You know that’s silly. If you actually believed that, I could go to where you live and take all your liberty by force, make you my slave, and because you’re philosophically opposed to forcing others to be responsible or whatever your hands would be self-tied and you would be a compliant slave. — praxis

To stop someone from assaulting another is not a matter of "forcing someone to be responsible". What kind of mental gymnastics is that?

Recently Seymour Hersh gave an interview in which he shared inside information about the view of the Ukraine war from sources within US intelligence.



At 19:58 Hersh goes into their view of the war, and how it differed from what the newspapers were publishing.

If we are to believe Hersh's sources, it turns out the idea of the advance on Kiev being a binding operation and not an attempt at capturing and occupying Kiev - an idea that I have posited multiple times in this thread - wasn't so far-fetched after all. In fact, it might've been exactly what took place.

Hersh names the figure of 60,000 Ukrainian defenders. The Ukrainian General Staff gave as their estimate for Russian troops attacking Kiev around 21,000.
This is essentially what I was already suspecting, and probably the reason why the Ukrainian order of battle remains undisclosed to this day, since it implies a successful Russian diversion, rather than the heroic Ukrainian defense it was framed as by the media.


The whole interview goes much further. It puts a bomb under the entire western narrative, which could already be seen cracking.

As Hersh said himself about his report on Nord Stream: all he did was dissect the obvious. And the only reason obvious things aren't said out loud is because of deafening US propaganda basically gas lighting the entire western world.


Anyhow, this is the umpteenth crack in the story. Can't wait to see the apologetics.

I don't know of any definition of "liberal" that isn't essentially about equality of some kind. — frank

I don't know of any that is.

But that's besides the point.

Most societies seek some sort of medium between liberty and equality. That doesn't change anything about the pursuit of equality being anti-liberal in nature.

Pursuers of equality calling themselves liberal are deceiving themselves and others. It's as simple as that.

Affordable healthcare isn’t responsible? Regulations aren’t responsible? Etc. — praxis

No, you're not getting my meaning.

Forcing people to act in ways that you perceive as benefitting the common good has nothing to do with responsibility. Responsibility is taken (up voluntarily by the individual), not imposed (through governmental threat of violence).

Civil Rights means the government is divided against itself. One part tries to protect equal opportunity, equality under the law, etc. from the other part. — frank

Sure, and I'm not saying that all equality bad.

But the pursuit of equality is anti-liberal by definition, so it makes no sense that those who campaign for ever more equality should call themselves liberal.


Ironically, both these cases remind me of Orwellian double-speak.

It seems to me modern progressivism is best described as pursuing ideals of (what I consider) extreme equality, and anti-capitalism, probably with (some form of) marxism as the alternative. — Tzeentch

And that's anti-liberal? — frank

Naturally. Wherever man is free, there exists inequality. The only way to make people more equal is to make them less free. The more equal people are made, the less free they are.

Moreover, the way governments make people equal is through the use of force. The more equal people are to be made, the more far-reaching governmental powers will have to be, and the more extreme their measures.

The question that never seems to be asked is what happens to all that power accumulation at the top.

Liberty requires responsibility and modern liberalism pursues that responsibility. — praxis

As for the first part, maybe so.

However, I don't think pursuing responsibility is what "modern liberalism" does. It simply tries to force people into acting in ways it considers "responsible" - that is not liberal. That is authoritarian.

Equality always comes at the expense of liberty, so the pursuit of it is by definition anti-liberal.

What ideals are you talking about? — frank

It seems to me modern progressivism is best described as pursuing ideals of (what I consider) extreme equality, and anti-capitalism, probably with (some form of) marxism as the alternative.

So, suddenly, in one generation, progressives turned into their opposites because... (enter bogeyman) wokism! — Baden

Not really.

Wokism is just a more racially-oriented, extreme version of the same ideals progressives hold today, and those ideals are a reaction to actual liberalism. To call oneself an anti-liberal however doesn't look very good, so the modern progressives kept the tag "liberal" while pursuing ideals which are profoundly anti-liberal.

Woke is clearly progressive.

Nowhere did I claim that "woke" is an umbrella term for progressivism.

"Typical tactics", "I understand what you're trying to do", "poisoning the well" - get a grip, mate.

But conflating the mad fringes of wokeness with progressives in general as Tzeentch has tried to do... — Baden

Stop replying to me if you're not going to make an effort at understanding my position.

You call Putin a liar in one sentence and take his word in the next.


Odd how that whenever it suits your narrative we should trust his word, and whenever it doesn't suit your narrative, he's lying.

15 years of protest against NATO expansion > Not a genuine expression of worry, but a carefully crafted lie.

Some war-time rhetoric > Not nonsense narratives meant to influence the public, but a genuine expression of his intentions.


You have to be pretty deep down the propaganda rabbit hole not to see this.

Also, "woke" is not liberal. It's progressive, though I would sooner call it regressive since it has effectively worked to dial back the clock on the role of race in society some 50 years. Alas, "woke" believes the changes they propose would benefit society, thus progressive is the proper term.

'Liberal' is just the label it inherited from the last wave of progressives, which had some right to call themselves liberals. Woke is just wearing it like a wolf in sheep's clothing.

What can be considered "progressive" these days is a counter-movement to actual liberalism, and is basically its polar opposite. It's attempts at controlling speech and people's thoughts are eerily Orwellian, and authoritarian to the very core.

"You will recognize them by their fruit."


As I said,

When I start looking at their actual effects, these "spontaneous" movements for "the betterment of society" seem to me premeditated attempts at spreading division, probably for the betterment of less than altruistic political agendas. — Tzeentch

What we're seeing today is the angry, radical, self-loathing Malcolm X approach.

I wish there were more Martin Luther Kings around.

Woke promotes racial segregation. Need me to repeat it?

I think Mearsheimer argued that the Kremlin decided Crimea is important enough for a Russian power position to grab. Maybe that's just part of it. Anyway, never mind me, carry on. — jorndoe

In a nutshell, this is basically it. Crimea is the prize here, however the connection a lot of people don't make is that a Ukraine in NATO (or otherwise allied with 'the West') would put Crimea in a permanent state of vulnerability since its only connection to Russia proper is the Kerch bridge.

This is why Russia chose to invade Ukraine. The first thing it did during the invasion was establish a land bridge with Crimea.

Much of Russia's conduct in this war, including what we know about the peace negotiations that took place in March 2022 point towards the securing of Crimea being their main strategic goal, either through annexation of parts of Ukraine, or through a negotiated deal.

I think he wanted to squash Ukrainian prosperity and block its efforts to join the EU. I think he also wanted to use the war to shore up his grip on dictatorship. — frank

I don't think either of these explanations hold much water, and basically exemplify the inability that is prevalent in this thread to see the Russians as anything other than cartoon villains.

Yes, I'm not saying Adams promoted or intended to promote racial segregation, but that "woke" ideology implicitly promotes it.

Fixed.

The US bombed Nord Stream for the simple fact that it didn't want European opinions getting in the way of war, and the Europeans, especially Scholz, took it like a ...

Moreover, it implicitly promotes racial segregation, which Adams's comments are a clear indication of.

When I start looking at their actual effects, these "spontaneous" movements for "the betterment of society" seem to me premeditated attempts at spreading division, probably for the betterment of less than altruistic political agendas.

By the way, I can think of some that would like the US going all isolation and NATO closing up shop. Can't tell if that's what you're suggesting here; is it? — jorndoe

If European leaders are incapable of serving European interests, NATO is a threat to European security.

Hmm Are you deliberately skipping who's doing the warring here, ... — jorndoe

So you're just going to support the US efforts to stoke the fires?

The US is just waiting for Russia to exhaust itself. Putin seems happy to allow the event to tear a new butthole for Russia, so I guess the wait will be extended. — frank

What indication is there of this, and why would the Russians be pursuing a strategy like that?

This sounds like wishful thinking to me. The same kind that predicted the Russian economy collapsing, the Russian army disintegrating, the Russian government being ousted, etc.

You called it a good article, that's why I asked.

To me it smells of the kind of war rhetoric that must've been prevalent before World War I, but if anything I share your worry.

What do you think is good about it?

It talks about Europe as a "muscular geopolitical protagonist", Germany as having to reinvent itself to arm itself and Ukraine against aggression, etc. A lot of war trumpeting.


Not a word of Nord Stream 2.

The reality is, when the US bombed Nord Stream 2, a piece of major infrastructure critical to the German economy, all Scholz asked was how many tanks the US wanted him to send. He's an absolute tool.

As a European myself I find the Germans' servile attitude beyond shameful, and as indicative of the relationship between the US and Europe - one of vassalage. European political leaders are servants of the American agenda, not serving the European peoples.


The article represents what the US wants Europe to be, and it represents in essence why the US provoked conflict in Eastern Europe - to break ties between Russia and Europe, and to remilitarize Europe, so it can serve as a useful in ally in the looming geopolitical conflict between the US and China as a counterbalance to Russia.

The US isn't interested in peace (see the peace talks they blocked), nor is it interested in what the Europeans think of all this (see the bombing of Nord Stream).

It really wants the war in Ukraine to have set all this in motion, but it remains to be seen. The US narrative is losing ground all over the world, and that includes inside Europe.

A horrible and bloody internet "pariah-ship and contempt" is what the majority of anonymous users of this thread have to suffer from the minority of other anonymous users for advocating B. — neomac

Your idea of pariahship is having people engage with you in page-long discussions? :chin:

I'm sorry the forum isn't your personal echo chamber, I guess.

Also on the topic of Europeans.

Hersh's article implicated Norway in the Nord Stream 2 sabotage. Norway is the world's third largest exporter of gas.

I'll leave it up to the forum what to do with that information.

I think it's worth pointing out that while the US narrative is alive and well within NATO, NATO is standing more and more isolated internationally.

Recently the European Council on Foreign Affairs published this paper:

United West, Divided From the Rest: Global Public Opinion One Year Into Russia's War on Ukraine


The global shift towards multilaterality is well underway, and the Ukraine war really shows how estranged NATO has become from the rest of the world, with basically every major international player outside of NATO refusing to pick sides in the conflict.


My expectation is that NATO will see a brief surge in unity as a result of the the Ukraine war, however as the reality of this conflict becomes apparent - the US role in causing it and its lack of commitment to solving it - it might in fact flip the other way and be the last nail on the coffin for NATO.

Best thing to happen to Russia would be a disastrous, humiliating defeat ... — ssu

Anyway, I think authoritarian dictatorships are bad and they should go. — ssu

Hence the solution would be to give Ukraine the ample resources to make this one of those defeats that Russia has suffered before... — ssu

Sounds like you're on a warpath. Who should be next? China?

No, but really. You're sounding a little detached. Any idea how many lives your lovely plans would cost?

NATO's Biggest European Members Float Defense Pact with Ukraine

Possibly some important developments here.

With the UK, France and Germany seeking to encourage peace talks, more elaborate NATO intervention in Ukraine seems unlikely for the near future.

A lot hinges on the commitment of the European nations if things were to escalate in Ukraine. Prior to this, the war rhetoric suggested the Europeans would follow the American line without much question, but with happenings such as these it remains to be seen.

In my opinion, this should have come a lot sooner. The war could have likely been avoided altogether had the Europeans made clear to Washington that they would not back the US in a protracted conflict in Ukraine.

The question is whether they can keep their backs straight.


As for the proposals themselves, there are some odd implications:
- Apparently Kiev is the party that needs to be encouraged.

- The way the European leaders seek to encourage Ukraine is apparently by way of "stronger ties between Ukraine and NATO". Note, NATO membership is not mentioned - I wonder if that's intentional. You'd think some form of close security cooperation between NATO and Ukraine after the war would have been on the table since the very start, but apparently not?

- Stronger ties between NATO and Ukraine was what sparked this conflict in the first place, so it's counterintuitive that this would become part of a negotiated peace. However, perhaps with the territories Russia holds (and Crimea strategically more secure), NATO membership for Ukraine is less of an issue.

You might be surprised that the countries comprising the majority of the world's population (China, India, Brazil, Pakistan, among others) do not seem to believe in the one-sided image of this war that is so dominant in the western media.

So no, you're not the only person. Though, if you're been reading western newspapers I don't blame you for feeling that way.

Interesting take on various relevant subjects by a retired US Army Colonel.

Me personally, ↪Tzeentch...? — jorndoe

Yea, why not?

I think your view that the war in Ukraine doesn't represent genuine Russian security concerns is the prevailing view in the West.

The worry I have with that view is that it seems to ignore the risk of escalation, because Russian threats of escalation are seen as a bluff by Putin.

My view is that this war does in some ways represent genuine Russian security concerns and that the risk of (nuclear) escalation is not trivial.

So my question is, should we continue to push Russia to escalate until eventually we get to the point they can no longer back up their 'bluffs'?

And is there any escalation big enough that would convince you the Russians aren't bluffing?

Since I think your view is the prevailing one, by asking you I am trying to get a sense of how close we might be to the precipice.

In the same round, would Putin risk Russia over southeast Ukraine (perhaps by unleashing the nukes)...? — jorndoe

How close do we want to get in order to find an answer to that question?

Would the United States have used nuclear weapons over Cuba?

I don't know. I'm glad we never found out.

The doomsday clock is now closer to midnight than it was back then.

The UN isn't quite as inconsequential irrelevant insignificant as me. I don't know if anyone thinks they're a bunch of airheads, but here's a report from their assembly today (Feb 22, 2023) on the topic. The message is clear enough.

What's your (anyone's) take? — jorndoe

What I would be looking for are the voting patterns and statements of BRICS countries and nations that have expressed interest in becoming part of BRICS or the BRICS development bank (NBD), because I think these nations represent a growing dissatisfaction with the western 'world order' ran out of Washington, and seem increasingly interested in forming a formal economic and political coalition against it.

My general sense is that you don't seem to take the Russian perception of NATO as a security threat very seriously.

The assumption seems to be, if we just raise the costs for Russia, they will eventually back out of this war because they have no legitimate reason to be in it in the first place.

My question is, how far would this war need to escalate for you to reconsider that position?

I think when Putin talks about the "destruction" of Russia, what he is talking about is the West seeking to end Russia as a great power. Of course with a typical narrative spin added to it.

Assuming that's what he means, he's not wrong. There are various respected western experts (Brzezinski for example) who argue that Russia without Ukraine and Crimea is not a great power. He states that pretty much verbatim in his book The Grand Chessboard.

Many (Sachs, Chomsky, Mearsheimer, etc.) also argue that a major reason behind NATO expansion was to contain Russia, and prevent it from rising back to great power status after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Brzezinski has even argued that the US should pursue NATO expansion precisely for this reason.

The idea that the West under US leadership sought to hamper Russia's rise to prominence is quite credible. I would even go so far as to say it's obvious.

If the Russians were relying on certain conditions like a military coup from within Ukraine and the population wasn’t so hostile (compare to the case of Crimea) and the logistic/coordination wasn’t so shitty and they manage to kill Zelensky, etc. things may have panned out differently for the Russians even with a small number of ground troops. — neomac

190,000 troops is completely insufficient to control Ukraine. Everyone, even your own preferred experts, seem to agree on that. So we've made some progress.

Now we have two options:

Your option - that number is a product of astronomic Russian incompetence and wishful thinking. In other words: "the Russians are dummies".

My option - that number is a product of limited Russian goals.

Still Western source — neomac

Gee, really? You have a problem with western sources now? :roll:

If you rely on the estimate of “21,000 troops” from that report why don’t you rely on the claim “the Russian military’s main effort remains seizing Kyiv in an effort to force the Ukrainian government to capitulate” ? — neomac

Because those estimates are not being contested by anyone, while the claim is.

Are you really going to hide behind random objections like these?

This is getting a little childish.

OK but that’s your personal view. Maybe the Russians had different views. For example I wouldn’t exclude that the Russians might have considered the Malorossia region (Kiev) as less anti-Russian than the Western side of Ukraine (Galicia), giving them some hope to find less hostile masses. Or that Ukrainian military would have been less of a problem if part of it also in the highest ranks would have revolted against Zelensky. On the other side I wouldn’t exclude that the Ukrainians didn’t fully trust Western military aid, or they might have feared further mobilisation, escalations, involvement of additional Russian private militia, etc. from Russians. — neomac

That's a lot of "maybes".

Since you seem to like CSIS, here is an update they gave on the Russo-Ukrainian war on March 1st, 2022.



At several points in the video the topic of insurgency comes up.

Here's an amusing quote from one of the participants, starting at roughly 33:00.

Through indiscriminate killing of civilians and leveling cities Russian armed forces might eventually prevail, but they will have a lot of trouble in the urban areas trying to root out these many fighters, but much of [the Ukrainian armed forces] will survive.

And they have no prospects of being able to occupy the country. Putin has said (again you can't believe him) but he said he has no intention of occupying. So you think [with] the destruction that already happened, if we support an insurgency, and I know we'll get to this in a minute, Russian casualties will be through the roof.

This will be... This could be an insurgency that is bigger than our Afghan one in the 1980's in terms of things we could provide them that would really hurt the Russians.

And then if he pulls out, If he installs a puppet government, that government's not going to last hours. I don't see how they could control the territory.

What is amusing about this is that they are essentially making very strong arguments why the Russians probably did not intend to do any of these things.

The idea of a Russian puppet government is completely unfeasible to them, just like it is to me.

The only connection they fail to make is that the Kremlin was probably well aware of the risks they are describing, which is part of the reason, if not the reason, they pursued a limited aim strategy as described by Mearsheimer.


The connection you fail to make is that all these western sources have one thing in common - they all spin the "Russian incompetence" yarn. CSIS, as pointed out, is funded by the US government and the DoD - that could be a clear sign of bias, but perhaps it is just something so simple as intellectual arrogance or tunnel vision.

In any case, the contradictions in their analysis are plain for all to see, and I've been pointing them out repeatedly.

Do you want me to believe that ISW, CSIS, WilsonCenter, RUSI, Ukrainian military experts don’t know the Russian military doctrine and couldn’t possibly think it was a maskirovka operation? — neomac

Given the indicators that the northern operations of the Russian armed forces were not the main effort, I would expect them to openly discuss the possibility. I wonder why they don't. :chin: Maybe because it would make them look awful silly at this point.

_____________________________________________


Let's do a quick recap:


190,000 troops were insufficient to control large parts of Ukraine.


You argue instead that the Russians' main goal was to control Ukraine by installing a puppet in Kiev.


My objection to this is along two lines:

> A puppet regime is completely unfeasible under conditions that were known prior to the invasion. The amount of western influence in Ukraine, the threat of a western-backed insurgency, the lack of troops to maintain control, etc. Your experts at CSIS seem to believe a Russian puppet would have "lasted hours."

> The northern drive on Kiev in no way indicates either in its troop count or behavior that it comprised the Russians' main effort. If that had been the case we would have expected to see an attempt to overwhelm the Ukrainian defense through massed forces and firepower.

Note: I did not claim the drive was too small to capture Kiev, though it was likely too small to capture Kiev if any sizable Ukrainian defense was present, which likely there was since it's the Ukrainian capital, though the Ukrainian order of battle remains undisclosed.
Nor did I argue that the Russians didn't want Kiev. Just that the troop count and behavior does not imply the Russians were prepared to pay much of a cost to capture it, which in turn implies it was not of a high priority.


My alternative to this theory is as follows:

> Given the Russians' relatively low troop count in relation to the size of Ukraine and the Ukrainian military, their ambitions were likely limited to occupying strategically relevant areas in the south and east of Ukraine. Occupying small pieces of Ukraine mitigates the risk of insurgency.

> The drive on Kiev likely had multiple possible goals, the first of which was probably to try and force the West to negotiate. If this failed, the attack would still be functioning as a diversion to lure Ukrainian defenders away from the strategically relevant areas in the east/south. Had the Ukrainians left their capital largely undefended in favor of defending the east/south, Kiev could have been captured.



I've said all I have to say on the topic. I don't think further exchanges will yield much fruit, so I will leave it here. I suggest you try to make your case succinctly one last time like I did with my recap, so we end the conversation with a nice summary from both sides.

Mearsheimer doesn’t explicitly talk about regime change in that video, all right. But he did it elsewhere:
You don’t think he has designs on Kyiv?
No, I don’t think he has designs on Kyiv. I think he’s interested in taking at least the Donbass, and maybe some more territory and eastern Ukraine, and, number two, he wants to install in Kyiv a pro-Russian government, a government that is attuned to Moscow’s interests. https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine (March 1, 2022) — neomac

This was a week into the war.

You're using statements made months apart, under entirely different circumstances and in both cases no actual argument is presented for your claim.

What else would be the purpose of capturing the political capital of Ukraine be? Forcing a negotiation (so surrender) and/or regime change. One can’t exclude regime change. — neomac

If the capture of Kiev would have forced a surrender and/or regime change, why was only a small portion of the Russian force dedicated to capturing it, and the Russians seemingly did not engage in heavy fighting in their operations around Kiev?

I don't believe capturing Kiev would have been decisive at all. With a sizable Ukrainian military and western support the war could have been carried on from elsewhere in the country, possibly even over the border from a NATO country.

Ironically, didn't Napoleon once invade Russia believing the capture of Moscow would end the war?

Besides he’s claim is more cautious than yours: “There are no exact formulas for how many soldiers are required to hold conquered territory, but a force ratio of as many as 20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants has sometimes been necessary to pacify a hostile local population.” — neomac

Ahem. From the very same article...

The force ratio of Russian soldiers in Ukraine was far too small to hold territory—including cities—for long.

____________________________

Mearsheimer does not contradict Jones, because Mearsheimer is arguing against the idea that Russia could conquer the entire of Ukraine. If I’m reading more into Mearsheimer’s claims in that video, you do the same. — neomac

Fair enough.

So the point of contention is whether regime change is a feasible option without occupying (the vast majority of) Ukraine.

I think it isn't because:
- The Ukrainian military was never decisively defeated.
- There is/was plenty of anti-Russian/pro-Western sentiment in Ukraine, especially in the western parts.
- Western backing would likely counteract Russian influence in areas not held directly by the Russian military, if not outright create and fund a widespread insurgency throughout the entire country.

We've seen the United States try to enact regime change under much more advantageous conditions with no success.

Where did you get the estimates of the number of Russian troops were between 15000 and 30000? — neomac

The day-by-day campaign assessments by ISW. (note: not western media)

On February 26th, 2022 their report stated:

The Russian military’s main effort remains seizing Kyiv in an effort to force the Ukrainian government to capitulate. The Ukrainian General Staff reported at 11am local time February 26 that Ukrainian forces halted 14 Russian BTGs northeast of Kyiv and that Russia has committed its northern reserves – an additional 17 BTGs – along this operational direction.

As you can see, these estimates are based on reports from the Ukrainian general staff.

31 BTGs each comprised of roughly 600 - 800 officers and soldiers amounts to roughly 21,000 troops.


As far as I know these numbers aren't being contested. If anything a western source would likely have a tendency to overstate rather than to understate Russian troop numbers. If they are being contested please show it to me and I might reconsider.

When you objected (“Russians were going to install a puppet regime in Kiev while occupying less than 1/5th of the country”) I argued yes so does Mearsheimer in that video by saying that a possible aim of Russia was capturing Kiev [2]. — neomac

Where did you get the idea that Mearsheimer argues the Russians could install a puppet regime by capturing Kiev?

He doesn't make that argument at all. Are you really going to stake your argument on a single line by Mearsheimer which he treats as no more than a passing comment?

I'd love to hear someone go into detail about how they believe installing a puppet regime under the circumstances we've discussed is feasible. Until then, I don't treat such a theory seriously, and it's pretty clear the comment of Mearsheimer you're relying on was only indirectly related to the subject matter of the lecture.

The predominant theory at the time that lecture was given was that the Russians attempted a serious attack to capture Kiev. By suggesting that the attack may have merely meant to threaten Kiev Mearsheimer was in essence already putting forward a controversial standpoint.

I'll repeat myself: it's obvious that Kiev was an interesting military and political target for the Russians. If they could have taken it at no cost they probably would have, for a myriad of possible reasons. However, the data from the battle does not indicate they were prepared to pay much of a cost at all, which puts into question the idea that their entire campaign hinged on capturing Kiev.

Your argument is just dismissive of what has been reported... — neomac

I think my argument holds true in face of the reported facts. I'd love to hear you present facts that would be at odds with my theory.

Reported opinions by potentially highly biased sources I assign very little weight to, especially if they blatantly ignore the facts.

I’m not over/underestimating anything because I’m relying on legit source reports. — neomac

Your own source, Seth G. Jones, states that subdueing a country's population with a force ratio of 4 to 1000 is woefully inadequate, regardless of what metric you pick. I've already rebutted your example of Afghanistan which serves as a clear example in favor of the case I am making.

You're cherry picking at best.

Whether those assumptions about early Russian intentions were wrong can’t be proved just by size and movement of ground troops over one month (even more so if one takes into account Russian logistical and coordination failures). — neomac

I think it's by far the strongest indication of Russian intentions we have.

according to British intelligence — neomac

Newspaper articles claiming things were claimed by British intelligence.

This isn't evidence of a planned coup. At most it is a possible indicator Russia-aligned politicians were in Ukraine. Well, color me surprised.

even in the very same article you took that excerpts it is still claimed: Russia failed to achieve what was likely its main political objective: to overthrow the Kyiv government in a blitzkrieg military operation. — neomac

And no source or argumentation is given - not very convincing. Mearsheimer contradicts Jones directly and gives a detailed argumentation as to why he believes the Russians did not aim for a classic blitzkrieg.

As if in Western media are impenetrable by pro-Russian propaganda that you can read and regurgitate here. — neomac

Except that I don't base my arguments on western media sources either. I base it on simple verifiable facts of the war (which as far as I am aware are not being disputed), and only rely on expert opinions like Mearsheimer to the degree they put forward theories that also rely on verifiable facts.

Again, nice try.

If you believe one of my sources suffers from a pro-Russian bias, I'd love to see you point it out.

As if experts can’t comment the war on Twitter. — neomac

Of course they can. I just won't take them seriously unless they make an actual case. Twitter, wikipedia, newspaper articles - I take none of that seriously.

Mearsheimer claims that the strategic objective Russians were aiming at were either capturing or threatening Kiev. — neomac

He does say that, without any elaboration whatsoever.

You look confused. — neomac

Are you really implying the Russians were going to install a puppet regime in Kiev while occupying less than 1/5th of the country, with a western-trained, western-backed Ukrainian military occupying the rest, and an angry Ukrainian population to reckon with, with 190,000 troops? — Tzeentch

Right, so it’s FALSE the assumption that one needs military control over the whole territory to install a puppet regime. — neomac

Do you know what a strawman is?

... yet in the same post you claim that my argument hinges on “occupy all of Ukraine”. — neomac

Which it essentially does, whether you realise it or not.

Second, I do not have an equation on how many ground troops are necessary to ensure the success of a regime change in Ukraine. So the quantities you are considering in your arguments (“1/5th with the 4/5ths”, “occupy all of Ukraine”, “the vast majority of the country”) may make sense to support your claims under certain conditions, but not under all conditions (e.g. it depends on how hostile the population is, the contribution from state apparatus insiders, the support of aircraft/rocket shelling, the size of the targeted territory, etc.). — neomac

It makes imminent sense in the conditions the Ukraine war is fought under.

A large, capable Ukrainian military (outnumbering the Russians even). Vast amounts of Western support, etc.

Regime change under the conditions you have suggested is outlandish.

Russia might have had a complex strategy wrt Kiev (based on different possible scenarios), which include regime change. — neomac

Again, lovely theory, but where is the evidence?

Every time you need to invent a more complicated explanation as to why the facts don't line up with your view it becomes less convincing.

To achieve regime change ground troops might have not been enough (also depending on how hostile the population would have proven to be), but in addition to that rocket/air-force strikes, possible inside jobs (especially by collaborationists within military/intelligence service favourable to a coup [1]) and killing Zelensky might have compensated. All these conditions are not implausible since they have some support from the available reports. — neomac

You vastly overestimate the weight of miscellaneous factors, and underestimate the importance of boots on the ground. No control means no regime change.

Your own article already blows your theory out of the water since it puts into perspective what kind of force is needed to occupy and control a population and what the Russians actually fielded.

Remember your example of Afghanistan? The US enjoyed every advantage imaginable. A decisive military victory, complete air dominance, support from multi-national coalitions and indigenous forces, a way higher troop-to-population ratio - almost double.

It was fighting a third world country. And it still lost.

Russia has none of those things.

The West propaganda objection is as good as the Russian propaganda counter-objection. — neomac

Except that I'm not basing myself on Russian or even pro-Russian sources, but nice try.

But estimates about the number of the deployed Russian troops were available very early in March 2022 (while the Russian attempt lasted till end march), so that begs the question: how credible was the Russian threat to the Ukrainians backed by the Americans if the number of ground troops was all the counts and it was evident to all military experts that they were insufficient to capture Kyiv? — neomac

That the Russians might want to take Kiev is pretty obvious, even just as a bargaining chip or a symbolic victory. The question is what importance they attributed to it, and what cost they would be willing to pay. The facts imply the answer is 'relatively little'.

I can't look into the minds of the Ukrainian leadership.

The Ukrainian order of battle for the Battle of Kiev remains undisclosed, so we don't actually know how seriously they took the threat because for that we need to know the numbers of troops they deployed in defense of it.

Casualty figures as far as they are available imply little heavy fighting, which means that whatever the Ukrainians defended with was enough for the Russians to decide not to even try capturing the city.

Here for more details: https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/23003689/putin-ukraine-russia-donbas-energy-feint — neomac

Don't bother with such blatantly biased and low-quality articles. Some of the sources linked in that article literally lead to Twitter. I did read the article, and it's basic regurgitation of points already made and debunked here.

It insists Kiev was the main prize, while the fighting around Kiev does not imply this at all.

If you want to make a convincing argument, you should see if such articles are based on anything substantial, and provide a link to the substance instead.

So far, if Russians wanted to threaten/capture Kiev as expected (also because without control over Malorossia there is no buffer territory wrt NATO), they failed. If the Russians wanted just to consolidate the Eastern-South, they didn't ensure the geopolitical victory they were after (at minute 1:40:04 of your video “Winning for Putin is putting an end to Ukraine joining the West, joining NATO, joining the EU”). — neomac

If the point of the advance on Kiev was to force the Ukrainian leadership to the negotiating table they succeeded actually. Those negotiations failed, though - blocked by the US, we now know.

And obviously Russia is so far unable to end the western policy of NATO membership for Ukraine, which I agree is probably their primary strategic objective.

I think it was also fairly obvious from the onset of the invasion that such a policy change would only come as the result of a brokered deal, and Russia lacked the power to enforce it unilaterally through military force.

It might be a little more complicated.

The Chinese refer to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, aka the Chicago Convention.

I haven't taken the time to read through it all, but it does seem that civil aviation enjoys a great deal of protection under the convention, and the US is a signatory to it.

Shooting down civilian craft without any type of warning seems questionable.

Write to wikipedia if you want evidences for its claims. — neomac

Why would I? You're the one trying to use it to make an argument. If you don't care about searching and providing evidence for your views or the persuasiveness of your argument that's your problem, not mine.

(https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare — neomac

Russia failed to achieve what was likely its main political objective: to overthrow the Kyiv government in a blitzkrieg military operation.

No, I don’t think he has designs on Kyiv. I think he’s interested in taking at least the Donbass, and maybe some more territory and eastern Ukraine, and, number two, he wants to install in Kyiv a pro-Russian government, a government that is attuned to Moscow’s interests. — neomac

Both the article and Mearsheimer's view on regime change in Ukraine (that he shared only days after the invasion - way too early for it to be viewed as a detailed assessment, in my opinion) are directly contradicted by a point Mearsheimer made himself more recently, namely that the Russian troop deployments were far too small to carry out a classic blitzkrieg necessary to facilitate such a thing. He states that almost literally word for word in one of the clips I gave you.

I don't agree with the point Mearsheimer made in March. It's incompatible with arguments he put forward later.

Furthermore, the article makes the same point I made before. It literally states:

Second, the Russian invasion force was far too small to seize and hold territory, ...

... Russia utilized between 150,000 and 190,000 soldiers—including regular and irregular forces—for the initial invasion of Ukraine, a country of approximately 44 million people with an area of over 600,000 square kilometers.34 Those numbers translate into a force ratio of 4 Russian soldiers per 1,000 Ukrainian inhabitants.

There are no exact formulas for how many soldiers are required to hold conquered territory, but a force ratio of as many as 20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants has sometimes been necessary to pacify a hostile local population.35 Large numbers of troops are generally essential to establish basic law and order. By the end of World War II, for example, there were 101 U.S. soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants in the U.S.-controlled sector of Germany. More recently, there were 19 U.S. and European soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants in Bosnia in 1995 and 20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants in Kosovo in 2000.36

Lower ratios are generally insufficient to pacify hostile populations. In Iraq, for instance, the United States had 7 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants and faced a persistent deadly insurgency—even with the help of Iraqi government forces and Sunni militia members. U.S.

Note that this doesn't even yet take into account a 200,000+ strong Ukrainian military that would not magically disappear.

The rest of the article isn't particularly convincing towards your point, as it talks mostly of operational matters and not about the intelligence upon which the Russians based themselves.

First things first, the puppet regime in Afghanistan didn’t have military control of the whole country, right? — neomac

Anything that smelled of Taliban was bombed into dust by the US Air Force. There wasn't a Taliban flag or outpost left standing anywhere in the country. I don't see how that can be classified as anything other than an exceptionally high degree of military control. Of course that military control started getting gradually eroded by an increasingly intense insurgency.

But my point never was that control of the whole country is necessary (nice strawman), but that enacting regime change while holding less than 1/5th with the 4/5ths being occupied by a western-backed, western-trained enemy military is utter fantasy.

That regime change was a likely goal is confirmed by attempts to kill Zelensky. — neomac

That does not confirm that at all.

Killing off leadership figures is a common method in warfare, which I already explained to you.

And it's not obvious at all that killing Zelensky would change anything about Ukraine's political course. In fact, I believe it would change nothing. How much influence do you believe Russia has in Ukraine, outside of the areas it directly controls? Virtually zero.

However, faced with fierce Ukrainian defense and the West’s crippling economic sanctions, Putin appears to be recalculating his initial maximalist aims. — neomac

More articles with claims about the inner goings-on of the Kremlin, without a shred of evidence presented.

This is a recurring theme: the entirety of your argument, nay the entire western narrative, hinges on the idea that the Russians went in with a force to destroy the Ukrainian military and occupy all of Ukraine - something which is almost directly contradicted by the facts.

It's obvious why they should argue this - because the idea of Russian imperialism and a Ukrainian resurgence is much easier to peddle if a narrative of grandiose Russian goals followed by a massive Russian failure to achieve those goals is established. However, much seems to indicate that the Russian initial aims weren't "maximalist". I think the negotiations that took place in March provide a solid basis for that view, since the terms that were almost agreed upon there were essentially the exact ones that Russia had been insisting on for years.

Further, there's really no way to save the "maximalist" argument from the fact that the 190,000 troops Russia deployed are completely insufficient for the goals you purport they had.

Even if you want to make the point that their goal was to enact regime change in Kiev, you cannot explain why only a small portion of those forces actually marched on Kiev, and intense fighting over the city never took place.

You can’t raise the standards for what constitutes “evidence” arbitrarily high, — neomac

I'm not raising standards "arbitrarily" high. The holes in your argument are utterly blatant, and instead of addressing those holes, you pile on more articles of people who seem similarly unaware of them.

What makes those sources legit? — neomac

Sources are legit when they produce a coherent argument based on verifable facts and evidence, or at least things which can be verified with a high degree of certainty. When their argument defies common logic, or features obvious holes, a detailed explanation should be in place to account for that.

Third, as I never claimed I’m an expert or even an amateur of military/intelligence field, and made it clear repeatedly, it’s pointless to accuse me of lacking “basic foundational knowledge” in the military/intelligence field. I’m fine with relying on military/intelligence experts’ feedback for that matter. It’s not evident to me you are one, ... — neomac

You say that, but you don't give the impression you wish to solely base yourself on expert opinions.

You take the smallest snippets of circumstantial proof and use it to argue the most far-reaching claims, generally without even checking if the snippets you use are based on anything tangible and real.

Because to me, “threatening Kiev” roughly means “threatening to capture Kiev”.
BTW what does “threatening Kiev” mean to you? What did the Russian threaten to do with their troops in Kiev if it was evident to anybody with “basic foundational knowledge” that the Russians were most certainly unable to capture Kiev? — neomac

That's another strawman.

I never argued the Ukrainians could have known prior to the invasion that the Russians would not try to take Kiev.

The fog of war can make diversionary attacks very effective, and we know for a fact that the Russians employ deception as a core pillar of their military doctrine.

The fact that the Russians used 15,000 - 30,000 out of a 190,000 men in their offensive towards Kiev, and the fact that very little heavy fighting seems to have taken place, does not imply the Russians attributed high strategic significance to the capture of Kiev.

I’m talking about what has been officially reported suggested by legit western [potentially highly biased and/or politicized] sources — neomac

Fixed.

I simply find implausible to claim that it’s unlikely that Russia pursued regime change because of lack of manpower or because negotiation was most certainly the only realistic goal. — neomac

I don't see how regime change is even a reasonable option without decisively defeating the Ukrainian military and occupying the vast majority of the country.

Again I ask you, Russia installs a puppet. What happens to the areas that aren't under Russian control? What happens to the Ukrainian military consisting of hundreds of thousands of men? What happens to western support?

Do those things magically disappear?

No. The war would obviously continue and the "regime change" would be completely meaningless in areas that Russia doesn't directly control.

You just talked about size and movement of the Russian troops on the ground. — neomac

I've talked about those things because they are in direct contradiction to the argument you have been putting forward.

- Why did the Russians try to kill Zelensky? — neomac

I've already explained. Decapitation is a common military strategy to diminish an enemy's command and control capabilities. Killing Zelensky would be a big symbolic victory and sow chaos and fear.

- Why did the Russian troops try to encircle Kiev ? — neomac

The obvious answer would be that even a diversionary attack needs to be credible.

But what do you mean when you say "try"?

There is no evidence of particularly heavy fighting around Kiev. As such, there is no indication that the Russians were prepared to overcome significant resistance in order to achieve whatever their goals may have been.

- Why did the Russians engage in troop battles, if they could simply heavy shell Kiev? — neomac

I don't know how you envision incursions into a foreign nation to take place without troops getting into combat with each other.

Troop movements require scouting, vanguards, rear security, logistics, etc. All those things involve physical men putting themselves in harms way.

Blindly shelling Kiev from the other side of the border is just another silly notion. Kiev has an area of 839 square kilometers. Randomly lobbing shells into it would have no impact whatsoever, besides fueling western propaganda. Cities are captured through urban combat - notoriously bloody and difficult - not unguided artillery barrages.
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What's your excuse now? — neomac

It's odd you get so adverserial about a genuine inquiry for a source. Is it not normal to you that people ask for sources when they are presented with claims they think are questionable? I would expect you to do the same.