Sure, we are maximally similar to other human beings, but we are also similar to rocks in a whole load of ways. We still need a principle to tell us when we can make the inference and when we can't. Do you have a way to decide? — bert1

There are degrees of similarity with regards to (bio)chemical composition and functionality. Rocks are less similar than humans in this regard.

Are you fishing for certainty with regards to "needing a principle" to make inferences about where consciousness is located?

It doesn't follow that all subjective experiences are dependent on a functioning brain, for example. A rock's experiences are presumably similarly correlated with its own internal processes. We have not discovered what it is about brains that entails that only brains can have experiences, and nothing else can. — bert1

Brains are made of different materials than rocks, and that is one good reason why rocks don't "experience" consciousness relative to brains. Brains are composed of particular materials interacting in particular ways relative to other stuff in the universe. And we only discover consciousness at the locations where brains are present.

Ok, thanks for answering.

So would it make sense to say then that ontologically influence is an indeterminer, i.e indeterministic?

Re

Influences are not the same thing as causal determinants.

What's influence ontologically? Or, what's the difference between causal determinants and influence ontologically?

To what extent is it 'valid' to say: Their forms are different, but in essence they are both just marble. — rachMiel

It's true to say that since the two separate "forms" are made of the same "kind" of stuff.

Let's say you've got two blocks of pure Carrara marble. One is carved into an exquisite sculpture by a master artist. The other is left untouched.

To what extent is it valid to say: They are simply different forms of marble. — rachMiel

I think it's true that they are two different forms or pieces of marble. All existents/objects are different from one another. With regards to resemblance, existents/objects are always on a degree/spectrum between similarity and difference and never identity.

Personally I think that all thinking is involuntary - that they are induced within cause and effect. — raza

Do you have any good reason(s) for why that is the case? Another question would be, do you have any good reason(s) for why free will is not the case and (strict) determinism is true?

For example, prior to the work of Maxwell and Hertz, electromagnetic radiation was non-physical, but became physical as a result of the knowledge that they generated. — johnpetrovic

The problem with that comment is that "electromagnetic radiation" was never non-physical, it was merely discovered to be physical. Unknown entities/processes do not entail non-physical entities/processes. You're conflating epistemological issues with ontological issues there.

While studying this question I ran across Parfit who argues, roughly, that human thoughts (where our math, morality and fiction are developed) map to physical entities in our mind through neuron patterns and such, and thereby exist in the ontological sense. Although these concepts would not exist in the universe without minds, that fact makes them no less real than sun rays, which would not exist without suns. — Read Parfit

I agree with that.

Once we grant thoughts themselves an ontological status, the next question becomes, can we apply objective criteria to the claims expressed by these thoughts? — Read Parfit

I don't think "objective criteria" makes sense, since criteria is necessarily subjective. We can produce criteria that we measure objective (i.e. external-to-mind) things against though, if that's what you mean.

How are the concepts expressed in the rules of Math, different from the concept of Pegasus? — Read Parfit

Mathematical concepts are based on a formal axiomatic system whereas concepts like Pegasus aren't.

What is a mental state? — Banno

States are just a particular set of processes (occurring subjectively or objectively). We come to identify and experience states that are familiar and occur regularly, and we tend to label them for our own practical utility. A mental state is a subjective phenomenon occurring at a particular moment in time.

Is it just experiencing Mental phenomena such as beliefs, desires, intentions , and sensations? — Banno

Yes.

Is it analogous to a physical state? How - what do mental and physical states have in common that makes them both states... That they only last for a limited time? — Banno

Mental states are physical states. Everything is always changing/in flux, and so everything/event/process is temporary.

A simple question - what is the neurological basis for the subconscious or unconscious mind? — EnPassant

"Mind" conventionally refers to awareness or consciousness. Nonconscious "mind" (i.e. nonconscious consciousness) is at least semantically incoherent. Ontologically, I don't think there's any good reason to believe that conscious processes can also be nonconscious processes, although it's logically possible, although we have yet to discover empirical evidence of this.

Further, mental phenomena like beliefs and feelings aren't the same kind of things as non-mental phenomena (i.e. nonconscious processes). Non-mental phenomena can influence or be influenced by mental phenomena, however.

(It is questions like this that convince me that neurology is not going to explain what the mind is.) — EnPassant

I think we already have a very good understanding about what the mind is and some of its functions.

emotional motivations that are not understood by the conscious mind. Sometimes people act without understanding their motivations. That seems to be a kind of unconscious mind. — EnPassant

Emotional motivations are a mixture of nonconscious processes (autonomic nervous system processes) and conscious processes (somatic nervous system processes). "Emotional motivations that are not understood by the conscious mind" would come under automatic or habitual behaviour along with conscious awareness of immediate/non-immediate assessments/interpretations and (re)actions.

I also think that although people believe that they aren't aware of their habitual or emotional reactions or reasons for reacting emotionally in a particular situation, that they just haven't been able to coherently understand their role and their thought/behavioural patterns in (a) given situation(s). I think they are aware of why they're reacting in the moment that they are reacting, but the information is processed very quickly and often chaotically (disorganised), and they don't tend to reflect much on it consequently to help make sense of it. So it feels or seems like a subconscious system is operating under awareness, but I don't think that's the case.

How deep/close is the relationship between an object and its most fundamental building block?

Let's say X is an object and Y is its fundamental building block, where any part of X could be broken down entirely into Ys (but no further).

Does it make sense to say: "X is really just Y" ? — rachMiel

I'd say that objects are identical to all the properties that comprise them. So the answer to your question is an identity relationship: X is Y. But bear in mind that all of the Ys are non-identical (i.e. nominalism), and the way they interact with each other makes X what it is.

1. So do "you", as the thinker, voluntarily generate a thought? — raza

I can voluntarily generate (some) thoughts, yes.

2. If so, how and why do you do this? — raza

To reflect, plan, make decisions, etc. I do it mainly by concentrating or focusing on specific aims or goals, e.g. I want to modify my CV, so I will have to think about what aspects of my current CV need updating.

2a. Do "you", as the thinker, generate an involuntary thought? — raza

The "you" there can be misleading. I am not voluntarily generating an involuntary thought; that's a contradiction. Involuntary thoughts arise and I become aware of them, and I can subsequently voluntarily act upon them, e.g. pay them attention, dismiss them, etc.

4. If not, what DOES generate an involuntary thought within "you", the thinker? — raza

Nonconscious processes that are triggered by internal and/or external stimuli. Voluntarily thoughts can also trigger involuntary thoughts.

5. If "you" the thinker does NOT generate an involuntary thought, does it still not remain that an involuntary thought is still being regarded as a "thought"? — raza

Yes. Any phenomena that one is aware of that constitutes thinking is a thought. Thoughts cannot be nonconscious though.

6. If an "involuntary thought" is thereby a result of thinking then what or who is the thinker of it? — raza

The person it is happening for/to.

7. Is the thinker of an "involuntary thought" you (the "thinker" of thoughts)? — raza

Yes.

Personally I think that all thinking is involuntary - that they are induced within cause and effect. — raza

So you don't believe in free will then?

All you have done here is used a category as a point on a spectrum. "Passive" is merely a point on a spectrum, the entire spectrum being "action". — raza

My point was that being aware of something is not necessarily a voluntary act.

What is interesting is that people, maybe you included, identify themselves as a thinker of thoughts.

However, As we have established, thoughts are involuntary — raza

Just to clarify, I said some thoughts are involuntary, not all.

What is it, though, that is surviving? — raza

A biological organism/entity, to put it broadly.

All these survival applications will still be involuntary because it will involve acts that were generated by thoughts which involuntarily arose. — raza

Some "applications" are involuntary, and some are voluntary.

My argument is that one is what is occurring.

It is impossible to be one without what is occurring and it is impossible for there to be any occurrence without one. — raza

I'm not sure I understand. I'd put it like this: to be or to exist is to "occur" or be to undergoing processes.

My point is that that identity, this "I, is not what it is in actuality. — raza

I certainly don't agree with that.

One cannot be a thing other than what is occurring. — raza

One cannot not be a thing occurring as a thing occurring.

Trying to find a label or box for myself is not something which interests me.

My words are my words. — raza

Well, in order to communicate it's important to find some common ground. Communication can be tricky in the first place. Otherwise, you may as well just argue with yourself. Anyway, you describing yourself as an "actualist" is labelling yourself. It's actually unavoidable to not label or organise experience. We need to do it to survive. But we can be aware that we're doing it, and realise that labels aren't the thing that they're labelling.

What do you mean "act upon"? Surely a thought perceived is always "acted upon". The act could be a dismissive action. — raza

For example, I am aware of the wind blowing on my face. I did not choose to notice that. I became aware of it in a passive sense. I can choose to act upon that sensation consequently, but that's not what I'm referring to here.

Are arising thoughts therefore "nonconscious brain states" due to the fact they arise involuntarily? — raza

No, thoughts are mental/conscious only. Thoughts being involuntary is not identical to nonconscious activity/states.

Thoughts arise involuntarily, do they not? — raza

Some do, yes. Some thoughts are voluntarily "produced".

Only either immediately or if it has been kept on ice.

Is a detached ear still an ear if it is re-attached surgically onto a leg (just to maintain blood supply to it)?

My point is about the use terms used to represent what is actually occurring rather than merely symbolic language.

An ear attached to a leg is no longer an ear. It has lost it's "ear" function. — raza

Sure, that's to do with the function of an ear. But functionality is just one criteria that people connote to different things. An arm can still be an arm even if its past functioning has stopped, because the criteria for being an arm to one might not involve or include arm functionality.

An actualist. An observer of what is obvious. No physical thing exists if it is not perceived. — raza

That's conflating epistemology with ontology. Do you understand? Knowledge of X does not determine or equate with actuality of X. By the way, you say "actualist", but that rather sounds like an idealist position: https://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_idealism.html

"Idealism is the metaphysical and epistemological doctrine that ideas or thoughts make up fundamental reality. Essentially, it is any philosophy which argues that the only thing actually knowable is consciousness (or the contents of consciousness), whereas we never can be sure that matter or anything in the outside world really exists. Thus, the only real things are mental entities, not physical things (which exist only in the sense that they are perceived)."

The entire body is in the same "location" to exist. Remove the head the body also dies and vice versa. — raza

I wasn't saying anything about death. My comment was to do with identity, i.e. a mind being identical to brain.

Are you therefore saying "mind" refers to will? — raza

Yes, but not limited to will. We sometimes have automatic thoughts that we can just be aware of; or sense/perceive things without necessarily acting upon those experiences.

Is a severed human arm still an arm or is it a piece of human meat? — raza

A human arm can be attached or detached from the rest of the human body. The arm itself hasn't changed.

A non conscious brain state? You mean a dead mind or brain? — raza

No. Nonconscious brain states are involuntary brain processes that involve regulating breathing, hear rate, balance, sensory and motor functions, etc.

Yes. One phenomena. Brain and mind, not brain and then, over there, a mind.

Just as a living body is essentially a body-mind. — raza

I'm not sure whether we're on the same page, but I'll just say that brain and mind are identical. They share the same location.

A thing (as in “every thing”) does not exist unless it arises within the mental. — raza

You're conflating epistemology with ontology there, unless you're an idealist. Are you an idealist?

What must be the case in order to successfully lie to yourself?

Simple enough question. But hard to answer. — Moliere

If by "successfully" you mean "genuinely", then I don't think it's possible to lie to oneself. You either believe A about X in situation Z or you don't. You can try to persuade or convince yourself to believe B about Y in situation Z even though you still genuinley believe A about X in situation Z. You can try to avoid thinking about, acknowledging, or denying a belief, but that's not the same as lying.

Lying involves holding a view about X as true but presenting it as false.

Mind and brain, however, is an idea. A mental construct. — raza

You're conflating the idea of "mind and brain" with a real/actual mind and brain. There are actual organs that we call "minds/brains"--they're not just ideas, unless you're an idealist.

They cannot be distinct from each other in any scientific way. — raza

Wrong. They are distinct in that minds are a type of brain state, i.e. minds are conscious states (as opposed to non-conscious brain states). There is a ton of evidence to demonstrate this.

Hence the contradiction above. — raza

Can you point out the contradiction?

Sure, maybe another time.

We are drifting off topic a bit, However, I would agree with the 'both realities' idea, however I suspect that what ultimately differentiates the two, is that one is temporal and the other is not. — Marcus de Brun

Ok, I disagree. But it seems that you'd prefer things to stay on topic (as in, you'd prefer to discuss this topic around the belief that temporal reality obtains externally only) so I won't go there.

Epistemology is all about certainty, not “Truth”. — Kaiser Basileus

No. Epistemology is about the nature of knowledge and how we acquire it.

we are assuming a temporal external reality independent of the individual consciousness. — Marcus de Brun

I believe that too. I'm a realist. But I'd also say that both internal and external "realities" are temporal (in other words, reality is temporal, period).

Where is trauma located? Does it lies in the brain which affects the mind or does it lies in the mind which affects the brain? — WhiteDreams

As in psychological trauma? It occurs in the brain. The mind is identical to the brain, namely, the aspect of the brain that is aware or conscious (conventionally, "mind" is synonymous with "consciousness"). I believe that trauma like any (or most?) psychological experience involves both nonconscious and conscious brain activity.

If trauma lies in the brain, and hypothetically, the mind can be a tangible object which can be transferred to a different brain, will the scar of trauma still be there together with the mind? — WhiteDreams

If that were possible, then the rewiring might affect how the trauma is re-experienced, if it's re-experienced at all.

If it is so, vice versa, then if the tangible mind is transferred to a traumatize brain, say, a brain with PTSD, will the mind acquire PTSD too? — WhiteDreams

Same as above.

Are there 'ever lasting truths'? If given enough time, will all truths as we know them today ultimately become fallacy? — Marcus de Brun

Truths, falsehoods, beliefs, etc. as mental phenomena only last as long as the mind conceiving/claiming them. What those truths/beliefs pick out in reality may change, whether perceiving and conceiving minds last or not.

“Experience” is mental only? What is therefore beyond the “mental”? — raza

Every thing (or all things) that is not mental is "beyond the mental."

“Experience”, in my view, is electrical. Some call it “chemical”. — raza

Yes, mental phenomena is electro-chemical, and experience is mental phenomena.

But I do not see where a boundary lies where “mental” is on one side and something else on the other. — raza

The boundary is the boundary of the brain.

So what is the “something else” which apparently isn’t “mental”? — raza

The "something else" is the stuff that the mental experiences.

What is it that is being aware of the pc? A “mental” something? — raza

Yes, a mind.

I say the language is accurate “I am sitting at my pc” because it is accepted as the appropriate form of sentence structure for disseminating that information.

Just because it is accurate in that way does not mean that is what actually occurred. — raza

You mean the "map-is-not-the-territory"-type thing? I agree: descriptions or propositions about stuff are not identical to the stuff that those descriptions/propositions are about.

I therefore state that what “you” are during the “at the pc” experience is the entire experience thus it’s content. — raza

Firstly, I don't know what you mean by "content". Secondly, in my view, "experience" is mental only. The boundaries of experiences are within the brain (in connection with the body). We experience stuff internally and externally though.

The “brain” engaged with the pc is, in effect, being also the pc. The pc is, during that experience, imbedded in the “brain” (for context, “brain” as awareness). — raza

I disagree, and I think thinking about things like that leads to confusion and incoherency. Being aware of the pc is not being the pc, but maybe you're being poetic or something.

But a super special kind of mental phenomena. — Srap Tasmaner

I'm not sure I'd put it like that. We can value "knowledge" as "super" or "special" qua mental phenomena, but that's only a subjective assessment. There's no objective value to that assessment. Although I'm not sure whether you meant it like that.

If you want to pick out some of your beliefs and call them "knowledge", you do that by saying something about the connection between those beliefs, the mental phenomena, and the content of those beliefs, what the beliefs are about, and what the beliefs are about is not (necessarily) mental. — Srap Tasmaner

I'm not sure what you're getting at there.

"I don't know that my experience of sitting at my PC writing is not an illusion, but I know that I am currently having an experience of some kind."

I question that you're really being honest with yourself here. I bet you really do believe that you are actually sitting at your PC writing, and that is not an illusion. Your issue is that you can't prove it, so you feel as if you ought to be skeptical of that. Please consider this. — Relativist

I am being honest. As I mentioned to another poster, I don't believe that my experience of sitting at my pc is an illusion, even if I can't know that with absolute certainty. But I don't need to know that with absolute certainty. I think it's reasonable to believe the experience is accurate. Hence why I think my present phenomenal experiences are foundational (classical/strong foundationalism), but whether those experiences are illusory or not (e.g whether I am actually a brain in a vat seemingly experiencing sitting at my pc) are foundational in a weak sense (modern/weak foundationalism).

It is not at all irrational to believe that the world of experience is actually a reflection of the actual world. I suggest that this is actually a properly basic belief because it is innate (no one had to convince you of this through argumentation), self-evident, consistent with a rational world view, and the presence of such beliefs is consistent with everything else we believe about the world (e.g. it's consistent with natural selection). It would be irrational to abandon this belief solely because of of the conceptual possibility that it is false. You should not abandon a belief just because there is an epistemic possibility of it being false; rather - a belief should only be abandoned if it is rationally defeated - i.e. you acquire a new belief that contradicts this innate belief, and you have more reasons to believe the new belief true. — Relativist

I generally agree with that.

I would say that normally we do know that it's not an illusion. However, I maybe using the word know differently from you. What I mean, is that we are reasonably sure that such-and-such is the case. I don't have to know with absolute certainty to make the claim that "I know..." Furthermore, if you don't know that you're sitting at your computer doing X, viz., having that experience, then how would you know that you're having any experience? We can be reasonably sure that our sensory experiences generally don't mislead us, if this wasn't the case, then we couldn't be sure of much. — Sam26

I use the conventional definition of "knowledge" per analytic philosophy (justified true belief).

In my view, some knowledge claims can be absolutely certain and some can't. The latter feature in the class of empirical claims, which cannot be proved (i.e. cannot be certain) and only provisionally verified. Since we cannot absolutely know some things ("brain-in-a-vat" type arguments and solipsism, etc.), all we can do is provide good reasons to believe one possibility over others. Since I can't absolutely know that my experience at my pc is an illusion or not, the best I can do is have good enough reasons to support my belief that I am sitting at my pc, and that that experience is not illusory. That's good enough to me, and I'm generally someone who has a commonsensical view on stuff like this, but I'm also aware of the logical and empirical impossibilities/barriers to making claims on absolute certainy.

Furthermore, if you don't know that you're sitting at your computer doing X, viz., having that experience, then how would you know that you're having any experience? We can be reasonably sure that our sensory experiences generally don't mislead us, if this wasn't the case, then we couldn't be sure of much. — Sam26

Because experiencing an illusion is still an experience. I don't think it is an illusion at all, but I can't be absolutely certain. But I also don't need to be absolutely certain to claim that I know that I am sitting at my pc. As you say, I can be reasonably sure about the general veracity of my sensorial experiences.

Indeed, I don't see how non-qualitative experience (whatever that is?--seems incoherent to me) can be the foundation of knowledge, since experience is necessarily qualitative, and knowledge is (ontologically) mental phenomena based upon experience.

Experience is the only starting point/foundation of knowledge whatsoever. No experience, no knowledge.

I see, thanks for explaining that.

With regards to your "position", I'd rather say that "I don't know that my experience of sitting at my PC writing is not an illusion, but I know that I am currently having an experience of some kind." That's a foundational belief for me.

Are the quality of an experience and its content related? — Srap Tasmaner

Well, now that I think about it, even the content of an experience is qualitative. How can any experience not be qualitative? So to answer your question, yes, they are related in that they are identical. You cannot separate qualia from content, in other words (if you buy qualia, that is).

The quality/content may be an illusion, but even the illusion would be qualitative. The problem here is that we cannot refute solipsism or "veil of perception"-type problems, but that impossibility is not a good enough reason to reject the idea that an experience of phenomena might be illusory. It's still an experience--one can be absolutely certain about that.