The United States have expressed their desire to incorporate Ukraine into NATO at the Bucharest Summit in 2008. In 2013-2014 the Maidan revolution took place in Ukraine, showing the Russians that a pro-Western flip of Ukraine was a real threat. The Russians responded by taking their primary strategic asset, Crimea, by force in 2014.

After 2014, it was clear that the situation with Ukraine's neutrality being at odds and Crimea being cut-off from Russia was not a long-term solution, and that war was looming.

In light of that, the United States started to support Ukraine financially and militarily, furthering the threat of a pro-Western flip.

At least since January 2021 U.S. support for Ukraine became official policy; U.S. Security Coorporation with Ukraine


It was a matter of time before Ukraine was armed and trained to such a degree that would make a limited war for southern Ukraine unfeasible, and even moreso the threat of Ukraine joining NATO, which would have made any invasion pretty much impossible.

Likely because the Russians felt time was running out.

Where’s the contradiction? The cruise missiles were supposed to have done a large part of the job even before the paratrooper first wave. — apokrisis

And how exactly did you envision GPS-guided cruise missiles taking out MANPADS and mobile anti-air platforms? Bomb every single building, ditch or treeline in and around Kiev?

Also, cruise missiles? Are you sure about that? What can you tell me about the use of cruise missiles in SEAD operations?

Again, why have paratroopers ring a cargo airfield unless you planned to use that airfield pretty soon. — apokrisis

The question is:
- Whether they were going to use it to land cargo planes, and the answer to that question is obviously no.
- Whether that proves they were intending to occupy and hold Kiev, which is what you argued and why you mentioned this in the first place.

I’m finding it quite amusing, — apokrisis

I'm having trouble hearing you from inside that hole you're digging for yourself.

By some accounts, Russia had intended to land 18-20 Ilyushin IL-76 transport planes at the Hostomel airfield invasion’s opening hours. An aerial convoy this size could have potentially brought two entire battalion tactical groups (BTGs) worth of troops and equipment to the capital’s doorstep within the first hours of the invasion.

Got any more expert sources to share with us, bud?

What's next?

Experts telling us the Russians "intended" to sail cruise ships up the Dnieper to stage an amphibious assault on Kiev?

What a bunch of dummies, those Russians. :lol:

Aren't we glad we have these "experts" telling us all about their silly intentions.

Just produce evidence to back your speculation. — apokrisis

That isn't speculation. You don't seem to be aware of what SEAD is, how it functions and the obvious issues it faces when targetting non-emitting anti-aircraft platforms.

No one suggested that. So strawman. — apokrisis

Oh, what is this then, and I quote:

By some accounts, Russia had intended to land 18-20 Ilyushin IL-76 transport planes at the Hostomel airfield invasion’s opening hours. An aerial convoy this size could have potentially brought two entire battalion tactical groups (BTGs) worth of troops and equipment to the capital’s doorstep within the first hours of the invasion.

Doesn't sound like these "expert" sources assumed any intention by the Russians to wait until the area was "reasonably safe", does it?

Again, the counterfactual is that no one in any of the reporting raised this as something making the Russian plan impossible. — apokrisis

Likely because they have absolutely no clue of what they're talking about.

The Russians would of course have to have suppressed the Ukraine air defences before the transport planes could land. — apokrisis

SEAD strikes to facilitate landing large, slow-moving cargo planes on the frontline?

What scale of suppression do you have in mind? A nuclear strike on Ukraine?

You understand that even MANPADS, IR AA or unguided AAA batteries would be having a turkey shoot?

The Ilyushins have flares and electronic countermeasures, showing they are intended to have some chance of landing in defended forward areas. — apokrisis

"Some chance of landing"?

Such measures are intended to give the plane a slight chance of getting away in case it gets engaged, not to land under fire. You're absolutely crazy if you think a cargo plane would be doing such things intentionally.

They're flying piñatas. And you're suggesting to land 18-20 of them under fire while loaded up with battalions worth of men and material. Oof.

My choice is between understanding what I can glean from named public sources or believing some random internet “military expert” pushing apologist talking points. — apokrisis

No. Your choice is admitting you're way out of book, or continuing to pretend you're not and fencing with newspaper articles. :roll:

And for the record, you can continue linking articles that state experts supposedly said things - those have zero value. Link instead to the actual expert saying it, accompanied by that which they base themselves on.

You are telling me all I need to know about your expertise and intentions here. — apokrisis

By stating what is absolutely obvious to anyone whose conception of war isn't based on newspaper articles? Ok! :grin:

So there is a reasonable conclusion that this risky mission was warranted to secure an airbridge — apokrisis

No. There is nothing reasonable about that conclusion. Airlifting in battalions worth of troops only several kilometres from the frontline when you even have a land connection available is quite the opposite of reasonable.

I would expect any kind of offensive, feint or otherwise, to include the capture of every possible airstrip in the area. It says nothing about their intentions regarding Kiev, which is what you tried to argue.

I'm not so sure. From what I've seen from Republican sources, they seem critical towards, for example, Ukraine joining NATO, which is essentially what started all of this.

But speaking of western support for the war in Ukraine.

Would the West still be supporting the war in Ukraine under say, a Republican US president and a right-leaning (read, anti-EU) Europe?

If you're not interested in a conversation, just say so.

Huh? Support for Ukraine has been something, both "in spirit" / goodwill in general populations, and materially. Have you checked the reactions all over...? It's not just some elite highups in Washington and Brussels. — jorndoe

When in my country's parliament ministers tried to call the war in Ukraine "our war", it raised a lot of eyebrows.

Given the large economic hardships (rampant inflation and energy scarcity) that are coming for much of Europe, it is my impression that support for Ukraine is very thin, and mostly something that is expressed in media and politics, but not felt among the population.

But that is admittedly just an impression I have.

If Russia was to just take over, say, Donbas and Crimea, then their anti-NATO thing would still apply. Less so if they'd taken over Kyiv and captured/killed the government, I might add. As an aside, without a secured route to Crimea via Berdiansk/Melitopol, they'd still have a route via Kerch. There are whatever plans at work, possibly changing now and then, some possibly rushed or pushed out. — jorndoe

Ukraine becoming NATO and Russia annexing the territories it now occupies would be a very flimsy solution indeed. Without a proper buffer, conflict is almost guaranteed. But trust is needed for this buffer to be re-installed, and that is non-existent. So the Russians have taken the approach that even during conflict their position in regards to Crimea must be 'safe'.

And the issue is of course access during times of conflict. The Kerch bridge would probably not survive day 1 of any future conflict.

So your theory is ... — apokrisis

I haven't posited any theory about what those troops were doing there.

I'm just challenging your view that it somehow proves the Russians were deeply committed in their push for Kiev.

Is it normal military tactics to stuff around taking hold of an enemy transport hub that you never intend to use? — apokrisis

Certainly. Denying that capability is just as important as being able to use it yourself. And who said they never intended to use it? Maybe they did. That doesn't prove the intentions towards Kiev you claim they must've had.

Even if you were asked to construct a feint on Kyiv with this exact force available to you, would this have been your cunning plan? It this the top option? — apokrisis

I have but a fraction of the information required to give a serious answer to that. If any here profess that "they could have done it better" I would find that very cute. The point of education is generally also to make one aware of the many things one doesn't know.

What’s the bleeding point of ringing an unwanted airfield with precious paratroopers when you have a whole country of other more intelligent choices? — apokrisis

What makes you believe the airport is unwanted? Airports are important military targets, either for own use or denying them to the enemy. If a military force occupies an area of land, I would expect them to secure every single airport, regardless of their immediate intentions or use by the enemy.

And yet 30 helicopters made the initial assault. How was that possible? Were they supersonic or stealth or something? — apokrisis

Helicopters fly low, and the type of air defense that can tackle low-flying helicopters have a significantly lower range.

The Russians also fired off 160 missiles to try and suppress the air defences. — apokrisis

Does that sound like the kind of environment you'd be airlifting in battalions worth of troops with cargo planes?

You make it sound like this hasn’t been the universal response of all informed military experts watching events unfold. — apokrisis

Your sources have been largely non-expert journalists. Among military experts there isn't any kind of consensus at all. Mearsheimer makes the exact opposite case that you're making.

Now the whole of the West may be pretending to be surprised by Russian ineptitude. — apokrisis

My point is that they are not pretending. They completely miscalculated the balance of power between Russia and Ukraine (Ukrainian forces would crumble in days, Kiev would fall in hours, etc.). Now they're having to swallow their own words, but they're not yet capable of conceiving that the Kremlin may not have made that same miscalculation.

This is why it is so hard for some to accept that Russia probably went into this war with limited war goals.

What would be the motive for this massive disinformation campaign that is apparently backed by endless factual evidence of incompetence and miscalculation by a regime eroded from the inside by its gangster economics? — apokrisis

You're asking what the point is of framing? Propaganda, of course. Western backing of Ukraine is hanging by a thread. The only parties that truly want it to continue are the Washington and Brussels elite. Both in terms of political willingness and domestic support it depends entirely on the idea that Ukraine can win this war.

I think we're seeing an interesting common theme arise; anything the Russians do is speculated, often without any objective basis, to have been a lot more ambitious than their actual results, and thus can be framed as a failure.

The sources that claim to know the Russian intentions are usually western journalists or military analysts - the same types of analysts who in the winter of 2021 claimed Kiev would fall in a matter of hours.

As I've hinted at before, it seems many western analysts are now having to correct their image of the Russian war machine that they themselves inflated beyond proportion. However, they are not yet at the stage where they're able to stop projecting that flawed image onto the Kremlin's military planning.

They seem convinced that the Kremlin shared their inflated view of the Russian military - something for which not a speck of evidence has been presented.

If Ukraine AA would have made an airbridge impossible, then someone might have mentioned it. — apokrisis

Not "would have made" - Ukrainian AA makes it impossible. You're suggesting to fly in cargo planes carrying entire battalions a few kilometers from the frontline, where even helicopters and combat aircraft cannot operate safely.

I already have.

It’s nice to know we have someone here with such obvious military expertise as yourself to guide us. — apokrisis

I'm presently serving and have a degree in military strategy.

By some accounts, Russia had intended to land 18-20 Ilyushin IL-76 transport planes at the Hostomel airfield invasion’s opening hours. An aerial convoy this size could have potentially brought two entire battalion tactical groups (BTGs) worth of troops and equipment to the capital’s doorstep within the first hours of the invasion.

Airlifting entire battalions by cargo plane under the Ukrainian AA umbrella?

The fact that you wouldn't dispose of such a notion outright is quite telling.

Now the question is, since you seem to lack military expertise, why do you choose to base your opinions on this specific article and this specific author? (or any of the other articles you have shared)

Newspaper articles are all fine and good, but what it seems we're ending up with is the blind leading the blind.

I don't disagree with the analysis here. I'm throwing out some ideas of what a negotiation could look like. But something has to be exchanged, I think. — Manuel

It's tough.

A neutral Ukraine is and has been the long-term solution to tensions between NATO and Russia, but the trust that makes such a thing feasible has been shattered. The United States and Ukraine will not trust Russia to respect Ukraine's neutrality and vice versa, and in both cases I would argue the distrust is well-founded.

Russia holding on to the areas it has currently occupied (creating a safe corridor to Crimea) is probably the bare minimum of what they will accept unless they are militarily completely defeated, but given the rhetoric from the United States and Ukraine, it is unlikely this will be accepted.

That's the issue - what is acceptable to one side is completely unacceptable to the other and vice versa.

Ukraine gets rid of the invaders. Russia keeps Crimea. — Manuel

The problem is that this is completely unacceptable to the Russians.

Their issue is Ukraine joining NATO, turning it into a military bulwark on their borders and making Russian access to Crimea a matter of US goodwill.

This has been in the line of expectations since the early 2010's, and nothing short of war would have stopped it.

Any future-proof solution to this conflict has to recognize that the Russians will go to full-scale war, and even nuclear war, over their access to Crimea.

I see. Then what was your perspective on the situation? — frank

On what part of the situation?

I don't think those who advocated Ukraine's surrender to Russia had any kind of resistance in mind. I think @Tzeentch, for instance, was concerned with casualties of an on going war. — frank

I never advocated any course of action for Ukraine - that would be highly presumptuous.

Simply because the Western media repeats again and again bold claims without justification, does not make it the default position that any dissenters must overcome a high burden of proof to critique, just makes it propaganda. — boethius

Exactly.

Because I cannot take you seriously. — apokrisis

What an odd response to being asked what data one's views are based on.

I guess I'd be pretty reluctant to share my sources too, if all I had were newspaper articles and confirmation bias.

If that is the case, doesn't that condition apply to your assessment that the attack on Kiev was only a feint? — Paine

Mine is not an assessment. It's a speculation, and I've never pretended otherwise. The issue is several here do not seem to realize that all they have is speculations also, and pretend to have some authoritative sources on their side, which they do not.

But in a sense, yes, the same condition applies. Which is why I supported my views with arguments based the type of data and common military logic that anyone can verify. When I asked the opponents of my position to share what data their views are based on, I was met with silence.

As a piece of military strategy, a feint draws forces from the true target. But the attack was sprung before movement of that kind changed the conditions on the ground. If you are going to deliver a sucker punch, you better make it work the first time. Do you have a vision of how things would have been different without this 'feint'? An historical parallel, perhaps? — Paine

In my view, the attack on Kiev likely served a different primary purpose - to show the West the Russians were serious about war in Ukraine, and give them a last chance to veer towards the Russians in regards to Ukraine's position in EU/NATO.

Of course, the Russians had no certainty this would work, and in the case the West did not back down, this attack could serve as the feint I mentioned.

Had the Russians made their intentions clear to march on the south without threatening Kiev, it stands to reason that resistance in the south would have been much higher.

Consider that the number of forces at the start of the invasion were roughly 200,000 Russians versus 250,000 Ukrainians - the Russians did not have anywhere near the 3:1 numerical advantage that is often considered a requirement for offensive military operations.

It was therefore vital that the Ukrainians were kept off balance.

I've also given several reasons why it is unlikely the Russians intended to occupy Kiev, the most important of which is that it would require an incredible investment of time and manpower, while Kiev is not of great strategic significance in the war.

The extent to which the attack on Kiev contributed to the relatively speedy advance in the south and the acquisition of the strategic territories that likely made up the Russians' initial wargoals is unknown. That would be a nice subject for research.

As for historical examples; the ground campaign of Desert Storm featured a feint on Kuwait as its primary tactical idea. The US forces pretended their intentions were to strike directly through the oil fields towards Kuwait, and the Iraqis concentrated their forces accordingly along the Kuwait-Saudi border.

Meanwhile, the US main force, VII Corps, crossed the Iraq-Saudi border instead, and wrapped up their entire flank.

Why don't you respond to my comment, instead of clowning?

With the assumption that the airborne force can be then quite quickly be relieved by a ground force. — ssu

And they were relieved, weren't they?

Nobody thinks of making a landing deep in enemy territory and then just assume that they can be evacuated by air ... — ssu

That just so happens to be part of the job description of airborne troops.

But I fail to see your point. This airport was somehow the critical point in taking Kiev, proving the Russians intended to take Kiev by force?

Not with landing paratroops on them. — ssu

Sure they can. Airports are a classic target for airborne assaults.

The heliborne landings in Hostomel Airport just next to Kyiv show the intent what Russians had. — ssu

It seems to me taking out airports would be a key strategic goal regardless of their intentions.

Not the failed attempt of quickly reaching the capital? — ssu

We've already been over that, and we've also established that the author you put forward ended up supporting my argument and not yours.

But it seems a quick reminder of what your author wrote is in order:

Kiev has almost 3 million inhabitants, Kharkiv has roughly 1.5 million, Odessa has 1 million, Dnipro has almost 1 million, Zaporizhia has 750,000, and even Mariupol has almost 500,000.If defended, these large urban areas could take considerable time and casualties to clear and occupy.

Therefore, the best course of action for Russian troops would be to bypass urban areas and mop them up later.

Kiev poses a similar challenge and, as the nation’s capital, possesses great symbolic value for whichever side holds it.

Source: Russia's Possible Invasion of Ukraine

In summary, Seth G. Jones, an author whose opinions you purport to value greatly, believes the taking of a city like Kiev would be a costly, time-consuming venture, and holds symbolic (and not actual) value.

But on the surprising incompetence side, we have systemic corruption, a historic undervaluing of logistics, a lack of NCO structure, no routine cross force training, a lack of communication gear, a lack of training hours, low morale and lack of mission preparation, plus umpteen other inadequacies that became apparent ... — apokrisis

A lot of claims, but what verifiable data are they based on?

The nature of war is messy - Clausewitz called it friction. In giant operations like these things go wrong, and they go wrong all the time. Logistical congestion is the norm rather than the exception - in a situation where both sides are trying to kill and hamper each other there is never enough ammunition, fuel, troops, fire support, etc. You can't predict an enemy whose primary concern is to be unpredictable, etc.

The question is, when you say incompetence what are you comparing it to?

...your “small but perfectly formed fighting force” ... — apokrisis

"My" perfectly formed fighting force?

This seems the go-to response whenever someone in this thread is faced with a conflicting view - start framing them as partisan.

The Russian forces are not "my" forces, nor do I view them as perfect - far from it. I suggest you stick to my actual words and stay away from this type of copium.

Can you link to even one that argues the opposite in convincing fashion? — apokrisis

Why would I want to? Attempts at making such assessments properly are foolish at this point, and I wouldn't take them seriously unless they're backed up by serious research. None of your articles are, probably because such research does not exist. They're based on anecdotes, small snippets of information, etc. that are framed to fit a certain narrative - propaganda, in other words.

Furthermore, facts that can be checked by anyone speak to the contrary.

- 20% of Ukraine is occupied by Russian forces.
- The Ukrainian military was properly trained and equipped by the United States.
- The Ukrainian military outnumbered the Russian military at the start of the invasion (even though most military doctrine prescribes at least a 3:1 numerical advantage to the attacker for offensive operations).
- etc.

Do your articles mention any of this?

Go back in time a little; see what western authors thought about Russia's prospects in a war against Ukraine prior to the invasion. Many thought Ukraine would stand no chance. Another poster in this thread linked an article that claimed Kiev would fall in a matter of hours!

So what these authors are really criticizing here is not the Russian military, but their own false conceptions of the Russian military. They're just trying to write it off as a Russian blunder, instead of their own.

You could link a hundred articles saying that the Russian military is terrible. Media have produced nothing but propaganda on this subject, so I don't know why you would rely on those to support your opinions.

The fact is that, for the time being, they're occupying 20% of Ukraine, and they did so while at a numerical disadvantage against a well-trained adversary.

I guess the US-trained Ukrainian military must be pretty poor aswell, letting a foreign military blunder their way into occupying their country, then?

I'm not sure where the idea comes from that the Russian army is in such a poor condition.

The Russian army went on the offensive against a (roughly) peer adversary while numerically disadvantaged - that's a military feat in and of itself. It managed to defeat the Ukrainian army in the first part of the war (a blow from which the Ukrainians have since recovered) and take substantial parts of Ukraine, which, based on the troops deployed, likely coincided with their initial wargoals.

Obviously this came at a cost, but war is a messy business. The Russians went up against a properly trained and equipped Ukrainian military. Things go wrong as they are inherent to in war, but militaries don't blunder their way into occupying 20% of a large country like Ukraine.

The only real blunder I have seen from the Russian military is the sinking of the Moskva. That seems like an intelligence failure to me.


Also, the idea that the matter of Ukraine is some personal project of Putin's I believe is outright rejected due to the fact that Ukraine has been a hot topic since the collapse of the USSR. Ukraine is of incredible strategic importance for the Russians, and they have consistently made clear the sensitivity of this region over the past decades. Ukraine is by far the most important region to Russia, outside of Russia proper.

This war isn't going to end any time soon.

If peace is signed, Ukraine can join NATO. As long as war continues, Ukraine cannot join NATO. At least not officially, according to the NATO charter. They might make an exception, but then again that would put NATO and Russia officially at war, (Art. 5, and all that) which might also not be what the West wants.

Russia has every incentive to let this war drag on.

Putin isn't desperate either. The situation right now is that Russia has annexed roughly 20% of Ukraine. This "Russia is losing the war / Putin is desperate" rhetoric is just a PsyOp. I'll believe it when it happens.

Where exactly do you get the idea from that Russian tanks carry significantly more ammunition than other tanks? What tank types are you comparing to this end?

From what I gather the T-72 carries around 45 rounds of ammunition for its main armament. For comparison, an M1 Abrams carries around 42.

This may vary between variants, but that doesn't look like a very significant difference to me.


It seems more likely that the difference you are trying to describe has to do with the loading systems that Russian tanks use. Russian tanks favor autoloading systems, which do increase the chance of cook-offs since a portion of the ammunition is carried in a ring in or below the turret, as opposed to the ammunition storage.

That is clearly a weighed design feature, though. It allows the tank to be operated by fewer crew.

Cook off after a top attack weapon strike or big bore mortar strike that would likely be fatal anyhow is less of an issue than having a tank that appears to have survived an indirect 155mm shell explode a few seconds later. In the latter, it is the cook off that is destroying the tank and killing the crew. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Even though I don't know what footage you're referring to, that does not sound like a typical cook-off at all. In order for a cook-off to happen, heavily armored compartments of the tank need to be penetrated - something which is unlikely to result from an indirect 155mm artillery hit.

Cook-offs can happen to all tanks, and it matters very little to the crew inside whether one round explodes inside the tank or twenty.

When they happen, the tank has already been penetrated, and with some likelihood knocked out.

If there is a high incidence of this effect in combat vehicles that are supposed to be able to sustain such attacks, then you appear to have a problem. Although it might just be with armor quality for the tanks. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This all depends on range. Tanks are made to fight over long ranges, and their armor protects them in that context. When a tank is said to be able to withstand a frontal impact from another tank's main armament, they might be talking about ranges of 1km+, over which the projectile loses a lot of energy.

If the same tanks would meet in an urban setting, at ranges of a few hundred meters, the armor might be easily beaten. Even side armor can become vulnerable to for example 30mm rounds at close ranges. This is nothing strange.

Also why the Moskova went down to a fairly small payload (Iran hit a much smaller Israeli ship with a similar payload and it sailed home under its own power, but of course where the hit occurs matters a lot). The Moskova had a ridiculous amount of ordinance for its size and I suspect this is what killed it — Count Timothy von Icarus

I suspect out-of-control fire is what took the Moskva out of action. Perhaps ammunition explosions did contribute to her eventual sinking, though a real ammunition cook-off of a ship of that size and capacity would probably have not lead to a "sinking", but to a complete blow-up.

It's an old ship, likely with somewhat outdated fire-fighting equipment on board. It was also taking on water.

I doubt many commanders would send their crew into a sinking, burning wreck of an old ship when they're only a few miles off the friendly coast. Not to mention they had no idea whether more missiles were being sent their way.

You could also come to this conclusion comparing the damage sustainable by the Stark when hit by an Exocet, versus the damage to a larger ship hit by a Neptune (similar payload), although impact site matters a lot. — Count Timothy von Icarus

And in the case of the USS Stark incident, you're comparing a ship and weapons platform of roughly the same time period (OHP-class, been in service since 1977, air-launched Exocet since 1979).

In the case of the Moskva, you're comparing a ship from 1983 to a weapons platform from 2021.

Russia isn't going to use nuclear weapons. They already hold enough territory to claim victory and there is very little chance of Ukraine mounting the types of offensives that would allow them to retake it, especially after the mobilization.

All of this nuclear fear-mongering is based on the assumption that Russia is losing and Putin is desperate. I don't think this is the case at all. Considering the amount of troops they have had deployed it's plausible that their initial war goals have already been reached.

Mearsheimer even considers the possibility that after the initial successes Russia expanded its wargoals.

When you touch a Greek stature you are touching the present day successor to a far past event and object. When you wrote the above your past writing reverberated into my present. I see it right now. — hypericin

I think that's an illusion. When I touch a Greek statue, I touch a Greek statue in the present. Everything I associate with that Greek statue, including its history, happens in my mind. We may have ideas of what the statue represents, where it came from, how old it is, but these are just educated guesses by historians. There's nothing real about that in the philosophical sense.

The event of your birth does not depend on the state of anyone's mind. — hypericin

I think it does. Recollections of the past are notoriously subjective. If there is no one around to remember my birth, does it still exist? If so, where?

You're whole life is the experience of your birth. — hypericin

I think I am just experiencing life in the present right now.

The past and future are right here, embodied in the present. — hypericin

I don't know what you mean by that. Can I touch the past and the future? Can you point to it so I can verify it exists?

Your current state of affairs all flow directly from the event of your birth. Therefore your birth is a real event, ... — hypericin

It probably was a real event. We have reason to think that. Does that still exist today? I would argue no, and thus it is not real. Just a memory, a conception, a reasoned argument, but nothing real.

... you experience it right now, ... — hypericin

I don't believe I am experiencing my birth right now, unless we have very different ideas of what it means to be born.