me put this another way by asking you a question: what would need to occur for you to believe we have direct experience of observables...of say, a tree?

#2 isn't quite right. What colour is the book if you turn out the lights, or if you're using a sodium lamp, and so forth? The point is that what you get from the book is reflected light, but nothing of the book itself. — tim wood

Yes, I agree. As you say, this is not a case of the actual book touching one's mental apparatus; the book is not actually touching my eye. What is touching my eye are the properties of light interacting with the both the book's properties and the properties of my mental apparatus.

People may agree that the book is red, but what does that tell us about red in-itself? — tim wood

By "red in-itself" do you mean noumena?

For example, you say, "What would existents look/be like without properties?" I know what you mean. The trouble is that the remark, which I think makes perfect sense most of the time, doesn't make sense here. — tim wood

I'm not sure whether you do know what I mean. If properties are identical to existents, then how can existents exist without properties?

This begins to look like the pre-Kant problem: if what you know is in your head, then how can you know about the world? If it's in the world (I.e., empirical/observational) then how can you know how it works? I say pre-Kant problem, because Kant resolved it. — tim wood

I think we have direct perception of observables (I'm a naive realist). In other words, we experience externals (i.e. objective/external-to-mind objects) directly. We can make inferences from that direct experience, and that's how we can know about the world.

Sore, you decree this from above, with no explanation. Why not, explanations are totally subjective. — tom

If you'd like an explanation just ask. Whether or not you'll accept that explanation is another matter.

Re "you decree this from above", I don't consider my views superior or anything like that. Maybe you think that because my claim seems to challenge or disagree with your views. "Explanations" just seem to be facts in my view though. I'm just stating what my ontological belief is with regards to explanations.

Meanwhile in reality, explanations of a certain broad category may be tested and compared objectively, by experiment. The other class of explanations may be criticised and compared using objective criteria like the one I gave earlier. — tom

How are you using "objective" there? I use it to refer to location: "objective" is everything that is not mental; "subjective" is everything that is mental. Explanations occur in minds; it's not something that non-minds do. Otherwise, you'd have to tell me where we would find explanations that occur in the world that are not mental. The same with "criteria": where in the world do criteria occur/originate from?

I'm sorry, but there are objective criteria regarding what makes a good explanation, and what makes one explanation better than the other. In fact, we have a rather well-developed method for deciding between explanations. It's called science.

Here's the objective criterion as to whether an explanation is good/bad: An explanation is good/bad if it is hard/easy to vary while still accounting for what it purports to account for. — tom

I agree that criteria can exist objectively in the sense of text or sounds. But the source of the criteria comes from minds. And again, what makes something "good" or "bad" re evaluative claims is subjective. Adhering to "objective criteria" (in the sense that I'm using) doesn't necessarily correlate with the criteria getting ontological facts right. That's why I tend to use an instrumentalist approach, at least with respect to unobservables and strictly mathematical theories.

Question: what exactly do you mean by qualia? — tim wood

By "qualia" I mean "what it's like to experience some phenomena", that is, the qualities of an experience. See "(1)" under "1. Uses of the Term 'Qualia'": https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/#Uses

The book is red. Completely ordinary and unremarkable statement, but the way we're looking at it we have to question it. Where is the red? What is (the) red? There are three questions to be asked and not just the third one that you ask. Is it? What is it? And qualia, what kind is it? — tim wood

What makes the book "red":

(1) specific properties intrinsic in the book (e.g. the molecules, atoms); (2) those specific properties actually interacting with the properties of our mental apparatus (e.g. our eyes, retina, nerve cells, etc.); (3) the changes in our mind caused by the interaction in (2) (e.g. within the occipital lobe, other brain/mental processes). We then (can also) infer "the colour red" as distinct from other colours based on experience (obviously).

With regards to this process, "qualia" is involved in (2) and (3).

Red seems to be a something. I, myself, have no idea what. What do you say red is? The question is, is it something in itself? Does red exist? I think maybe it doesn't. — tim wood

So "red" is the name we give to a particular (qualitative, i.e. "qualia") experience which involves a dynamic process involving the properties of some object that causes our minds to make specific changes.

What are properties? — tim wood

For example, the book is a composite of particular molecules that are dynamically and constantly interacting (i.e. constantly changing). In other words, some properties include atoms, particular sets of atoms (molecules), the way those atoms/molecules relate/interact with each other, and that dynamic interaction is constantly in motion, i.e. "changing".

How do you know there are properties? — tim wood

Because it doesn't make sense to me to think that existents aren't just a "bundle" of properties interacting. What would existents look/be like without properties?

And it doesn't do to just "disagree" with the planet's greatest thinkers. — tim wood

It's not as if I haven't thought about what the so-called "greatest thinkers" have claimed before disagreeing. Btw, "greatest" is subjective.

No. I mean that their ideas, their arguments, have to be dealt with. If you dismiss them out-of-hand, well, you can, but your arguments can't. — tim wood

I agree that dealing with their arguments can be productive in a variety of ways, such as understanding the historical roots of particular views, learning to argue philosophically, learning to think critically, etc.

But that's just the thing: you seem to be assuming that I am dismissing their views "out-of-hand" as if I haven't digested, researched, argued or thought about their views before. That's not the case. I am open to being challenged, to my views being inaccurate. But I'm not just going to assume the supposed "greatest thinkers" are correct just because you or others consider them as authoritatively infallible. Otherwise it seems that you're committing the argument from authority fallacy.

No. It looks like you're missing the point of taking an intuitive approach. You seem to be assuming that only an analytical approach could warrant disagreement. — Noble Dust

I'm happy to be corrected. What is the point of taking an intuitive approach in your view?

Btw, the reason I made that assumption was because I thought "the destination" was synonymous with a conclusion that you already had in mind prior to opening the thread. That's kind of what I meant by "destination". But maybe you meant something different.

Correct. Within the context of this thread, the destination would be "a view of the beauty of humanity which humans themselves cannot see, in the same way that humans see a certain beauty in bird which birds themselves cannot see." — Noble Dust

I see. So essentially what you wanted from this thread was others to understand, agree or share similar views re beauty within a macrocosmic hierarchy, and revel or admire/appreciate being at that "destination" with you. Is that right?

Or rather, the destination (instead of route in my reply) — Noble Dust

Ok. So if I took an intuitive route, I would more likely arrive at the same or similar destination as you. Do you have in mind what the destination what be or look like?

I can't imagine how you could have. — Noble Dust

Right. So it's as though my taking a specific route (analytic, in this case) towards some destination would lead me astray. Whereas maybe taking a different route (an intuitive one) would lead me somewhere more specific. Is that right?

It seems to come down to the fact that you're taking an analytical approach, while I'm not. I think your analysis would probably indicate that you're more correct from an analytical standpoint. But the whole concept that I presented is both aesthetic/artistic and intuitive (as well as open to analysis, as everything of course is); so the same goes for my intuitive approach; I've gone into detail about it from that angle, and you haven't responded within an intuitive approach at all, whereas I've attempted to interface with your analytical approach. My approach begins with intuition, not with analysis. Good discussion though, I'm not trying to shut it down, feel free to continue. — Noble Dust

Let me ask you this: would it have made any difference if I had arrived at (more or less) the same conclusions via a more intuitive route?

That's sure a get-out-of-jail-free card, for anything whatever. 'Works for me!' — Wayfarer

First off, it's a fact that "explanations" are subjective. There are no objective criteria for what counts as a correct/incorrect or right/wrong "explanation".

Secondly, it's not simply a dismissive and self-reinforcing belief with regards to explanations serving my (or anyone's) needs, as you seem to believe. For example, it's not as if I haven't been challenged on my views; it's not as if I haven't developed my views that support my explanations. For me, it comes down to whether the reasoning for my views is "good" (which is also subjective). It's not as if you would be excluded/exempt from this fact; in other words, it's not as if you don't think "works for me!" with regards to your "good" reasons and explanations.