Has the impulsivity ever resulted in bad decisions? — Wallows
I don't know how one can learn how to be less impulsive or learn patience. It's a trait I suppose.
Any thoughts? — Wallows
H]ow is this "absolutely free will" ... relevant to any human concerns? — SophistiCat
This is also what Strawson Jr. is arguing. But my question is - so what? If that's how you define "absolutely free will," then, obviously, that's how it is. But how is this "absolutely free will" - a made-up thing that cannot possibly exist - relevant to any human concerns? — SophistiCat
There is a subtext here, viz. the utilitarian assumption that there is an optimal course of action -- one that results in the greatest happiness, is impelled by the most libido, or has the maximal value of some other utility function. However, if you look at the lead up to decisions, what Aristotle calls proairesis, that is not how we choose. I have never assigned a value to each motivating factor and then calculated which option maximizes the resulting utility. In fact, such a calculation cannot be done, implicitly or explicitly. The reason is simple: motivating factors are not commensurate. No amount of sex will satisfy our need for nutrition, and neither will satisfy our need for understanding. Thus, no trade-off is possible.
H. A. Simmon has written about this at length. Human decisions are made using satisficing rather than maximization. We choose courses of action that satisfy as many of our needs as possible, rather than finding one that maximizes some utility function. As there are many courses of action that can satisfy our needs, satisficing, unlike optimizing, does not constrain us to a single line of action. — Dfpolis
I think supervenience is an irrational distraction -- one invented to avoid discussions of causal ontology. — Dfpolis
There can be no historical events without variations in the positions of the moon and planets, but that does not mean that we should all be studying astrology. — Dfpolis
It would be very coincidental if the one that we judged to be better mentally were also the only one that was physically realizable. Such a parallel relation reminds me of Leibnitz' monadology and would seem to require a providential God. — Dfpolis
the choice of a goal against a compulsion is a sign that the compulsion is not determining. Consider an alcoholic who habitually goes into every bar he or she passes. One day they commit to being sober. That commitment makes no physical change. Their brain is still wired the same way. Every time they pass a bar, they still start to walk in. So, they remind themselves of their commitment and, by force of will, walk by — Dfpolis
we need a mechanism for evolutionary selection of the capacity to represent multiple options -- one that translates into reproductive success — Dfpolis
Isn't it more rational to think that the very fact of commitment to the better option is one of the conditions of physical realization — Dfpolis
